PrefBlog

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close August 31, 2017, was $9.7021.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-8-11):

Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-8-11):

Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

FixedReset performance lost a little ground relative to that of PerpetualDiscounts in August, but have strongly outperformed over the past three months:

Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. However, the increasingly hawkish tilt among global central banks has been widely remarked:

Two weeks of rhetoric from policy makers in Europe and North America has rewritten the outlook for markets, with the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada now seen as more likely than not to join the Federal Reserve in raising rates before the year is out, based on overnight index swap rates. Even the possibility of a European Central Bank hike, once seen as all but impossible, is slowly growing.

The prospect of four of the world’s five largest central banks moving to tighten policy at the same time is shocking traders after years of easing, with the dislocations in money markets also rippling through global bonds.

Recent economic performance in Canada has led to speculation regarding a BoC policy hike in September:

The loonie soared after Canada’s economy accelerated more than forecast in the second quarter, boosting bets the central bank will increase rates for the second time this year — possibly as early as next week.

The Canadian dollar rose 1.1 percent to C$1.2483 per U.S. dollar at 4:09 p.m. in Toronto, reversing earlier losses to be the top gainer among its Group-of-10 peers on Thursday. Yields on the country’s federal government bonds advanced as the likelihood of an interest-rate increase this year edged up to 79 percent, according to overnight index swaps data compiled by Bloomberg. Investors see a 40 percent chance of a hike on Sept. 6, and 70 percent in October.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on August 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as recently updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Turnover continued to ease to about 8% in a very quiet August.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

• Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
• DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
• DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital. However, OSFI has recently indicated that it would support a mechanism similar to the NVCC rule for banks, so we may see some developments as the IAIS deliberations regarding insurance capital continue.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another few years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on August 31 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of July 31, 2017, and published in the August, 2017, PrefLetter. It is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is much better
• MAPF liquidity is lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is a less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
  • Neither portfolio is exposed to Operating Retractibles (there aren’t too many of those any more!)
  • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
  • MAPF is a little less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is a little higher weighted in FixedResets, but has a greater emphasis on lower-spread issues

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 31, 2017, was $9.7255.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-7-14):

Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-7-14):

Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

The second-quarter outperformance of PerpetualDiscounts over FixedResets sharply reversed itself in July with a sharp decline in PerpetualDiscount prices in the first half of the month met by opposite movement by FixedResets:

Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. However, the increasingly hawkish tilt among global central banks has been widely remarked:

Two weeks of rhetoric from policy makers in Europe and North America has rewritten the outlook for markets, with the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada now seen as more likely than not to join the Federal Reserve in raising rates before the year is out, based on overnight index swap rates. Even the possibility of a European Central Bank hike, once seen as all but impossible, is slowly growing.

The prospect of four of the world’s five largest central banks moving to tighten policy at the same time is shocking traders after years of easing, with the dislocations in money markets also rippling through global bonds.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as recently updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Turnover eased from June’s high level to about 11% in July.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

• Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
• DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
• DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital. However, OSFI has recently indicated that it would support a mechanism similar to the NVCC rule for banks, so we may see some developments as the IAIS deliberations regarding insurance capital continue.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another few years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on July 31 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is better
• MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
  • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
  • MAPF is usually, but not currently, more exposed to SplitShares
  • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has published its:

• 17H1 Semi-Annual Financial Statements (unaudited)
• June Month-end statement of holdings (unaudited)
• 17H1 Statement of transactions (unaudited)

All materials are accessable via the fund’s main web-page.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close June 30, 2017, was $9.5313 after a distribution of $0.089495.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-6-9):

Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-6-9):

Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

The performance gap between FixedResets and PerpetualDiscounts, remarked on last month, narrowed sharply in June but, amazingly, PerpetualDiscounts still managed to outperform over the quarter:

Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. However, the increasingly hawkish tilt among global central banks has been widely remarked:

Two weeks of rhetoric from policy makers in Europe and North America has rewritten the outlook for markets, with the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada now seen as more likely than not to join the Federal Reserve in raising rates before the year is out, based on overnight index swap rates. Even the possibility of a European Central Bank hike, once seen as all but impossible, is slowly growing.

The prospect of four of the world’s five largest central banks moving to tighten policy at the same time is shocking traders after years of easing, with the dislocations in money markets also rippling through global bonds.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as recently updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Turnover rocketed up in June, to about 32%. A relatively disorderly advance in the market, most notably on the June 13 and June 28 major ex-dividend days, afforded a large number of trading opportunities.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

• Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
• DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
• DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital. However, OSFI has recently indicated that it would support a mechanism similar to the NVCC rule for banks, so we may see some developments as the IAIS deliberations regarding insurance capital continue.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another few years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on June 30 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is better
• MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
  • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
  • MAPF is usually, but not currently, more exposed to SplitShares
  • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close May 31, 2017, was $9.1975.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-5-12):

Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-4-13):

Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

The performance gap between FixedResets and PerpetualDiscounts, remarked on last month, widened in May:

Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. The drop in FixedReset relative performance could be related to uninspiring economic news:

In the first official growth estimates of Trump’s presidency, federal economists reported gross domestic product, a broad measure of economic growth, grew at an annualized rate of just 0.7 percent in the year’s first quarter, down from 2.1 percent growth in the fourth quarter of 2016.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as recently updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Turnover picked up in May, to about 12%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

• Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
• DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
• DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital. However, OSFI has recently indicated that it would support a mechanism similar to the NVCC rule for banks, so we may see some developments as the IAIS deliberations regarding insurance capital continue.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another few years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on May 31 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is better
• MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
  • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
  • MAPF is usually, but not currently, more exposed to SplitShares
  • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close April 28, 2017, was $9.3037.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-4-13):

Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-4-13):

Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

April was looking like a reasonable month until the last week, when FixedResets fell dramatically compared to PerpetualDiscounts:

Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. The drop in FixedReset relative performance could be related to uninspiring economic news:

In the first official growth estimates of Trump’s presidency, federal economists reported gross domestic product, a broad measure of economic growth, grew at an annualized rate of just 0.7 percent in the year’s first quarter, down from 2.1 percent growth in the fourth quarter of 2016.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.