Archive for August, 2010

FIG.PR.A Holders to Vote on Merger / Exchange

Wednesday, August 18th, 2010

Faircourt Asset Management has announced:

that it will hold securityholder meetings on September 13, 2010 for Faircourt Income & Growth Split Trust (“FIG”) and Faircourt Split Trust (“FCS”, and together with FIG, the “Funds”). At the meetings, holders of units (“Unitholders”) and holders of preferred securities (“Preferred Securityholders”) of FIG will be asked to consider the proposed merger (the “Merger Proposal”) of FIG into FCS, to create a single trust (the “Continuing Trust”). Preferred Securityholders of FIG will also be asked to consider the proposed exchange (the “Exchange”) of FIG preferred securities for a new class of preferred securities of the Continuing Trust which, if approved, is expected to occur shortly following approval. FCS Unitholders and FCS Preferred Securityholders will also be asked to consider various amendments to the FCS declaration of trust and FCS trust indenture (the “FCS Proposals”).

The Merger Proposal and FCS Proposals are being proposed in response to expected changes in the taxation of income funds. As a result of these changes, there are now an insufficient number of “income funds” for FIG and FCS to continue to meet their investment restrictions. Consequently, the Manager has proposed that the investment mandate of the Continuing Trust be expanded to remedy this situation. The Manager believes that these amendments will also benefit Securityholders by allowing the Continuing Trust to invest in a broader range of securities and giving the Continuing Trust the flexibility to adjust its portfolio in the future as and when required to respond to market movements.

The meetings of Unitholders and Preferred Securityholders will be held on September 13, 2010 at Stikeman Elliott LLP, 199 Bay Street, 51st Floor, Toronto Ontario, M5L 1B9 and details regarding the Merger Proposal, FCS Proposals and the Exchange will be contained in a joint management information circular (the “Circular”) which will be mailed to Unitholders and Preferred Securityholders later in August. The Circular will also then be posted on Faircourt’s website and on the SEDAR website at www.sedar.com. The record date for the special meetings is August 13, 2010. If no quorum is present for any meeting of Unitholders, such meeting(s) will be adjourned until September 27, 2010. If no quorum is present for any meeting of Preferred Securityholders, such meeting(s) will be adjourned until September 20, 2010. Unitholders and Preferred Securityholders are encouraged to attend the meetings or complete the proxy forms or voting instruction forms (as described in the Circular) in order that their units and preferred securities can be voted at the meetings.

Pretty skimpy information and there’s nothing on the website. Yield? Tax status of future distributions? Asset Coverage? Portfolio Manager? We’ll just have to wait.

FIG.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when distributions to the Capital Unitholders were suspended. FIG.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index due to credit concerns.

Update 2010-8-20: FIG.PR.A has been put on Review – Developing by DBRS

BoC Studies Capital Ratio Cost/Benefits

Wednesday, August 18th, 2010

The Bank of Canada has released:

a comprehensive assessment of the potential impact on the Canadian economy of new global capital and liquidity standards, which are to be finalized later this year by the G-20.

The study is titled Strengthening International Capital and Liquidity Standards: A Macroeconomic Impact Assessment for Canada:

While this country boasts a strong financial sector, it too was buffeted by financial shocks from abroad. Our economy could not escape the spillover effects of the ensuing global economic downturn. Canadian economic output fell by more than 3 per cent during the crisis, and more than 400,000 jobs disappeared.

This looks like mistake number one, according to me – it assumes that the damage caused during the Panic of 2007 was all attributable to the financial crisis itself, which I think is a load of hooey.

Recessions are good things; a recession is nature’s way of telling us we’re doing things wrong. Most of the harm experienced in Canada during the Panic may be ascribed to the auto industry … hands up everybody who thinks that there were no problems in the auto industry prior to the crisis! Didn’t think so … the Panic brought things to light and forced the decision makers to address a problem … it didn’t actually cause the problem.

Financial crises are damaging because they bring a lot of problems to light all at the same time.

But for the first time, I see official acknowledgement that higher capital ratios are not automatically good:

The benefits of higher capital and liquidity standards must be weighed against their potential costs to the Canadian economy. Over time, it is expected that banks will seek to pass on the cost of higher capital and liquidity requirements through higher lending rates to borrowers. The cost of higher capital is higher lending spreads, which the Bank calculates would increase by about 14 basis points for every percentage-point increase in bank capital requirements. This figure was then used as an input to the Bank’s macroeconomic models to gauge the impact on economic output. New liquidity requirements also present costs for the Canadian economy. These requirements are estimated to add roughly an additional 14 basis points to lending spreads, and thus are equivalent in impact to an additional 1-percentage-point increase in bank capital requirements. Consequently, the cost of a 2-percentage-point increase in capital requirements, in conjunction with the new liquidity standards, should be an increase in lending spreads of about 42 basis points.

However, they show more than just a little political influence with:

In the wake of the crisis, the Bank of Canada cut its target for the overnight rate to a historic low of one-quarter of one per cent, and decades of progress in improving Canada’s fiscal position suffered a setback as fiscal support for the Canadian economy pushed federal and provincial government budgets back into substantial deficits.

The GST cut and elimination of the structural surplus had nothing to do with it, so vote Conservative!

The regulators have been busy:

To assess the potential economic implications of these reforms, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the BCBS conducted two international studies that assessed (i) the longer-run macroeconomic benefits and costs (the LEI report) and (ii) the shorter-term transition costs (the MAG report) associated with adopting the new standards. (footnote) The reports are: “An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of the New Regulatory Framework” (the LEI report), and “Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements – Interim Report “ (the MAG report). Both are available at http://www.bis.org.

They do acknowledge a major problem:

No allowance is made for the possibility that households and firms may find cheaper alternative sources of financing in the longer run that would reduce the impact of the new rules on the economy.

If loan rates increase 42bp, I would consider that a certainty. Private mortgages will take off and I’m wondering about the potential to start a private mortgage fund myself. What’s more, this will siphon off the good business from the banks and leave them with the dregs … but there’s no allowance for it.

Specifically, assuming a starting probability of a crisis of 4.5 per cent in any given country, the LEI report found that an increase of 2 percentage points in bank capital ratios reduced the probability of a financial crisis by 2.9 percentage points, while increases in capital ratios of 4 and 6 percentage points reduced the probability of a financial crisis by 3.6 and 4 percentage points, respectively. These calculations assume a combined effect from increases in capital as well as from new liquidity rules.

When these reductions in the probability of a crisis (e.g., 2.9 percentage points for a 2-percentage-point increase in capital ratios) are multiplied by the cumulative cost of crises (63 per cent of GDP), the benefits to annual economic output are potentially large, in the order of 2 per cent of GDP

If, as I assert, the bulk of the costs experienced during financial crises are simply reflections of structural problems that are merely brought to light by the crisis, then this calculation is … er … inoperable.

For example, following the approach used by the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (U.K. FSA) and described in Barrell et al. (2009), the annual probability of a domestic financial crisis was estimated based on several domestic factors, including the unweighted capital ratio of banks, their liquid assets as a share of total assets, and house prices expressed in real terms. This approach suggests a 1.7 per cent probability of a financial crisis occurring in Canada (implying that a financial crisis occurs, on average, every 60 years or so). This figure is substantially lower than the LEI report’s 4.5 per cent likelihood of a foreign financial crisis (approximately once every 22 years).

Since the banks nearly blew themselves in the late eighties with the MBA crisis, I guess that means we’ve got about forty years to go.

As indicated in Annex 1, most Canadian banks appear to be well placed to meet the new Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirement, since they carry a large stock of residential mortgages that could be converted at a small cost to federal government-guaranteed National Housing Act Mortgage-Backed Securities that would qualify as eligible liquid assets under the new rules.

Great! Wave a magic wand, and suddenly you get to recategorize existing assets. This part really gives me a lot of confidence, you know?

Given the current exceptionally low level of bank deposit rates and the cost of bank debt funding more generally, it is also assumed that the wider interest margins will effectively result in higher interest rates (lending spreads) on bank loans to households, firms, and other sectors of the economy. It is further assumed that the higher lending spreads will be passed along to all bank borrowers, and not just to certain subgroups, such as households or small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), because all banks in Canada and abroad will be affected by the higher capital and liquidity requirements.

Apparently, Dr. Pangloss had a hand in this report. As noted above, increased spreads will increase the opportunity for shadow banks to move in … there will be a lot of business borrowing at prime (or prime+) who are going to find the commercial paper market (either directly or via BAs) and short-term bond issuance to be a whole lot more attractive if spreads increase 42bp.

Don’t get me wrong! I’m very happy to see that, at last, there is some official acknowledgment that increased capital standards will have a cost. But I think some of the embedded assumptions are more than just a little bit suspect and I look forward to seeing academic attacks on this paper.

A related post is Elliott: Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements

August 17, 2010

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010

The Nanex explanation of the Flash Crash was discussed on August 9. It now appears that the mechanism is considered plausible by the CFTC:

What this delay means is that, hypothetically, at the same real time, there could be two different price quotes: the real time NYSE price quote feed that had most stocks falling rapidly and the delayed consolidated price quote feed where the prices had not yet fully reflected the downward movement. Therefore, an algorithmic computer program, which would use high-frequency or flash trading and is written to sense price differences, could submit buy and sell orders to arbitrage between the two prices. The algo program could buy at the lower price from the NYSE feed and immediately sell on another exchange portal using the delayed consolidated price quote feed. This could be done is large quantities, repeatedly. Here is what we know: there was a delay between the premium and the consolidated price quote feeds. What we do not know yet is if some algorithmic trading took advantage of that situation.

We had our Technology Advisory Committee in this room last month and I asked the experts if this type of thing was possible or if it was just a conspiracy theory. Four of the panelists assured me that this could take place. In fact, they even acknowledged that some algorithmic programs were geared to not only take advantage of market circumstances, but could be used to instigate certain market conditions in order to then initiate their own program of buying or selling.

Therefore, I urge the staffs of the CFTC and the SEC to not leave this and any other stones unturned as they continue to investigate the flash crash. Did algo price pirates seek false profits on May 6th? Inquiring minds want to know.

Pirates? Sounds like he’s got a solution and is just waiting for a plausible problem.

A Barclay’s settlement illustrates all I find confusing about financial regulation:

Barclays PLC agreed to pay $298 million to settle charges by U.S. and New York prosecutors that the U.K. bank altered financial records for more than a decade to hide hundreds of millions of dollars in payments flowing into the U.S. from Cuba, Libya, Iran and other sanctioned countries.

The bank plans to pay $298 million to settle claims by U.S. prosecutors that it altered financial records for more than a decade to hide hundreds of millions of dollars that flowed to the U.S. from nations like Cuba, Libya and Iran.

A federal court filing said Barclays “accepts and acknowledges responsibility for its conduct and that of its employees.” U.S. officials said the bank altered payment messages or deleted information about sanctioned countries.

In other cases, Barclays returned payments out of fear they would be detected by U.S. officials, sending fax cover sheets that said: “Payments to U.S.A. must NOT contain the word listed below.” Prosecutors said payments often were re-sent after references to the sanctioned countries, which included Sudan and Myanmar, were omitted.

OK, so they pay a fine. Good. But it doesn’t say anywhere that anyone’s been banned from the industry. They altered records! They had a protocol for hiding transfers! That shows deliberate intent to break the law, with a policy set somewhere by somebody who thought about it … and nobody’s been banned from the industry? And yet they’re going after a dumbass salesman at Goldman who did his job and did it well? I don’t get it.

It was a good day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 24bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp on high volume. Sadly, FixedResets did not set a new yield low today – in fact, the median weighte average YTW actually increased fractionally.

MFC issues continue to be prominent in the highlights.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0661 % 2,056.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0661 % 3,114.7
Floater 2.54 % 2.16 % 38,385 21.96 4 0.0661 % 2,220.0
OpRet 4.90 % -1.58 % 99,970 0.20 9 -0.0301 % 2,351.4
SplitShare 6.02 % -7.77 % 64,403 0.08 2 0.4379 % 2,303.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0301 % 2,150.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 5.41 % 92,663 5.59 7 0.3963 % 1,955.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.77 % 5.84 % 183,119 14.07 71 0.2395 % 1,879.8
FixedReset 5.29 % 3.32 % 274,579 3.39 47 0.0346 % 2,240.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 18.06
Evaluated at bid price : 18.06
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.36
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 114,947 RBC bought 11,500 from Nesbitt at 18.50; TD crosed 40,000 at 18.60. RBC crossed 13,200 at 18.69.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 60,781 RBC crossed blocks of 17,000 and 33,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 59,063 RBC crossed 15,200 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 56,912 National bought 10,700 from anonymous at 26.45; RBC crossed 24,300 at 26.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 55,141 RBC crossed 24,000 at 21.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 52,786 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-17
Maturity Price : 21.87
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
There were 55 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

August 16, 2010

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010

The FDIC is looking for comments:

The FDIC and the other federal banking agencies are requesting comment on alternative standards of creditworthiness to replace the use of credit ratings in the risk-based capital requirements. The comment period for the attached Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) will be 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register.

They’ll get a lot of comments … but I don’t know how many useful ones!

Fans of Judge Jed Rakoff can add another bubble-gum card to their collection – Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle:

A federal judge refused to approve the Securities and Exchange Commission’s $75 million settlement with Citigroup Inc. over the bank’s disclosure of subprime-mortgage problems, saying she is “baffled” by the proposed pact.

The move by U.S. District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle represents another challenge for the SEC as it tries to punish financial institutions blamed for the financial crisis.

Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle said she didn’t have “sufficient information.”

The judge, striking a frustrated tone, fired several questions at the SEC, among them why it pursued only two individuals in the case and why Citigroup shareholders should have to pay for the alleged sins of bank executives.

“I look at this and say, ‘Why would I find this fair and reasonable?'” the judge told both sides at a 90-minute hearing. “You expect the court to rubber-stamp, but we can’t.”

Part of freedom is an independent judiciary – which is why politicians and bureaucrats avoid them whenever possible.

New York Congressman Peter King stated on the weekend that he agrees with Sarah Palin, Newt Gingrich, other Republicans and Al-Qaeda that there is some kind of religious war going on:

“President Obama is wrong,” said King in an e-mailed statement. “The right and moral thing for President Obama to have done was to urge Muslim leaders to respect the families of those who died and move their mosque away from Ground Zero.”

I hadn’t realized there was a religious crusade going on; I thought it was simply some harrassment of the civilized world by a rag-tag pack of psychopaths. But it’s nice to see the US Republicans agree with Al-Qaeda on something; it gives hope for the brotherhood of man.

There was good volume in the Canadian preferred share market today as PerpetualDiscounts gained 9bp and FixedResets were up 9bp. The win by FixedResets took their median weighted average yield down to 3.318%, just a hair off the all-time low of 3.314% set on March 26.

MFC was again prominent on the highlight reel.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,054.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 3,112.6
Floater 2.55 % 2.16 % 38,454 21.97 4 0.0000 % 2,218.5
OpRet 4.90 % -1.56 % 99,153 0.20 9 -0.3000 % 2,352.1
SplitShare 6.05 % -2.62 % 64,157 0.08 2 0.2299 % 2,293.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3000 % 2,150.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.55 % 93,684 5.65 7 -0.1301 % 1,947.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.78 % 5.83 % 180,241 14.07 71 0.0865 % 1,875.4
FixedReset 5.30 % 3.32 % 272,788 3.39 47 0.0921 % 2,239.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.84
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 155,470 RBC crossed blocks of 100,000 and 40,000 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 85,589 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 20,000 and 40,000 at 18.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-16
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 60,830 Desjardins crossed 15,400 at 24.75; CIBC bought 13,000 from National at 24.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-16
Maturity Price : 24.52
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 55,030 RBC crossed 49,100 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-16
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 54,800 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 20.85; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 20.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-16
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 39,241 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-16
Maturity Price : 24.97
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

FRBB: Bubbles Happen

Monday, August 16th, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a discussion paper by Kristopher S. Gerardi, Christopher L. Foote, and Paul S. Willen titled Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism About the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash:

Understanding the evolution of real-time beliefs about house price appreciation is central to understanding the U.S. housing crisis. At the peak of the recent housing cycle, both borrowers and lenders appealed to optimistic house price forecasts to justify undertaking increasingly risky loans. Many observers have argued that these rosy forecasts ignored basic theoretical and empirical evidence that pointed to a massive overvaluation of housing and thus to an inevitable and severe price decline. We revisit the boom years and show that the economics profession provided little such countervailing evidence at the time. Many economists, skeptical that a bubble existed, attempted to justify the historic run-up in housing prices based on housing fundamentals. Other economists were more uncertain, pointing to some evidence of bubble-like behavior in certain regional housing markets. Even these more skeptical economists, however, refused to take a conclusive position on whether a bubble existed. The small number of economists who argued forcefully for a bubble often did so years before the housing market peak, and thus lost a fair amount of credibility, or they make arguments fundamentally at odds with the data even ex post. For example, some economists suggested that cities where new construction was limited by zoning regulations or geography were particularly “bubble-prone,” yet the data shows that the cities with the biggest gyrations in house prices were often those at the epicenter of the new construction boom. We conclude by arguing that economic theory provides little guidance as to what should be the “correct” level of asset prices —including housing prices. Thus, while optimistic forecasts held by many market participants in 2005 turned out to be inaccurate, they were not ex ante unreasonable.

I’ll admit I was undecided about whether to highlight this paper in its own post, or simply to mention it in today’s market update … until I read the following:

It is instructive to read the logic of non-economists who looked at house price data in the same period. Paolo Pellegrini and John Paulson, whose wildly successful 2006 bet against subprime mortgages is now the stuff of Wall Street legend, made the following argument, as chronicled in Zuckerman (2009). First, they noted that house prices had deviated from trend:

Those facts are indisputable, but the logic that followed would have earned the two investors a zero on an undergraduate finance exam:

Ha-ha! I hope this gets quoted extensively by Fabulous Fabio and Alan Greenspan as they defend themselves against the charges that they bear personal responsibility for the Panic of 2007.

The authors don’t spare Krugman:

Krugman’s thesis seems to hinge on the idea that scarce coastal land is valuable and bubbles can only happen when assets are in short supply, but the whole point about bubbles is that the fundamentals of supply and demand do not matter. Thus, there is no reason why land in places where it is easy to build could not experience bubbles. Ex post, as we will explore at length, the places in the United States where the housing market most resembled a bubble were Phoenix and Las Vegas. According to recent research, both locations are characterized by relatively high housing-supply elasticities; unlike certain coastal areas, the two cities have an abundance of surrounding land on which to accommodate new construction.

The authors’ purpose is clear:

Ultimately, our paper argues that the academic research available in 2006 was basically inconclusive and could not convincingly support or refute any hypothesis about the future path of asset prices. Thus, investors who believed that house prices were going to fall could find evidence to support their position, while those who wanted to believe that house prices would continue to rise could not be dissuaded either. There were reasonable arguments on both sides.

One of the bubbleistas was Baker:

In addition to the divergence between rents and prices in the U.S. housing market, Baker also called attention to changes in demographic trends that could put additional downward pressure on house prices. He noted that during the 1970s and early 1980s, housing grew from about 17 percent of consumption to more than 25 percent, in large part due to increased demand for housing from the first baby boom cohorts, who were then entering adulthood. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the housing share of consumption remained relatively constant, consistent with the modest demographic changes taking place in the United States at that time. In the future, Baker argued, as the baby boomers entered retirement, housing demand—and hence prices—would likely fall.

This argument has been taken up by some researchers at BIS, as discussed on August 4.

Baker also supplied contemporary arguments against the Greenspan-dunnit thesis:

As we will
discuss in more detail below, many economists pointed to low interest rates as justifying higher housing prices, but Baker was skeptical of this claim. Nominal interest rates were indeed low in the early 2000s, as the Federal Reserve had adopted a loose monetary policy to combat the effects of the 2001 recession. However, Baker pointed out that nominal rates could not explain the divergence of housing prices from fundamentals, as it is the real interest rate (the difference between the nominal rate and expected inflation) that should influence prices.

Another very interesting point is:

The evolving landscape of mortgage lending is also relevant to an ongoing debate in the literature about the direction of causality between reduced underwriting standards and higher house prices. Did lax lending standards shift out the demand curve for new homes and raise house prices, or did higher house prices reduce the chance of future loan losses, thereby encouraging lenders to relax their standards? Economists will debate this issue for some time. For our part, we simply point out that an in-depth study of lending standards would have been of little help to an economist trying to learn whether the early-to-mid 2000s increase in house prices was sustainable. If one economist argued that lax standards were fueling an unsustainable surge in house prices, another could have responded that reducing credit constraints generally brings asset prices closer to fundamental values, not farther away.

Another good point is:

If we have learned anything from this crisis, it is that large declines in house prices are always a possibility, so regulators and policymakers must take them into account when making decisions. A 30 percent fall in house prices over three years may be very difficult, if not impossible, to generate in any plausible econometric model, but a truly robust financial institution must be able to withstand one. The fact that so many professional investors as well as individual households ignored this possibility, even in 2006, suggests that we cannot allow investors to try to time market collapses.

All in all, most interesting and well balanced. Related posts on PrefBlog include:

As for me … I’ve always disclaimed any ability or interest in forecasting macroeconomic trends. But what I have said is … bad investments will hurt you. Concentration will kill you.

The Panic of 2007 wasn’t caused by Merrill Lynch et al. buying sub-prime paper. It was caused by the fact that they levered it up big time.

August Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Monday, August 16th, 2010

The August, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The August edition contains an appendix reviewing the theory of FixedReset pricing and presenting two related models that shown good explanatory power since April 2009.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the August 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the September, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close September 10 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on September 13.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

August PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

Saturday, August 14th, 2010

The markets have closed and the August edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The August edition will contain an appendix discussing the relative pricing of FixedReset issues and the historical record of the pricing model that has been developed.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The August issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the July issue.

August 13, 2010

Friday, August 13th, 2010

Nothing happened today. BOR-RING!

It was a relatively quiet day in the Canadian preferred share market as well, where volume was below average. PerpetualDiscounts were about as flat as you can get, despite dominating the (reasonably short) performance table, which was in turn comprised entirely of losers. The Manulife PerpetualDiscounts, MFC.PR.B and MFC.PR.C had a horrible day; it appears that a number of holders wanted to sell after last week’s earnings release, but wanted to earn just one more dividend before getting out. Both issues made it onto the volume table as well.

It was left to FixedResets to provide the day’s entertainment and they managed to gain 5bp on the day, taking the median weighted average yield down to 3.35% – the second lowest on record, beaten only by March 26 … which, as many will know, marked the beginning of a severe slump in prices that lasted until the end of April.

I asked a Technical Analyst if 3.30% marked a Resistance Point, but after talking for half an hour he realized that not only was his chart upside down, but that the kids had been using it for tick tac toe. I’ll call him again next year and learn why it is now totally obvious that the market is currently about to … er … do whatever it’s going to do.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5786 % 2,054.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5786 % 3,112.6
Floater 2.55 % 2.15 % 35,602 21.94 4 -0.5786 % 2,218.5
OpRet 4.88 % -1.50 % 100,455 0.21 9 0.0155 % 2,359.2
SplitShare 6.06 % -1.01 % 64,763 0.08 2 0.1675 % 2,288.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0155 % 2,157.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.57 % 94,556 5.60 7 0.1813 % 1,950.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.87 % 172,772 14.03 71 -0.0002 % 1,873.7
FixedReset 5.30 % 3.35 % 275,212 3.40 47 0.0490 % 2,237.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.54
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 15.05
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 34,882 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 26,733 TD crossed 20,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.82
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 25,975 Nesbitt crossed 20,400 at 19.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 25,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 23,735 TD crossed 17,200 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 22,305 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

August 12, 2010

Thursday, August 12th, 2010

Jump on the long corporate express!

Johnson & Johnson sold $1.1 billion of bonds at the lowest interest rates on record for 10-year and 30-year securities amid surging investor demand for the highest- rated corporate debt.

The drugmaker, in the first offering by a nonfinancial AAA rated company in 15 months, sold $550 million of 2.95 percent, 10-year notes and the same amount of 4.5 percent, 30-year bonds, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s the lowest coupons for those maturities on record, according to Citigroup Inc. data going back to 1981.

The company’s 10-year debt yields 43 basis points more than similar-maturity Treasuries, and the 30-year bonds pay a spread of 68 basis points, Bloomberg data show. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

Greece isn’t having much fun:

Greece’s recession deepened in the second quarter, according to official estimates released Thursday, as the country felt the painful consequences of the government’s drive to reduce its debt load with aggressive austerity cuts.

Gross domestic product declined by 1.5 per cent from the previous quarter as the government reduced spending. The unemployment rate, meanwhile, rose to 12 per cent in May from 11.9 per cent, the statistics agency said.

Manulife common took another hit today:

Worries about deteriorating economic conditions pushed the TSX financial sector down 1.56 per cent as TD Bank (TSX:TD) fell 90 cents to $70.82. Manulife Financial was down 62 cents or 4.62 per cent at $12.79 in heavy trading. Its stock has plunged 20 per cent since surprising investors with a $2.4-billion quarterly loss last week, followed by a downgrade by DBRS.

The PerpetualDiscount preferreds, MFC.PR.B and MFC.PR.C have underperformed their index sharply, but not ridiculously, since August 4, the day before the earnings announcement: -1.67% and -1.71% vs. +0.41%. However, they go ex-Dividend tomorrow and we may well see a rush for the exits.

The Canadian preferred share market was strong today on average volume, with PerpetualDiscounts up 10bp and FixedResets up 15bp. The win by the FixedResets took their yield to the sixth-lowest of all time, just a hair higher than the recent low set on August 4.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2361 % 2,066.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2361 % 3,130.7
Floater 2.53 % 2.14 % 37,065 21.97 4 -0.2361 % 2,231.4
OpRet 4.88 % 1.41 % 104,205 0.21 9 0.0986 % 2,358.8
SplitShare 6.07 % -1.70 % 66,993 0.08 2 0.8870 % 2,284.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0986 % 2,156.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.54 % 97,808 5.66 7 -0.1584 % 1,946.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.81 % 174,581 14.04 71 0.0992 % 1,873.7
FixedReset 5.30 % 3.39 % 278,778 3.40 47 0.1498 % 2,236.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.79
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 50,800 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 37,618 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 36,890 Nesbitt crossed 35,200 at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 27,420 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 26,100 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.26.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 24,850 Nesbitt crossed 10,500 at 21.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.98
Evaluated at bid price : 20.98
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SBN.PR.A Warrant Prospectus Filed

Thursday, August 12th, 2010

S Split Corp has announced:

that it has filed a final short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of its Class A Shares. Each Class A shareholder of record on August 23, 2010 will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held.

Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price of $19.13.

The Toronto Stock Exchange has conditionally approved the listing of the Warrants under the symbol SBN.WT.A and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof. It is expected that the Warrants will commence trading on August 19, 2010 and will remain trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date of January 17, 2011.

The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Fund invests in a portfolio of common shares of The Bank of Nova Scotia.

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they announced that they were going to try again with the warrants. SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2010-10-9: The warrants have been issued:

Under the warrant offering, the Fund issued one Warrant for each Class A Share of the Fund held by holders of record on August 23, 2010. Each Warrant entitles its holder to acquire one Unit at a subscription price of $19.13 commencing on August 24, 2010 and ending on the expiry date of January 17, 2011. The Warrants trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol SBN.WT.A and will continue trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date.