March 23, 2009

There was an interesting joint Treasury / Fed Press Release today that raised as many questions as it answered:

The Federal Reserve to avoid credit risk and credit allocation
The Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort responsibilities involve lending against collateral, secured to the satisfaction of the responsible Federal Reserve Bank. Actions taken by the Federal Reserve should also aim to improve financial or credit conditions broadly, not to allocate credit to narrowly-defined sectors or classes of borrowers. Government decisions to influence the allocation of credit are the province of the fiscal authorities.

This is eminently sensible – but why is it being repeated? There has been some concern expressed that the Fed is usurping fiscal functions (which I have disagreed with) – are these concerns gaining traction?

Need for a comprehensive resolution regime for systemically critical financial institutions
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve remain fully committed to preventing the disorderly failure of systemically critical financial institutions. To reduce the risk of future crises, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve will work with the Congress to develop a regime that will allow the U.S. government to address effectively at an early stage the potential failure of any systemically critical financial institution. As part of the framework set forth, the legislation should spell out to the extent possible the expected role of the Federal Reserve and other U.S. government agencies in such resolutions.

It looks like the Fiscal Stability Regulator plan is going to happen.

In the longer term and as its authorities permit, the Treasury will seek to remove from the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, or to liquidate, the so-called Maiden Lane facilities made by the Federal Reserve as part of efforts to stabilize systemically critical financial institutions.

Is this an admission that the Maiden Lane facilities were not, in fact, adequately collateralized?

Equities were on fire today:

Canadian stocks rose the most in three months after the U.S. Treasury said it will spend $1 trillion to purchase distressed assets and Petro-Canada agreed to be bought in the biggest deal for a Canadian oil company.

Manulife Financial Corp., Canada’s largest insurer, climbed 16 percent after the Treasury said it will provide capital and financing for private investors to buy illiquid loans and securities held by banks.

Royal Bank of Canada increased 7.6 percent to C$37.94. Toronto-Dominion Bank rose 10 percent to C$45.50. A gauge of financial shares surged 8.7 percent, the most of the 10 industries in the S&P/TSX.

The Treasury’s Public-Private Investment Program will use $75 billion to $100 billion from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program enacted last year, giving the government “purchasing power” of $500 billion. The Treasury said the program may double “over time.”

Thoughts of imminent mass-bankruptcy disappeared (at least for today) and prefs did really well – in fact, the sub-investment grade split share preferreds did really, really well.

Split Share High Performers
March 23, 2009
Ticker Asset
Coverage
Day’s
Performance
FTU.PR.A 0.4+:1
3/13
+14.06%
FTN.PR.A 1.2-:1
3/13
+12.48%
LFE.PR.A 1.1-:1
3/13
+6.84%
FFN.PR.A 1.0+:1
3/13
+5.73%
ASC.PR.A 0.7-:1
3/20
+5.56%
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4666 % 843.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4666 % 1,364.5
Floater 4.69 % 5.65 % 59,072 14.44 3 0.4666 % 1,054.1
OpRet 5.26 % 4.84 % 129,999 3.89 15 0.0028 % 2,059.9
SplitShare 6.81 % 9.59 % 52,151 4.79 6 1.3986 % 1,631.6
Interest-Bearing 6.02 % 7.98 % 34,811 0.74 1 0.8089 % 1,951.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5297 % 1,506.7
Perpetual-Discount 7.18 % 7.27 % 152,275 12.13 71 0.5297 % 1,387.6
FixedReset 6.11 % 5.74 % 633,745 13.83 31 0.1316 % 1,813.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -3.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.62
Evaluated at bid price : 19.62
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.86
Evaluated at bid price : 15.86
Bid-YTW : 8.22 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 7.92 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.04
Evaluated at bid price : 17.04
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 16.51
Evaluated at bid price : 16.51
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.77
Evaluated at bid price : 18.77
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.64
Evaluated at bid price : 15.64
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.22
Evaluated at bid price : 17.22
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 13.20
Evaluated at bid price : 13.20
Bid-YTW : 9.26 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 22.92
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 7.75 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 14.31
Evaluated at bid price : 14.31
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 7.26 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.57
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 7.70 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 12.91
Evaluated at bid price : 12.91
Bid-YTW : 9.28 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 2.00 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of March 12 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.16
Bid-YTW : 9.59 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.90
Evaluated at bid price : 15.90
Bid-YTW : 7.38 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 20.68
Evaluated at bid price : 20.68
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 8.98 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.74
Evaluated at bid price : 18.74
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.40
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 3.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 6.84 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of March 13, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.50
Bid-YTW : 14.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 211,656 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 25.03
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 193,421 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 109,077 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 63,743 National crossed 12,000 at 25.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 60,924 National bought 10,000 from RBC at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 60,333 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 25.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Late Update: Andrew Cuomo proudly announced the success of his extortion racket:

New York state’s attorney general, Andrew Cuomo, said late Monday that 15 of the top 20 recipients of $165 million in retention bonuses from American International Group Inc.’s Financial Products unit have agreed to give back their bonuses — amounting to in excess of $30 million in cash.

He added that he sees no public interest in disclosing the names of people who return their bonuses, and he acknowledged that returning the money is a difficult decision for many people in the unit who weren’t involved in devising the problematic transactions that helped topple AIG.

I like to think I’d hang on to the money and force Congress to illustrate the depths of their moral bankruptcy by taxing it all way. I also like to think I’d quit – CEO Liddy threw his people to the wolves rather than stand up for them. CEO Liddy is not a leader.

4 Responses to “March 23, 2009”

  1. prefhound says:

    James, you are quite circumspect on your opinion of the latest US plan to buy “toxic” bank assets in a partnership among Treasury, the Fed and private investors — even though this caused a market “melt-up” of 7% today.

    What is your view of this nth such plan, with no prior takeup on previous versions because banks were unwilling to sell and recognize a big loss and investors were unwilling to buy until sure there was a bottom?

    What is your view on how private investors might feel about investing alongside a government that changes the rules after the fact to suit political opportunism (e.g. bank executive compensation and AIG bonuses dictated by politicians despite having “co-invested” with new and old private investors rather than taking over the banks)?

    Finally, are you as baffled as I that such a remarkable melt-up was accompanied by more or less normal US trading volume, so might reflect a pause for sellers to reflect while shorts were busy trying to cover?

    I’m dying to be optimistic and some positive market sentiment for a while would be a nice antidote to overwhelming (possibly unwarranted) negativity.

    Will the plan work? Will it even be necessary? Please prognosticate…..

  2. jiHymas says:

    Sorry – I’ve been busy!

    The new Treasury plan was announced in a press release today.

    It is remarkably short on details. For instance, the Legacy Securities Terms states:

    Proceeds received by a Fund will be divided between the Treasury and
    the applicable Private Vehicle based on equity contributions, except that
    Treasury will take warrants as required by EESA to protect the interests
    of taxpayers. The terms and amounts of such warrants will be
    determined in part based on the amount of Treasury Debt Financing
    taken.

    It seems to me that the terms and amounts of the warrants are critical to the valuation of the equity!

    I agree that the political involvement is a big negative. The crisis has become so politicized – with Obama throwing gasoline onto the fire – that it is difficult to imagine a runaway success.

    The Administration is terrified. They concede:

    As prices declined further, many traditional sources of capital exited these markets, causing declines in secondary market liquidity. As a result, we have been in a vicious cycle in which declining asset prices have triggered further deleveraging and reductions in market liquidity, which in turn have led to further price declines. While fundamentals have surely deteriorated over the past 18-24 months, there is evidence that current prices for some legacy assets embed substantial liquidity discounts.

    … and are terrified of reprising Japan’s lost decade (now stretching into Japan’s lost quarter-century):

    This approach is superior to the alternatives of either hoping for banks to gradually work these assets off their books or of the government purchasing the assets directly. Simply hoping for banks to work legacy assets off over time risks prolonging a financial crisis, as in the case of the Japanese experience.

    The critical element – that was missing from previous plans – is the presence of FDIC guaranteed financing, providing leverage of up to 6:1. This makes the package attractive. But if anybody makes too much money, he risks becoming a target for political oppobrium (sourced at the highest levels) and excise taxes.

    It will help a little, I think, but only to the extent to which politicians can claim credit.

  3. […] News points out that the joint Fed/Treasury press release (reported by PrefBlog on March 23) could have more implications than have been commonly discussed: The release said that while the […]

  4. […] noted on March 23 that Liddy, the last CEO of AIG, demonstrated his lack of qualification for the office by throwing […]

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