Archive for December, 2007

December 31, 2007

Monday, December 31st, 2007

Hurrah! 2007 is finally over!

Strong performance from the PerpetualDiscounts again, but all this is on relatively light volume. Santa brought me exactly what I asked for.

Happy New Year! Best Wishes for 2008!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.19% 5.19% 73,469 15.15 2 0.0000% 1,059.2
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 5.15% 85,409 15.30 8 +0.1145% 1,026.3
Floater 5.82% 5.84% 139,591 14.13 2 +1.0369% 829.8
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.08% 81,377 3.53 16 +0.0657% 1,039.6
Split-Share 5.31% 5.51% 107,314 4.19 15 +0.3585% 1,029.6
Interest Bearing 6.37% 6.58% 61,709 3.44 4 -0.1262% 1,058.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.82% 4.94% 79,658 5.23 11 +0.2505% 1,018.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.51% 5.42% 375,952 14.29 55 +0.8340% 928.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.7686% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 25.55 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.0725% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 23.56 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.1291% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.46% based on a bid of 20.60 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1302% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 20.58 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.1478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.15 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.2766% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 23.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.3767% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 18.41 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater +1.4006%  
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.9957% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.81% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.0366% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 24.55 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +2.0947% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 22.42 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +2.1998% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.
ACO.PR.A OpRet +2.2684% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.64% based on a bid of 26.60 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.3903% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 23.56 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.4540% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 21.71 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.4561% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 23.36 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +2.8037% Asset coverage of 3.7+:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.90% based on a bid of 18.70 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (5.73% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (7.42% to 2016-3-25).
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.8352% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 21.40 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.8375% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 23.92 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +3.3609% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.38% based on a bid of 18.76 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +3.70% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 21.04 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +4.2105%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 46,910 RBC crossed 18,400 at 23.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 23.56 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 19,190 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 21.04 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 14,415 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.19 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 13,195 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 23.18 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 12,513 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 20.41 and a limitMaturity.

There were five other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February 2005

Monday, December 31st, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2005-2-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,352.5 1 2.00 2.51% 21.0 131M 2.53%
FixedFloater 2,240.6 8 2.00 2.39% 19.4 73M 5.28%
Floater 1,994.5 5 2.00 -2.42% 0.10 53M 3.28%
OpRet 1,818.9 20 1.51 2.89% 3.5 94M 4.65%
SplitShare 1,855.8 15 1.93 3.82% 3.4 89M 5.01%
Interest-Bearing 2,237.8 8 2.00 4.01% 1.9 97M 6.51%
Perpetual-Premium 1,394.2 35 1.63 4.68% 4.6 106M 5.39%
Perpetual-Discount 1,573.1 2 1.00 4.87 15.7 13,061M 4.90%

Index Constitution, 2005-2-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2005-2-28, Post-rebalancing

Research : Convexity

Saturday, December 29th, 2007

Why do I want extra yield for holding a perpetual that is priced near par? I try to explain the rationale in this article, published in the November 2007 edition of Canadian Moneysaver.

Look for the research link!

December 28, 2007

Saturday, December 29th, 2007

Well, the same things that caused me to drastically foreshorten yesterday’s report are causing me to chop today’s report to the bone!

With any luck, 2008 will be a bit more consistent in terms of post lengths.

The S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index gained again today and, barring a catastrophic end to the trading year, will be up on the month. PerpetualDiscounts performed superbly, but remain below the recent peak level of 930.2 reached on December 11.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.19% 5.17% 76,492 15.19 2 +0.0000% 1,059.2
Fixed-Floater 4.90% 5.13% 87,719 15.33 8 -0.1429% 1,025.1
Floater 5.88% 5.90% 143,995 14.05 2 +0.0640% 821.3
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.12% 84,029 3.30 16 -0.3452% 1,038.9
Split-Share 5.33% 5.56% 109,594 4.31 15 +0.1328% 1,025.9
Interest Bearing 6.36% 6.51% 62,942 3.45 4 +0.1805% 1,059.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.16% 81,131 4.24 11 +0.0743% 1,016.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.55% 5.56% 383,987 14.53 55 +1.0465% 920.5

IQW.PR.C : Conversion to Common Requested for Over Half of Issue

Saturday, December 29th, 2007

Quebecor World has announced:

that, on or prior to December 27, 2007, it received notices in respect of 3,975,663 of its 7,000,000 issued and outstanding Series 5 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares (TSX: IQW.PR.C) (the “Series 5 Preferred Shares”) requesting conversion into the Company’s Subordinate Voting Shares.

In accordance with the provisions governing the Series 5 Preferred Shares, registered holders of such shares are entitled to convert all or any number of their Series 5 Preferred Shares into a number of Subordinate Voting Shares effective as of March 1, 2008 (the “First Conversion Date”), provided such holders gave notice of their intention to convert at least 65 days prior to the First Conversion Date. The next conversion date on which registered holders of the Series 5 Preferred Shares will be entitled to convert all or any number of such shares into Subordinate Voting Shares is June 1, 2008, and notices of conversion in respect thereof must be deposited with the Company’s transfer agent, Computershare Investor Services Inc., on or before March 27, 2008. The Series 5 Preferred Shares are convertible into that number of the Company’s Subordinate Voting Shares determined by dividing Cdn$25.00 together with all accrued and unpaid dividends on such shares up to February 29, 2008 by the greater of (i) Cdn$2.00 and (ii) 95% of the weighted average trading price of the Series 5 Preferred Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the period of twenty trading days ending on February 26, 2008. Notwithstanding the notices of conversion received in respect of the Series 5 Preferred Shares, the Company retains the right under the provisions governing the Series 5 Preferred Shares to redeem all or any number of such Series 5 Preferred Shares in respect of which a notice of conversion was received. In the event Quebecor World were to decide to avail itself of its right to redeem all or any number of such Series 5 Preferred Shares in respect of which a notice of conversion was received, it would be required to provide notice to the holders of Series 5 Preferred Shares that submitted a notice of conversion by January 21, 2008.

Dividends on this issue have been suspended.

IQW SVSs closed today at $1.75, so assuming that the conversion is performed at the $2 minimum, four million (roughly) shares of IQW.PR.C will convert to fifty-million shares of IQW … since there are only about eighty-five-million of these shares outstanding, the converters will own over one-third of the company.

At the close of $15.75 for IQW.PR.C, the effective price of the new shares is $1.26, providing a nifty fifty-cent profit per IQW share to the converters (or, to put it another way, $21 worth of IQW stock – given current prices – will be received for every IQW.PR.C share.

One risk to the converters who are attempting to arbitrage is a rise in the price of the SVS; since the conversion price is 95% of the calculated price (if this is over $2), then if they have shorted now on a 12.5:1 basis for proceeds of $21, then:

Profit = proceeds of short sale – cost of IQW.PR.C – (number of shares actually received – 12.5)*price of shares

where “number of shares actually received” = 25 / (price of shares * 0.95)

so

Profit = proceeds of short sale – cost of IQW.PR.C – ((25 / (price of shares * 0.95)) – 12.5) * price of shares)

and ((25 / (price of shares * 0.95)) – 12.5) * price of shares)

= ((26.04 / price of shares) – 12.5) * price of shares

= 26.04 – 12.5*price of shares

So

Profit = proceeds of short sale – cost of IQW.PR.C + 26.04 – 12.5*price of shares

= 1.75*12.5 – 15.75 + 26.04 – 12.5*price of shares

= 21.875 – 15.75 + 26.04 – 12.5*price of shares

= 32.525 – 12.5*price of shares

Implying that the “risk arbitrage” will be profitable provided that, in the simplest scenario:

(i) shares are converted at 95% of the calculated market price of $2.60 or lower

(ii) the resultant short can be covered at that price (if necessary)

… assuming as well that IQW has been shorted at a ratio of 12.5:1 at a price of 1.75 and the IQW.PR.C was purchased at 15.75

Update, 2007-12-30: An Assiduous Reader who is in the unfortunate position of holding this issue, writes in and says:

The second one is the dreaded IQW.PR.C.  I read today on the RBC Action Direct web site that Quebecor has received notice to convert a large number of this outstanding preferred to subordinate voting shares (I’m assuming I should have done the same but I missed the March 1st date because I wasn’t aware I had to provide 65 days notice).  I don’t own a lot of it but I assume I should be doing the same as to preserve some capital before the
company goes bankrupt?  Thoughts on this?

Well, actually I don’t have a lot of thoughts on this, because IQW is junk and I don’t trade junk. I’m a fixed-income guy; junk requires equity-style analysis. That being said:

The case for conversion relies on current prices. At the current conversion rate of 12.5 IQW for 1 IQW.PR.C, the common is more valuable. Going by this, you would wait until the last possible moment before the next conversion date, examine prices at that time and request conversion if the terms are still favourable. Then, after having waited out the notice period and received your common, you would treat the IQW in the same manner as every other equity in your portfolio.

The case for retaining IQW.PR.C relies on their seniority. At the time the dividend was suspended, the company stated that it had cash on hand to make the payments, but was prevented from doing so by the Corporations Act, which prevents them from paying dividends when their shareholders’ equity is so low. They stated at that time that the annual meeting would rejig the balance sheet – through a few bookkeeping entries – to allow the resumption of dividends on their preferreds. If the company should ever pay any dividends ever again, the preferreds will be taken care of first! Should you keep the issue over the next notice date, you will retain the option to request conversion on the following date, and so on ad infinitum … or ad bankruptcy, anyway!

IQW is in a bad way. They’re not making any money, nobody seems to want their assets and they can’t find new financing. All I can really suggest is that you get their latest regulatory filings (SEDAR), perhaps discuss the company on Financial Webring Forum, develop a few potential scenarios for the company’s future … and make your own decision.

December 27, 2007

Friday, December 28th, 2007

Sorry, folks! What with month-end, year-end and a chess tournament, I am just plain out of time!

There was good performance in the market today, but volumes were markedly lower now that tax-loss-selling season is over. On a cheery note, the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Indexas proxied by CPD, is now in the black for the month!

I should be able to update tomorrow.

Update, 2007-12-28:

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.17% 5.15% 78,669 15.22 2 +0.2029% 1,059.2
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 5.11% 90,093 15.37 8 +0.3170% 1,026.6
Floater 5.88% 5.90% 145,103 14.05 2 1.6810% 820.7
Op. Retract 4.85% 2.58% 85,811 3.30 16 +0.0076% 1,042.5
Split-Share 5.34% 5.54% 112,024 4.30 15 -0.0050% 1,024.5
Interest Bearing 6.37% 6.61% 64,594 3.66 4 +0.6749% 1,057.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.50% 83,206 4.27 11 +0.2301% 1,015.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.60% 5.64% 391,664 14.12 55 +0.4324% 910.9

December 24, 2007

Monday, December 24th, 2007
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.14% 5.14% 81,927 15.19 2 -0.0406% 1,057.0
Fixed-Floater 4.88% 5.11% 92,385 15.32 8 +0.2075% 1,023.4
Floater 5.98% 6.00% 149,486 13.91 2 +0.9228% 807.2
Op. Retract 4.85% 2.58% 87,876 3.16 16 +0.3915% 1,042.4
Split-Share 5.32% 5.49% 113,820 4.12 15 -0.0847% 1,024.6
Interest Bearing 6.36% 6.93% 65,312 3.65 4 +0.2061% 1,050.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.51% 85,534 6.07 11 +0.3074% 1,013.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.62% 5.67% 400,998 14.17 55 +0.2879% 907.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.0720% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 19.85 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.7604% Asset coverage of 3.7+:1 as of November 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.85% based on a bid of 17.30 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.08% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (7.51% to 2016-3-25).
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5686% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 20.08 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.5144% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.61% based on a bid of 20.16 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.3819% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 21.41 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3707% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 24.15 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3502% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 22.65 and a limitMaturity.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare -1.2834% Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of December 14 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.26% based on a bid of 9.23 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2031% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.1753% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 18.73 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.0857% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 17.31 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0643% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 20.89 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0782% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.2146% Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of December 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.3508% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 23.26 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.4063% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 19.47 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.4139% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.4462% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.95% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.4577% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.87% based on a bid of 17.40 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater +1.4857%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare +1.5152% Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of December 20, according to TD. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.41% based on a bid of 10.05 and a call 2009-1-14 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.5233% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.66 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.5955% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.65 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.6348% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 21.76 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.9669% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium +2.5237% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2012-7-1 at 25.00
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +4.5414% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 23.25 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +4.9972%  
BAM.PR.J OpRet +5.5064% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.80% based on a bid of 26.25 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.A OpRet 481,700 Global crossed 240,300 for cash at 26.57, then the same number for regular at 26.23. Went ex-dividend today for $0.33125. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 25.40 and a softMaturity 2011-7-30 at 25.00.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 83,200 Scotia processed an Internal Cross for 81,200 at 24.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 59,425 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 18.73 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 47,114 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 19.31 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 39,580 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 20.17 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-six other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Canadian ABCP : Agreement! Before Christmas! Perfect!

Sunday, December 23rd, 2007

Bloomberg reports:

Investors holding about C$33 billion ($33.3 billion) of short-term debt in Canada agreed to swap it for longer-term notes, ending a four-month freeze in trading of the securities.

Today’s agreement, which covers 20 of the 22 non-bank trusts, has been approved “in principle” by the investor group as well as the trust sponsors. Some lenders, including “several of the large Canadian banks,” have said they may provide credit facilities, according to the statement.

Toronto-Dominion Bank, Canada’s second-biggest lender, is “not a participant in the agreement,” bank spokesman Simon Townsend said. The Toronto-based bank had originally resisted supporting the restructuring agreement because it didn’t underwrite the debt in the first place. The C$80 billion market for commercial paper sold by lenders such as Royal Bank of Canada hasn’t been interrupted by the freeze in non-bank paper.

Crawford said that based on the advice of financial adviser JPMorgan Chase & Co., most of the restructured notes will receive a AAA rating, according to the statement.

The group didn’t say how much investors will receive on the dollar, according to spokesman Mark Boutet.

The commercial paper will be restructured differently depending on the type of asset that backs it, the statement said.

Things were looking grim after last week’s hiccup. There are no details on how the margin of the CDSs that have been written will work … the only thing that would make sense to me is that an equity tranche will be issued and paid out of what would otherwise have gone to the senior noteholders. Or, perhaps, the lines from the banks will be more richly rewarded (again, out of the senior noteholders’ hides). But I will report new developments as they are released…

December 21, 2007

Friday, December 21st, 2007

Today’s report will be somewhat delayed, I’m afraid … it might even have to wait until Monday.

Update

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.11% 5.12% 82,731 15.23 2 +0.6164% 1,057.4
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 5.10% 94,419 15.33 8 -0.2713% 1,021.2
Floater 6.03% 6.05% 140,841 13.84 2 +1.1345% 799.8
Op. Retract 4.86% 2.58% 88,547 3.29 16 +0.4138% 1,038.4
Split-Share 5.32% 5.50% 114,253 4.31 15 -0.2145% 1,025.4
Interest Bearing 6.37% 6.98% 66,699 3.65 4 -0.2557% 1,048.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.84% 5.58% 86,717 6.09 11 +0.2589% 1,009.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.63% 5.68% 403,293 14.36 55 -0.3673% 904.4

Willem Buiter's Prescription

Friday, December 21st, 2007

Willem Buiter of the London School of Economics has authored Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis, published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research.

The paper includes one thoroughly delicious quote that shows the author understands the nature of regulation:

Because Sarbanes-Oxley compliance is mainly a matter of box-ticking (like most realworld compliance, especially compliance originating in the USA), it has not materially improved the informational value of accounting or the protection offered to investors.

All in all, the essay is extremely good … I may not agree with all of it, but the man makes some good points and has some well-founded opinions. I’ll present some quotes from the essay with my own thoughts … but the full document is well worth reading.

There is a long section on the credit rating agencies. Mr. Buiter states as problems:

  • Any model of credit risk will have flaws and these flaws may be exploited by issuers. Even honest models won’t work particularly well during black swan events.
  • Only default risk is rated – not market risk and not liquidity risk
  • agencies are conflicted, in that:
    • they are paid by the issuers
    • they sell advisory services to their rating service clients
    • the complexity of some instruments results in designer and issuer working with the same model … possibly one designed by the issuer

To Mr. Buiter’s credit, he does not attempt to solve the first two problems with rhetoric:

There is no obvious solution other than ‘try harder and don’t pretend to know more than you know’ for the first problem. The second problem requires better education of the investing public.

His third problem, which has three facets, has a five part solution:

  • Reputational concerns
  • Remove the CRA’s quasi-regulatory role
  • Make the CRAs one-product firms
  • End payment by issuer
  • Increase competition

I don’t have a major problem with the idea of removing the CRAs’ quasi-regulatory role (their ratings are a factor in determining the credit conversion factor that converts the total value of the loan to risk-weighted assets), but Mr. Buiter is not clear on what is to replace the current system.

It seems clear that a loan to IBM is safer than a loan to Joe’s Barbershop; it also seems clear that this difference should have an effect on the measured risk profile of the bank. I suggest that the CRAs have a very good track record in assessing these risks – and yes, I am including the subprime & Enron debacles when reviewing their record.

The thing about risk, you see, is that it’s risky.

With respect to his third proposition, making the CRAs one-product firms … how is he going to enforce this and why would he want to? Yesterday we saw extremely poor performance by the CIBC preferred issues. I will suggest that some portion of this, at least, was due to stockbrokers telling their clients that CIBC was a relatively poor credit (relative to other banks, and relative to their financial position last year at this time) and exposure to it should be minimized. In such a case, the stockbroker is acting as a Credit Rating Agency.

In the absence of a regulatory role for CRAs, how is one to differentiate between a one-product-by-regulation firm and … anybody else?

His proposal for ending issuer payment is so convoluted I will reproduce it in full, to avoid charges of mockery by misquotation:

Payment by the buyer (the investors) is desirable but subject to a ‘collective action’ or ‘free rider’ problem. One solution would be to have the ratings paid for by a representative body for the (corporate) investor side of the market. This could be financed through a levy on the firms in the industry. Paying the levy could be made mandatory for all firms in a regulated industry. Conceivably, the security issuers could also be asked to contribute. Conflict of interest is avoided as long as no individual issuer pays for his own ratings. This would leave some free rider problems, but should permit a less perverse incentivised rating process to get off the ground. I don’t think it would be necessary (or even make sense) to socialise the rating process, say by creating a state-financed (or even industryfinanced) body with official and exclusive powers to provide the ratings.

Frankly, I don’t understand why his proposed solution, involving mandatory payments by firms in the industry, is different from the socialization he decries. There may also be some conflict with his proposal to emphasize reputational concerns and competition … how do I go about getting some of the lolly? Can I just declare to the central body that I am a credit rater, that will be $500,000 please?

Reputational concerns and competition currently work along the lines of … some firms are better regarded by investors than others. I, for instance, have greater respect for Fitch and Moody’s than for S&P and DBRS … give me my choice of any two ratings on a bond, and you know which ones I’ll pay attention to! How would this be reflected in such a centralized system?

In the end, I have to reiterate my familiar refrain: Credit Ratings are Advice. Take it, leave it, your choice. So far, the Bank of Canada has said it best:

investors should not lose sight of the fact that one can delegate tasks but not accountability.

After reviewing the macroeconomic situation he makes further proposals, including:

if a financial institution borrows short and lends long, if it borrows liquid (during normal times, but with the risk of occasional illiquidity in its usual funding channels) and lends illiquid, and if banks are substantially exposed to it, then it should be regulated like a bank, even if it says ‘Hedge Fund’ on the letterhead. The rules should aggressively chase the unceasing attempts, through institutional and instrument innovation, to avoid regulation.

I disagree with this, particularly with the implicit belief that rules exist in order that they be followed. The weak point of the argument here is “if banks are substantially exposed to it“. It does seem likely that there has been far too much contagion in the past crisis, but regulating the universe is not the proper answer. What should be done is to improve the capital requirement rules and force the banks to make a more substantial capital provision for their riskier assets – such as Mr. Buiter implies is a good description for their hedge fund exposure.

If the risk weights applied to, for instance, the provision of a global liquidity line to a SIV have been shown to be inadequate (and this has not been documented, although I suspect that it is the case) … increase the risk weight of the line! Currently it’s at a flat 10% … I suggest that a tiering be considered, so that a bank with $10-billion of tier 1 capital can extend such a line for $10-billion at the 10% rate, but the next ten billion is charged at a 20% rate, etc.

Ensuring that everything is regulated is poor policy. Let us ensure that the core of the financial system – the banks, who have access to lines provided by the central banks – is secure, and then let people play around on the edges to their, and their investors’, hearts’ content.

The main problem with the arrangement [separating bank supervision functions from liquidity provision functions] is that it puts the information about individual banks in a different agency (the FSA) from the agency with the liquid financial resources to provide short-term assistance to a troubled bank (the Bank of England). This happened when the Bank lost banking sector supervision and regulatory responsibility on being made operationally independent for monetary policy by Gordon Brown in 1997. It’s clear this separation of information and resources does not work.

This issue was discussed on December 5.

Liquidity can vanish today, because market participants with surplus liquidity fear that both they themselves and their potential counterparties will be illiquid in the future (say, three months from now), when the loans would have to be repaid. A credible commitment by the Central Bank to provide liquidity in the future (three months from now) would solve the problem, but it is apparent that the required credibility simply does not exist. Therefore, the only time-consistent solution, in the absence of a credible commitment mechanism, is to intervene today at a three-month maturity.

One lesson – that Canadian non-bank ABCP investors will be happy to explain thoroughly – from the current crisis is that liquidity risk is different from credit risk. Traditionally, LIBOR spreads are explained in terms of credit risk – I suggest that liquidity risk is the operational concern and that liquidity hoarding is its sympton. I remember on anecdote from the Panic of 1907 … a banker complained to J.P. Morgan that his liquid assets had been eroded to 18% … Morgan gave him the what-for, telling him that liquid assets were held precisely for such circumstances.

If a bank’s afraid to make three-month interbank loans because it might have its credit lines drawn on in the intervening time, then part of the problem is that it has too many lines – a problem that would be addressed by higher capital charges.

To address the point, however, I have no problem with, for instance, a regular three month term facility, to be financed with treasury bills as a neutralizer.

Capitalism, based on greed, private property rights and decentralised decision making, is both cyclical and subject to bouts of financial manic-depressive illness. There is no economy-wide auctioneer, no enforcer of systemic ‘transversality conditions’ to rule out periodic explosive bubble behaviour of asset prices in speculative
markets. It’s unfortunate, but we have to live with it. The last time humanity tried to do away with these excesses of capitalism, we got central planning, and we all know now how well that worked. Hayek and Keynes were both right.

Hear, hear!

All in all, a fine article.