Turnover ticked up a little to a still anemic 1% in June, as the fund is now ‘all-in’ on FixedResets, particularly those with a low Issue Reset Spread. There were a few trades beginning to look interesting on the strong day June 28; if the buying pressure exhibited at the close remains in effect in the coming week, there may well be more trading to report next month!
There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:
- Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
- DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
- DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)
This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.
To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.
And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.
I have argued for a long time that insurers will become covered by NVCC rules similar to the banks, but regulatory process on the issue is very slow.
As a result of prior delays, I initially extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.
In December, 2018, I extended the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another five years, to 2030-1-31.
The new date has been chosen with the idea that a decision will be made by the IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors) in 2019, and (if favourable) will be implemented with an 11-year grace period, similarly to the banks. We shall see just how accurate these suppositions might be!
I must emphasize that these extensions do not give rise to any desire on my part to alter the fundamentals of my analysis. It is simply a reaction to the excessive time the regulators are taking to discuss the issue.
Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on June 28 was as follows:
MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2019-6-28 | |||
HIMI Indices Sector | Weighting | YTW | ModDur |
Ratchet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
FixFloat | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Floater | 0% | N/A | N/A |
OpRet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
SplitShare | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Interest Rearing | 0% | N/A | N/A |
PerpetualPremium | 0% | N/A | N/A |
PerpetualDiscount | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Fixed-Reset Discount | 46.3% | 5.71% | 14.50 |
Deemed-Retractible | 0% | N/A | N/A |
FloatingReset | 0% | N/A | N/A |
FixedReset Premium | 0% | N/A | N/A |
FixedReset Bank non-NVCC | 0% | N/A | N/A |
FixedReset Insurance non-NVCC | 40.8% | 9.27% | 8.42 |
Scraps – Ratchet | 1.4% | 7.17% | 13.87 |
Scraps – FixedFloater | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – Floater | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – OpRet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – SplitShare | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – PerpPrem | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – PerpDisc | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – FR Discount | 10.3% | 7.16% | 12.51 |
Scraps – DeemedRet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – FloatingReset | 0.7% | 8.17% | 11.22 |
Scraps – FR Premium | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – Bank non-NVCC | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Scraps – Ins non-NVCC | 0% | N/A | N/A |
Cash | +0.4% | 0.00% | 0.00 |
Total | 100% | 7.33% | 11.72 |
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero. | |||
The various “Scraps” indices include issues with a DBRS rating of Pfd-3(high) or lower and issues with an Average Trading Value (calculated with HIMIPref™ methodology, which is relatively complex) of less than $25,000. The issues considered “Scraps” are subdivided into indices which reflect those of the main indices. | |||
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company or the regulator. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2030-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See the Deemed Retractible Review: September 2016 for the rationale behind this analysis.
Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue and by a further five years in December, 2018. |
|||
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 1.34% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 1.66% |
The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.
Credit distribution is:
MAPF Credit Analysis 2019-6-28 | ||
DBRS Rating | Weighting | |
Pfd-1 | 0 | |
Pfd-1(low) | 0 | |
Pfd-2(high) | 23.3% | |
Pfd-2 | 33.7% | |
Pfd-2(low) | 30.0% | |
Pfd-3(high) | 3.7% | |
Pfd-3 | 4.8% | |
Pfd-3(low) | 3.3% | |
Pfd-4(high) | 0% | |
Pfd-4 | 0% | |
Pfd-4(low) | 0% | |
Pfd-5(high) | 0.7% | |
Pfd-5 | 0.0% | |
Cash | +0.4% | |
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. | ||
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5(high) by S&P and is unrated by DBRS; it is included in the Pfd-5(high) total. | ||
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3. |
Liquidity Distribution is:
MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2019-6-28 | |
Average Daily Trading | Weighting |
<$50,000 | 3.4% |
$50,000 – $100,000 | 82.2% |
$100,000 – $200,000 | 8.9% |
$200,000 – $300,000 | 5.1% |
>$300,000 | 0% |
Cash | +0.4% |
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. |
The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:
Range | MAPF Weight |
<100bp | 0% |
100-149bp | 25.7% |
150-199bp | 26.9% |
200-249bp | 28.7% |
250-299bp | 10.4% |
300-349bp | 0.9% |
350-399bp | 1.2% |
400-449bp | 1.8% |
450-499bp | 1.2% |
500-549bp | 1.3% |
550-599bp | 0% |
>= 600bp | 0% |
Undefined | 1.9% |
Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.
Range | MAPF Weight |
Currently Floating | 3.4% |
0-1 Year | 11.0% |
1-2 Years | 46.9% |
2-3 Years | 25.5% |
3-4 Years | 12.2% |
4-5 Years | 0.7% |
5-6 Years | 0% |
>6 Years | 0% |
Not Floating Rate | 0.4% |
MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.
A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of July 31, 2017, and published in the August, 2017, PrefLetter. It is fair to say:
- MAPF credit quality is much better
- MAPF liquidity is lower
- MAPF Yield is higher
- Weightings
- MAPF is much less exposed to Straight Perpetuals
- Neither portfolio is exposed to Operating Retractibles (there aren’t too many of those any more!)
- MAPF is equally exposed to SplitShares (that is to say, currently no exposure)
- MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
- MAPF is significantly higher weighted in FixedResets, with a much greater emphasis on lower-spread and insurance issues
CM.PR.O To Reset at 3.713%
Saturday, June 29th, 2019Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has announced:
CM.PR.O is a FixedReset, 3.90%+232, NVCC-compliant, that commenced trading 2014-6-11 after being announced 2014-6-2. The extension was announced 2019-6-12. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset (Discount) subindex.
The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., CM.PR.O and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.
We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).
Click for Big
Frankly, I am not sure how seriously to take the results charted above. FixedResets had a very strong day on June 28 which was emphatically not shared by their FloatingReset counterparts, where extant, and thus the calculated break-even point for the FloatingReset dividend rates (determined by the average bill rate until the next Exchange Date) has declined dramatically from the last calculation as of June 10. It is not yet clear, of course, whether this represents an actual change in market sentiment or whether this is an artifact of a few players’ day’s trading which will be quickly reversed. The following discussion will assume that this is representative of an actual change in sentiment, but please note that this conclusion is highly provisional!
The market has lost enthusiasm for floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.34% and +0.68%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.
Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.
If we plug in the current bid price of the CM.PR.O FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade well below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, CM.PR.O. Therefore, it seems likely that I will recommend that holders of CM.PR.O
determine whether or not to convert based on their own portfolio considerations and forecast for policy ratescontinue to hold the issue and not to convert, but I will wait until it’s closer to the July 16 notification deadline before making a final pronouncement – particularly since, as noted above, the closing quotes for June 28 are highly suspect. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.Posted in Issue Comments | No Comments »