First, the Loblaws REIT facilitated the Shoppers’ deal:
For too long, Loblaw shares traded at a valuation discount to Shoppers that made the math of any acquisition difficult. That finally changed when Loblaw announced its intention to create a real estate investment trust last December to hold the real estate housing the company’s grocery stores.
Loblaw’s price-earnings ratio jumped from 13 times earnings to more than 15, and then soared again in recent weeks to more than 17. Shoppers, meantime, was trading in the 14-15 times earnings range, down from much higher levels a few years earlier when growth was headier. Now the transaction, with synergies, could be solidly additive to earnings per share.
Such valuation advantages can be fleeting, so Mr. Weston moved fast when the opportunity arose and Shoppers opened the door to finally consummating a transaction.
The transaction and the cheers from shareholders and analysts should cement the influence of the new guard in the Weston empire, as their push for a REIT proved the catalyst.
Weston Chief Financial Officer Richard Dufresne, a former investment banker, and Khush Dadyburjor, who runs corporate development, were among those who pushed hardest for the REIT. They were up against concern among some of the old guard inside Loblaw and its parent company, George Weston Ltd., that the REIT was simply financial engineering that would bring no real advantage for the company, according to one person familiar with the transaction.
Loblaw’s ability to finally buy one of the most coveted assets in Canadian retailing should end any doubts about the REIT, and put the dealmakers firmly in charge. (That assumes of course, that the Shoppers transaction does not turn out to be a bust.)
Now, there’s a massive REIT coming out in the States:
The initial public offering of Brixmor Property Group, the second-largest U.S. shopping center landlord, may be the biggest for a retail real estate investment trust since Simon Property Group Inc.’s IPO 20 years ago.
The sale of shares in New York-based Brixmor, a Blackstone Group LP (BX) unit, probably “will raise $700 million or more,” according to Renaissance Capital LLC, a Greenwich, Connecticut-based research firm. That would be the largest IPO by a shopping-focused REIT since Simon’s $840 million share sale in 1993, data from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts show.
…
Brixmor owns 522 shopping centers with 87 million square feet (8.1 million square meters) of space. The assets that form Brixmor’s core were acquired in Blackstone’s $9 billion purchase of U.S. shopping centers from Australia’s Centro Properties Group in 2011. Brixmor is second to Kimco Realty Corp. (KIM) among U.S. shopping-center landlords by number of properties.
Hmmm … looks like the little guy’s getting in ….
DBRS confirmed PDV.PR.A at Pfd-3:
On July 20, 2012, DBRS downgraded the rating of the Preferred Shares to Pfd-3 from Pfd-3 (high) due to a drop in downside protection in the months leading up to the rating action. Since then, the NAV of the Company has recovered slowly, with downside protection available to holders increasing from 37% in July 2012 to 40% in January 2013, and stabilizing at that level over the past few months. The current dividend coverage ratio is approximately 0.88 times, so income received on the Portfolio is unable to fully cover Preferred Share distributions. As a result, the rating of the Preferred Shares has been confirmed at Pfd-3.
DBRS will continue to closely monitor changes in the credit quality of the Preferred Shares and provide rating updates as required.
It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 8bp, FixedResets down 23bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. The Performance Highlights table is fairly lengthy, with a notable contingent of losing FixedResets. Volume was enormous. Massive. Humungous.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0259 % | 2,577.6 |
FixedFloater | 4.16 % | 3.45 % | 38,131 | 18.50 | 1 | 0.0000 % | 3,994.0 |
Floater | 2.72 % | 2.92 % | 92,862 | 19.95 | 4 | 0.0259 % | 2,783.1 |
OpRet | 4.58 % | 2.91 % | 80,209 | 0.69 | 3 | 0.0509 % | 2,632.5 |
SplitShare | 4.66 % | 4.41 % | 57,089 | 3.92 | 6 | 0.1323 % | 2,976.5 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0509 % | 2,407.1 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.61 % | 4.93 % | 100,075 | 3.80 | 12 | -0.2274 % | 2,288.5 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.32 % | 5.33 % | 146,014 | 14.88 | 26 | 0.0783 % | 2,422.0 |
FixedReset | 4.96 % | 3.59 % | 248,713 | 3.79 | 84 | -0.2269 % | 2,476.4 |
Deemed-Retractible | 5.05 % | 4.51 % | 209,166 | 6.89 | 43 | -0.0009 % | 2,389.8 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
MFC.PR.D | FixedReset | -2.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.19 Bid-YTW : 6.33 % |
BNS.PR.Y | FixedReset | -2.64 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.61 Bid-YTW : 3.74 % |
BNS.PR.P | FixedReset | -1.87 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.18 Bid-YTW : 3.98 % |
CIU.PR.B | FixedReset | -1.69 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-06-01 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.56 Bid-YTW : 5.14 % |
IAG.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.48 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2017-06-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.36 Bid-YTW : 3.99 % |
CU.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | -1.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2043-07-19 Maturity Price : 22.48 Evaluated at bid price : 22.80 Bid-YTW : 4.99 % |
PWF.PR.S | Perpetual-Discount | -1.25 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2043-07-19 Maturity Price : 23.31 Evaluated at bid price : 23.62 Bid-YTW : 5.08 % |
FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | -1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2043-07-19 Maturity Price : 23.42 Evaluated at bid price : 23.77 Bid-YTW : 3.45 % |
CU.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2043-07-19 Maturity Price : 23.93 Evaluated at bid price : 24.30 Bid-YTW : 5.09 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
ENB.PR.Y | FixedReset | 423,648 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2043-07-19 Maturity Price : 23.08 Evaluated at bid price : 24.93 Bid-YTW : 4.00 % |
BNS.PR.P | FixedReset | 294,388 | It’s Strong-Pair counterpart, BNS.PR.A, was added to TXPR; therefore, the weight of BNS.PR.P in the index will be reduced. (There, see, I figured it out). YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.18 Bid-YTW : 3.98 % |
RY.PR.X | FixedReset | 285,186 | Scotia crossed blocks of 97,900 shares, 50,000 and 60,000, all at 26.31. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 53,500 and 20,000, at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-08-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.29 Bid-YTW : 2.37 % |
BNS.PR.A | FixedReset | 244,808 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2013-08-18 Maturity Price : 25.50 Evaluated at bid price : 26.10 Bid-YTW : -26.40 % |
GWO.PR.G | Deemed-Retractible | 220,219 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.00 Bid-YTW : 5.26 % |
TD.PR.Q | Deemed-Retractible | 148,440 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2013-08-18 Maturity Price : 26.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.32 Bid-YTW : -11.34 % |
BAM.PR.J | OpRet | 141,205 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-03-31 Maturity Price : 26.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.07 Bid-YTW : -0.29 % |
MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | 119,150 | Added to TXPR and TXPL. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2018-09-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.16 Bid-YTW : 3.74 % |
RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 109,866 | Scotia crossed blocks of 21,800 shares, 20,000 and 40,000, all at 25.40. National crossed 20,800 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-02-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.43 Bid-YTW : 3.37 % |
RY.PR.D | Deemed-Retractible | 105,727 | Added to TXPR. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.42 Bid-YTW : 4.38 % |
There were 92 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
TRI.PR.B | Floater | Quote: 23.30 – 24.50 Spot Rate : 1.2000 Average : 0.7737 YTW SCENARIO |
MFC.PR.D | FixedReset | Quote: 25.19 – 25.87 Spot Rate : 0.6800 Average : 0.3657 YTW SCENARIO |
CIU.PR.B | FixedReset | Quote: 25.56 – 26.19 Spot Rate : 0.6300 Average : 0.3797 YTW SCENARIO |
CU.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 22.80 – 23.38 Spot Rate : 0.5800 Average : 0.3766 YTW SCENARIO |
BNS.PR.P | FixedReset | Quote: 24.18 – 24.65 Spot Rate : 0.4700 Average : 0.2688 YTW SCENARIO |
FTS.PR.G | FixedReset | Quote: 24.40 – 24.78 Spot Rate : 0.3800 Average : 0.2139 YTW SCENARIO |
I don’t understand the YTW scenario that you are assuming for MFD.PR.D. Wouldn’t it be a no brainer for MFC to redeem at the reset date (2014-06-19) given the reset rate of +456bp. Seems that MFC should be able to refinance at much lower rate than that. Am I missing something?
Never mind, I think I figured it out. I had naively assumed that YTW scenario would be the best scenario for the issuer. I now get that that is not so in some cases. That makes the YTW concept less useful than I thought it was because while it does show you what the theoretically worst case is, it can be a very improbable scenario, not even worth considering.
It would be nice to have a YTML (Yield to Most Likely) metric — although that is probably very difficult to automatically calculate.
I’m sorry, I meant to answer this later and later turned into …
Anyway, it turns out that the yield to call is more than the yield to perpetuity when the 5-Year GOC rate is held constant – therefore, the YTW scenario is perpetuity.
One enhancement I have been toying with is the calculation of “Yield to Issuer Best”, in which:
i) Yield Scenarios are calculated, as at present
ii) The YTW Scenario is the one with the lowest yield, as at present
iii) The internally consistent yield curve is calculated, using all instruments eligible for this calculation (volume & credit qualifiers), as at present
iv) the Yield To Issuer Best Scenario is calculated as the scenario from (i) which has the lowest yield relative to the yield curve from (iii).
However, programming and testing this will take time…
Thanks for getting back to me. Yes, your “Yield to Issuer Best” would be very useful especially with the things that could happen with these fixed reset issues coming up to their reset dates.