There is some thought that Canada’s inflation is normalizing:
Canada’s inflation rate accelerated faster than economists predicted in October, led by gasoline and clothing and suggesting the economy may be running hotter than the central bank had thought.
The consumer price index rose 2.4 percent compared with the same month a year earlier, Statistics Canada said from Ottawa. That’s faster than all 21 economists in a Bloomberg News survey predicted. The core rate that excludes eight volatile products accelerated to 2.3 percent, the strongest in almost three years.
Inflation has exceeded the Bank of Canada’s 2 percent target in five of the past six months, making it more difficult for Governor Stephen Poloz to argue temporary factors are driving price gains. Canada’s dollar rose the most in almost two months after today’s report as traders speculated the central bank may have to bring forward its timetable for raising borrowing costs.
…
Canada’s dollar strengthened 0.7 percent to C$1.1229 per U.S. dollar at 10:40 a.m. Toronto time. Two-year federal government bond yields rose to 1.07 percent from 1.05 percent.Clothing and footwear price gains accelerated to 3.1 percent, from September’s 2 percent pace, as retailers offered fewer discounts, Statistics Canada said today.
Gasoline prices rose 0.6 percent in October from a year earlier. On a monthly basis, gasoline fell 4 percent in October, the fourth consecutive decline.
The next few inflation reports may show the gains in gasoline and clothing prices receding, Ferley said, citing a recent fall in fuel prices and a slower depreciation of Canada’s dollar that had boosted the cost of imported apparel. Today’s inflation gain was still broad enough to suggest price gains faster than Poloz expects, he said.
Food prices rose 2.8 percent in October, including a 12.4 percent surge for meat purchased at stores.
It was a positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 15bp, FixedResets flat and DeemedRetractibles up 7bp. Volatility was good, comprised entirely of FixedResets. Volume was a little low.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.1129 % | 2,541.5 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.1129 % | 4,023.7 |
Floater | 2.97 % | 3.07 % | 58,507 | 19.50 | 4 | -0.1129 % | 2,701.8 |
OpRet | 4.04 % | -4.49 % | 98,444 | 0.08 | 1 | 0.3773 % | 2,760.1 |
SplitShare | 4.27 % | 4.03 % | 48,635 | 3.78 | 5 | 0.2377 % | 3,192.0 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.3773 % | 2,523.8 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.44 % | -10.22 % | 67,308 | 0.08 | 19 | -0.0697 % | 2,485.6 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.10 % | 5.01 % | 106,627 | 15.40 | 16 | 0.1474 % | 2,685.1 |
FixedReset | 4.17 % | 3.55 % | 174,850 | 4.48 | 74 | 0.0004 % | 2,596.4 |
Deemed-Retractible | 4.94 % | -1.00 % | 98,055 | 0.11 | 40 | 0.0662 % | 2,615.3 |
FloatingReset | 2.56 % | -0.95 % | 59,866 | 0.08 | 6 | -0.1888 % | 2,553.1 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | -1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2018-09-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.01 Bid-YTW : 3.73 % |
TRP.PR.A | FixedReset | 1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 21.68 Evaluated at bid price : 22.07 Bid-YTW : 3.95 % |
TRP.PR.C | FixedReset | 1.23 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 21.80 Evaluated at bid price : 22.28 Bid-YTW : 3.51 % |
FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 20.51 Evaluated at bid price : 20.51 Bid-YTW : 3.67 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
RY.PR.Z | FixedReset | 205,547 | National sold three blocks to Nesbitt, two of 14,000 each and one of 11,900, all at 25.50; it also sold blocks of 18,900 and 25,000 to Scotia at 25.51. Scotia crossed 50,000 at 25.52 and Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 25.54. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2019-05-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.56 Bid-YTW : 3.47 % |
ENB.PR.P | FixedReset | 57,023 | Scotia crossed 43,200 at 24.41. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 23.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.41 Bid-YTW : 4.03 % |
ENB.PF.C | FixedReset | 56,385 | TD crossed 38,200 at 25.20. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 23.21 Evaluated at bid price : 25.20 Bid-YTW : 4.08 % |
TRP.PR.B | FixedReset | 41,221 | Nesbitt crossed 32,500 at 19.01 YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 19.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.00 Bid-YTW : 3.79 % |
ENB.PR.Y | FixedReset | 40,071 | TD crossed 26,700 at 23.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2044-11-21 Maturity Price : 22.61 Evaluated at bid price : 23.60 Bid-YTW : 4.11 % |
MFC.PR.L | FixedReset | 37,419 | TD crossed 30,000 at 25.25. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2019-06-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.20 Bid-YTW : 3.66 % |
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
BAM.PR.M | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 22.30 – 23.00 Spot Rate : 0.7000 Average : 0.4491 YTW SCENARIO |
ELF.PR.H | Perpetual-Premium | Quote: 25.32 – 25.75 Spot Rate : 0.4300 Average : 0.2564 YTW SCENARIO |
BAM.PF.F | FixedReset | Quote: 25.71 – 26.15 Spot Rate : 0.4400 Average : 0.2826 YTW SCENARIO |
PWF.PR.R | Perpetual-Premium | Quote: 26.31 – 26.72 Spot Rate : 0.4100 Average : 0.2536 YTW SCENARIO |
MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | Quote: 25.01 – 25.40 Spot Rate : 0.3900 Average : 0.2400 YTW SCENARIO |
BMO.PR.R | FloatingReset | Quote: 25.48 – 25.85 Spot Rate : 0.3700 Average : 0.2419 YTW SCENARIO |
Hi James,
Does the BoC have direct control of the 90-day treasury rate like it does (I presume) with the prime rate?
What is the best way to play the scenario where the bank raises interest rates in mid to late 2015? Would it be via
(a) one of the many floaters having a dividend directly proportional to prime; or
(b) a low-spread issue (e.g. conversion of TRP.PR.B @128bps to its floater version in June, although any other low-spread issue may do), for which any increase in the 90-day rate would have the biggest relative effect on the dividend increase?
Is there a rule of thumb (in this low-interest environment) for the ratio of the 90-day BoC rate increase resulting from an increase of the prime rate (or vice versa)? (e.g. an increase of the prime by a factor of 1.3 corresponding to an increase of the 90-day by 1.5…)
As a general rule, you can say that the Bank of Canada has control over exactly one interest rate: the Bank Rate:
Everything else flows from there and the question of exactly how it flows is a matter for continual academic inquiry. The bank makes available a number of backgrounders on monetary policy.
Prime is set by the banks themselves, and is supposed to be the rate at which they will lend to their best and most rock-solid customers, although this definition is suffering from the attentions of the marketing boys (‘Mortgages below prime!’) and is even less meaningful in the States. However, Prime is still a benchmark and used to determine the interest the bank charges on lots of call loans, such as HELOCs, etc.
Changes in the Bank Rate will normally be transmitted 1:1 to Prime, as you can see from the series of posts on Canada Prime, but this will not necessarily always be the case – for instance a 75bp cut in the Bank Rate led to a cut of only 50bp in Prime in December 2008.
You will have noted that I said the Bank controls only the Bank Rate ‘as a general rule’. Everything else is a market rate, but there is little – other than market wariness – to prevent the Bank from entering the market and distorting it to meet its policy ends. Quantitative Easing is the most obvious example.
What is the best way to play the scenario where the bank raises interest rates in mid to late 2015?
It depends! How much of the rise is already priced in to which securities? What else is going on? I’m afraid there are no easy answers. You may be interested in two of my publications, Some Preferreds To Float Your Boat and Are Floating Prefs Money Market Vehicles?.
Is there a rule of thumb …
As alluded to above, you may reasonably assume that changes in the Bank Rate will be transmitted 1:1 to changes in the 90-day Treasury Bill Yield, and transmitted 1:1 to changes in Prime, although there will be some slippage if the historical relationships that were in effect prior to the Credit Crunch re-establish themselves.
So the official inflation rate is well over 2%. I wonder what the real inflation rate is.
I was just reading an article in Macleans about shrinking packaged food sizes. I wonder if Stats Can takes the package size into account when calculating inflation. They have so many tricks to lower the reported rate of inflation.
Substitution, where if an item like, say, a certain type of apple gets to be too expensive they substitute a cheaper type.
They also factor in the improved quality of products. For example, computers get faster every year, so even if the price of a “standard” computer doesn’t drop in dollar terms they will calculate that it did because you get more processing speed for your dollar. Of course this doesn’t account for the fact that computer programs and web pages get more complex every year and required more processing power.
Not to mention the core inflation versus overall inflation nonsense. It seems whichever is lower is the one that gets the headlines, so that people can fret over the looming risk of deflation.
I wonder if Stats Can takes the package size into account when calculating inflation.
Transcript – An Overview of Canada’s Consumer Price Index (CPI):
Quantifying the effect of quality changes is difficult; see, for example, Measurement Bias in the Canadian Consumer Price Index and Measurement Bias in the Canadian
Consumer Price Index: An Update, as well as discussion at Finiki – Inflation.
There are plenty of apocalyptic critics of inflation measurement – see, for example, No. 515—PUBLIC COMMENT ON INFLATION MEASUREMENT AND THE CHAINED-CPI (C-CPI) from ShadowStats, which is the most credible critic I know of – with the caveat that I can’t be bothered to look into the matter particularly deeply.
Look at the two charts about 2/3 of the way down the page, titled “Consumer Inflation – Official vs. ShadowStats (XXXX-based) Alternate” where XXXX is either 1980 or 1990. The “1980” based chart claims that actual inflation has been a little under 10% annually since 2000 or, in other words, that prices have more or less quadrupled over the past 14 years. This is horse-shit. The 1990-based alternate claims an average of somewhere around 5-6% since 2000, thus claiming that prices have at least doubled in the last 14 years. This is also horseshit, merely somewhat less fragrant.
Then, if we look at Chart 13 in Review of Economic, Systemic-Solvency, Inflation, U.S. Dollar and Gold Circumstances [2012] we see that the numbers imply that “Real Average Weekly Earnings” for “Production and Non-Supervisory Workers” have declined from about $265 [1982-1984 constant dollars] in 1989-95 to about $185 in 2012; which is to say that the real standard of living for these workers has dropped by about 30% over the twenty-odd years. Horseshit, horseshit, horseshit.
I certainly won’t even attempt to defend every decimal place in the official estimates of inflation – but I will say that I haven’t seen any credible numbers that show much of a difference.
Not to mention the core inflation versus overall inflation nonsense.
I don’t consider it to be nonsense at all, and if you look at historical numbers, you’ll see that over the long run they’re pretty much the same, with core numbers being much smoother.
The danger with core vs. overall inflation is that the definition of “core” is subject to change – it is my understanding that during the 1970’s, one contributor to the Great Inflation was the changing definition of “core” … a relatively highly politicized Federal Reserve kept narrowing the definition to eliminate those segments of the economy over which they had lost control. There’s a reasonably detailed essay titled The Great Inflation – 1965 to 1982 by Michael Bryan of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in which you may be interested; there’s also a great quote in this article about core inflation:
However, I don’t see that happening today.
I couldn’t resist looking into the books for the figures from when I was setting up the firm in 2000.
I paid $2,200 for a desktop machine that could run HIMIPref™ and $6,500 for a laptop with equivalent power. Nowadays I buy low-end lap-tops and pay for them out of petty cash – they come in at less than $500.
I paid a bit more than $800 for a laser printer and my back-up system consisted of a zip drive and 12 disks, which had an incredible capacity of a full 250MB (wow!) cost a bit more than $600.
And it cost me thirty bucks to execute a trade with a discount broker.