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It’s time for … Battling Robots!
Vanguard has an ally in Palo Alto, California–based Wealthfront. The company’s algorithms direct about 90 percent of the average portfolio to Vanguard funds. The firms don’t have a financial relationship, and they’re chasing different markets. Yet their CEOs praise each other’s strategies. “I’m a big fan of what’s happened in the robo-world,” Vanguard CEO Bill McNabb says.
…
Fidelity is embracing the robo-product route via the 3,200 independent advisory firms for which it clears trades and holds about $1.5 trillion in assets. Boston-based Fidelity teamed up with No. 2 robo-firm Betterment in October to steer those advisers toward Betterment’s software. The robo-programs pick portfolios, often based on Vanguard funds, and automatically rebalance them to cut time and costs. Fidelity gets a referral fee, which it won’t disclose, from its New York–based partner. “Financial firms can no longer wait for the emerging affluent to appear at their doorstep when they have enough assets,” says David Canter, who heads a Fidelity unit serving independent advisers. “You have to think about them now.”
…
In the rising robo-rivalry between Fidelity and Vanguard, the winner may be … Charles Schwab Corp. The largest independent U.S. brokerage by client assets started a robo-offering for retail investors on March 9. By the end of May, the new program had $2.4 billion in client money and about 33,000 accounts. “The pressure is on,” Aite’s Pirker says.
So far, at any rate, there doesn’t appear to be any big threat to human advisors; everything’s happening in the discount space and clients are those who were already willing to go it alone, but are willing to pay a few bucks for some reassurance. Eventually I’m quite certain that every comprehensive fund family – and who is more comprehensive than Vanguard? – will have one.
Bond ETF outflows are rising:
Investors in U.S. exchange-traded funds have sold the most bonds in June in 15 months. So far, it’s proving to be a winning bet.
They pulled $2.14 billion out of fixed-income funds since May 31, on course to be the biggest monthly withdrawal since March 2014, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
With everyone getting ready for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, Treasuries have fallen almost 1 percent since the end of May, based on Bloomberg World Bond Indexes. It’s the biggest monthly decline since February.
Tim Kiladze of the Globe notes the current disaffection with FixedResets:
A sudden change of heart from retail investors is making financing decisions much tougher for Canada’s biggest companies.
Until recently, retail investors were happy to buy new issues of rate reset preferred shares from companies such as Royal Bank of Canada, TransCanada Corp. and Husky Energy Inc.
Such a heavy appetite for the product made it easy for these issuers to raise cash. In 2014, $14-billion worth of these securities were gobbled up.
But lately, retail investors are giving rate reset preferred shares the cold shoulder. Burned by poor performing issues, they are much less willing to buy new offerings of these securities.
My comments of June 16 regarding the Brondesbury Group report on Mutual Fund Fee Research commissioned by the OSC attracted some attention from a well-known activist … so I replied with an eMail:
At the risk of putting words in your mouth, I’ll suggest that you’re concerned with the 1-5% (?) of cases in which the salesman-client relationship goes badly wrong.
I am concerned about these cases, but in the same way I’m concerned about murder and burglary. When people clearly do wrong, catch ’em and punish ’em, I say – I do not advocate that we require people to prove that they have no intention of murdering or burglarizing anybody, and to prove that they have adequate supervision to ensure they don’t go astray. Nor do I advocate that police check everybody’s house annually to ensure the locks are up to the latest standards and the ‘safe-room’ is adequately secured against armed marauders, or that the citizen sign a release stating that he does not want these things and file it with the proper authorities.
I am more concerned with the effects on capital markets of a blanket fiduciary standard. Mainly, capital markets do not exist for the purpose of giving Granny a safe investment; giving Granny a good place to put her $50,000 is only a means to an end. Capital markets exist for the purpose of transmitting money from savers to direct investors – companies that need a few billion to build a pipeline, or a factory or whatever. All regulation must not only recognize this, but recognize that all other aspects of capital markets are subordinate to this purpose.
So my major problem with a blanket fiduciary standard is: who’s going to do the selling? Selling is hard work and it’s valuable to the entity whose goods are being sold. So we have new issue commissions, paid directly from the issuer to the salesman, just like happens with the friendly salesman at your local electronics store. So who are these people going to be?
Under a blanket fiduciary standard, it obviously cannot be the fiduciary, so Granny can’t buy a new issue bond and capture (to some extent) the new issue concession. Granny must buy whatever is available on the secondary market and pay a markup that is (proportionately) pretty big. Granny can’t buy a GIC either, because GICs have the profit margin and sales commission (or salary, if it’s a teller doing the work) built in to the offered yield (taken off the top!) and are therefore (according to some) inherently evil.
However, fiduciaries are a valuable part of capital markets. I should know – I’m a fiduciary myself. Fiduciaries allow for a certain amount of trust in a relationship between naive client and big-shot markets guy, thereby encouraging more direct participation by clients in the capital market’s purpose of turning cash under the mattress into new skyscrapers.
So we need fiduciaries and we need salesmen in our idealized capital markets – and guess what? We have that already! There are lots of fiduciaries around for those that want them; there are lots of salesmen around for those who want them, too. There will be lots of individuals who will want relationships with both types of professional; and, I suggest, there will be lots of investors who will maintain accounts with salesmen only when an objective evaluation will suggest a fiduciary. ‘Why should I pay this fiduciary?’ they will ask. ‘Last year he only did two trades and charged me $3,000!’
What we don’t have is strict separation of functions. Given the huge amount of money that’s made from new issue commissions (as I mentioned on June 16, this exceeds mutual fund commission revenue at the major brokerages), it should be clear that strict separation is necessary. Not only should any individual market professional be prohibited from being both a salesman and a fiduciary (even to different clients), but any given corporate group should be prohibited from assuming both roles. If X is a sales channel and Y is a fiduciary channel and Z owns both X and Y … there will be problems, conflicts of interest and leakages. Guaranteed. So all investment professionals and all their employers must be forced to make the choice. Sell Side or Buy Side? Choose!
It won’t happen. There are a lot of very large corporate interests that make very good money by being all things to all people and there are lots of regulators and politicians who want to work for these large corporations in their futures at double the paycheque. So we’ll keep muddling along, true to the ideal that we can all achieve moral perfection as long as there are enough rules and enough people to enforce them and enough money spent on compliance instead of laying bricks for the new factory.
Actually, this eMail turned out rather longer than I expected and I like it. So I’m going to publish it on my blog tonight (your name will not be mentioned).
By the way, I have a small and nascent sideline providing expert witness reports for negligence and misconduct cases involving preferred shares; it’s something I think can grow, since I have the belief that the guys in the big firms won’t work for plaintiffs. You might want to keep me in mind when one of the 1-5% (?) of relationships crosses your desk.
Sincerely,
Actually, I should have also pointed out that the typical problem I see when reviewing portfolios is not that investors have too much equity, but that they have too little. Not only are they grossly overweighted in fixed-income, but that fixed income is short term, and not only is it short term, but it’s federal debt. If anything, commissions on selling equities should be increased because people simply aren’t holding enough of them.
On cue, Rob Carrick writes a piece in the Globe about fee based accounts:
Fee-based advice is where the momentum is in the investment industry today. PriceMetrix says the percentage of fee-based assets rose to 35 per cent in 2014 from 31 per cent in 2013, while the percentage of total fee revenue from fee-based accounts rose to 53 per cent from 47 per cent. “More and more advisers are realizing that operating on a fee-for-service basis is simply a more productive way to grow your business,” said Patrick Kennedy, co-founder and chief customer officer at Toronto-based PriceMetrix.
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The general unavailability of fee information is a problem, though. Try this: Google the name of an investment firm you know and see if there’s a “fees” or “pricing” tab on their website. Outside of some online robo-adviser firms, I couldn’t find a single example of a company doing this.
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Fee secrecy is good for business. Clients are told what the costs are and they have no context to judge them. They can negotiate, but without the knowledge that there may be other firms doing the same kind of work for half a percentage point less. On a $500,000 portfolio, that difference amounts to $2,500 per year.
It’s not just fee information that is hard to get (I publish my fees!) but, more critically, it is performance information that is very difficult to get. I didn’t mention it in my long eMail, above, but I think anybody charging a fee for discretionary asset management should be required to publish a comprehensive performance report, going back to inception. Composites can be created either by asset type or account characteristics (or both!), I don’t care, but performance must be published! What’s more, returns should be reported using Time-Weighted returns, not the Dollar-Weighted returns so beloved of regulators and morons (see November 26, 2012 for the initial fluttering of eyelashes; the eventual decision to mandate dollar-weighted returns was discussed in greater detail in PrefLetter).
John Heinzl in the Globe gave a sensible response to a small investor wailing about preferred share prices:
A few years ago I started accounts worth $5,000 for each of two grandchildren, and invested all of the money in BCE preferred shares (BCE.PR.K). The value of these accounts has since fallen to about $3,900, but my adviser recommends we leave them as is. The funds will not be needed for the grandchildren until about 15 years from now. I have thought about dumping the shares but feel the capital loss at this point would be significant, and perhaps the shares will pick up in the years to come?
…
Two other factors to consider are the time horizon and diversification. If the money will not be needed for 15 years, you might wish to consider investing in something that provides more growth potential (preferred shares are usually purchased for income, not growth). Investing the entire account in a single stock is probably not a good idea, however, because it entails too much risk; a low-cost index exchange-traded fund or mutual fund – particularly one that allows full reinvestment of dividends to maximize compounding – will give you both growth potential and diversification.
Fifteen year time horizon? For the kids? There are only two legitimate choices:
- Canadian equity ETF
- One, maybe two, single stocks
I’ll also note that ‘selling things because they’ve gone down’ is as common as it is silly; it’s probably a factor in the current very long stretch of drip-drip-drip losses.
One of the best investments I ever made (well, it was made on my behalf, but never mind that) was 100 shares (or so) of Irwin Toy when I was about ten years old. Investment returns were no great shakes, and I’m not even sure if I got dividend cheques, but it was a company whose products I was familiar with AND I could watch the stock price AND I could read a little bit of the quarterly reports (although I found them pretty boring – I was only ten!) AND, best of all, Irwin Toy had a Junior Shareholders Club, and if we went to the annual meeting we got a present. I still wonder, from time to time, whether there were a few boys from Marketting in attendance, making notes about kids reactions to the game or toy they received.
Anyway, it was a superb introduction to the concept of stocks. So while the investor didn’t say anything about his personal circumstances, I suggest that those with a little bit of breathing room in their finances would be well advised to buy their kids a few shares (not necessarily a board lot, but worth enough that a ten year old will consider it a significant investment) in something like Walt Disney common. Or Apple. Or Loblaw. Or Cineplex. Or Hudson’s Bay Company. Or Restaurant Brands. Are these good investments, by the standards of my very astute Assiduous Readers? I don’t know. Who cares?
Getting back to economics for a moment, numbers released today were soft:
Canada’s consumer prices advanced 0.9 per cent in May from a year earlier while retail sales for April posted a surprise decline, signs the second-quarter recovery the central bank is counting on remains in doubt.
Core inflation, which excludes eight volatile products, slowed to 2.2 per cent from 2.3 per cent in April, Statistics Canada said Friday from Ottawa. April retail sales fell 0.1 per cent on declines in food and electronics. Economists had expected sales to rise 0.7 per cent, according to the median forecast in a Bloomberg News survey.
Total inflation, while exceeding April’s 0.8 per cent pace, is still outside the Bank of Canada’s 1 per cent to 3 per cent target range. The 0.1 per cent April decline in retail sales exceeded even the most bearish economist forecast, suggesting economic weakness in the first quarter from lower crude oil prices is lingering into the second.
And, just to cap the week, Barrie McKenna wrote about one of our favourite off-topics:
At the moment, demand is growing for butter and cream, but it’s flat for fluid milk. The excess skim milk is turned into powder for baby formula, used as animal feed, or thrown away.
Trade is generally not an option. Canada is severally limited in what it can export because the World Trade Organization deems the fixed domestic milk prices a subsidy.
…
Imports have been growing rapidly, and will continue to rise when the free-trade deal with Europe is put in place. If Canada eventually joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership, experts say even more imported dairy products will pour into the country.Canada’s trade deficit in dairy products has more than doubled since 2006. In 2014, dairy imports reached $900-million versus exports of $281-million, and the trend has accelerated in the first three months of this year. Exports were lower in 2014 than they were in 2006.
“Canada’s dairy sector is being seriously squeezed and faces a growing trade deficit,” according to a report slated to be released Monday by the Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute. “This is hardly a growth formula for one of Canada’s largest agri-food sectors, but more importantly, a significant threat to the current system.”
The dairy industry is a great example of the long-term evils of trade protectionism.
It was another bad day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets both down 30bp and DeemedRetractibles off 10bp. FixedResets dominated the bad part of the Performance Highlights table; the good part wasn’t big enough to be worth noticing. Volume was below average.
For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.
Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread
Here’s TRP:
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TRP.PR.A, which resets 2019-12-31 at +192, is bid at 20.20 to be $0.84 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.51 cheap at its bid price of 16.27.
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Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).
Most expensive is MFC.PR.J, resetting at +261bp on 2018-3-19, bid at 24.69 to be $0.49 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.70 to be $0.23 cheap.
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The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.50 to be $0.92 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 22.70 and appears to be $0.69 rich.
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FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.39, looks $0.32 cheap and resets 2020-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 21.15 and is $0.19 rich.
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Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of about 0.45%, including the outliers TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F at -0.34% and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.I at +1.17%. On the junk side there are two outliers: FFH.PR.E / FFH.PR.F at -0.87% and DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D at -0.46%.
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Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.3746 % | 2,202.4 |
| FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.3746 % | 3,850.8 |
| Floater | 3.52 % | 3.52 % | 63,131 | 18.48 | 3 | -0.3746 % | 2,341.3 |
| OpRet | 4.78 % | -9.28 % | 23,474 | 0.08 | 1 | 0.0395 % | 2,781.3 |
| SplitShare | 4.60 % | 4.92 % | 68,816 | 3.28 | 3 | -0.1608 % | 3,244.1 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0395 % | 2,543.2 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 5.47 % | 4.76 % | 58,985 | 4.98 | 19 | -0.0069 % | 2,518.1 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 5.20 % | 5.15 % | 115,336 | 15.21 | 15 | -0.3036 % | 2,708.1 |
| FixedReset | 4.54 % | 3.88 % | 241,764 | 16.21 | 88 | -0.3001 % | 2,337.4 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 5.01 % | 3.34 % | 112,089 | 0.76 | 34 | -0.1038 % | 2,621.0 |
| FloatingReset | 2.51 % | 2.93 % | 57,860 | 6.10 | 9 | 0.1524 % | 2,341.1 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| HSE.PR.A | FixedReset | -2.75 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 15.56 Evaluated at bid price : 15.56 Bid-YTW : 4.54 % |
| TRP.PR.C | FixedReset | -2.52 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 16.27 Evaluated at bid price : 16.27 Bid-YTW : 4.04 % |
| IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | -2.37 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.70 Bid-YTW : 4.95 % |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset | -2.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 21.85 Evaluated at bid price : 22.26 Bid-YTW : 4.01 % |
| ENB.PR.N | FixedReset | -2.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 18.82 Evaluated at bid price : 18.82 Bid-YTW : 4.98 % |
| BAM.PR.K | Floater | -1.77 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 13.85 Evaluated at bid price : 13.85 Bid-YTW : 3.60 % |
| MFC.PR.L | FixedReset | -1.76 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.30 Bid-YTW : 4.94 % |
| FTS.PR.K | FixedReset | -1.63 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 21.15 Evaluated at bid price : 21.15 Bid-YTW : 3.84 % |
| CIU.PR.C | FixedReset | -1.59 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 16.14 Evaluated at bid price : 16.14 Bid-YTW : 3.78 % |
| ENB.PR.J | FixedReset | -1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 19.21 Evaluated at bid price : 19.21 Bid-YTW : 4.91 % |
| FTS.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 21.32 Evaluated at bid price : 21.62 Bid-YTW : 3.76 % |
| FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | -1.27 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 16.39 Evaluated at bid price : 16.39 Bid-YTW : 3.78 % |
| ENB.PF.A | FixedReset | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 19.61 Evaluated at bid price : 19.61 Bid-YTW : 4.94 % |
| TD.PF.A | FixedReset | -1.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 22.37 Evaluated at bid price : 23.10 Bid-YTW : 3.66 % |
| ENB.PF.C | FixedReset | -1.17 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 19.48 Evaluated at bid price : 19.48 Bid-YTW : 4.97 % |
| ENB.PF.E | FixedReset | -1.06 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 19.64 Evaluated at bid price : 19.64 Bid-YTW : 4.96 % |
| FTS.PR.M | FixedReset | -1.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 22.84 Evaluated at bid price : 24.05 Bid-YTW : 3.69 % |
| RY.PR.K | FloatingReset | 1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.73 Bid-YTW : 2.69 % |
| MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2017-03-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.70 Bid-YTW : 2.95 % |
| IFC.PR.A | FixedReset | 1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.75 Bid-YTW : 6.13 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| GWO.PR.F | Deemed-Retractible | 344,965 | Scotia crossed blocks of 155,000 and 187,600, both at 25.42. Nice tickets! YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2015-07-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.35 Bid-YTW : -12.77 % |
| MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | 99,831 | RBC bought blocks of 10,700 and 33,900 from National at 25.65, then another 30,800 at 25.70. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2017-03-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.70 Bid-YTW : 2.95 % |
| HSE.PR.G | FixedReset | 90,627 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 23.01 Evaluated at bid price : 24.59 Bid-YTW : 4.54 % |
| FTS.PR.M | FixedReset | 78,000 | RBC crossed 75,000 at 24.45. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 22.84 Evaluated at bid price : 24.05 Bid-YTW : 3.69 % |
| RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 73,233 | TD crossed blocks of 34,200 and 25,000, both at 25.23. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.23 Bid-YTW : 3.16 % |
| TRP.PR.G | FixedReset | 57,060 | RBC crossed 39,400 at 24.90. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-06-19 Maturity Price : 23.10 Evaluated at bid price : 24.91 Bid-YTW : 3.83 % |
| There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| HSE.PR.C | FixedReset | Quote: 23.61 – 24.44 Spot Rate : 0.8300 Average : 0.5285 YTW SCENARIO |
| IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | Quote: 22.70 – 23.59 Spot Rate : 0.8900 Average : 0.6494 YTW SCENARIO |
| CU.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 21.97 – 22.68 Spot Rate : 0.7100 Average : 0.4885 YTW SCENARIO |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset | Quote: 22.26 – 22.93 Spot Rate : 0.6700 Average : 0.5056 YTW SCENARIO |
| ELF.PR.H | Perpetual-Premium | Quote: 25.05 – 25.56 Spot Rate : 0.5100 Average : 0.3632 YTW SCENARIO |
| GWO.PR.S | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 26.10 – 26.50 Spot Rate : 0.4000 Average : 0.2555 YTW SCENARIO |