There were no surprises with Canadian inflation:
Statistics Canada reported Friday that the country’s inflation rate, as measured by the year-over-year change in the CPI, held steady at 1 per cent in October, as slumping energy costs continued to suppress an otherwise generally rising tide for consumer prices. The CPI edged up a thin 0.1 per cent in October over September, despite gains in most major categories, including a 0.4-per-cent rise in food prices and a 0.3-per-cent increase in shelter costs. But gasoline prices slid 2 per cent month over month, leaving them down 17 per cent compared with a year earlier.
Excluding the energy sector, CPI was up 0.2 per cent month over month, and 2.1 per cent year over year, the statistical agency said.
…
But economists noted that the days of below-normal inflation rates are numbered – simply because the plunge in energy prices is about to drop out of the year-to-year price comparisons.
The BoC has published a working paper by Celso Brunetti, Bahattin Buyuksahin, Jeffrey H. Harris titled Speculators, Prices and Market Volatility:
We analyze data from 2005 through 2009 that uniquely identify categories of traders to assess how speculators such as hedge funds and swap dealers relate to volatility and price changes. Examining various subperiods where price trends are strong, we find little evidence that speculators destabilize financial markets. To the contrary, hedge funds facilitate price discovery by trading with contemporaneous returns while serving to reduce volatility. Swap dealer activity, however, is largely unrelated to both contemporaneous returns and volatility. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds provide valuable liquidity and largely serve to stabilize futures markets.
…
We also examine whether the “financialization” of futures markets (as represented by the changing mix of participant positions) has affected the functioning of the futures markets. In every instance, we find that speculative position changes do not amplify volatility during the crisis and so do not impede the functioning of futures markets. Conversely, in each market we find that macroeconomic conditions are significantly related to futures market volatility, with the strongest link from 2006 through July 2008. In fact, during the heart of the financial crisis after July 2008, volatility is strongly related to macroeconomic uncertainty (rather than market conditions or financialization).Although our tests do not examine positions, prices or volatility over short intervals (such as a few hours or days), we find no systematic, deleterious link between the trades of hedge funds or swap dealers and either returns or volatility. To the contrary, hedge fund trading, although positively correlated with price changes, is negatively related to volatility both contemporaneously and with a one-day lead. Hedge funds commonly provided liquidity in futures markets and improved price efficiency during the recent financial crisis. We conclude that speculators such as hedge funds and swap dealers should not be viewed as adversarial agents in financial markets, but rather as important liquidity providers to hedgers that enhance the proper functioning of financial markets.
It seems that all the downtown development that Toronto is seeing is not an isolated phenomenon:
Lena Edlund and Michaela Sviatchi of Columbia University and Cecilia Machado of the Getulio Vargas Foundation wondered why the relationship between housing prices and distance from the center of major U.S. cities has reversed since 1980. That year, prices were higher in the suburbs, and urban centers were going to seed. In the next 30 years, prices within three miles of the central business districts of the 27 biggest cities in the U.S. more than doubled. Within a radius of three to 10 miles, they increased by 60 percent. Further out, they only grew by 6 to 10 percent.
“The price profile flips,” the economists wrote in a recent paper. “In 1980, prices in the periphery are 50 percent higher than in the center. By 2010, prices in the center are 40 percent higher than in the periphery.”
The original paper also notes:
Between 1965 and 2005, leisure grew but not for the college educated. In the 1985-2005 period, the contraction in leisure among college men was substantial enough to result in an overall reduction for men (leisure grew among non-college men); for women, leisure contracted across the board but at the twice the rate for college women compared to non-college women [Aguiar and Hurst, 2009, table 2-2].
Aguiar and Hurst [2007, 2009] identified rising labor supply of the skilled to lie at the core of this development. Census data bear this out. The fraction college graduates who worked full time started to rise in the 1970s after three decades of barely moving, Figures 2 and 3. Unsurprisingly, the increase was more pronounced for women. Since 1990, there has also been a notable increase in the fraction (men and women) working 50+ hours per week (or “long hours” to use the terminology of Kuhn and Lozano [2006]).
I sneered at the Capital Power note exchange offer yesterday – the information circular has now been released on SEDAR although I am not permitted to link to it directly as this would make access to public documents too convenient for mere retail scum. The company states:
CPLP believes the Note Exchange Transaction may have the following benefits for the CPLP Noteholders, and that CPLP Noteholders should consider the following factors, among others, in making a decision whether to vote in favour of the Note Exchange Resolution:
- Same Terms. Upon completion of the Note Exchange Transaction, CPLP Noteholders will receive Capital Power Notes having terms (including with respect to coupon, maturity and redemption price) that are the same as those of the CPLP Notes for which they are being exchanged (except for conforming changes necessary to reflect Capital Power as the new issuer and to reflect the guarantee being provided by CPLP).
- Better Liquidity. Over time it is expected that debt of Capital Power will be more liquid than that of CPLP as Capital Power is expected to be the active debt issuer going forward and CPLP will not be.
- Structural Enhancement. Upon completion of the Note Exchange Transaction, CPLP Noteholders will receive Capital Power Notes that will rank pari passu with Capital Power’s other senior unsecured debt securities, will benefit from Capital Power’s diversified asset base (which includes CPLP’s asset base), will benefit from reporting consistent with Capital Power’s publicly traded equity, and will maintain the existing structural priority through a guarantee issued by CPLP. On November 19, 2015, each of DBRS Limited and Standard & Poor’s publicly announced that it expects to assign the same credit rating to the Capital Power Notes that it has assigned to the CPLP Notes.
…
RBC Capital Markets has been retained on behalf of CPLP to act as solicitation agent and to solicit votes in favour of the Note Exchange Resolution.The Solicitation Agent will be entitled to receive a fee for its services and be reimbursed for certain reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, including fees of legal counsel, and will be indemnified against certain liabilities and expenses in connection with the solicitation of votes in favour of the Note Exchange Resolution.
But I will note (from the Annual Report:
The Company, through its subsidiary CPLP, has the following externally imposed requirements on its capital as a result of its credit facilities and certain debt covenants, as defined in the respective agreements:
- Maintenance of modified consolidated net tangible assets to consolidated net tangible assets ratio, as defined in the debt agreements, of not less than 0.8 to 1.0;
- Maintenance of senior debt to consolidated capitalization ratio, as defined in the debt agreements, of not more than 0.65 to 1.0;
- Limitation on debt issued by subsidiaries; and
- In the event that CPLP is assigned a rating of less than BBB- by S&P and BBB (Low) by DBRS, CPLP would also be required to maintain a ratio of net income before interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization to finance expense, as defined in the debt agreements, of not less than 2.5 to 1.0.
I will also note, from the Annual Report, that consolidated revenue was $1,228-million while CPLP revenue was $1,220-million. So: diversification , schmiversification. I’ll stick to my guns and say holders should vote against the plan, despite the fact that the agencies say the difference between the two entitities does not result in a notching of credit and despite the fact that one major dealer, at least, thinks everything’s peachy with voting in favour. Being closer to the money and being owed the money directly by a financing vehicle subject to covenants is worth something; and even if it’s only worth 5bp, I want that 5bp.
It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 33bp, FixedResets losing 69bp and DeemedRetractibles off 10bp. The Performance Highlights table is of moderate – by 2015 standards – length. Volume was well above average.
Interestingly, this time the market was down only moderately until about 3pm, when it commenced a significant downdraft – but this time, instead of a last minute collapse, there was a notable (albeit insufficient) rebound commencing at 3:54. Perhaps some players have set up to take advantage of late-session selling pressure!
Click for Big
For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.
Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread
Here’s TRP:
Click for Big
TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 18.85 to be $0.77 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.47 cheap at its bid price of 13.25.
Click for Big
Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230bp on 2020-3-19, bid at 20.90 to be 0.59 rich, while MFC.PR.K resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 19.52 to be 0.42 cheap.
Click for Big
The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 16.59 to be $1.21 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp on 2020-3-31 is bid at 19.90 and appears to be $0.78 rich.
Click for Big
FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 19.62, looks $0.90 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp and resetting 2020-6-1, is bid at 14.14 and is $0.81 cheap.
Click for Big
Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.45%, with one outlier above 0.50%. There is one junk outlier below -1.50%.
Click for Big
Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 4.29 % | 5.15 % | 33,506 | 17.64 | 1 | -0.5625 % | 1,808.9 |
| FixedFloater | 6.11 % | 5.35 % | 26,169 | 17.09 | 1 | 0.3226 % | 3,194.3 |
| Floater | 4.19 % | 4.22 % | 78,841 | 16.91 | 3 | 1.3465 % | 1,886.8 |
| OpRet | 4.86 % | 3.78 % | 35,386 | 0.76 | 1 | -0.0794 % | 2,736.5 |
| SplitShare | 4.76 % | 5.60 % | 136,547 | 2.91 | 5 | 0.1643 % | 3,221.2 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1643 % | 2,513.3 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 5.81 % | 1.55 % | 88,883 | 0.08 | 6 | -0.1254 % | 2,502.6 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 5.54 % | 5.62 % | 87,738 | 14.46 | 33 | -0.3257 % | 2,583.6 |
| FixedReset | 4.91 % | 4.60 % | 220,423 | 15.36 | 76 | -0.6918 % | 2,088.0 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 5.16 % | 5.25 % | 116,104 | 5.39 | 33 | -0.0977 % | 2,581.4 |
| FloatingReset | 2.57 % | 3.78 % | 60,567 | 5.76 | 10 | -0.0203 % | 2,197.7 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| TD.PF.D | FixedReset | -5.62 % | Just standard nonsense from nonsense-central. The issue traded 4669 shares in a range of 21.90-20 today before closing at 21.00-22.10 (!). I have not checked whether this lamentable state of affairs is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.00 Bid-YTW : 4.44 % |
| HSE.PR.A | FixedReset | -4.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 13.67 Evaluated at bid price : 13.67 Bid-YTW : 5.02 % |
| IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | -2.79 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.88 Bid-YTW : 6.81 % |
| HSE.PR.C | FixedReset | -2.74 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.23 Evaluated at bid price : 20.23 Bid-YTW : 5.24 % |
| CM.PR.Q | FixedReset | -2.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.50 Evaluated at bid price : 21.80 Bid-YTW : 4.25 % |
| BAM.PF.F | FixedReset | -2.23 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.02 Evaluated at bid price : 21.02 Bid-YTW : 4.77 % |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset | -2.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.30 Evaluated at bid price : 21.30 Bid-YTW : 4.32 % |
| BAM.PR.T | FixedReset | -2.02 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 17.50 Evaluated at bid price : 17.50 Bid-YTW : 4.88 % |
| TRP.PR.B | FixedReset | -1.92 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 12.28 Evaluated at bid price : 12.28 Bid-YTW : 4.55 % |
| BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | -1.87 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.51 Evaluated at bid price : 20.51 Bid-YTW : 5.89 % |
| RY.PR.Z | FixedReset | -1.67 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.40 Evaluated at bid price : 19.40 Bid-YTW : 4.28 % |
| BAM.PF.B | FixedReset | -1.63 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.30 Evaluated at bid price : 19.30 Bid-YTW : 4.86 % |
| RY.PR.M | FixedReset | -1.59 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.00 Bid-YTW : 4.27 % |
| BMO.PR.Y | FixedReset | -1.49 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.55 Evaluated at bid price : 21.87 Bid-YTW : 4.21 % |
| IFC.PR.A | FixedReset | -1.46 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.87 Bid-YTW : 8.40 % |
| RY.PR.O | Perpetual-Discount | -1.45 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 22.71 Evaluated at bid price : 23.06 Bid-YTW : 5.32 % |
| FTS.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 18.43 Evaluated at bid price : 18.43 Bid-YTW : 4.34 % |
| BAM.PF.A | FixedReset | -1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.50 Evaluated at bid price : 20.50 Bid-YTW : 4.89 % |
| BAM.PR.M | Perpetual-Discount | -1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.60 Evaluated at bid price : 20.60 Bid-YTW : 5.86 % |
| NA.PR.S | FixedReset | -1.37 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.41 Evaluated at bid price : 19.41 Bid-YTW : 4.51 % |
| HSE.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.36 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 22.03 Evaluated at bid price : 22.55 Bid-YTW : 5.03 % |
| RY.PR.H | FixedReset | -1.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.35 Evaluated at bid price : 19.35 Bid-YTW : 4.33 % |
| POW.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 22.39 Evaluated at bid price : 22.65 Bid-YTW : 5.58 % |
| CU.PR.C | FixedReset | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.55 Evaluated at bid price : 19.55 Bid-YTW : 4.35 % |
| TD.PR.S | FixedReset | -1.22 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.20 Bid-YTW : 3.54 % |
| MFC.PR.J | FixedReset | -1.22 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.63 Bid-YTW : 5.55 % |
| W.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 23.74 Evaluated at bid price : 24.05 Bid-YTW : 5.89 % |
| BAM.PR.R | FixedReset | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 16.59 Evaluated at bid price : 16.59 Bid-YTW : 5.07 % |
| MFC.PR.G | FixedReset | -1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.60 Bid-YTW : 5.21 % |
| NA.PR.W | FixedReset | -1.14 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.11 Evaluated at bid price : 19.11 Bid-YTW : 4.40 % |
| SLF.PR.H | FixedReset | -1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 18.30 Bid-YTW : 7.36 % |
| VNR.PR.A | FixedReset | -1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.30 Evaluated at bid price : 20.30 Bid-YTW : 4.75 % |
| SLF.PR.I | FixedReset | -1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.11 Bid-YTW : 5.46 % |
| BAM.PF.C | Perpetual-Discount | -1.00 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.79 Evaluated at bid price : 20.79 Bid-YTW : 5.93 % |
| CU.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 1.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.85 Evaluated at bid price : 20.85 Bid-YTW : 5.42 % |
| BMO.PR.M | FixedReset | 1.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.40 Bid-YTW : 3.39 % |
| BNS.PR.D | FloatingReset | 1.32 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.02 Bid-YTW : 5.18 % |
| MFC.PR.F | FixedReset | 1.39 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 15.25 Bid-YTW : 8.67 % |
| PWF.PR.T | FixedReset | 2.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 21.88 Evaluated at bid price : 22.20 Bid-YTW : 3.89 % |
| BAM.PR.B | Floater | 2.72 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 11.32 Evaluated at bid price : 11.32 Bid-YTW : 4.22 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| CM.PR.O | FixedReset | 164,810 | RBC crossed 100,000 at 19.85; Scotia crossed 40,000 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.71 Evaluated at bid price : 19.71 Bid-YTW : 4.34 % |
| BNS.PR.R | FixedReset | 138,700 | Nesbitt crossed blocks of 20,000 and 50,000, both at 24.85. TD sold 10,000 to anonymous at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.82 Bid-YTW : 3.55 % |
| BMO.PR.T | FixedReset | 131,286 | Scotia crossed 50,000 at 19.60; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 19.37 Evaluated at bid price : 19.37 Bid-YTW : 4.31 % |
| BMO.PR.S | FixedReset | 119,222 | RBC crossed 49,400 at 20.10. Scotia crossed 50,600 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-11-20 Maturity Price : 20.07 Evaluated at bid price : 20.07 Bid-YTW : 4.26 % |
| RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 86,735 | RBC crossed 49,800 at 24.50; TD crossed 10,800 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.48 Bid-YTW : 3.61 % |
| BNS.PR.B | FloatingReset | 75,490 | Scotia crossed 74,300 at 22.47. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.54 Bid-YTW : 3.86 % |
| There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| TD.PF.D | FixedReset | Quote: 21.00 – 22.10 Spot Rate : 1.1000 Average : 0.7028 YTW SCENARIO |
| HSE.PR.A | FixedReset | Quote: 13.67 – 14.47 Spot Rate : 0.8000 Average : 0.4891 YTW SCENARIO |
| VNR.PR.A | FixedReset | Quote: 20.30 – 21.31 Spot Rate : 1.0100 Average : 0.7213 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 20.51 – 21.25 Spot Rate : 0.7400 Average : 0.5038 YTW SCENARIO |
| IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | Quote: 19.88 – 20.56 Spot Rate : 0.6800 Average : 0.4531 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PR.M | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 20.60 – 21.20 Spot Rate : 0.6000 Average : 0.4169 YTW SCENARIO |