So, how about the industry reactions to the Pacific trade deal, eh?:
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trade Minister François-Philippe Champagne announced on Tuesday, will benefit Canada’s agricultural sector, chiefly beef and pork producers, which are being granted market access to the once-sheltered Japanese market – access that rivals in Australia already enjoy.
But Canada’s dairy farmers, the head of the country’s largest private-sector union and a major portion of the Canadian auto industry say the new deal makes major concessions to foreign competitors that will cost jobs in Canada without yielding sufficient reciprocal benefits.
…
Key sectors of the auto industry in Canada oppose the new agreement.
…
Auto-parts makers say the TPP would open them up to more intense competition from low-cost countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia. The Detroit Three auto makers say it will eliminate tariffs on Japan-made vehicles entering the Canadian market while not removing existing non-tariff barriers in Japan.
So confident exporters love it and coddled parasites hate it? I like this deal already!
Clare O’Hara of the Globe continues the whitewashing of the Canadian discount brokerages negligence:
Online discount brokerages at Canada’s Big Six banks are continuing to see a surge in trading volumes and new account openings amid the investor frenzy centred on cannabis and cryptocurrency-related stocks.
The increased activity has been testing the limits of what some of the brokerages can handle during peak periods in the North American trading day.
Royal Bank of Canada’s RBC Direct Investing experienced outages on Tuesday morning that blocked some investors from accessing their online trading accounts for approximately an hour.
Meanwhile, Toronto-Dominion Bank has had to postpone a new online system for opening accounts, forcing investors to visit branches in person and endure at least a one-week waiting period.
…
Officials for other online brokerages at Bank of Montreal, National Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Bank of Nova Scotia have all confirmed they also have been seeing higher-than-normal trading volumes.For some of them, account opening requests have been running more than three times the average rates of 2017.
…
Scotiabank confirmed it has seen an increase of account openings of more than three times the daily average of last year, as well as almost double the trading volume than expected for this month.BMO InvestorLine has seen its traffic volume increase steadily each month since September; since November, it has a 26-per-cent increase in new accounts, according to the bank.
I don’t give a rat’s putootie about “double the trading volume expected for this month.” I have two questions instead: How was the expectation developed? And mainly, how does that expectation compare with what might be reasonably expected during an actual market break?
I also don’t give a rat’s putootie about account openings of “three times the average rates of 2017”. 2017 was a nothing year. Nothing significant happened. Who cares about 2017? What might the account opening rate be during an actual market break?
These clowns have had a mild stress test and failed miserably.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.3712 % | 2,891.7 |
| FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.3712 % | 5,306.1 |
| Floater | 3.44 % | 3.57 % | 43,525 | 18.36 | 4 | 0.3712 % | 3,057.9 |
| OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1163 % | 3,165.6 |
| SplitShare | 4.64 % | 4.11 % | 66,526 | 3.38 | 5 | 0.1163 % | 3,780.4 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1163 % | 2,949.6 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 5.37 % | -1.13 % | 67,476 | 0.09 | 18 | 0.0656 % | 2,865.9 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 5.30 % | 5.29 % | 69,172 | 14.98 | 16 | -0.0963 % | 3,001.6 |
| FixedReset | 4.20 % | 4.47 % | 147,433 | 3.89 | 101 | 0.2177 % | 2,537.3 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 5.06 % | 5.48 % | 83,606 | 5.82 | 28 | 0.0547 % | 2,956.3 |
| FloatingReset | 3.04 % | 2.96 % | 40,932 | 3.78 | 10 | 0.0694 % | 2,771.2 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| PWF.PR.Z | Perpetual-Discount | -1.22 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 23.99 Evaluated at bid price : 24.36 Bid-YTW : 5.29 % |
| MFC.PR.M | FixedReset | 1.00 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.24 Bid-YTW : 4.86 % |
| SLF.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.04 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.24 Bid-YTW : 5.43 % |
| BAM.PR.B | Floater | 1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 17.03 Evaluated at bid price : 17.03 Bid-YTW : 3.57 % |
| MFC.PR.J | FixedReset | 1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.79 Bid-YTW : 4.88 % |
| TRP.PR.H | FloatingReset | 1.41 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 17.25 Evaluated at bid price : 17.25 Bid-YTW : 3.61 % |
| IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | 1.91 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-09-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.96 Bid-YTW : 4.66 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| TD.PF.A | FixedReset | 308,100 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 23.49 Evaluated at bid price : 23.86 Bid-YTW : 4.43 % |
| BNS.PR.G | FixedReset | 208,500 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-07-25 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.72 Bid-YTW : 3.41 % |
| BAM.PR.Z | FixedReset | 132,393 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 23.11 Evaluated at bid price : 24.85 Bid-YTW : 4.89 % |
| RY.PR.Q | FixedReset | 107,957 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-05-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.56 Bid-YTW : 3.38 % |
| BNS.PR.Q | FixedReset | 102,700 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2018-10-25 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.99 Bid-YTW : 3.68 % |
| BMO.PR.S | FixedReset | 102,635 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-01-25 Maturity Price : 24.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.40 Bid-YTW : 4.48 % |
| There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| BAM.PF.J | FixedReset | Quote: 25.50 – 26.39 Spot Rate : 0.8900 Average : 0.5165 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 21.84 – 22.23 Spot Rate : 0.3900 Average : 0.2462 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PF.E | FixedReset | Quote: 24.10 – 24.45 Spot Rate : 0.3500 Average : 0.2277 YTW SCENARIO |
| PWF.PR.Z | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 24.36 – 24.75 Spot Rate : 0.3900 Average : 0.2683 YTW SCENARIO |
| BMO.PR.Q | FixedReset | Quote: 22.81 – 23.07 Spot Rate : 0.2600 Average : 0.1664 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PF.H | FixedReset | Quote: 26.24 – 26.50 Spot Rate : 0.2600 Average : 0.1813 YTW SCENARIO |
On the issue of delays at the brokerages. The December 2017 trading volume update from TMX shows that Venture volumes were 55% higher than Dec 2016 with 106% increase in the # of trades executed.
Jan 2018 figures aren’t out yet, but given the December ones, I have no problem believing the PR statements put out by the banks that volume has been unprecedented.
The question remains: How do these volumes compare with what might be reasonably expected in the event of a market break, a la 2008Q4, 2001Q2 and 1987Q4? I really don’t care about comparisons with December 2016, because nothing happened in December 2016.
And, what’s more, why is it taking so long to fix? Even if it is unprecedented and not within reasonable surge expectations, fixing it should be a matter of simply snapping in a few dozen more servers according to plan.
“These clowns have had a mild stress test and failed miserably.”
hahahaha. i see you love the banks as much as i do… they are clowns. this whole volume issue is a joke. i can’t understand how this is a problem. everything is electronic now. it’s not like people are phoning in orders.
as for opening accounts.. wow.. back when i first opened a TD Waterhouse account in the mid-90’s, i went into a branch with my completed application, they faxed it down to someone at Waterhouse, and they got a call back with my new account number… i mean really.. that was 1994. and today? they can’t open up accounts?
as for how things were running, TD wasn’t bad for me this week. no problems logging in. no problems with orders.
I should also point out that all of these large brokerages should have some kind of formula that will estimate volumes for the next month (at least) based on their historical experience.
e.g., 100 RRIF accounts will normally generate two trades, four ‘phone calls and five cash withdrawals every month, except in January, when those numbers triple and February, when they double.
… and …
a market decline of 10% in the past 11 months will generate a 15% increase in margin account trading, a 10% increase in cash account trading and a 5% increase in registered account trading, except in December, when those figures are doubled.
There would be many such terms in a competently researched, reasonably reliable forecasting tool. It would be, shall we say, somewhat more complex than ‘the expected volume is equal to that of the same month last year’.
If I am to believe that that unexpected trading volumes are responsible for the problems, I want to know (a) how reliable this algorithm has been historically and (b) what part of the algorithm went blahooey in the past month, as well as (c) how they propose to deal with a market break, given the predictions of this heuristic.
Until then, I will continue to believe that the banks are simply mouthing PR bullshit to obfuscate their negligence.
Ok, so the volume was increased over the month. The question I always have is how did they respond during this increase volume period. Did they increase capacity,staff,resources ? The answer is probably NO.
Every year at holiday time they have the same response for their credit card side. The holiday happens EVERY year at the same time so why not staff up.
Again the answer is COST, they figure they can skate through these periods by telling us ” the wait times are longer because of higher volumes” ” we value your business”. Interpretstion is we are too cheap to hire staff and you have nothing better to than sit on the phone listening to our commercials.
Did they increase capacity,staff,resources ?
Yes, the banks employ an army of part-timers, many of whom would be thrilled to take a course and get a few extra shifts answering the ‘phone during busy periods. But as I have often said, the banks do not have any interest in doing a good job. That’s not their business model. Their business model is to do an adequate job very cheaply and slap a brand name on it.
It works out very well for them; it helps that they are sheltered from competition.
While I’m not impressed with how the big banks are handling the increase in activity, that isn’t what interests me the most about this situation.
The current investor infatuation with crypto currency and cannabis stocks reminds me of the 2000 tech stock bubble. Mindless trend following by hordes of investors. This will end badly, it always does.
The current investor infatuation with crypto currency and cannabis stocks reminds me of the 2000 tech stock bubble.
Yep.
Could the infatuation with Bitcoin and marijuana stocks lead to a flood of “small accounts” being opened to trade these securities…
So, not the number of shares traded, but the number of orders could be the cause of the problem.
the number of orders could be the cause of the problem.
Sure. that’s possible. But before I believe anything at all, I want to see an honest effort by the banks to explain the difficulty and where their preparations failed. So far they haven’t made any effort to publicize a convincing narrative.