PrefBlog

Paul Krugman writes an op-ed in the New York Times, Good and Boring, lauding the resilience of Canadian banks:

Canada has an independent Financial Consumer Agency, and it has sharply restricted subprime-type lending.

Above all, Canada’s experience seems to support those who say that the way to keep banking safe is to keep it boring — that is, to limit the extent to which banks can take on risk.
…
More specifically, Canada has been much stricter about limiting banks’ leverage, the extent to which they can rely on borrowed funds. It has also limited the process of securitization, in which banks package and resell claims on their loans outstanding — a process that was supposed to help banks reduce their risk by spreading it, but has turned out in practice to be a way for banks to make ever-bigger wagers with other people’s money.
…
Actually, the financial reform bill that the House of Representatives passed in December would significantly Canadianize the U.S. system. It would create an independent Consumer Financial Protection Agency, it would establish limits on leverage, and it would limit securitization by requiring that lenders hold on to some of their loans.

I suggest that Dr. Krugman has selected features of Canada’s system to further his domestic political arguments. The IMF has published suggestions that a critical factor is the stable deposit base of Canadian banks – which, I believe, is related to their national scope and oligopolistic position. Another major factor has been the banks’ control over the mortgage market – limited competition (no GSE’s here in Canada!) has allowed them to extract rents from hapless Canadian mortgagees, leaving much less necessity of reaching for yield. The sole Canadian bank that did fail during the crisis, Dundee Bank, failed because its lack of mortgage distribution channels encouraged it to go out on a limb provided by ABCP.

Paul Volcker testified to the Senate banking committee today:

Given strong legislative direction, bank supervisors should be able to appraise the nature of those trading activities and contain excesses. An analysis of volume relative to customer relationships and of the relative volatility of gains and losses would go a long way toward informing such judgments. For instance, patterns of exceptionally large gains and losses over a period of time in the “trading book” should raise an examiner’s eyebrows. Persisting over time, the result should be not just raised eyebrows but substantially raised capital requirements.

This is much more in line with my thinking than a flat prohibition, which will be subject to interpretation.

More generally, proprietary trading activity should not be able to profit from knowledge of customer trades.

That’s what the SEC’s supposed to be worrying about.

Mr. Volcker also noted that he had attached an essay to his official testimony, but I can’t find it!

A relatively directionless day for Canadian preferred shares, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 5bp and FixedResets gaining 1bp on moderate volume.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010 at 7:58 pm and is filed under Market Action. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.