{"id":10078,"date":"2010-03-12T22:30:27","date_gmt":"2010-03-13T02:30:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=10078"},"modified":"2010-03-12T22:30:27","modified_gmt":"2010-03-13T02:30:27","slug":"march-12-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=10078","title":{"rendered":"March 12, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Another boring day, as far as actual news was concerned. An <a href=\"http:\/\/dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com\/2010\/03\/12\/the-british-origins-of-lehmans-accounting-gimmick\/\">explanation of Lehman&#8217;s financing technique<\/a> looked interesting at first, but turned out to be only legal hairsplitting. OK, OK, so the outward leg of the repo is recorded as a true sale and that delevers the balance sheet. Fair enough. But how did they avoid putting the inward leg on the balance sheet? Fortunately, <a href=\"http:\/\/lehmanreport.jenner.com\/VOLUME%203.pdf\">volume 3 of the Examiner&#8217;s report<\/a> makes that part clear:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Unlike an ordinary repo transaction, Lehman did not record the borrowing of cash from a Repo 105 transaction even though Lehman was obliged to repay the borrowing. Instead, Lehman established a long inventory derivative asset representing the obligation under a forward contract to repurchase the full amount of securities \u201csold.\u201d3009 As Lehman\u2019s internal Repo 105 Accounting Policy explained, assuming Lehman borrowed $100 cash in exchange for a pledge of $105 of fixed income collateral, Lehman booked a $5 derivative, which represented Lehman\u2019s obligation to repurchase the securities at the end of the term of the repo transaction. The $5 arose from the fact that when it came time to repurchase the pledged securities, Lehman paid $100 cash for $105 worth of securities. The transaction therefore had a $5 value to Lehman reflecting the market value of the \u201covercollateralization\u201d amount of the Repo 105 transaction. Because it had a positive fair value of $5, the derivative was recorded as an asset under SFAS 133.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Volume stayed perky today, while PerpetualDiscounts lost 8bp and FixedResets gained 14bp, taking yields on the latter down to 3.50%. Yields on FixedResets have only been below 3.50% on three days &#8211; ever! &#8211; with the all time low being 3.46% on January 11, 2010.<\/p>\n<p>March 12 is the fourth-lowest FixedReset index yield of all time, March 11 is fifth-lowest.<\/p>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='8'><strong>HIMIPref&trade; Preferred Indices<br \/>These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref&trade; Indices<\/strong><br \/>Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Mean<br \/>Current<br \/>Yield<br \/>(at bid)<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>YTW<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Average<br \/>Trading<br \/>Value<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Mod Dur<br \/>(YTW)<\/td>\n<td>Issues<\/td>\n<td>Day&#8217;s Perf.<\/td>\n<td>Index Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Ratchet<\/td>\n<td>2.63 %<\/td>\n<td>2.77 %<\/td>\n<td>51,166<\/td>\n<td>20.85<\/td>\n<td>1<\/td>\n<td>0.4204 %<\/td>\n<td>2,103.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedFloater<\/td>\n<td>5.12 %<\/td>\n<td>3.23 %<\/td>\n<td>41,025<\/td>\n<td>19.90<\/td>\n<td>1<\/td>\n<td>0.7109 %<\/td>\n<td>3,089.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>1.93 %<\/td>\n<td>1.73 %<\/td>\n<td>43,450<\/td>\n<td>23.22<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>0.0490 %<\/td>\n<td>2,389.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>4.90 %<\/td>\n<td>3.03 %<\/td>\n<td>102,424<\/td>\n<td>0.22<\/td>\n<td>13<\/td>\n<td>-0.0745 %<\/td>\n<td>2,310.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SplitShare<\/td>\n<td>6.40 %<\/td>\n<td>6.27 %<\/td>\n<td>126,761<\/td>\n<td>3.70<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td>-0.2862 %<\/td>\n<td>2,131.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>-0.0745 %<\/td>\n<td>2,112.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>5.88 %<\/td>\n<td>5.82 %<\/td>\n<td>124,300<\/td>\n<td>5.84<\/td>\n<td>7<\/td>\n<td>0.1931 %<\/td>\n<td>1,892.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>5.90 %<\/td>\n<td>5.96 %<\/td>\n<td>173,706<\/td>\n<td>13.98<\/td>\n<td>71<\/td>\n<td>-0.0803 %<\/td>\n<td>1,791.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>5.36 %<\/td>\n<td>3.50 %<\/td>\n<td>323,459<\/td>\n<td>3.70<\/td>\n<td>43<\/td>\n<td>0.1354 %<\/td>\n<td>2,200.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Change<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HSB.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>-1.15 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-03-12<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 21.42<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.42<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HSB.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>-1.05 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-03-12<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 21.50<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.77<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TRI.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>1.04 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-03-12<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 24.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.25<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 1.60 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.I<\/td>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>1.15 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2010-07-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.50<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.56<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Shares<br \/>Traded<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TRP.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>134,422<\/td>\n<td><a href=\"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=10070\">Recent new issue<\/a>.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-03-12<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 24.87<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.92<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TD.PR.M<\/td>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>126,260<\/td>\n<td>RBC bought 10,000 from National at 26.25; National crossed 25,000 at 26.12. RBC crossed 22,000 at 26.15, then bought 11,500 from National at the same price. National crossed 30,000 at 26.15.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2010-05-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.75<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.10<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 0.66 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>ACO.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>63,748<\/td>\n<td>CIBC crossed 24,900 at 25.52.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2010-12-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.51<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.38 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BMO.PR.P<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>60,615<\/td>\n<td>TD crossed 50,000 at 27.10.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-03-27<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.09<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>RY.PR.I<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>55,439<\/td>\n<td>RB crossed 21,000 at 26.47 and two blocks, of 10,000 and 15,000, at 26.45.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-03-26<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.40<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.55 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TD.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>44,750<\/td>\n<td>RBC crossed 10,000 at 27.10; TD crossed 17,200 at the same price.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-03-02<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.08<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.51 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'>There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Another boring day, as far as actual news was concerned. An explanation of Lehman&#8217;s financing technique looked interesting at first, but turned out to be only legal hairsplitting. OK, OK, so the outward leg of &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10078","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10078","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=10078"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10078\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=10078"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=10078"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=10078"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}