{"id":12187,"date":"2010-09-13T22:43:42","date_gmt":"2010-09-14T02:43:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=12187"},"modified":"2010-09-13T22:43:42","modified_gmt":"2010-09-14T02:43:42","slug":"september-13-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=12187","title":{"rendered":"September 13, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Deutsche Bank&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2010-09-12\/deutsche-bank-to-raise-eu9-8-billion-for-postbank-regulation.html\">not letting the grass grow under their feet<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Deutsche Bank AG, Germany\u2019s largest bank, plans to raise at least 9.8 billion euros ($12.5 billion) in its biggest-ever share sale to take over Deutsche Postbank AG and meet stricter capital rules.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Deutsche Bank fell 2.32 euros, or 4.6 percent, to 47.70 euros in Frankfurt trading on Sept. 10, giving the company a market value of 29.6 billion euros. Postbank jumped 1.23 euros, or 4.8 percent, to 27.04 euros, valuing the bank at 5.9 billion euros.<\/p>\n<p>Ackermann, who previously said the bank would only raise capital for acquisitions, is trying to build up the bank\u2019s so- called stable businesses of retail banking and asset management, and reduce reliance on investment banking, which accounted for 78 percent of pretax profit in the first half.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Postbank\u2019s Tier 1 capital ratio, a measure of financial strength, fell to 6.6 percent under the most severe scenario of the European Union stress tests conducted in July, compared with the 6 percent minimum required to pass. Deutsche Bank\u2019s ratio, by contrast, stood at 9.7 percent under the toughest test.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>There is continued feeling that High Frequency Traders <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2010-09-13\/sec-second-guesses-its-stock-trading-crusade-as-u-s-market-makers-vanish.html\">aren&#8217;t quite our type of person, dear<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has spent 15 years remaking the stock market into 11 competing exchanges and hundreds of computer-driven traders. In the process it has virtually eliminated the traditional market makers who bought and sold stocks when no one else would.<\/p>\n<p>Now the SEC is concerned the revolution has gone too far, leaving markets vulnerable when selling starts to snowball.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Specialists at the NYSE maintained \u201cfair and orderly\u201d markets by stepping in themselves when buyers and sellers weren\u2019t available. Similar to market makers on the Nasdaq, they took risks in return for the ability to see supply and demand for stocks and profit from the difference between the bid and offer prices. Both businesses suffered when exchanges started pricing stocks in penny increments in 2001, squeezing profit out of the bid-ask spread.<\/p>\n<p>The SEC is in the \u201cearly stages of thinking about whether obligations on market makers akin to what used to exist might make sense,\u201d Schapiro told reporters on Sept. 7. The issue is \u201cwhether the firms that effectively act as market makers during normal times should have any obligation to support the market in reasonable ways in tough times,\u201d she said during a speech in New York the same day.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>\u201cThe playing field has leveled dramatically,\u201d said Joe Ratterman, chief executive officer of exchange operator Bats, which accounts for 11 percent of U.S. stock trading. \u201cIt used to be easy for a specialist to work off a 6- or 12-cent spread, but when he had to offer a penny spread it became hard to make a fat living. A new breed of firms stepped in and learned to be efficient. Those firms replaced the ones that were less efficient.\u201d<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/> The Brady Commission report on the October 1987 crash found NYSE specialists and Nasdaq market makers performed erratically and didn\u2019t stem the downward slide of prices. Many Nasdaq market makers didn\u2019t answer their phones, ignoring customers, while overwhelmed NYSE specialists who had bought as sell orders flooded in later gave up or halted trading, according to the January 1988 report by the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, led by former New Jersey Republican Senator Nicholas Brady.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The article highlighted <a href=\"http:\/\/sec.gov\/comments\/s7-02-10\/s70210-122.pdf\">Vanguard&#8217;s comment letter<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Vanguard and its investors have benefited fiom the competition that today&#8217;s market structure facilitates. Over the past fifteen years, the competition among trading venues and significant technologtcal advancements have greatly reduced transaction costs for all investors across our markets. Although Vanguard does not engage in &#8220;high frequency trading&#8221; and does not operate a &#8220;dark pool,&#8221; we believe much of the public concern over &#8220;high fiequency trading&#8221; is misplaced and believes such activity, appropriately examined, contributes to a more efficient market that benefits all investors.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Various groups have attempted to quantify the reduction in transaction costs over the last ten to fifteen years. The Commission will continue to receive this data throughout the comment period. While the data universally demonstrate a significant reduction in transaction costs over the last ten to fifteen years, the precise percentages vary (estimates have ranged from a reduction of 35% to more than 60%). Vanguard estimates are in this range, and we conservatively estimate that transaction costs have declined 50 bps, or 100 bps round trip. This reduction in transaction costs provides a substantial benefit to investors in the form of higher net returns. For example, if an average actively managed equity mutual fund with a 100% turnover ratio would currently provide an annual return of 9%, the same fund would have returned 8% per year without the reduction in transaction costs over the past decade.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Vanguard supports a trade-through rule that provides &#8220;depth-of-book protection because protecting quotations at multiple price levels encourages the display of limit orders, which, for the reasons set forth above, benefits all investor.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=12165\">The recent IIROC report<\/a> trumpeted Canadian-style depth-of-book protection.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Vanguard believes the Commission should consider the costs and benefits of a &#8220;trade-at&#8221; rule in which a trading center that was not displaying the NBBO price at the time a marketable order was received could either: &#8220;1) execute the order with significant price improvement (such as the minimum allowable quoting increment (generally one cent)); or 2) route lSOs to full displayed size of NBBO quotations and then execute the balance of the order at the NBBO price.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Such a rule would clearly provide an incentive to display limit orders which, as discussed above, Vanguard believes is in the best interests of all investors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Vanguard is missing the point. The purpose of public markets is to give the private school guys the opportunity to make a fat living with no brains and less work. What do customers have to do with it?<\/p>\n<p>Another good move upwards on hefty volume in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 32bp and FixedResets up 4bp. MFC issues had a notable day, with three issues featured on the nice side of the performance table. MFC.PR.A had another day of high volume; I see on <a href=\"http:\/\/www.pfin.ca\/canadianfixedincome\/Default.aspx\">CBID<\/a> that the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.manulife.com\/public\/news\/detail\/0,,lang=en&#038;artId=145918&#038;navId=630002,00.html\">recent MFC senior bond issue<\/a>, 4.079% of 2015, are quoted to yield 4.12% &#8230; basically even-yield with the preferreds, so the 160-odd bp of tax effectiveness looks very nice for a five-year term.<\/p>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='8'><strong>HIMIPref&trade; Preferred Indices<br \/>These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref&trade; Indices<\/strong><br \/>Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Mean<br \/>Current<br \/>Yield<br \/>(at bid)<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>YTW<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Average<br \/>Trading<br \/>Value<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Mod Dur<br \/>(YTW)<\/td>\n<td>Issues<\/td>\n<td>Day&#8217;s Perf.<\/td>\n<td>Index Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Ratchet<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.8337 %<\/td>\n<td>2,079.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedFloater<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.8337 %<\/td>\n<td>3,149.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>2.92 %<\/td>\n<td>3.43 %<\/td>\n<td>62,908<\/td>\n<td>18.69<\/td>\n<td>3<\/td>\n<td>0.8337 %<\/td>\n<td>2,244.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>4.87 %<\/td>\n<td>-0.18 %<\/td>\n<td>91,379<\/td>\n<td>0.21<\/td>\n<td>9<\/td>\n<td>0.3382 %<\/td>\n<td>2,379.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SplitShare<\/td>\n<td>5.95 %<\/td>\n<td>-34.66 %<\/td>\n<td>64,288<\/td>\n<td>0.09<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td>0.1439 %<\/td>\n<td>2,364.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.3382 %<\/td>\n<td>2,175.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>5.71 %<\/td>\n<td>5.42 %<\/td>\n<td>125,918<\/td>\n<td>5.52<\/td>\n<td>14<\/td>\n<td>0.3378 %<\/td>\n<td>1,981.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>5.60 %<\/td>\n<td>5.68 %<\/td>\n<td>191,586<\/td>\n<td>14.36<\/td>\n<td>63<\/td>\n<td>0.3216 %<\/td>\n<td>1,944.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>5.25 %<\/td>\n<td>3.08 %<\/td>\n<td>272,381<\/td>\n<td>3.32<\/td>\n<td>47<\/td>\n<td>0.0419 %<\/td>\n<td>2,264.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Change<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.R<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>-1.53 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2016-07-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.23<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.39 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SLF.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>1.02 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 20.71<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.71<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.76 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>PWF.PR.E<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>1.05 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.06<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.00<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.77 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>1.11 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-07-19<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.30<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.01 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HSB.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>1.20 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 22.91<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.13<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.52 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.L<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>1.32 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 24.39<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.60<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SLF.PR.E<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>1.33 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 19.77<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.77<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.71 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TRI.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>2.17 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.20<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.50<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.22 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>2.19 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 19.57<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.57<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>2.44 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 18.90<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.90<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.99 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>RY.PR.H<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>2.92 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2017-06-23<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.77<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Shares<br \/>Traded<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>196,414<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.00; RBC crossed three blocks of 25,000 each, all at the same price.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Soft Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-12-18<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.11 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BNS.PR.Y<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>79,498<\/td>\n<td>Scotia crossed 68,500 at 25.23.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.12<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.17<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>RY.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>47,835<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2040-09-13<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 21.35<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.35<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.26 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>CM.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>45,667<\/td>\n<td>TD crossed 28,300 at 25.38.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-05-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.32<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.42 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BMO.PR.P<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>43,364<\/td>\n<td>TD crossed 30,000 at 27.52.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-03-27<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.50<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TRP.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>37,125<\/td>\n<td>RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.98.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2021-03-01<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.88<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.78 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'>There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Deutsche Bank&#8217;s not letting the grass grow under their feet: Deutsche Bank AG, Germany\u2019s largest bank, plans to raise at least 9.8 billion euros ($12.5 billion) in its biggest-ever share sale to take over Deutsche &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12187","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12187","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=12187"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12187\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=12187"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=12187"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=12187"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}