{"id":15904,"date":"2011-08-06T00:32:54","date_gmt":"2011-08-06T04:32:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=15904"},"modified":"2011-08-06T00:32:54","modified_gmt":"2011-08-06T04:32:54","slug":"august-5-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=15904","title":{"rendered":"August 5, 2011"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Since the politicians won&#8217;t bail out Ireland and Portugal, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2011-08-04\/trichet-signals-ecb-buying-bonds-as-it-offers-banks-cash-amid-debt-crisis.html\">the central bank is doing it<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet said the ECB has resumed bond purchases and will offer banks more cash to stop the region\u2019s debt crisis from engulfing Italy and Spain and hurting the economy.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>ECB purchases of Irish and Portuguese bonds during the press briefing haven\u2019t stamped out investor concern on the 21- month crisis spreading to Italy and Spain, whose yields soared to euro-era highs this week. European officials are trying to put a firewall around Europe\u2019s third and fourth-largest economies to avoid them being forced into seeking external aid.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Italian and Spanish 10-year bonds declined, pushing the yields as high as 6.23 percent and 6.33 percent respectively. Irish and Portuguese bonds rose as people with knowledge of today\u2019s transactions said the ECB bought those securities after being absent from the market for 18 weeks. That debt was at 10.4 percent and 11.3 percent as of 5 p.m. in London. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Gee, isn&#8217;t it great when a central bank takes on credit risk?<\/p>\n<p>But don&#8217;t lose faith in Europe! <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theglobeandmail.com\/report-on-business\/international-news\/eu-bank-intervenes-to-prop-up-euro-zone-bonds\/article2119353\/\">It&#8217;s all America&#8217;s fault<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>And Mr. Trichet pointed the finger at the U.S. debt ceiling showdown for stoking market tensions in Europe.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIt\u2019s clear the world is intertwined,\u201d he told reporters after the bank opted to leave its key interest unchanged at 1.5 per cent. \u201cWhat happens in the U.S. influences the rest of the world.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>There are <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2011-08-05\/italy-seeks-to-balance-budget-by-13-as-berlusconi-speeds-up-fiscal-steps.html\">indications Italy is serious about austerity<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The Italian government, seeking to earn the confidence of investors who have driven its bond yields to euro-era highs, will speed up austerity measures and will target a balanced budget a year earlier than planned.<\/p>\n<p>The country will adopt a balanced-budget amendment, liberalize its labor market, and speed asset sales, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti said in a joint Rome press conference today.<\/p>\n<p>While yields on Italian and Spanish debt fell today, borrowing costs have surged since a July 21 European Union summit aimed at heading off contagion from Europe\u2019s debt crisis to the euro zone\u2019s third- and fourth-largest economies. Italian 10-year bond yields are up 76 basis points since the summit, while Spanish yields are up 33 basis points.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Berlusconi said the government now won\u2019t wait until 2013-2014 to eliminate tax loopholes and deductions worth 25 billion euros ($36 billion), though he didn\u2019t say when they would be enacted. He also said he agreed with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to hold a meeting of Group of Seven finance ministers within days.<\/p>\n<p>Spanish borrowing costs are below those of Italy for the first time since May 2010 on speculation Italy\u2019s higher debt load makes it less able to withstand contagion from the region\u2019s fiscal crisis. The nation\u2019s debt is set to reach 120 percent of gross domestic product this year, second highest in the euro region after Greece.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2011-08-06\/u-s-credit-rating-cut-by-s-p-for-first-time-on-deficit-reduction-accord.html\">S&#038;P downgraded USA<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The U.S. had its AAA credit rating downgraded for the first time by Standard &#038; Poor\u2019s, which slammed the nation\u2019s political process and said lawmakers failed to cut spending enough to reduce record deficits.<\/p>\n<p>S&#038;P dropped the ranking one level to AA+, after warning on July 14 that it would reduce the rating in the absence of a \u201ccredible\u201d plan to lower deficits even if the nation\u2019s $14.3 trillion debt limit was lifted. The U.S. was awarded the top credit ranking by New York-based S&#038;P in 1941. It kept the outlook at \u201cnegative.\u201d<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>S&#038;P said it may lower the long-term rating to AA within the next two years if spending reductions are lower than agreed to, interest rates rise or \u201cnew fiscal pressures\u201d during the period result in higher general government debt.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>S&#038;P also changed its assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would expire by the end of 2012 \u201cbecause the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise revenues.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cMore broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating,\u201d S&#038;P said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The downgrade process was, apparently, <a href=\"http:\/\/dealbreaker.com\/2011\/08\/so-standard-poors-maybe-cant-do-basic-math-so-what\/\">enlivened by a $2-trillion arithmetical error<\/a> that you can be sure the politicians will harp on (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/8301-503544_162-20088959-503544.html\">Treasury&#8217;s started already<\/a>). The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.standardandpoors.com\/ratings\/articles\/en\/us\/?assetID=1245316529563\">S&#038;P release<\/a> highlights:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to &#8216;AA+&#8217; from &#8216;AAA&#8217; and affirmed the &#8216;A-1+&#8217; short-term rating.\n<li>We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government&#8217;s medium-term debt dynamics.\n<li>More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.\n<li>Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government&#8217;s debt dynamics any time soon.\n<li>The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to &#8216;AA&#8217; within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.federalreserve.gov\/newsevents\/press\/bcreg\/20110805a.htm\">Fed has issued guidance to banks<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Earlier today, Standard &#038; Poor&#8217;s rating agency lowered the long-term rating of the U.S. government and federal agencies from AAA to AA+. With regard to this action, the federal banking agencies are providing the following guidance to banks, savings associations, credit unions, and bank and savings and loan holding companies (collectively, banking organizations).<\/p>\n<p>For risk-based capital purposes, the risk weights for Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, government agencies, and government-sponsored entities will not change. The treatment of Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, government agencies, and government-sponsored entities under other federal banking agency regulations, including, for example, the Federal Reserve Board&#8217;s Regulation W, will also be unaffected.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>That&#8217;s how Europe can solve its banking problems! Just allow loans-gone-bad to be risk-weighted at their original rates!<\/p>\n<p>I remember the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.parl.gc.ca\/ParlInfo\/Documents\/MaidenSpeech\/English\/Nolin_PierreClaude_SEN.pdf\">DBRS downgrade of Canada in Spring, 1994<\/a>, which the ancients among us will remember as a horrible bear market for bonds, full of nervousness. The downgrade was announced at about 5pm; we were getting pricing data from two brokerages, one of which prepared their run prior to the announcment, the other after. Only a few minutes, but there were literally dollars of difference in the long bond prices! Bids just disappeared as the dealers went short in preparation for overnight selling.<\/p>\n<p>Yellow Media&#8217;s sell-side analysts <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theglobeandmail.com\/globe-investor\/investment-ideas\/features\/eye-on-equities\/yellow-media-slides-further-as-analysts-slash-forecasts\/article2120968\/\">continue to follow the stock<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Canaccord Genuity believes the carnage isn\u2019t over yet. In a new research report today, analyst Aravinda Galappatthige cut his price target to a mere 60 cents, a far cry from his previous guess of $2.75. Not surprisingly, he downgraded Yellow Media to a \u201csell\u201d from a \u201chold.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe steep decline in our target is due to common equity at now only 20 per cent of the enterprise value of the company,\u201d Mr. Galappatthige explained. \u201cConsequently, even moderate cuts to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and free cash flow, which lowers enterprise value, have the potential to have a magnified impact on equity.\u201d<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>\u201cYellow Media is in the midst of transforming its business from a directory publisher to a broader, online-centric, marketing solutions company serving mainly small and medium enterprises. While we do expect to see some success for the company in this process, we believe print declines will hit double-digit rates starting fiscal 2011 and more than offset online growth, given that print currently makes up approximately 75 per cent of revenues. Moreover, if the print declines worsen &#8211; to 15-20 per cent levels, as we are seeing in most international markets, we believe Yellow Media\u2019s EBITDA and FCF could be impacted significantly.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>CIBC World Markets Inc. analyst Robert Bek today also took a knife to his price estimate, slashing it to $1.25 from $5.50.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThough the Band-Aid has been ripped off this story, we still believe investors should watch on the sidelines as an equity recovery is tenuous, at best,\u201d he wrote. \u201cOur (new price target) is probably half way to fair value, but downside risks are material, including the potential for a restructuring if conditions worsen.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=15888&#038;cpage=1#comment-83383\">comments to the recent YLO post<\/a>, <i>newbiepref<\/i> instructs me on a feature of the TSX website: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.tmxmoney.com\/HttpController?GetPage=SearchInsiderTrade&#038;Language=en\">Insider Trades by Symbol<\/a>, through which I see that YLO (almost certainly YLO, but it could be some other insider) bought all four of its preferred share issues today. The total value was only $160,000 (about 2\/3 of it in YLO.PR.A) but even so they&#8217;re taking these things off the balance sheet at about half-price, on average. Nice work if you can get it!<\/p>\n<p>These are small quantities, to be sure, but it will be remembered that quantities are restricted under the terms of their <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ypg.com\/en\/newsroom\/503-yellow-media-inc-announces-toronto-stock-exchange-approval-for-its-normal-course-issuer-bid-in-respect-of-its-common-shares-and-series-1-series-2-series-3-and-series-5-preferred-shares\">Normal Course Issuer Bid<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p> In accordance with the rules of the Toronto Stock Exchange, the maximum numbers of securities that can be purchased on a daily basis by Yellow Media Inc. are 641,849 common shares, 5,248 first preferred shares, series 1, 3,134 first preferred shares, series 2, 3,068 first preferred shares, series 3 and 1,385 first preferred shares, series 5, subject to the block purchase exception<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>They hit the limits precisely &#8211; to the very share! &#8211; for three of the four issues; they were sloppy with YLO.PR.B and bought only 3,100 of the allowable 3,134. As discussed in the commented post, they&#8217;re not buying the common any more, probably because of bank loan covenants.<\/p>\n<p>It was a weak day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 4bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 18bp. Good volatility; let&#8217;s hope things heat up a little more next week! Volume was average.<\/p>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='8'><strong>HIMIPref&trade; Preferred Indices<br \/>These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref&trade; Indices<\/strong><br \/>Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Mean<br \/>Current<br \/>Yield<br \/>(at bid)<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>YTW<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Average<br \/>Trading<br \/>Value<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Mod Dur<br \/>(YTW)<\/td>\n<td>Issues<\/td>\n<td>Day&#8217;s Perf.<\/td>\n<td>Index Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Ratchet<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>-1.4129 %<\/td>\n<td>2,357.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedFloater<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>-1.4129 %<\/td>\n<td>3,544.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>2.57 %<\/td>\n<td>2.33 %<\/td>\n<td>33,461<\/td>\n<td>21.45<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>-1.4129 %<\/td>\n<td>2,544.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>4.85 %<\/td>\n<td>2.36 %<\/td>\n<td>54,724<\/td>\n<td>0.15<\/td>\n<td>9<\/td>\n<td>0.2096 %<\/td>\n<td>2,454.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SplitShare<\/td>\n<td>5.30 %<\/td>\n<td>5.63 %<\/td>\n<td>65,658<\/td>\n<td>2.60<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>-0.6105 %<\/td>\n<td>2,496.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.2096 %<\/td>\n<td>2,244.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>5.68 %<\/td>\n<td>5.29 %<\/td>\n<td>138,886<\/td>\n<td>1.19<\/td>\n<td>14<\/td>\n<td>-0.1030 %<\/td>\n<td>2,096.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>5.38 %<\/td>\n<td>5.41 %<\/td>\n<td>116,119<\/td>\n<td>14.74<\/td>\n<td>16<\/td>\n<td>-0.0368 %<\/td>\n<td>2,215.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>5.15 %<\/td>\n<td>3.15 %<\/td>\n<td>212,595<\/td>\n<td>2.61<\/td>\n<td>58<\/td>\n<td>-0.0320 %<\/td>\n<td>2,325.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>5.07 %<\/td>\n<td>4.74 %<\/td>\n<td>273,955<\/td>\n<td>8.04<\/td>\n<td>46<\/td>\n<td>-0.1829 %<\/td>\n<td>2,176.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Change<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>-3.54 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 17.99<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.99<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.K<\/td>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>-2.73 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 18.14<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.14<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.91 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SLF.PR.F<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>-1.58 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-06-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.77<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BNA.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>SplitShare<\/td>\n<td>-1.43 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-07-09<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.25<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>PWF.PR.P<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>-1.19 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.44<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.79<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.30 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>-1.14 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.50<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 6.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HSE.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>1.25 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.46<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.90<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.44 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>PWF.PR.K<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>2.02 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.46<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.73<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.24 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>IAG.PR.C<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>3.48 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 28.25<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 0.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Shares<br \/>Traded<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>RY.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>238,663<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt crossed three blocks of 50,000 each, all at 24.75; RBC crossed 50,000 and 25,000 at the same price.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.68<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>RY.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>125,260<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.73 and two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 24.70.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.66<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.61 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.B<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>86,600<\/td>\n<td>RBC crossed 10,000 at 22.75 and 64,300 at 22.70.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.50<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 6.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>CM.PR.I<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>75,298<\/td>\n<td>TD crossed 44,700 at 25.30.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2016-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.14<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.60 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>W.PR.J<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>61,000<\/td>\n<td>National crossed 60,000 at 24.90.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-08-05<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 24.55<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.80<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>MFC.PR.D<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>54,900<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt bought 10,000 from RBC at 27.45, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-06-19<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.41<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.39 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'>There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='3'><strong>Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Quote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>IAG.PR.F<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.70 &#8211; 26.79<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  1.0900<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.7000<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.70<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.66 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.G<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.25 &#8211; 25.80<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.5500<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.3069<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.25<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.01 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.M<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.80 &#8211; 26.45<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.6500<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.4234<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.80<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SLF.PR.F<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 26.77 &#8211; 27.29<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.5200<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.3184<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-06-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.77<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TCA.PR.X<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 50.51 &#8211; 51.00<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.4900<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.3407<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-10-15<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 50.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 50.51<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.17 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>NA.PR.O<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 27.51 &#8211; 27.94<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.4300<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.3109<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-02-15<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.51<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.43 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since the politicians won&#8217;t bail out Ireland and Portugal, the central bank is doing it: European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet said the ECB has resumed bond purchases and will offer banks more cash 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