{"id":16655,"date":"2011-10-13T23:20:38","date_gmt":"2011-10-14T03:20:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=16655"},"modified":"2011-10-13T23:20:38","modified_gmt":"2011-10-14T03:20:38","slug":"october-13-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=16655","title":{"rendered":"October 13, 2011"},"content":{"rendered":"

Back in 2005-07, Wall Street’s biggest problem was they just couldn’t write enough mortgages. Times have changed, and now their biggest problem is they can’t write enough mortgages<\/a> (emphasis added):<\/p>\n

Wall Street firms are in discussions to pool as much as $1.5 billion of property loans they\u2019ve amassed this year after a slowdown left them unable to stockpile enough mortgages to sell as securities.<\/p>\n

Citigroup Inc. (C), Deutsche Bank AG (DBK), Guggenheim Securities LLC, and UBS AG (UBSN) are among lenders in talks to bundle commercial mortgages to be sold as bonds during the fourth quarter, said people familiar with the talks. The firms want to clear their books before year-end and avoid risking drops in value by holding the debt<\/b>, said the people, who declined to be identified because the plans are preliminary.
…<\/b>
Wall Street has arranged about $25.6 billion in commercial mortgage-backed securities this year, compared with about $11.5 billion in all of 2010, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Sales plummeted to $3.4 billion in 2009 compared with a record $234 billion in 2007, the data show.<\/p>\n

Credit Suisse, which hasn\u2019t offered a deal since sales revived in 2009, informed about 50 employees yesterday that their jobs were likely to be eliminated, said two people with knowledge of the matter, who declined to be identified because the matter isn\u2019t public. The bank is keeping the division that trades the debt, the people said. Jack Grone, a spokesman in New York, for Switzerland\u2019s second-largest bank, declined to comment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

You see that emphasis???? They want to avoid possible drops in value????? And so they want to sell it to their clients????? Betting against their clients????? Isn’t that EVIL?????? How dare they even dream of buying something from one party and selling it to another?????? Occupy Wall Street!<\/p>\n

Fitch is warning of rating carnage<\/a>:<\/p>\n

UBS AG (UBSN), Lloyds Banking Group Plc and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc had long-term issuer default grades cut by Fitch Ratings, which put more than a dozen other lenders on watch negative as part of a global review.<\/p>\n

UBS\u2019s long-term issuer default rating and its \u201csupport rating floor\u201d were cut to \u201cA\u201d from \u201cA+\u201d on a \u201cview that the one-notch uplift for close affiliation with the Swiss state is no longer warranted,\u201d the ratings firm said in a statement. Lloyds and RBS were lowered two steps to A from AA- as Fitch said the U.K. is less likely to provide future support.<\/p>\n

Fitch also placed viability ratings, and in some cases credit grades, on negative watch for seven global banks including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley (MS) because of new regulations and economic developments. It put European banks such as Credit Agricole SA on watch, based on sovereign debt concerns and said it would review Bank of America Corp. (BAC)\u2019s mortgage-litigation risks.<\/p>\n

Placement of the seven global banks — also including Deutsche Bank AG (DBK), Credit Suisse AG, BNP Paribas (BNP) SA, Societe Generale (GLE) SA and Barclays Plc (BARC) — on watch \u201creflects Fitch\u2019s view that these institutions\u2019 business models are particularly sensitive to the increased challenges the financial markets are facing,\u201d Fitch analysts wrote in a statement. \u201cThese challenges result from both economic developments, particularly in the euro area, as well as a myriad of regulatory changes.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

More dissent in the FOMC<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Narayana Kocherlakota said the central bank has put its credibility at risk by easing during a year in which inflation rose and unemployment fell.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe committee\u2019s actions at the last two meetings are inconsistent with a systematic pursuit of its communicated objectives,\u201d Kocherlakota said today in a speech in Sidney, Montana. \u201cIt follows that these actions diminish the committee\u2019s credibility and so reduce the effectiveness of future committee actions and communications.\u201d<\/p>\n

The speech marked the first time Kocherlakota has spoken about policy since opposing a Federal Open Market Committee decision to sell $400 billion of short-term Treasury securities and replace them with $400 billion of longer-term securities.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

S&P downgraded Spain<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Spain had its credit rating cut one level by Standard & Poor\u2019s as rising defaults threaten efforts to stem Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis and limit risks for the region’s banks.<\/p>\n

The ranking slid to AA-, with a negative outlook, in the third reduction by S&P in three years. The ratings company announced the change in a statement.<\/p>\n

\u201cDespite signs of resilience in economic performance during 2011, we see heightened risks to Spain\u2019s growth prospects,\u201d S&P said in the statement. \u201cThe financial profile of the Spanish banking system will, in our opinion, weaken further, with the stock of problematic assets rising further.\u201d <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It was a good solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 22bp, FixedResets gaining 21bp and DeemedRetractibles up 17bp. Volatility was good, with SLF issues prominent on the plus side, contrary to recent experience<\/a>. Volume was actually above average! RBC had a good day, shutting out the opposition as far as my block reporting goes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.5891 %<\/td>\n1,965.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.5891 %<\/td>\n2,956.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n3.66 %<\/td>\n3.67 %<\/td>\n154,556<\/td>\n18.15<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n-0.5891 %<\/td>\n2,122.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.86 %<\/td>\n3.20 %<\/td>\n64,048<\/td>\n1.56<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n-0.0097 %<\/td>\n2,446.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n5.47 %<\/td>\n1.78 %<\/td>\n56,740<\/td>\n0.37<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n-0.1373 %<\/td>\n2,449.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.0097 %<\/td>\n2,236.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.68 %<\/td>\n3.96 %<\/td>\n103,169<\/td>\n0.38<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n0.0182 %<\/td>\n2,129.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.38 %<\/td>\n5.43 %<\/td>\n111,258<\/td>\n14.71<\/td>\n17<\/td>\n0.2176 %<\/td>\n2,242.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n5.16 %<\/td>\n3.33 %<\/td>\n198,945<\/td>\n2.58<\/td>\n61<\/td>\n0.2118 %<\/td>\n2,322.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n5.09 %<\/td>\n4.60 %<\/td>\n215,426<\/td>\n7.71<\/td>\n46<\/td>\n0.1709 %<\/td>\n2,189.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.E<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n-2.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-06-01
\nMaturity Price : 25.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.50
\nBid-YTW : 3.28 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-1.03 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-10-13
\nMaturity Price : 14.38
\nEvaluated at bid price : 14.38
\nBid-YTW : 3.67 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.B<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.75
\nBid-YTW : 6.04 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.M<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.40
\nBid-YTW : 3.33 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.M<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-10-13
\nMaturity Price : 21.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.90
\nBid-YTW : 5.45 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.J<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n1.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2018-03-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.00
\nBid-YTW : 4.74 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.18 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-10-13
\nMaturity Price : 20.56
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.56
\nBid-YTW : 5.81 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.23 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-06-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.42
\nBid-YTW : 3.89 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.F<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.38 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2041-10-13
\nMaturity Price : 22.05
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.05
\nBid-YTW : 6.05 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IAG.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.48 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.74
\nBid-YTW : 3.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.A<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.48 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.56
\nBid-YTW : 6.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.D<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.52 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.35
\nBid-YTW : 6.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.C<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.77 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.30
\nBid-YTW : 6.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.M<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n186,900<\/td>\nCalled for redemption<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-04-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.46
\nBid-YTW : 2.67 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n144,840<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2017-06-01
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.45
\nBid-YTW : 3.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.J<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n78,474<\/td>\nRBC crossed 56,400 at 25.15.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.13
\nBid-YTW : 4.53 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.N<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n75,300<\/td>\nCalled for redemption<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-04-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.46
\nBid-YTW : 2.58 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n52,475<\/td>\nRBC crossed 49,300 at 25.00.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2011-12-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.98
\nBid-YTW : 4.51 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.G<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n51,570<\/td>\nRBC crossed blocks of 24,400 and 22,800, both at 25.00.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.90
\nBid-YTW : 5.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nQuote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.G<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\nQuote: 25.00 – 25.31
\nSpot Rate : 0.3100
\nAverage : 0.2095<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00
\nBid-YTW : 4.60 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BNA.PR.C<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\nQuote: 20.59 – 20.88
\nSpot Rate : 0.2900
\nAverage : 0.2099<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.59
\nBid-YTW : 7.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

HSB.PR.D<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\nQuote: 24.60 – 24.90
\nSpot Rate : 0.3000
\nAverage : 0.2205<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.60
\nBid-YTW : 5.26 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

RY.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 26.88 – 27.18
\nSpot Rate : 0.3000
\nAverage : 0.2338<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-02-24
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.88
\nBid-YTW : 3.32 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

TD.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 26.80 – 26.97
\nSpot Rate : 0.1700
\nAverage : 0.1062<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-04-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.80
\nBid-YTW : 3.17 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

SLF.PR.C<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\nQuote: 21.30 – 21.58
\nSpot Rate : 0.2800
\nAverage : 0.2169<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.30
\nBid-YTW : 6.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Back in 2005-07, Wall Street’s biggest problem was they just couldn’t write enough mortgages. Times have changed, and now their biggest problem is they can’t write enough mortgages (emphasis added): Wall Street firms are in …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-16655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16655","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=16655"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16655\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=16655"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=16655"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=16655"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}