{"id":18340,"date":"2012-04-10T22:14:16","date_gmt":"2012-04-11T02:14:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=18340"},"modified":"2012-04-10T22:14:16","modified_gmt":"2012-04-11T02:14:16","slug":"april-10-2012","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=18340","title":{"rendered":"April 10, 2012"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theglobeandmail.com\/report-on-business\/economy\/economy-lab\/daily-mix\/imf-debt-study-a-wakeup-call-for-canadians\/article2397170\/\">mention in the Globe &#038; Mail<\/a> led me to an IMF publication (Chapter 3 of of the April, 2012, World Economic Outlook) titled <a href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/weo\/2012\/01\/pdf\/c3.pdf\">Dealing with Household Debt<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Does household debt amplify downturns and weaken recoveries? Based on an analysis of advanced economies over the past three decades, we find that housing busts and recessions preceded by larger run-ups in household debt tend to be more severe and protracted. These patterns are<br \/>\nconsistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models. Based on case studies, we find that government policies can help prevent prolonged contractions in economic activity by addressing the problem of excessive household debt. In particular, bold household debt restructuring programs such as those implemented in the United States in the 1930s and in Iceland today can significantly reduce debt repayment burdens and the number of household defaults and foreclosures. Such policies can therefore help avert self-reinforcing cycles of household defaults, further house price declines, and additional contractions in output.<br \/><b>&#8230;<\/b><br \/>Macroeconomic policies are a crucial element of forestalling excessive contractions in economic activity during episodes of household deleveraging. For example, monetary easing in economies in which mortgages typically have variable interest rates, as in the Scandinavian countries,<br \/>\ncan quickly reduce mortgage payments and avert household defaults. Similarly, fiscal transfers to households through social safety nets can boost households\u2019 incomes and improve their ability to service debt, as in the Scandinavian countries.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Clearly, it is better to avoid such a situation in the first place, but there is only ineffective policy in place in Canada to do so at this time. Buying a larger house (or a small house or condominium instead of renting) is a means of capital formation, which is encouraged by low interest rates. That&#8217;s what lower interest rates are supposed to do, for heaven&#8217;s sake! However, housing is non-productive capital; so much so that it can almost be considered consumption.<\/p>\n<p>So the question really is: in times of economic downturns, how should policy act to promote &#8220;good&#8221; capital formation as opposed to &#8220;bad&#8221; capital formation?<\/p>\n<p>I suggest that both monetary and fiscal policy are very blunt tools &#8211; too blunt to address the issue. Instead, a regulatory response is required:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Don&#8217;t be so damn eager to raise the limits on explicitly (Canada) or implicitly (US) government guarantees of mortgage debt. Set a limit, based on historical experience and rising with nominal GDP, of the amount of such guarantees. In 2006, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cmhc.ca\/en\/corp\/about\/anrecopl\/upload\/2006-to-2011-financial-highlights.pdf\">CMHC insurance outstanding was $291-billion<\/a>. In 2010 the plan was to have total outstanding of $533-billion. Why? Why do What-debt? and Spend-Every-Penny want to create a housing bubble? I can only assume that it is because this will give them more opportunity to micro-manage the economy, with credit-rationing and rule changes by government fiat, rather than the unexciting process of raising insurance prices when a reasonable limit is approached.\n<li>Impose a capital surcharge the banks when their loan books get distorted. Mortgages are now 40% of the balance sheets; they used to be 30% not so very long ago. Such a sudden change indicates to me a strong possibility that this is simply regulatory arbitrage (why lend to Jimmy&#8217;s Barber Shop, with a risk-weighting of 100%, when you can lend to Jimmy himself as a mortgage, with a 35% risk-weight or maybe even a government guarantee with an even lower risk-weight?). So, in this case of distortion, and in every other case of material distortion, impose a surcharge. An extra 10% risk-weight (to 45% on mortgags) on loan book elements in material excess of their historical norms is my prescription.<\/ul>\n<p>Three cheers for <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/2012-04-09\/wind-power-seen-surging-as-custom-barges-cut-set-up-costs.html\">offshore wind power<\/a>!<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Offshore wind costs about $232 a megawatt-hour of power generated, according to data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance. That compares with about $80 for onshore wind, $62 for gas-fired plants and $77 for coal. The government supports the industry with incentives for power produced by renewable energy sources.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It&#8217;s not clear if the price figures include provisions for back-up power and demand-timing differences (the wind tends to blow at night, when demand is relatively low, can sometimes die at highly inconvenient moments and electricity can&#8217;t be stored very well. This has a huge effect on honest cost assessment, and no effect on &#8211; shall we say &#8211; other assessments).<\/p>\n<p>It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 4bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles down 2bp. Volatility was low. Volume was a little below average.<\/p>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='8'><strong>HIMIPref&trade; Preferred Indices<br \/>These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref&trade; Indices<\/strong><br \/>Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Mean<br \/>Current<br \/>Yield<br \/>(at bid)<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>YTW<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Average<br \/>Trading<br \/>Value<\/td>\n<td>Median<br \/>Mod Dur<br \/>(YTW)<\/td>\n<td>Issues<\/td>\n<td>Day&#8217;s Perf.<\/td>\n<td>Index Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Ratchet<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>-0.2858 %<\/td>\n<td>2,399.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedFloater<\/td>\n<td>4.42 %<\/td>\n<td>3.83 %<\/td>\n<td>37,343<\/td>\n<td>17.57<\/td>\n<td>1<\/td>\n<td>1.0818 %<\/td>\n<td>3,527.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>3.01 %<\/td>\n<td>3.01 %<\/td>\n<td>47,315<\/td>\n<td>19.71<\/td>\n<td>3<\/td>\n<td>-0.2858 %<\/td>\n<td>2,590.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>OpRet<\/td>\n<td>4.75 %<\/td>\n<td>2.74 %<\/td>\n<td>48,136<\/td>\n<td>1.16<\/td>\n<td>5<\/td>\n<td>0.1609 %<\/td>\n<td>2,509.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SplitShare<\/td>\n<td>5.26 %<\/td>\n<td>-4.66 %<\/td>\n<td>81,958<\/td>\n<td>0.68<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>-0.1387 %<\/td>\n<td>2,687.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0.00 %<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.00<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.1609 %<\/td>\n<td>2,294.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>5.48 %<\/td>\n<td>1.26 %<\/td>\n<td>85,762<\/td>\n<td>0.15<\/td>\n<td>23<\/td>\n<td>-0.0417 %<\/td>\n<td>2,217.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n<td>5.17 %<\/td>\n<td>5.10 %<\/td>\n<td>133,510<\/td>\n<td>15.24<\/td>\n<td>10<\/td>\n<td>0.2902 %<\/td>\n<td>2,412.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>5.02 %<\/td>\n<td>3.00 %<\/td>\n<td>185,702<\/td>\n<td>2.20<\/td>\n<td>67<\/td>\n<td>0.0155 %<\/td>\n<td>2,392.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>4.97 %<\/td>\n<td>3.95 %<\/td>\n<td>205,560<\/td>\n<td>3.06<\/td>\n<td>46<\/td>\n<td>-0.0223 %<\/td>\n<td>2,301.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Change<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.J<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>-1.18 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.00<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.70 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.G<\/td>\n<td>FixedFloater<\/td>\n<td>1.08 %<\/td>\n<td>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2042-04-10<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 22.31<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.49<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.83 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'><strong>Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Shares<br \/>Traded<\/td>\n<td>Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>TRP.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>299,184<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt crossed 290,000 at 26.00.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-12-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.00<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>ENB.PR.H<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>90,363<\/td>\n<td><a href=\"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=18224\">Recent new issue<\/a>.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2042-04-10<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 23.14<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.15<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>CM.PR.J<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>72,214<\/td>\n<td><a href=\"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=18049\">Called for redemption<\/a>.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-04-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.75<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.97<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BMO.PR.K<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>57,652<\/td>\n<td>RBC crossed 49,000 at 26.60.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-11-25<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 26.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.58<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>ENB.PR.F<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>54,167<\/td>\n<td>Nesbitt crosed 11,600 at 25.55; RBC crossed 20,000 at the same price.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2018-06-01<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.51<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.81 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.P<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>41,810<\/td>\n<td>TD crossed 20,700 at 25.77; RBC crossed 15,000 at 25.75.<br \/>\nYTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.70<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.16 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='4'>There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<table border='1'>\n<tr>\n<td colspan='3'><strong>Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Issue<\/td>\n<td>Index<\/td>\n<td>Quote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.F<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.23 &#8211; 25.49<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.2600<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1879<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-09-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.23<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 4.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>POW.PR.A<\/td>\n<td>Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.11 &#8211; 25.35<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.2400<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1694<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2012-05-10<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.11<br \/>\nBid-YTW : -0.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.P<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 27.15 &#8211; 27.39<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.2400<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1785<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-09-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.15<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.45 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>GWO.PR.G<\/td>\n<td>Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 25.00 &#8211; 25.21<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.2100<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1553<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Hard Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 5.25 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>CM.PR.L<\/td>\n<td>FixedReset<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 26.70 &#8211; 26.88<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.1800<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1271<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Call<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-04-30<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 25.00<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.70<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 2.90 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>BAM.PR.K<\/td>\n<td>Floater<\/td>\n<td>Quote: 17.29 &#8211; 17.54<br \/>\nSpot Rate  :  0.2500<br \/>\nAverage  :  0.1977<\/p>\n<p>YTW SCENARIO<br \/>\nMaturity Type   : Limit Maturity<br \/>\nMaturity Date\t: 2042-04-10<br \/>\nMaturity Price  : 17.29<br \/>\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.29<br \/>\nBid-YTW : 3.05 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A mention in the Globe &#038; Mail led me to an IMF publication (Chapter 3 of of the April, 2012, World Economic Outlook) titled Dealing with Household Debt: Does household debt amplify downturns and weaken &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18340","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18340","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=18340"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18340\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=18340"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=18340"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=18340"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}