{"id":22306,"date":"2013-06-21T19:54:56","date_gmt":"2013-06-21T23:54:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=22306"},"modified":"2013-06-21T19:54:56","modified_gmt":"2013-06-21T23:54:56","slug":"june-21-2013","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=22306","title":{"rendered":"June 21, 2013"},"content":{"rendered":"

I noted on June 19<\/a> that James Bullard of the St. Louis Fed had dissented against the latest decision. He has taken the unusual – but certainly not unknown – step of explaining why<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard dissented with the Federal Open Market Committee decision announced on June 19, 2013. In his view, the Committee should have more strongly signaled its willingness to defend its inflation target of 2 percent in light of recent low inflation readings. Inflation in the U.S. has surprised on the downside during 2013. Measured as the percent change from one year earlier, the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) headline inflation rate is running below 1 percent, and the PCE core inflation rate is close to 1 percent. President Bullard believes that to maintain credibility, the Committee must defend its inflation target when inflation is below target as well as when it is above target.<\/p>\n

President Bullard also felt that the Committee\u2019s decision to authorize the Chairman to lay out a more elaborate plan for reducing the pace of asset purchases was inappropriately timed. The Committee was, through the Summary of Economic Projections process, marking down its assessment of both real GDP growth and inflation for 2013, and yet simultaneously announcing that less accommodative policy may be in store. President Bullard felt that a more prudent approach would be to wait for more tangible signs that the economy was strengthening and that inflation was on a path to return toward target before making such an announcement.<\/p>\n

In addition, President Bullard felt that the Committee\u2019s decision to authorize the Chairman to make an announcement of an approximate timeline for reducing the pace of asset purchases to zero was a step away from state-contingent monetary policy. President Bullard feels strongly that state-contingent monetary policy is best central bank practice, with clear support both from academic theory and from central bank experience over the last several decades. Policy actions should be undertaken to meet policy objectives, not calendar objectives.<\/p>\n

While President Bullard found much to disagree with in this decision, he does feel that the Committee can conduct an appropriate and effective monetary policy going forward, and he looks forward to working with his colleagues to achieve this outcome.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Sun Life Financial’s sale of its US annuities book met a small positive response from the Credit Rating Agencies<\/a>. Now, SLF has announced<\/a>:<\/p>\n

On December 17, 2012, Sun Life Financial Inc. (TSX: SLF) (NYSE: SLF) entered into a definitive stock purchase agreement to sell its U.S. annuities business and certain of its U.S. life insurance businesses to Delaware Life Holdings, LLC, which was expected to close before the end of the second quarter of 2013, subject to regulatory approvals and other closing conditions. Approvals for the transaction have since been obtained from a number of regulators, including the Delaware Department of Insurance and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The approval process is also underway with the New York Department of Financial Services. The Department has recently undertaken a review of private investor groups as owners of annuity businesses, and we anticipate that the review will delay the close of the transaction beyond the end of the second quarter of 2013. We are continuing to work with Delaware Life Holdings, LLC, to obtain approval from the New York Department of Financial Services for the transaction and to close the transaction as soon as possible. Both parties have made substantial progress in preparing for the close and for the transition of employees and operations to support the business going forward.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The NY Dept. of Financial Services has made waves before<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The regulator, led by Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky, has expressed concern over whether the firms will be sufficiently careful with investments that back long-term obligations to retirement savers. Guggenheim, Apollo and Harbinger have announced deals to buy units that sell fixed annuities, which provide streams of payments to retirees and other customers.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe risk that we\u2019re concerned about at DFS is whether these private-equity firms are more short-term focused, when this is a business that\u2019s all about the long haul,\u201d Lawsky said in an April 18 speech. \u201cTheir short-term focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and leverage in order to boost short-term returns.\u201d
…<\/b>
Lawsky is seeking e-mails, pitchbooks, memos, and information about investment allocations and return assumptions, the person said. Bloomberg reported last month that Wall Street firms have been acquiring life insurance companies and adding investments such as mortgage-backed securities that have drawn attention from regulators accustomed to simpler portfolios.<\/p>\n

The regulator wants to understand the risks the companies are taking on and how they\u2019re presenting the deals to investors, and the information may be used to craft new regulations, the person said. The Wall Street Journal reported on the subpoenas earlier today.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

US regulators are considering a DSIB rule that actually means something<\/a>:<\/p>\n

U.S. regulators last year proposed implementing the 3 percent international requirement for what\u2019s known as the simple leverage ratio. Now the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., under pressure from lawmakers, are weighing increasing that figure for some of the biggest banks, according to the people, who asked not to be identified because the discussions are private.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe 3 percent was clearly inadequate, nothing really,\u201d said Simon Johnson, an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund. \u201cGoing up to five or six will make the rule be worth something. Having a lot of capital is crucial for banks to be sound. The leverage ratio is a good safety tool because risk-weighting can be gamed by banks so easily.\u201d
…<\/b>
By going above the figure adopted in 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the U.S. also could put pressure on Europe to affirm its commitment to the standard, which is seen as a tool to rein in risk in the financial system. Regulators in the U.K. and Switzerland told banks yesterday to increase their ratios of capital to total assets.<\/p>\n

U.S. banks have had to comply with a simple leverage requirement of 4 percent for two decades. The new version, proposed last June, expands the definition of what counts as assets in calculating the ratio, incorporating some commitments such as lines of credit kept off balance sheets under current accounting rules. The draft is an attempt to bridge U.S. and international accounting standards.
…<\/b>
FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig has called for scrapping risk-based rules entirely in favor of a 10 percent leverage ratio, calculated to include even more off-balance-sheet assets than allowed under Basel and define capital more narrowly. To reach Hoenig\u2019s requirements, the three largest U.S. banks — JPMorgan, Bank of America and Citigroup (C) — would have to stop distributing dividends for about five years, according to FDIC data and analysts\u2019 earnings expectations compiled by Bloomberg.<\/p>\n

The Systemic Risk Council, an advisory group led by former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, has called for 8 percent. Bair fought for a global leverage ratio in Basel committee meetings when she led the U.S. agency.<\/p>\n

A bipartisan Senate bill introduced in April by David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, and Ohio Democrat Sherrod Brown would set the leverage ratio at 15 percent. Banks have assailed the proposal. It \u201cwould limit an institution\u2019s ability to lend to businesses, hampering economic growth and job creation,\u201d the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association, a Washington-based lobbying group, said at the time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A modest upward move in the overall index (TXPR up 10bp<\/a>) masked a great deal of internal movement for the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualPremiums down 19bp (a lot of these are actually ‘PendingPerpetualDiscounts’ at this time, of course), FixedResets gaining 4bp (despite poor performance from the new issue, which was just a catch-up) and DeemedRetractibles winning 43bp. There is another very lengthy Performance Highlights table as the market readjusts to new levels; there’s no readily discernable pattern in these returns. Volume remained very high, but well off yesterday’s peak.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.0919 %<\/td>\n2,546.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n4.31 %<\/td>\n3.64 %<\/td>\n49,459<\/td>\n18.02<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n0.8230 %<\/td>\n3,813.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n2.76 %<\/td>\n2.90 %<\/td>\n79,337<\/td>\n19.98<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n0.0919 %<\/td>\n2,749.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.85 %<\/td>\n2.87 %<\/td>\n68,536<\/td>\n0.08<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n-0.0546 %<\/td>\n2,614.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n4.67 %<\/td>\n4.22 %<\/td>\n99,535<\/td>\n4.00<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n0.6922 %<\/td>\n2,963.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.0546 %<\/td>\n2,390.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.44 %<\/td>\n5.41 %<\/td>\n127,977<\/td>\n14.50<\/td>\n33<\/td>\n-0.1916 %<\/td>\n2,271.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.50 %<\/td>\n5.65 %<\/td>\n245,791<\/td>\n14.49<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n0.6553 %<\/td>\n2,373.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n4.97 %<\/td>\n3.51 %<\/td>\n242,622<\/td>\n3.42<\/td>\n82<\/td>\n0.0434 %<\/td>\n2,474.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n5.10 %<\/td>\n4.98 %<\/td>\n170,252<\/td>\n6.97<\/td>\n44<\/td>\n0.4258 %<\/td>\n2,362.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.X<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-3.72 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.63
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.54
\nBid-YTW : 3.93 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.18
\nBid-YTW : 5.40 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CIU.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.38
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.62
\nBid-YTW : 5.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.50 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 21.96
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.26
\nBid-YTW : 5.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
POW.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.34 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 23.35
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.61
\nBid-YTW : 5.29 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.27 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.42
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.28
\nBid-YTW : 4.13 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
POW.PR.B<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 24.09
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.35
\nBid-YTW : 5.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.R<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.03 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.55
\nBid-YTW : 5.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.J<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.15
\nBid-YTW : 4.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.N<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.10 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 21.09
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.09
\nBid-YTW : 5.66 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.13 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 23.26
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.01
\nBid-YTW : 4.02 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.C<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.25 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-11-24
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.18
\nBid-YTW : 4.46 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n1.29 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 23.20
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.50
\nBid-YTW : 5.08 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
W.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n1.30 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 24.65
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.91
\nBid-YTW : 5.72 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.I<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.44 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.51
\nBid-YTW : 5.70 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.K<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n1.72 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-11-25
\nMaturity Price : 25.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.45
\nBid-YTW : 5.05 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.A<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n2.92 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.04
\nBid-YTW : 4.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PF.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n3.54 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.96
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.55
\nBid-YTW : 4.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNA.PR.C<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n4.72 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.61
\nBid-YTW : 4.73 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.K<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n235,745<\/td>\nNew issue settled today<\/a>
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.55
\nBid-YTW : 4.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n134,072<\/td>\nNational crossed 110,000 at 23.10.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 22.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.18
\nBid-YTW : 5.40 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n119,575<\/td>\nNesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.10.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 24.88
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.10
\nBid-YTW : 5.82 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.Q<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n111,000<\/td>\nScotia crossed blocks of 66,000 and 40,000, both at 25.95.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2017-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.90
\nBid-YTW : 4.77 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.D<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n66,945<\/td>\nScotia crossed 50,000 at 25.20.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-04-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.25
\nBid-YTW : 3.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n65,855<\/td>\nRBC crossed 48,800 at 26.00.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-04-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.90
\nBid-YTW : 3.02 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nQuote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.Q<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.16 – 25.50
\nSpot Rate : 0.3400
\nAverage : 0.2016<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.16
\nBid-YTW : 3.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BMO.PR.J<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\nQuote: 25.15 – 25.59
\nSpot Rate : 0.4400
\nAverage : 0.3134<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.15
\nBid-YTW : 4.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

RY.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.24 – 25.51
\nSpot Rate : 0.2700
\nAverage : 0.1620<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2022-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.24
\nBid-YTW : 3.71 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

CIU.PR.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.81 – 26.16
\nSpot Rate : 0.3500
\nAverage : 0.2423<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-06-01
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.81
\nBid-YTW : 3.62 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

GWO.PR.J<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.20 – 25.49
\nSpot Rate : 0.2900
\nAverage : 0.1869<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.20
\nBid-YTW : 4.19 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

CM.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\nQuote: 25.11 – 25.39
\nSpot Rate : 0.2800
\nAverage : 0.1780<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2043-06-21
\nMaturity Price : 24.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.11
\nBid-YTW : 5.45 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I noted on June 19 that James Bullard of the St. Louis Fed had dissented against the latest decision. He has taken the unusual – but certainly not unknown – step of explaining why: Federal …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22306","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22306","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=22306"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22306\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=22306"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=22306"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=22306"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}