{"id":27959,"date":"2015-02-25T20:21:46","date_gmt":"2015-02-26T01:21:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=27959"},"modified":"2015-02-25T20:21:46","modified_gmt":"2015-02-26T01:21:46","slug":"february-25-2015","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=27959","title":{"rendered":"February 25, 2015"},"content":{"rendered":"

There are many revolving doors in the world … this one is minor<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Michelle Choi, an analyst for Moody\u2019s Investors Service, gave a credit rating to bonds issued by a New Jersey town in September. In October, she switched sides and started working for the town\u2019s underwriter, Morgan Stanley.<\/p>\n

Choi is one of hundreds of employees at Moody\u2019s and other credit-rating companies, including Standard & Poor\u2019s and Fitch Ratings, who\u2019ve gone to work for Wall Street since the 2008 financial crisis exposed the conflicts at the heart of the ratings business.<\/p>\n

While there\u2019s no evidence that Choi\u2019s job-hunting influenced the grade she gave Evesham Township\u2019s debt, the rising number of job changes in the industry raises a question: can credit analysts be impartial about grading bonds while looking for employment at banks that underwrite them?<\/p>\n

The ratings companies say the answer is yes. An academic study by longtime industry observers suggests otherwise.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Meanwhile, the SEC proudly trumpeted its compliance results<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Each year, the BSA Review Group makes hundreds of referrals based on information gleaned initially from SAR reporting. Some statistics drive home the usefulness of the information we receive through SARs:
\n\u2022 In the last six months or so we have been averaging around one temporary restraining order or asset freeze per month that was initiated based upon SARs reviewed by that group.
\n\u2022 In the last year or so, the SEC has brought actions against seven alleged Ponzi or pyramid schemes collectively involving over $100 million, and has opened a number of investigations or examinations into other possible Ponzi schemes, based on information we first obtained from SARs.
\n\u2022 Also in the last year or so, we\u2019ve charged eight people with insider trading in cases where we allege they collectively earned well over $10 million \u2013 again based on information we first obtained from SAR reporting.
\n\u2022 Over the past three and a half years, the SEC has initiated hundreds of exams and investigations based on the leads generated by the group from SARs and other BSA reports.
\n\u2022 And the number of investigations or exams that the SEC has opened based on information first discovered in SARs has essentially doubled each of the past two years.<\/p>\n

I share these statistics to illustrate the important point that the AML programs you oversee are critical in helping to expose fraud, the exploitation of vulnerable investors, and other misconduct. The quality of the reporting, and the industry expertise that you lend to your reports, often makes it possible for us to act more quickly than we otherwise could. And it increases the chance that we will be able to hold wrongdoers responsible and, we hope, recover investor losses.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It doesn’t sound like much to justify $7-billion in annual costs and the impetus given to terrorists<\/a>, does it? And, of course, the whole programme was portrayed as an anti-terror weapon, since that is a more popular idea than just another intrusive “crime detection” programme.<\/p>\n

And here’s a little more evidence that compliance costs are out of control<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Costs remain a challenge for the [HSBC] Group, with adjusted operating expenditure up by USD 2.2 billion, due to higher regulatory and compliance costs as well as inflationary pressures. Reporting a cost-income ratio of 67% in 2014 (59.6% in 2013), the Group has moved away from its previous target of a cost-income ratio in the mid-50s and is now just aiming to achieve positive jaws on an adjusted basis.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Who cares if any business gets done, as long as regulators are employed?<\/p>\n

Here’s a view that the bond market doesn’t care much about the Fed<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Traders are taking the Federal Reserve chair\u2019s comments over the past two days — labor market market isn\u2019t fully healed and inflation is too low — as confirmation that the Fed is very unlikely to raise interest rates in the first half of the year. Economists including UBS Group AG\u2019s Drew Matus and JPMorgan Chase & Co.\u2019s Michael Feroli saw in her message reasons to reaffirm their calls for the first increase to come by June.<\/p>\n

But there\u2019s a third view about how Yellen\u2019s testimony applies to the bond market, as expressed by Jim Bianco, the founder of Bianco Research LLC in Chicago: It doesn\u2019t really matter.<\/p>\n

In his alternative scenario, \u201ceverybody\u2019s right,\u201d Bianco said, in that the Fed could start raising its benchmark rate from near zero, like economists predict, and yields remain low, like traders seem to be anticipating.<\/p>\n

With almost $2 trillion of sovereign debt in Europe offering negative yields, demand for U.S. fixed-income assets is unlikely to evaporate regardless of what the Fed does. That demand — coming in part from overseas — will ensure that bond prices remain high and yields low.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 13bp, FixedResets off 7bp and DeemedRetractibles down 10bp. The Performance Highlights table is lengthy, dominated by FixedResets on both sides of the fence. Volume was high.<\/p>\n

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.93%, equivalent to 6.41% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates<\/a> now yield about 3.65%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 275bp, a sharp widening from the 260bp reported February 18<\/a>.<\/p>\n

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I\u2019ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets\u2019 Implied Volatilities. This doesn\u2019t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.<\/p>\n

Remember that all rich \/cheap assessments are:
\n\u00bb based on Implied Volatility Theory only
\n\u00bb are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
\n\u00bb assume constant GOC-5 yield
\n\u00bb assume constant Implied Volatility
\n\u00bb assume constant spread<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s TRP:<\/p>\n

\"impVol_TRP_150225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

The new issue has caused a large change in the curve-fitting for the TRP series of FixedResets, which is discussed at greater length on the post announcing the new issue<\/a>. TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.40 to be $1.36 rich, while the new issue, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.03 cheap at its issue price of 25.00.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_MFC_150225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).<\/p>\n

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.00 to be $0.57 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.92 to be $0.57 cheap.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_BAM_150225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable \u2013 it\u2019s the scale that makes it look so weird.<\/p>\n

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, bid at 17.51 to be $0.67 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.63 and appears to be $1.11 rich.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_FTS_150225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway \u2026 FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.90, looks $0.80 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.63 and is $1.01 rich.<\/p>\n

\"pairs_FR_140225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Most of the investment grade break-even rates are a little below zero.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, the market\u2019s distaste for product linked to Money Market rates does not extend to prime, as shown by the FixedFloater\/RatchetRate pairs:<\/p>\n

\"pairs_FF_140225\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-1.7968 %<\/td>\n2,291.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n4.42 %<\/td>\n3.57 %<\/td>\n18,906<\/td>\n18.30<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n-1.1494 %<\/td>\n4,000.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n3.15 %<\/td>\n3.29 %<\/td>\n65,511<\/td>\n18.96<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n-1.7968 %<\/td>\n2,435.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.08 %<\/td>\n1.38 %<\/td>\n110,211<\/td>\n0.31<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n0.0000 %<\/td>\n2,760.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n4.41 %<\/td>\n4.20 %<\/td>\n28,416<\/td>\n3.55<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n0.4648 %<\/td>\n3,212.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.0000 %<\/td>\n2,524.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.33 %<\/td>\n-0.55 %<\/td>\n56,589<\/td>\n0.08<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n0.0768 %<\/td>\n2,515.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n4.94 %<\/td>\n4.93 %<\/td>\n142,172<\/td>\n15.64<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n0.1293 %<\/td>\n2,800.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n4.42 %<\/td>\n3.37 %<\/td>\n212,278<\/td>\n16.79<\/td>\n79<\/td>\n-0.0655 %<\/td>\n2,411.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n4.91 %<\/td>\n0.17 %<\/td>\n102,710<\/td>\n0.17<\/td>\n39<\/td>\n-0.0961 %<\/td>\n2,652.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FloatingReset<\/td>\n2.43 %<\/td>\n2.86 %<\/td>\n93,221<\/td>\n6.39<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n-0.0861 %<\/td>\n2,324.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-2.16 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 14.98
\nEvaluated at bid price : 14.98
\nBid-YTW : 3.36 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.C<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-2.14 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 15.12
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.12
\nBid-YTW : 3.33 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PF.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.66 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 21.57
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.91
\nBid-YTW : 4.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.X<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.63 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 17.51
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.51
\nBid-YTW : 3.93 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-1.61 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 15.30
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.30
\nBid-YTW : 3.29 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PF.E<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.61 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 21.67
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.06
\nBid-YTW : 4.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.59 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.55
\nBid-YTW : 5.81 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PF.A<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.48 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 21.58
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.90
\nBid-YTW : 4.07 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.A<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-1.37 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 18.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.00
\nBid-YTW : 2.78 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.25 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.41
\nBid-YTW : 6.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedFloater<\/td>\n-1.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 21.79
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.50
\nBid-YTW : 3.57 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.M<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.54
\nBid-YTW : 3.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.01 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.50
\nBid-YTW : 3.64 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 19.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.80
\nBid-YTW : 4.19 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.L<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.00
\nBid-YTW : 3.79 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PVS.PR.B<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n1.09 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.12
\nBid-YTW : 4.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.A<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.28 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 19.85
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.85
\nBid-YTW : 3.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.33 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2017-09-19
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.90
\nBid-YTW : 2.84 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.53 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 16.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.60
\nBid-YTW : 3.46 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.H<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.99 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 16.90
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.90
\nBid-YTW : 3.13 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n2.49 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 23.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.33
\nBid-YTW : 3.16 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.A<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n118,915<\/td>\nTD crossed blocks of 12,000 at 24.80 and 25,000 at 24.77, sold 11,900 to Desjardins at 24.80 and 25,800 to anonymous at 24.82. Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 24.80.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 23.10
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.75
\nBid-YTW : 3.02 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.S<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n113,266<\/td>\nScotia crossed blocks of 25,000 and 50,000, both at 25.00. TD crossed 15,000 at the same price.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 23.20
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.92
\nBid-YTW : 3.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OSP.PR.A<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n78,932<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2020-03-31
\nMaturity Price : 10.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 10.10
\nBid-YTW : 4.81 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n75,733<\/td>\nRBC crossed 20,000 at 24.70. TD crossed blocks of 25,000 and 15,000 at the same price.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 23.05
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.57
\nBid-YTW : 3.04 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.E<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n62,900<\/td>\nNesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.53.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-03-27
\nMaturity Price : 25.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.49
\nBid-YTW : -6.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n44,686<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.41
\nBid-YTW : 6.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nQuote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.04 – 25.59
\nSpot Rate : 0.5500
\nAverage : 0.3383<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 23.27
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.04
\nBid-YTW : 3.11 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

NEW.PR.D<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\nQuote: 32.43 – 33.43
\nSpot Rate : 1.0000
\nAverage : 0.8380<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-06-26
\nMaturity Price : 32.07
\nEvaluated at bid price : 32.43
\nBid-YTW : 2.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BAM.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedFloater<\/td>\nQuote: 21.50 – 21.99
\nSpot Rate : 0.4900
\nAverage : 0.3745<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 21.79
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.50
\nBid-YTW : 3.57 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

CM.PR.P<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 24.42 – 24.75
\nSpot Rate : 0.3300
\nAverage : 0.2150<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-02-25
\nMaturity Price : 22.96
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.42
\nBid-YTW : 3.09 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

MFC.PR.B<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\nQuote: 24.57 – 24.94
\nSpot Rate : 0.3700
\nAverage : 0.2720<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.57
\nBid-YTW : 4.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

MFC.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 25.54 – 25.77
\nSpot Rate : 0.2300
\nAverage : 0.1541<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2016-12-19
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.54
\nBid-YTW : 3.02 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

There are many revolving doors in the world … this one is minor: Michelle Choi, an analyst for Moody\u2019s Investors Service, gave a credit rating to bonds issued by a New Jersey town in September. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-27959","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27959","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=27959"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27959\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=27959"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=27959"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=27959"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}