{"id":28660,"date":"2015-04-14T22:28:30","date_gmt":"2015-04-15T03:28:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=28660"},"modified":"2015-04-14T22:28:30","modified_gmt":"2015-04-15T03:28:30","slug":"april-14-2015","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=28660","title":{"rendered":"April 14, 2015"},"content":{"rendered":"

SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar managed to deliver notice of his own incompetence and a slap in the face to Canadian regulators<\/a> simultaneously:<\/p>\n

Now let\u2019s talk about one particular type of complex security known as structured notes \u2014 which has now become a $45 billion market \u2014 and where the registered offerings are targeted at retail investors.[22] In fact, recent data shows that an estimated 99% of all purchasers of these products are retail investors.[23] These securities are issued by large financial institutions and offer returns that are linked to the performance of a reference asset or index.[24] In their most basic form, structured notes are investment products that typically have a fixed maturity that includes a bond component and an embedded derivative.[25] What isn\u2019t always made clear are the risks of these debt look-alikes \u2014 of which there can be many. As the SEC recently pointed out in an Investor Bulletin, the risks of these products include, among others, the products\u2019 complex payoff structures, market risk on the reference asset or index, high fees, a lack of a liquid secondary market, opaque pricing, credit risk, and complicated payoff structures that can make it difficult to assess value, risk, and potential for growth.[26] Moreover, there are a wide variety of structured notes that have different risk profiles \u2014 some of these examples include principal protected notes, reverse convertible notes, enhanced participation or leveraged notes, and hybrid notes that combine multiple characteristics.[27]<\/p>\n

Structured notes grabbed widespread public notoriety in 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history.[28] Lehman Brothers had sold unsecured debt called \u201cprincipal protected notes\u201d that became worthless when the firm collapsed, and investors lost billions of dollars as a result.[29] In essence, the securities sold as \u201cprincipal protected\u201d were really not \u201cprotected;\u201d in fact, the \u201cprotection\u201d that was offered was tied to the creditworthiness of the issuer, which cratered along with Lehman Brothers. These products have been referred to as \u201cTrojan horses\u201d that ultimately enter into an investment portfolio and destroy people\u2019s life savings.[30]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Well, yeah. A guarantee is only as good as the guarantor. Since when is that news? Meanwhile, here in Canada:<\/p>\n

<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

There’s an interesting story about emerging battery technologies and players<\/a> on Bloomberg.<\/p>\n

\"batteries\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

$500 sounds like an awful lot to pay to store $0.20 (tops) worth of electricity, but:<\/p>\n

[MIT Professor Donald] Sadoway, a 65-year-old Canadian, defies the nerdy inventor mold. He\u2019s been known to teach his class in a tuxedo while serving champagne. Yet he\u2019s all science when explaining batteries. He says Ambri can top lithium-ion on price and longevity with tricky chemistry that he and a former student have finally perfected. The battery combines two metals Sadoway won\u2019t disclose that have different weights and melting points. He separates them with a salt layer. Electric currents heat the metals to as much as 700 degrees Celsius (1,292 degrees Fahrenheit) to pass electrons through the molten salt. That helps the metals hold more energy. Unlike the lithium-ion in laptops, which can take about 400 charges and last four years, Sadoway says his batteries can take 10,000 charges and work for at least a decade.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

So if you do it 10,000 times, that’s $0.05 per cycle in capital cost, and the arbitrage over time just got a lot more interesting. <\/p>\n

Sadoway is one of the first out of the gate. This year, he plans to ship six 10-ton prototypes packed with hundreds of liquid metal cells to wind and solar farms in Hawaii, a microgrid in Alaska, and a Consolidated Edison substation in Manhattan. Ambri\u2019s battery will store power Con Ed offloads when demand is low. Then, rather than cranking up another coal- or gas-fired plant, the utility will drain the battery when New Yorkers want more juice<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It is of great interest to learn that AltaGas has issued 2-Year USD FRNs at USD 3-Month LIBOR + 85bp<\/a>. 3-Month LIBOR will generally be roughly equal to 3-Month Treasuries plus a spread, the famous TED Spread<\/a>, currently about 25bp, where it is most of the time<\/a>. So, for the sake of round-figures, say these notes have been issued at 3-Month Treasuries +125.<\/p>\n

Now compare this with, for instance, ALA.PR.A, which currently pays $1.25 p.a. and will become exchangeable into a FloatingReset paying 3-Month bills+317bp at the end of October and is bid today at 19.35 to yield 4.51% to perpetuity (assuming a yield on the underlying Canada of 0.78%. That’s quite the difference!<\/p>\n

We can, and almost certainly will, argue for hours about how much effect there is of tax effects, currency, maturity date and liquidity in the difference between these spreads. But it’s a fascinating contrast anyway.<\/p>\n

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 73bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. The Performance Highlights table continues to illustrate a high level of volatility. Volume was above average.<\/p>\n

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I\u2019ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets\u2019 Implied Volatilities. This doesn\u2019t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.<\/p>\n

Remember that all rich \/cheap assessments are:
\n\u00bb based on Implied Volatility Theory only
\n\u00bb are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
\n\u00bb assume constant GOC-5 yield
\n\u00bb assume constant Implied Volatility
\n\u00bb assume constant spread<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s TRP:<\/p>\n

\"impVol_TRP_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.88 to be $1.66 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $1.05 cheap at its bid price of 15.45.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_MFC_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).<\/p>\n

Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230 on 2020-3-19, bid at 23.65 to be $0.51 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.16 to be $0.85 cheap. The lowest spread issue, MFC.PR.F, is noticeably off the curve defined by its peers.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_BAM_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.25 to be $0.90 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.10 and appears to be $1.29 rich.<\/p>\n

\"impVol_FTS_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway \u2026 FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 15.40, looks $1.12 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 21.77 and is $0.71 rich.<\/p>\n

\"pairs_FR_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Investment-grade pairs other than TRP.PR.A \/ TRP.PR.F now predict an average over the next five years of about 0.30%. TRP.PR.A \/ TRP.PR.F remains an outlier, predicting 1.03%. The DC.PR.B \/ DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3\/4 years of -1.18%.<\/p>\n

\"pairs_FF_150414\"<\/a>
Click for Big<\/i><\/div>\n

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-1.9471 %<\/td>\n2,139.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-1.9471 %<\/td>\n3,740.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n3.39 %<\/td>\n3.50 %<\/td>\n58,788<\/td>\n18.54<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n-1.9471 %<\/td>\n2,274.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.43 %<\/td>\n-1.52 %<\/td>\n36,854<\/td>\n0.13<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n0.0000 %<\/td>\n2,762.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n4.57 %<\/td>\n4.56 %<\/td>\n61,508<\/td>\n3.42<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n0.0534 %<\/td>\n3,225.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.0000 %<\/td>\n2,525.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.31 %<\/td>\n0.73 %<\/td>\n65,242<\/td>\n0.08<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n0.0126 %<\/td>\n2,524.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.15 %<\/td>\n5.07 %<\/td>\n150,570<\/td>\n14.91<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n-0.7257 %<\/td>\n2,770.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n4.55 %<\/td>\n3.82 %<\/td>\n263,779<\/td>\n16.40<\/td>\n85<\/td>\n-0.0981 %<\/td>\n2,346.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deemed-Retractible<\/td>\n4.89 %<\/td>\n1.93 %<\/td>\n107,614<\/td>\n0.12<\/td>\n36<\/td>\n0.0055 %<\/td>\n2,657.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FloatingReset<\/td>\n2.54 %<\/td>\n2.95 %<\/td>\n76,314<\/td>\n6.26<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n0.1232 %<\/td>\n2,344.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CIU.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-3.22 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 15.92
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.92
\nBid-YTW : 3.54 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.A<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-3.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 16.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.60
\nBid-YTW : 3.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-2.88 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 13.82
\nEvaluated at bid price : 13.82
\nBid-YTW : 3.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PF.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.57 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.39
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.75
\nBid-YTW : 5.41 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-2.54 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.73
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.78
\nBid-YTW : 3.29 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PF.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.81 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 21.42
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.75
\nBid-YTW : 4.11 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IFC.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.58 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.30
\nBid-YTW : 3.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.X<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.28 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 16.91
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.91
\nBid-YTW : 4.18 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.26 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 19.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.60
\nBid-YTW : 4.58 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 19.14
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.14
\nBid-YTW : 4.55 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 17.91
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.91
\nBid-YTW : 4.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.C<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n-1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 14.17
\nEvaluated at bid price : 14.17
\nBid-YTW : 3.54 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.N<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 21.94
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.34
\nBid-YTW : 5.34 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.M<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n-1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.36
\nBid-YTW : 3.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.65
\nBid-YTW : 4.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.19 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.88
\nBid-YTW : 3.44 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PF.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.73 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 20.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.60
\nBid-YTW : 4.58 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.P<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.83 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 17.23
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.23
\nBid-YTW : 3.59 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.R<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n2.01 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 19.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.25
\nBid-YTW : 4.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n148,432<\/td>\nNesbitt crossed blocks of 89,600 and 50,000, both at 25.22.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.13
\nBid-YTW : 3.61 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IFC.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n90,676<\/td>\nDesjardins crossed 12,600 at 24.70. Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 25,000 each at the same price.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2025-01-31
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.30
\nBid-YTW : 3.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n87,139<\/td>\nScotia crossed 25,000 at 25.05, then sold 10,000 to RBC at 25.00. RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.00.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 23.08
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.87
\nBid-YTW : 3.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.R<\/td>\nDeemed-Retractible<\/td>\n87,009<\/td>\nTD crossed 45,400 at 25.49.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-05-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.48
\nBid-YTW : 4.24 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PF.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n79,566<\/td>\nTD crossed blocks of 25,600 shares, 40,000 and 12,000, all at 24.27.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.88
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.27
\nBid-YTW : 3.89 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
HSE.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n63,420<\/td>\nRBC crossed 40,000 at 25.22.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 23.21
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.15
\nBid-YTW : 4.28 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nQuote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.B<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 23.78 – 24.45
\nSpot Rate : 0.6700
\nAverage : 0.4089<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.73
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.78
\nBid-YTW : 3.29 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

ENB.PR.J<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 20.10 – 20.49
\nSpot Rate : 0.3900
\nAverage : 0.2363<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 20.10
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.10
\nBid-YTW : 4.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BAM.PF.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\nQuote: 22.75 – 23.12
\nSpot Rate : 0.3700
\nAverage : 0.2163<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.39
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.75
\nBid-YTW : 5.41 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BAM.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\nQuote: 13.82 – 14.30
\nSpot Rate : 0.4800
\nAverage : 0.3468<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 13.82
\nEvaluated at bid price : 13.82
\nBid-YTW : 3.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

CU.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\nQuote: 23.30 – 23.62
\nSpot Rate : 0.3200
\nAverage : 0.1956<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 22.99
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.30
\nBid-YTW : 4.87 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

CIU.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\nQuote: 15.92 – 16.59
\nSpot Rate : 0.6700
\nAverage : 0.5566<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2045-04-14
\nMaturity Price : 15.92
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.92
\nBid-YTW : 3.54 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar managed to deliver notice of his own incompetence and a slap in the face to Canadian regulators simultaneously: Now let\u2019s talk about one particular type of complex security known as …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-28660","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28660","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=28660"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28660\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=28660"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=28660"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=28660"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}