{"id":44994,"date":"2023-03-17T20:04:27","date_gmt":"2023-03-18T01:04:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=44994"},"modified":"2023-03-17T20:04:27","modified_gmt":"2023-03-18T01:04:27","slug":"march-17-2023","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=44994","title":{"rendered":"March 17, 2023"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"<\/a><\/div>\n

TXPR closed at 549.90<\/a>, up 0.54% on the day. Volume today was 926,050, below the median of the past 21 trading days.<\/p>\n

CPD closed at 10.97<\/a>, down 0.72% on the day. Volume was 49,780, third-lowest of the past 21 trading days.<\/p>\n

ZPR closed at 9.06<\/a>, down 0.22% on the day. Volume was 88,280, second-lowest of the past 21 trading days.<\/p>\n

Five-year Canada yields plummetted back down to 2.92%<\/a> today.<\/p>\n

Equities were hit again; pundits blamed, basically, uncertainty<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Wall Street closed sharply lower on Friday, marking the end of a tumultuous week dominated by an unfolding crisis in the banking sector and the gathering storm clouds of possible recession.<\/p>\n

All three indexes ended the session deep in negative territory, with financial stocks down the most among the major sectors of the S&P 500.<\/p>\n

Canada\u2019s main stock index also fell, dragged down by losses in financial and energy stocks as fears of a global banking meltdown continued to plague investors. But losses were a little more modest.<\/p>\n

The S&P\/TSX composite index was down 152.83, or 0.77%, at 19,387.72, its second straight week of losses. For the week, it was down 1.8%.<\/p>\n

While the benchmark S&P 500 ended higher than last Friday\u2019s close, the Nasdaq and the Dow posted weekly declines.
\n…<\/b>
\nOver the last two weeks, the S&P Banking index and the KBW Regional Banking index plunged by 4.6% and 5.4%, respectively, their largest two-week drops since March 2020.<\/p>\n

First Republic Bank plunged 32.8% after the bank announced it was suspending its dividend, reversing Thursday\u2019s surge which was sparked by an unprecedented $30 billion rescue package from large financial institutions<\/p>\n

Among First Republic\u2019s peers, PacWest Bancorp fell 19.0% while Western Alliance slid 15.1%.<\/p>\n

U.S.-traded shares of Credit Suisse also closed sharply lower, down 6.9%.
\n…<\/b>
\nAt last glance, financial markets have priced in a 60.5% likelihood that the central bank will raise its key target rate by 25 basis points, and a 39.5% probability that it will let the current rate stand, according to CME\u2019s FedWatch tool.<\/p>\n

Uncertainly over what the Fed will do at its policy meeting next week and beyond, and the overall volatile credit markets, also have investors betting interest cuts are in the cards at the Bank of Canada. As of late Friday, money markets were placing 45% odds the bank will cut its trend-setting overnight rate next month by a quarter of a percentage point. Markets are pricing in more than 50 basis points of easing by July.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Bond market volatility is high<\/a>:<\/p>\n

In 2008, and again in early 2020 during the shocking early days of COVID-19, bond yields collapsed as investors braced for tumbling interest rates.<\/p>\n

This time, however, traders are torn between two scenarios. They can bet on rates continuing their historically fast upward march to combat inflation, as U.S. Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell suggested last week was still necessary, and that the European Central Bank reinforced this week by hiking its own benchmark rate by half a percentage point.<\/p>\n

Or fixed income investors can decide the contagion effects of regional bank failures in the United States and the near-collapse of Credit Suisse in Europe will spawn a broader economic crisis requiring interest rates to fall back toward zero.
\n…<\/b>
\nThe Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate, or MOVE Index, which tracks the implied volatility of U.S. Treasury bonds, hit its highest level since 2009 this week.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And with respect to US banks<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The shares of many banks resumed their dizzying slide, erasing gains from Thursday that had provided a brief moment of calm during a tumultuous week. First Republic, the beleaguered regional lender, lost a third of its already beaten-down value on Friday alone. The S&P 500 stock index fell about 1.1 percent \u2014 the week\u2019s worst day of trading.<\/p>\n

President Biden asked Congress on Friday to grant financial regulators broad new powers to punish the executives of failed lenders. A day earlier, data showed that banks in the United States borrowed record amounts from the Federal Reserve this week to meet short-term needs, another sign of acute stresses in the financial system.
\n…<\/b>
\nThe KBW bank index, which tracks the performance of 24 US banks, skidded more than 5 percent and has lost over 20 percent of its value this year, versus a small gain in the broader market over that period.
\n…<\/b>
\nOther signs of anxiety also persisted. Data from the Federal Reserve released on Thursday showed that banks borrowed record amounts of emergency funds from the central bank in recent days, tapping both existing facilities and a new program to shore up liquidity that was announced after the seizure of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

How much at the discount window<\/a>?<\/p>\n

Banks took an all-time high $152.9 billion from the Fed’s traditional lender-of-last resort facility known as the discount window as of Wednesday, while also taking $11.9 billion in loans from the Fed’s newly created Bank Term Lending Program. The discount window jump crashed through the prior record of $112 billion in the fall of 2008, during the most acute phase of the financial crisis.
\n…<\/b>
\nIncluding more than $140 billion in other funding provided to the new bridge banks for Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, the central bank’s total balance sheet mushroomed by roughly $300 billion in the last week. That reverses a substantial portion of the balance sheet reduction accomplished since last summer.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

To put that in perspective:<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/div>\n

And what does Biden want additional rules for<\/a>?<\/p>\n

One plank of the proposal would broaden the F.D.I.C.\u2019s ability to seek the return of compensation from executives of failed banks, in response to reports that the chief executive of Silicon Valley Bank sold $3 million in shares of the bank shortly before federal regulators took it over a week ago. Regulators\u2019 current clawback powers are limited to the largest banks; Mr. Biden would expand them to cover banks the size of Signature and Silicon Valley Bank.
\n…<\/b>
\nThe president is also asking Congress to lower a legal bar that the F.D.I.C. must clear in order to bar an executive from a failed bank from working elsewhere in the financial industry. That ability currently applies only to executives who engage in \u201cwillful or continuing disregard for the safety and soundness\u201d of their institutions. He is similarly seeking to broaden the agency\u2019s ability to impose fines on executives whose actions contribute to the failure of their banks.
\n…<\/b>
\nThe chair of the Senate Banking Committee, Sherrod Brown of Ohio, said in a statement emailed to reporters that regulators needed \u201cstronger rules to rein in risky behavior and catch incompetence.\u201d<\/p>\n

He added that in addition to executives who had failed at their duties, there should be a way to hold accountable the \u201cregulators tasked with overseeing them.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The good old American puritanical streak. If anything goes wrong, it must be somebody’s fault and they must be punished!<\/p>\n

There are more mechanical complications<\/a>, which I fail to understand:<\/p>\n

I am concerned by reports of retail investors being unable to exercise options they purchased on Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank stock.[1] I am hopeful that broker-dealers and clearing agencies will make efforts to assist retail investors in exercising their options if the investors wish to do so, including by exploring possible cash settlements. In addition, I hope that FINRA and my colleagues at the SEC will move forward with efforts to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework around complex products, including options, which are risky and can expose an investor to sudden and severe losses.[2]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Huh<\/a>?:<\/p>\n

Retail options traders who thought they hit the jackpot with their wagers against the stock of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank are now finding themselves in a world of hurt. Despite the collapse of the banks, the traders are unable to cash in on their put options after brokers halted trading in the stocks, leaving them with worthless contracts set to expire Friday.
\n…<\/b>
\n\u201cOn expiration day, Interactive Brokers will allow customers to manually exercise any of their expiring option positions in SIVBVB -2.3% and SBNY, as long as their account is sufficiently funded and has the permissions required to carry the stock position that will result from the exercise,\u201d the broker\u2019s statement read. \u201cPer OCC, no options in those series will be automatically exercised.\u201d The OCC would be the Options Clearing Corporation. They\u2019re the biggest equity derivatives clearinghouse in the world, serving as the middleman between buyers and sellers tasked with making sure that everyone is playing by the rules and set to get paid what they\u2019re entitled.
\n…<\/b>
\nOf course, if the stock doesn\u2019t start trading again by Friday, there won\u2019t be much point in exercising the options. That\u2019s because the stock prices they\u2019re tied to won\u2019t reflect the current reality \u2014 that they\u2019re worthless \u2014 but rather the price before trading stopped.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And<\/a>:<\/p>\n

There are about 7,660 put options on SVB Financial worth a notional $114 million due to expire Friday and another 22,347 worth $178 million on Signature, according to Bloomberg calculations based on the last trading session for each stock. Assuming the banks\u2019 shares are now worthless, they all represent winning bets.<\/p>\n

The Options Clearing Corp., which provides clearing and settlement services for derivatives, announced Tuesday that its usual process of automatically exercising options would not happen for contracts tied to Signature and SVB. That\u2019s because when shares aren\u2019t trading, there\u2019s technically no way to value them and determine which options are in-the-money.
\n…<\/b>
\nMeanwhile, margin risk is adding a further complication, according to Steve Sosnick, chief strategist at Interactive Brokers. That\u2019s because the amount of collateral a trader needs to deposit in an account is tied to the last closing price of the underlying stock.<\/p>\n

For SVB that was $106.04, and for Signature it was $70. In other words, even if a trader sold a $30 put on SVB, they\u2019d still need to have sufficient funds in the account to cover the position as if it was valued at $106.04.<\/p>\n

\u201cYou may find yourself in margin deficit as the short position is immediately marked to the last traded price,\u201d Sosnick said. \u201cAnd that position will persist until the Depository Trust Company or the Options Clearing Corp. make a determination of the final value. That could take some time.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I can’t believe that there’s no established procedure for this. There’s a regulatory failure, if you’re looking for one!<\/p>\n

The IMF has published several articles on monetary policy<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Soaring prices were a surprise from the perspective of precrisis policy frameworks, especially for advanced economies. Empirical evidence suggested that inflation rose by only a small amount when unemployment declined, consistent with a very flat Phillips curve. This evidence was reinforced by the pre-pandemic experience of inflation that remained tepid even as monetary stimulus pushed unemployment to very low levels.<\/p>\n

However, these models embedding a low Phillips curve slope did a poor job of explaining the pandemic-related surge in prices. Most inflation forecasts based on these models, including ours at the IMF, significantly underpredicted inflation.<\/p>\n

While high inflation partly reflects unusual developments, some forecast errors likely reflect our misunderstanding of the Phillips curve and the supply side of the economy.<\/p>\n

While the standard Phillips curve links inflation to the unemployment gap, the rapid employment recovery may have played a significant role in driving inflation, implying that \u201cspeed effects\u201d matter more than previously thought. There may also be important nonlinearities in the Phillips curve slope: price and wage pressures from falling unemployment become more acute when the economy is running hot than when it\u2019s below full employment. Finally, surging goods inflation during the recovery\u2014when constraints on supply and demand for services meant massive stimulus fell heavily on goods\u2014suggests the importance of capacity constraints at the sectoral, as well as aggregate, level.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

And HOOPP did very well<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP), long a top performer among Canada\u2019s big pension plans, swung to a loss in 2022, its first in 14 years.<\/p>\n

HOOPP said Friday it posted a loss of 8.60 per cent on its investment portfolio, cutting its assets to $103.7-billion at year end.<\/p>\n

The plan, which serves 435,000 active and retired Ontario health care workers at more than 630 employers, dipped to its lowest level of funding since 2014 \u2013 but that funding ratio, which compares its assets with the future benefits it owes members, still stood at 117 per cent, down from 120 per cent at the end of 2021.
\n…<\/b>
\n[Chief Investment Officer] Mr. Wissell said despite the overall loss, HOOPP beat its benchmark \u2013 what a similar portfolio should have been expected to return \u2013 by 4.61 percentage points. And each investment department outperformed its benchmark, \u201cacross the board,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

HOOPP\u2019s 10-year annualized return as of the end of 2022 was 8.35 per cent.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat we say here is, we\u2019re in the pension delivery business. We\u2019re not in the money-management business, so against that backdrop, we\u2019re pleased that we remain fully funded,\u201d Mr. Wissell said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref\u2122 Preferred Indices
\nThese values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref\u2122 Indices<\/strong>
\nValues are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
\nCurrent
\nYield
\n(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
\nYTW<\/td>\n		Median
\nAverage
\nTrading
\nValue<\/td>\n		Median
\nMod Dur
\n(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n2.8455 %<\/td>\n2,431.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n2.8455 %<\/td>\n4,663.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n9.27 %<\/td>\n9.22 %<\/td>\n53,122<\/td>\n10.24<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2.8455 %<\/td>\n2,687.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.0186 %<\/td>\n3,304.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n5.09 %<\/td>\n7.45 %<\/td>\n51,673<\/td>\n2.71<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n-0.0186 %<\/td>\n3,946.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n-0.0186 %<\/td>\n3,079.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.1774 %<\/td>\n2,730.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n6.25 %<\/td>\n6.38 %<\/td>\n60,231<\/td>\n13.31<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n0.1774 %<\/td>\n2,977.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset Disc<\/td>\n5.73 %<\/td>\n7.48 %<\/td>\n99,016<\/td>\n12.23<\/td>\n61<\/td>\n0.2048 %<\/td>\n2,144.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Insurance Straight<\/td>\n6.17 %<\/td>\n6.24 %<\/td>\n79,318<\/td>\n13.62<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n0.4184 %<\/td>\n2,911.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FloatingReset<\/td>\n10.27 %<\/td>\n10.53 %<\/td>\n34,527<\/td>\n9.19<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n0.6974 %<\/td>\n2,460.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset Prem<\/td>\n6.62 %<\/td>\n6.48 %<\/td>\n223,244<\/td>\n12.76<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n-0.0794 %<\/td>\n2,334.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset Bank Non<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.2048 %<\/td>\n2,192.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n5.55 %<\/td>\n7.10 %<\/td>\n88,273<\/td>\n12.40<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n0.4067 %<\/td>\n2,337.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-12.18 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.00
\nBid-YTW : 8.43 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.C<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-4.94 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.97
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.97
\nBid-YTW : 7.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.M<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-4.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.71
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.71
\nBid-YTW : 7.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.D<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-3.90 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.25
\nBid-YTW : 7.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.D<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-3.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.21
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.21
\nBid-YTW : 8.71 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.90 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.75
\nBid-YTW : 6.40 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PF.B<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-2.10 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.35
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.35
\nBid-YTW : 8.44 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.61
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.61
\nBid-YTW : 6.51 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-1.91 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 10.76
\nEvaluated at bid price : 10.76
\nBid-YTW : 9.22 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MIC.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.88 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.30
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.30
\nBid-YTW : 6.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.56 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 21.40
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.40
\nBid-YTW : 6.56 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BIP.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n-1.36 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 21.49
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.80
\nBid-YTW : 6.82 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.M<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n-1.26 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.27
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.27
\nBid-YTW : 7.46 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IAF.PR.B<\/td>\nInsurance Straight<\/td>\n1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.25
\nBid-YTW : 6.00 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.E<\/td>\nInsurance Straight<\/td>\n1.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.92
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.92
\nBid-YTW : 5.97 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.S<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.11 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 21.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.95
\nBid-YTW : 6.42 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.A<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.11 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 13.63
\nEvaluated at bid price : 13.63
\nBid-YTW : 8.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.16 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.95
\nBid-YTW : 6.87 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PVS.PR.H<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n1.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2027-02-28
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.51
\nBid-YTW : 7.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.20 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 23.01
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.53
\nBid-YTW : 6.62 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PF.I<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.21 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.90
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.90
\nBid-YTW : 7.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.H<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.21 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.50
\nBid-YTW : 7.30 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.Z<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.22 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.75
\nBid-YTW : 6.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n1.23 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 12.35
\nEvaluated at bid price : 12.35
\nBid-YTW : 7.64 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.F<\/td>\nFloatingReset<\/td>\n1.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.50
\nBid-YTW : 10.53 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PF.F<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.30
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.30
\nBid-YTW : 8.64 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.25 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.40
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.40
\nBid-YTW : 8.44 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n1.25 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 22.09
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.64
\nBid-YTW : 6.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.S<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.36 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.17
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.17
\nBid-YTW : 6.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.Y<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.37 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.75
\nBid-YTW : 7.43 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PF.J<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.41 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 21.55
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.55
\nBid-YTW : 6.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.S<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.44 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.65
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.65
\nBid-YTW : 7.40 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.Q<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n1.47 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.30
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.30
\nBid-YTW : 7.15 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IFC.PR.E<\/td>\nInsurance Straight<\/td>\n1.60 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.98
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.98
\nBid-YTW : 6.23 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.N<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.63 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 22.22
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.50
\nBid-YTW : 5.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PF.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.48
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.48
\nBid-YTW : 6.19 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.73 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.55
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.55
\nBid-YTW : 6.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BIP.PR.B<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.96 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 22.73
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.45
\nBid-YTW : 7.57 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n1.99 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.50
\nBid-YTW : 6.90 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.W<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n2.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.96
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.96
\nBid-YTW : 7.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.K<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\n2.39 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.25
\nBid-YTW : 6.72 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BIP.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n2.74 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.52
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.52
\nBid-YTW : 7.50 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n3.23 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.50
\nBid-YTW : 6.87 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.E<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n3.66 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.80
\nBid-YTW : 6.25 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n3.72 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 20.38
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.38
\nBid-YTW : 6.66 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PR.M<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.80 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.25
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.25
\nBid-YTW : 6.54 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n6.67 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 12.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 12.80
\nBid-YTW : 9.22 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
\nTraded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n45,375<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 12.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 12.50
\nBid-YTW : 9.44 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTS.PR.K<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n24,868<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.84
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.84
\nBid-YTW : 7.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.Y<\/td>\nInsurance Straight<\/td>\n23,600<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.50
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.50
\nBid-YTW : 6.11 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PF.A<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\n19,916<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.80
\nBid-YTW : 7.78 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BN.PF.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n18,424<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 18.71
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.71
\nBid-YTW : 6.58 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n17,938<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 22.31
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.58
\nBid-YTW : 6.46 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 10 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Wide Spread Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nQuote Data and Yield Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CU.PR.E<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\nQuote: 19.80 – 24.12
\nSpot Rate : 4.3200
\nAverage : 2.5324<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 19.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.80
\nBid-YTW : 6.25 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

TD.PF.E<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\nQuote: 16.00 – 19.17
\nSpot Rate : 3.1700
\nAverage : 1.9964<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.00
\nBid-YTW : 8.43 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

FTS.PR.K<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\nQuote: 15.84 – 17.97
\nSpot Rate : 2.1300
\nAverage : 1.2579<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 15.84
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.84
\nBid-YTW : 7.86 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

BN.PF.J<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\nQuote: 22.10 – 23.99
\nSpot Rate : 1.8900
\nAverage : 1.1376<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 21.72
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.10
\nBid-YTW : 6.91 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

MFC.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset Ins Non<\/td>\nQuote: 16.73 – 18.46
\nSpot Rate : 1.7300
\nAverage : 1.1752<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 16.73
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.73
\nBid-YTW : 7.56 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

PWF.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset Disc<\/td>\nQuote: 17.51 – 19.27
\nSpot Rate : 1.7600
\nAverage : 1.2619<\/p>\n

YTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2053-03-17
\nMaturity Price : 17.51
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.51
\nBid-YTW : 7.62 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

TXPR closed at 549.90, up 0.54% on the day. Volume today was 926,050, below the median of the past 21 trading days. CPD closed at 10.97, down 0.72% on the day. Volume was 49,780, third-lowest …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-44994","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/44994","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=44994"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/44994\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=44994"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=44994"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=44994"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}