{"id":5398,"date":"2009-02-09T20:54:18","date_gmt":"2009-02-10T00:54:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=5398"},"modified":"2009-02-09T20:54:18","modified_gmt":"2009-02-10T00:54:18","slug":"february-9-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=5398","title":{"rendered":"February 9, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"

Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), in the Financial Times, 3 February 2009<\/a>:<\/p>\n

As today\u2019s financial crisis progressively gets resolved, it will be necessary to start the process of preventing future crises. This will require substantial reform of the regulatory framework. Banks will have to strengthen their capital and their liquidity buffers. And financial regulation must have a less pro-cyclical effect. The objective must be to enable the banks to curb the impact of shocks on the economy, rather than to amplify them, as is the case now, where negative spirals are generated between the financial system and the real economy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The trouble with attempting a counter-cyclical (or less pro-cyclical) regulatory policy is that it requires the authorities to determine what the cycle is – and I don’t believe that they are any smarter or better informed that the rest of the world. It also opens up a greater possibility of political interference in what is a rather dry, technical and confusing area … can’t you just hear What-Debt? as Pooh-Bah of banking regulation? ‘Thanks to my wise tax-cutting, we are all going to be rich forever. It is impossible for a bank to go bankrupt. Therefore …’<\/p>\n

I have heard some things about a Spanish model of “Dynamic Provisioning”, but haven’t investigated any of the details.<\/p>\n

Michael Pomerleano, Harald Scheule and Andrew Sheng write a nice piece of VoxEU, The devil is in the details<\/a>, emphasizing the dangers of cliff risk through model homogeneity:<\/p>\n

the price of all risky assets may have dropped below their fundamental value. Therefore, leveraged markets are prone to overshoot in booms and underprice in downturns. If this is true, the current losses in the trading book may be overestimated. If policy does not respond well (or is ineffective), the pessimistic view becomes self-reinforcing. Under the present \u201cfair market value\u201d regulatory regime, market risk exposures are marked to market and a large fraction of the losses reported to date relate to market-risk exposures.
…<\/b>
A little understood problem is that the model provider, financial intermediation, and model auditing industry is highly concentrated, leading to systemic risk. Several examples suffice: the small number of credit rating agencies for bond and structured finance issues, the growing market share of \u201ctoo big to fail\u201d financial institutions, and joint ventures in model construction designed to reduce costs. The problem is compounded by the use of similar quantitative frameworks and frameworks that are calibrated based on similar loss experiences.<\/p>\n

An anecdote illustrates this point. Some years ago the chief risk officer of a major U.S. bank presented the asset correlation matrix used by his institution. Another major financial institution at the event confirmed its use of the same matrix. While the institutions were fundamentally different in nature, they shared the same reputable consulting firm. Neither this firm\u2019s model nor any other model has been formally validated. The oligopolistic structure was nurtured by the limited data availability and the propensity of financial institutions to outsource risk modelling. A similar situation prevails in the accounting industry, which is dominated by the \u201cBig Four.\u201d The public sector has abdicated too much authority to vested interests in the private sector.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This behaviour is lauded and encouraged by regulators and large firms, under the twin banners of eliminating regulatory arbitrage and encouraging “best practices”. The authors recommend:<\/p>\n

Deconcentration of risk models is another priority. This may involve generating a compulsory global warehouse for financial risk\u2013related data (particularly regarding credit risk) and encouraging alternative modelling techniques. While limited data-sharing initiatives reportedly are being undertaken in Japan, they need to be far more extensive and systematic. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

while – in a decision I consider to be inconsistent with their stated thesis – recommending:<\/p>\n

Regulatory arbitrage has transferred risks to off-balance-sheet special-purpose vehicles and hedge funds. This practice may have to be limited by homogenising rules across financial instruments and institutions as well as across industries and countries.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Fed is having difficulty coming to grips with the question of what to do next<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Federal Reserve officials have failed to resolve an internal debate over whether to purchase long-term Treasuries, even as rising yields on the securities threaten to undermine the central bank\u2019s objective of cutting borrowing costs for consumers and businesses.
…<\/b>
\u201cThe Fed will get a lot more bang for its buck by buying mortgages than buying Treasuries,\u201d said John Ryding, founder and chief economist of RDQ Economics LLC in New York and a former Fed economist.
…<\/b>
Lacker preferred to expand the money supply \u201cby purchasing U.S. Treasury securities rather than through targeted credit programs,\u201d the FOMC statement said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Accrued Interest<\/i> comments on<\/a> pending revisions to TARP, which he states will include FDIC insured 10-year covered bonds. The source WSJ article<\/a> does not reference covered bonds, but the idea has been floating around for a few weeks<\/a>. As yet there is nothing on the FDIC website<\/a> regarding such a guarantee – the last mention was a policy statement<\/a> cleaning up legal loose ends in August.<\/p>\n

The market ticked up today on reasonable volume bolstered by all the recent new issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n5.31 %<\/td>\n3.79 %<\/td>\n24,095<\/td>\n17.76<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n0.1275 %<\/td>\n861.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n7.34 %<\/td>\n7.00 %<\/td>\n65,988<\/td>\n13.85<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n-0.4060 %<\/td>\n1,368.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n5.33 %<\/td>\n4.40 %<\/td>\n31,097<\/td>\n16.57<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n1.0778 %<\/td>\n985.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n5.26 %<\/td>\n4.68 %<\/td>\n153,334<\/td>\n4.01<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n0.1355 %<\/td>\n2,042.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n6.20 %<\/td>\n9.74 %<\/td>\n71,094<\/td>\n4.07<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n0.1503 %<\/td>\n1,798.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n7.02 %<\/td>\n8.47 %<\/td>\n34,181<\/td>\n0.85<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n0.4028 %<\/td>\n2,015.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.3763 %<\/td>\n1,562.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n6.88 %<\/td>\n6.96 %<\/td>\n204,598<\/td>\n12.60<\/td>\n71<\/td>\n0.3763 %<\/td>\n1,439.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n6.11 %<\/td>\n5.73 %<\/td>\n658,001<\/td>\n13.94<\/td>\n27<\/td>\n0.4675 %<\/td>\n1,802.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FFN.PR.A<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n-2.67 %<\/td>\nAsset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 30 according to the company<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-12-01
\nMaturity Price : 10.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 7.30
\nBid-YTW : 11.97 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.48 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 17.27
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.27
\nBid-YTW : 7.47 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.J<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n-1.89 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2018-03-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.20
\nBid-YTW : 10.22 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BCE.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedFloater<\/td>\n-1.76 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 14.55
\nBid-YTW : 7.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
HSB.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.41 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 17.42
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.42
\nBid-YTW : 7.31 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BCE.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedFloater<\/td>\n-1.29 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 14.56
\nBid-YTW : 7.35 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 18.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.80
\nBid-YTW : 7.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 15.59
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.59
\nBid-YTW : 7.35 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.C<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 15.47
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.47
\nBid-YTW : 7.32 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENB.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.05 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 23.68
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.95
\nBid-YTW : 5.85 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 16.94
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.94
\nBid-YTW : 7.17 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.09 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 17.55
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.55
\nBid-YTW : 6.45 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.10 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 20.31
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.31
\nBid-YTW : 7.16 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.14 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 22.21
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.25
\nBid-YTW : 4.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.14 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 21.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.10
\nBid-YTW : 6.85 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.K<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.16 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 21.48
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.80
\nBid-YTW : 5.17 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.N<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 22.51
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.57
\nBid-YTW : 4.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 20.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.80
\nBid-YTW : 7.09 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TCA.PR.Y<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.19 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 44.92
\nEvaluated at bid price : 46.71
\nBid-YTW : 6.00 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FIG.PR.A<\/td>\nInterest-Bearing<\/td>\n1.20 %<\/td>\nAsset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of February 6, based on Capital units at $1.49<\/a> and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred<\/a>..
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-12-31
\nMaturity Price : 10.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 7.61
\nBid-YTW : 12.34 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FTN.PR.A<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n1.26 %<\/td>\nAsset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 30 according to the company<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-12-01
\nMaturity Price : 10.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 8.02
\nBid-YTW : 9.35 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.P<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.27 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 20.01
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.01
\nBid-YTW : 6.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.50 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 23.66
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.70
\nBid-YTW : 5.23 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.F<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.56 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 15.65
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.65
\nBid-YTW : 8.61 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.R<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.57 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 21.91
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.95
\nBid-YTW : 4.72 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n1.59 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 7.67
\nEvaluated at bid price : 7.67
\nBid-YTW : 6.96 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.71 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 16.69
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.69
\nBid-YTW : 7.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n1.89 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 7.55
\nEvaluated at bid price : 7.55
\nBid-YTW : 7.07 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.93 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 17.98
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.98
\nBid-YTW : 6.79 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.M<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n2.03 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 21.30
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.60
\nBid-YTW : 6.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.A<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n2.27 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 22.46
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.50
\nBid-YTW : 4.67 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.I<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n2.44 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-12-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.00
\nBid-YTW : 9.94 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNA.PR.C<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n3.55 %<\/td>\nAsset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of January 30 according to the company<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 12.26
\nBid-YTW : 14.37 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n171,279<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-05-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00
\nBid-YTW : 6.34 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.L<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n122,334<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 24.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00
\nBid-YTW : 6.56 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.M<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n101,700<\/td>\nDesjardins crossed 90,000 at 25.76.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2013-10-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.76
\nBid-YTW : 4.04 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.R<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n89,460<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-03-26
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.00
\nBid-YTW : 6.34 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.X<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n70,149<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-05-25
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.08
\nBid-YTW : 6.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.E<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n54,445<\/td>\nNesbitt bought 19,600 from RBC at 15.72.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-02-09
\nMaturity Price : 15.45
\nEvaluated at bid price : 15.45
\nBid-YTW : 7.42 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), in the Financial Times, 3 February 2009: As today\u2019s financial crisis progressively gets resolved, it will be necessary to start the process of preventing future …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5398","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5398","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5398"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5398\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5398"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5398"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5398"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}