{"id":7420,"date":"2009-08-05T12:57:03","date_gmt":"2009-08-05T16:57:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=7420"},"modified":"2009-08-05T12:57:03","modified_gmt":"2009-08-05T16:57:03","slug":"august-4-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=7420","title":{"rendered":"August 4, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Bank for International Settlements has released<\/a> a paper by Fabio Panetta, Thomas Faeh, Giuseppe Grande, Corrinne Ho, Michael King, Aviram Levy, Federico M Signoretti, Marco Taboga and Andrea Zaghini, An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes<\/a>:<\/p>\n

We analyse the wide array of rescue programmes adopted in several countries, following Lehman Brothers\u2019 default in September 2008, in order to support banks and other financial institutions. We first provide an overview of the programmes, comparing their characteristics, magnitudes and participation rates across countries. We then consider the effects of the programmes on banks\u2019 risk and valuation, looking at the behaviour of CDS premia and stock prices. We then proceed to analyse the issuance of government guaranteed bonds by banks, examining their impact on banks\u2019 funding and highlighting undesired effects and distortions. Finally, we briefly review the recent evolution of bank lending to the private sector. We draw policy implications, in particular as regards the way of mitigating the distortions implied by such programmes and the need for an exit strategy<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Paul Krugman wrote a piece in the New York Times titled Rewarding Bad Actors<\/a>, which dealt in part with High Frequency Trading:<\/p>\n

It\u2019s hard to imagine a better illustration than high-frequency trading. The stock market is supposed to allocate capital to its most productive uses, for example by helping companies with good ideas raise money. But it\u2019s hard to see how traders who place their orders one-thirtieth of a second faster than anyone else do anything to improve that social function.
…<\/b>
And there\u2019s a good case that such activities are actually harmful. For example, high-frequency trading probably degrades the stock market\u2019s function, because it\u2019s a kind of tax on investors who lack access to those superfast computers \u2014 which means that the money Goldman spends on those computers has a negative effect on national wealth. As the great Stanford economist Kenneth Arrow put it in 1973, speculation based on private information imposes a \u201cdouble social loss\u201d: it uses up resources and undermines markets.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Far be it from me to dismiss the thoughts of a Nobel-winning economist, but I fail to see his point here – at the very least, it needs elucidation.<\/p>\n

Mr. Krugman implies that there is a lower limit to trading reaction speed, below which improvements in reaction time have deleterious effects on national wealth. I don’t see how you would go about defining such a thing. It should also be noted that High Frequency Trading does not necessarily have anything to do with Flash Orders; HFT is simply a method of arbitrage. If, for instance, there is a huge seller of SLF.PR.A, and I can arbitrage that by selling SLF.PR.E to buy it, surely this is a Good Thing for capital markets, and the faster the better? HFT deepens the markets by converting supply and demand for one particular financial instrument into supply and demand for related financial instruments; deepening the market and providing better liquidity for those who want it.<\/p>\n

From the point of view of the original seller of SLF.PR.A, I’m doing him a favour … instead of taking trading costs of ten cents per share, he’s only spending nine cents. My nine-cent reward for executing the near-arbitrage (it’s not pure arbitrage since the two issues are not interconvertible) serves as a carrot for my competition … if they can do it faster, stronger, better, the original seller’s cost will drop to eight cents – and they’ll get to keep it all while I go back to the drawing board in an effort to make it seven cents.<\/p>\n

But it looks like Flash Orders will be banned<\/a>. I must say, I’m disappointed with the press coverage of the issue: I haven’t seen an interview anywhere with a supporter (or at least a user) of Flash Orders, willing to stand up on his hind legs and say ‘Flash Orders are Good because …’. But that’s modern journalism for you … all they do nowadays is copy things down from press releases and occasionally call the number at the bottom so they can claim they’ve got an exclusive.<\/p>\n

A rip-roaring day for PerpetualDiscounts, with FixedResets doing quite well but trailing badly and shut out of the volume tables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n2.0893 %<\/td>\n1,244.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n7.11 %<\/td>\n5.28 %<\/td>\n42,111<\/td>\n16.90<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n0.3279 %<\/td>\n2,160.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n3.66 %<\/td>\n3.68 %<\/td>\n72,454<\/td>\n18.10<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2.0893 %<\/td>\n1,555.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.89 %<\/td>\n-6.03 %<\/td>\n141,272<\/td>\n0.10<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n0.3218 %<\/td>\n2,257.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n5.82 %<\/td>\n6.63 %<\/td>\n97,262<\/td>\n4.12<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n0.4891 %<\/td>\n1,995.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.3218 %<\/td>\n2,064.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.74 %<\/td>\n5.58 %<\/td>\n76,837<\/td>\n13.86<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n-0.1885 %<\/td>\n1,845.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.97 %<\/td>\n6.04 %<\/td>\n171,813<\/td>\n13.82<\/td>\n67<\/td>\n0.8545 %<\/td>\n1,717.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n5.49 %<\/td>\n4.04 %<\/td>\n556,396<\/td>\n4.15<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n0.2404 %<\/td>\n2,099.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
W.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.02 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 22.15
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.43
\nBid-YTW : 6.30 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.C<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.01 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.06
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.06
\nBid-YTW : 6.00 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 24.09
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.40
\nBid-YTW : 6.18 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.F<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-07-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.30
\nBid-YTW : 4.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMO.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 23.09
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.25
\nBid-YTW : 5.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
W.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.04 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 21.89
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.25
\nBid-YTW : 6.23 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 24.39
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.60
\nBid-YTW : 5.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IAG.PR.C<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.07 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-01-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.39
\nBid-YTW : 4.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.C<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.09 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 18.51
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.51
\nBid-YTW : 6.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.12 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 18.98
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.98
\nBid-YTW : 5.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.X<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n1.13 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-09-23
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.78
\nBid-YTW : 3.84 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CIU.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.14 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.40
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.40
\nBid-YTW : 5.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.M<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 16.70
\nEvaluated at bid price : 16.70
\nBid-YTW : 7.23 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.17 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.02
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.02
\nBid-YTW : 6.00 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.25 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.99
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.99
\nBid-YTW : 5.76 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.C<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.32 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.02
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.02
\nBid-YTW : 5.76 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n1.33 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 10.70
\nEvaluated at bid price : 10.70
\nBid-YTW : 3.71 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.F<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.35 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.46
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.46
\nBid-YTW : 6.89 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.38 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 17.65
\nEvaluated at bid price : 17.65
\nBid-YTW : 6.81 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
HSB.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.41 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.80
\nBid-YTW : 6.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.45 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.95
\nBid-YTW : 5.82 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.B<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.46 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.51
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.51
\nBid-YTW : 6.06 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.O<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.50 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 24.21
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.42
\nBid-YTW : 5.77 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.N<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.52 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 22.64
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.78
\nBid-YTW : 5.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.E<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.57 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 18.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.80
\nBid-YTW : 6.07 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.F<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.58 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 24.19
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.48
\nBid-YTW : 6.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.O<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.60 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 21.60
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.60
\nBid-YTW : 5.66 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNA.PR.C<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n1.63 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.05
\nBid-YTW : 8.93 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.P<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 23.21
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.38
\nBid-YTW : 5.65 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.W<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.89 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 21.61
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.61
\nBid-YTW : 5.69 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.B<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.90 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.88
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.88
\nBid-YTW : 6.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.A<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n2.08 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-12-18
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.07
\nBid-YTW : 3.45 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.J<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n2.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2018-03-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.76
\nBid-YTW : 6.27 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.E<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n2.24 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 21.96
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.35
\nBid-YTW : 6.18 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n2.38 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.79
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.79
\nBid-YTW : 6.09 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.K<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n2.86 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 10.80
\nEvaluated at bid price : 10.80
\nBid-YTW : 3.68 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
HSB.PR.C<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n2.88 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 21.47
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.77
\nBid-YTW : 5.92 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.B<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n182,531<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.88
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.88
\nBid-YTW : 6.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.B<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n50,395<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.40
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.40
\nBid-YTW : 5.78 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.B<\/td>\nFloater<\/td>\n44,318<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 10.70
\nEvaluated at bid price : 10.70
\nBid-YTW : 3.71 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n39,083<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 19.65
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.65
\nBid-YTW : 6.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.N<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n33,803<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 22.64
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.78
\nBid-YTW : 5.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.H<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n33,097<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-08-04
\nMaturity Price : 20.11
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.11
\nBid-YTW : 6.02 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Bank for International Settlements has released a paper by Fabio Panetta, Thomas Faeh, Giuseppe Grande, Corrinne Ho, Michael King, Aviram Levy, Federico M Signoretti, Marco Taboga and Andrea Zaghini, An assessment of financial sector …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7420","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7420","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7420"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7420\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7420"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7420"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7420"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}