{"id":8218,"date":"2009-10-08T19:29:45","date_gmt":"2009-10-08T23:29:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prefblog.com\/?p=8218"},"modified":"2009-10-08T19:29:45","modified_gmt":"2009-10-08T23:29:45","slug":"october-8-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/?p=8218","title":{"rendered":"October 8, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is way, way, way WAY off topic, but I grew up with Vivien Leigh telling the Beatrix Potter stories (on 45s – if anybody remembers what those were) and have been looking for re-releases for years. Found ’em<\/a>! The best is Peter Rabbit<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Yet another major US housing subsidizer is in trouble<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The Federal Housing Administration, which insures mortgages with low down payments, may require a U.S. bailout because of $54 billion more in losses than it can withstand, a former Fannie Mae executive said.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt appears destined for a taxpayer bailout in the next 24 to 36 months,\u201d consultant Edward Pinto said in testimony prepared for a House committee hearing in Washington today.
…<\/b>
The FHA program\u2019s volumes have quadrupled since 2006 as private lenders and insurers pulled back amid the U.S. housing slump, Pinto said. The jump has left the agency backing risky loans and exposed to fraud in a \u201cmarket where prices have yet to stabilize,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

Representative Scott Garrett, a New Jersey Republican, introduced legislation this month to boost the FHA\u2019s minimum down payment to 5 percent from 3.5 percent to help shore up the agency\u2019s insurance fund, a move that could add to the housing market\u2019s burdens as it struggles to recover.
…<\/b>
Falling prices will push the FHA\u2019s single-family fund\u2019s reserves below a 2 percent cushion required by Congress, Commissioner David H. Stevens, who will also speak today, said last month. \u201cUnder no circumstances will a taxpayer bailout be needed\u201d because the shortfall will be cured over time, he said.<\/p>\n

The idea the FHA needs a rescue is \u201cjust plain wrong,\u201d Stevens said in an Oct. 6 letter to the Wall Street Journal. That\u2019s in part because the FHA\u2019s accounting method mean its reserves are enough to cover more than 30 years of projected losses, assuming no revenue from new business, he said.<\/p>\n

FHA\u2019s total reserves exceed $30 billion, or more than 4.4 percent of its insurance, according to Stevens. The loan- insurance ratio, which compares the reserves with the loans insured, was 6.4 percent a year ago, government data shows.
…<\/b>
Official figures on FHA\u2019s reserves as of Sept. 30 won\u2019t show a shortfall when released because \u201cthe assumptions used will be overly optimistic relative to loss mitigation resulting from both loan modifications and recent and expected underwriting changes,\u201d Pinto said. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the early days of MLEC (remember MLEC? It was going to save the world from a possible credit crunch) I argued<\/a> that the only way it could work would be if it had the plan of buying wonderful assets from distressed SIVs. Now that PPIP is the acronym of the day, it looks like I was right<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Starwood Capital Group LLC and TPG\u2019s agreement to buy $4.5 billion of Corus Bankshares Inc.\u2019s real estate assets shows investors are ready to bet on distressed property — as long as the U.S. helps finance the deals.<\/p>\n

The private-equity firms led a group that won the auction for loans and properties of the failed Chicago lender, offering $554 million, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said Oct. 6. They will take a 40 percent stake and manage the portfolio, while the FDIC keeps 60 percent and lends the buyers as much as $2.39 billion to complete the sale.<\/p>\n

The investors, who are paying about 60 cents on the dollar, beat out seven other bidders.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Some may quibble over my equating these distressed mortgages with “wonderful assets” … but with vendor financing of over 80% of the price on a non-recourse basis … well, it works just like that extra glass of beer in a pick-up bar near closing time, you know?<\/p>\n

THUMP! The preferred share market got whacked again today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 43bp and FixedResets losing 16bp on good volume. I am pleased to see a lot of volatility evidenced in the composition of the performance table: there were fifteen index included issues losing more than a point (total return), but five gained more than this. Increasing volatility means more trading chances!<\/p>\n

The new PWF 5.80% Straight<\/a> starts trading tomorrow … that should be fun.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices<\/strong>
Values are provisional and are finalized monthly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Index<\/td>\nMean
Current
Yield
(at bid)<\/td>\n		Median
YTW<\/td>\n		Median
Average
Trading
Value<\/td>\n		Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)<\/td>\n		Issues<\/td>\nDay’s Perf.<\/td>\nIndex Value<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ratchet<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.3093 %<\/td>\n1,498.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedFloater<\/td>\n5.80 %<\/td>\n4.03 %<\/td>\n44,820<\/td>\n18.54<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n-1.2632 %<\/td>\n2,649.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Floater<\/td>\n2.60 %<\/td>\n3.00 %<\/td>\n100,050<\/td>\n19.76<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n0.3093 %<\/td>\n1,871.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OpRet<\/td>\n4.90 %<\/td>\n-3.61 %<\/td>\n123,455<\/td>\n0.09<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n0.1365 %<\/td>\n2,281.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SplitShare<\/td>\n6.46 %<\/td>\n6.57 %<\/td>\n673,106<\/td>\n3.98<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n-0.7735 %<\/td>\n2,047.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interest-Bearing<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0.00 %<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.00<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0.1365 %<\/td>\n2,085.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Premium<\/td>\n5.90 %<\/td>\n5.88 %<\/td>\n151,903<\/td>\n14.02<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n-0.3619 %<\/td>\n1,852.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Perpetual-Discount<\/td>\n5.90 %<\/td>\n5.93 %<\/td>\n217,479<\/td>\n14.01<\/td>\n61<\/td>\n-0.4254 %<\/td>\n1,753.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FixedReset<\/td>\n5.51 %<\/td>\n4.07 %<\/td>\n448,719<\/td>\n4.06<\/td>\n41<\/td>\n-0.1641 %<\/td>\n2,107.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Performance Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nChange<\/td>\nNotes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.34 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 21.29
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.29
\nBid-YTW : 6.16 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-2.06 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 22.20
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.78
\nBid-YTW : 5.75 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.90 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 21.15
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.15
\nBid-YTW : 6.05 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GWO.PR.I<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.86 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 18.46
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.46
\nBid-YTW : 6.15 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 19.67
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.67
\nBid-YTW : 5.74 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NA.PR.L<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.65 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 20.90
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.90
\nBid-YTW : 5.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.63 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 23.90
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.20
\nBid-YTW : 6.10 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNA.PR.C<\/td>\nSplitShare<\/td>\n-1.55 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Hard Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2019-01-10
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.00
\nBid-YTW : 8.20 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CM.PR.P<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.38 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 22.39
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.95
\nBid-YTW : 5.98 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.O<\/td>\nPerpetual-Premium<\/td>\n-1.31 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 23.95
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.15
\nBid-YTW : 5.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
POW.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.30 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 22.44
\nEvaluated at bid price : 22.70
\nBid-YTW : 6.19 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BAM.PR.G<\/td>\nFixedFloater<\/td>\n-1.26 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.76
\nBid-YTW : 4.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.Q<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.14 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 24.06
\nEvaluated at bid price : 24.27
\nBid-YTW : 5.77 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PWF.PR.F<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.10 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 21.52
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.52
\nBid-YTW : 6.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.K<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n-1.00 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 20.75
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.75
\nBid-YTW : 5.80 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
W.PR.J<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.15 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 23.58
\nEvaluated at bid price : 23.85
\nBid-YTW : 5.89 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ELF.PR.G<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.38 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 18.41
\nEvaluated at bid price : 18.41
\nBid-YTW : 6.49 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
IGM.PR.A<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n1.47 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2009-11-07
\nMaturity Price : 26.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.99
\nBid-YTW : -35.03 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MFC.PR.A<\/td>\nOpRet<\/td>\n1.48 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Soft Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2015-12-18
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 26.14
\nBid-YTW : 3.34 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
HSB.PR.D<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n1.90 %<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 21.41
\nEvaluated at bid price : 21.41
\nBid-YTW : 5.89 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Volume Highlights<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Issue<\/td>\nIndex<\/td>\nShares
Traded<\/td>\n		Notes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TRP.PR.A<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n94,105<\/td>\nRecent new issue<\/a>.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2020-01-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 25.20
\nBid-YTW : 4.46 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.I<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n68,850<\/td>\nNesbitt crossed 28,200 at 27.30.
\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-08-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.30
\nBid-YTW : 4.12 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNS.PR.T<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n44,111<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-05-25
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.42
\nBid-YTW : 3.91 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SLF.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n36,408<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 19.67
\nEvaluated at bid price : 19.67
\nBid-YTW : 6.09 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TD.PR.E<\/td>\nFixedReset<\/td>\n35,306<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Call
\nMaturity Date\t: 2014-05-30
\nMaturity Price : 25.00
\nEvaluated at bid price : 27.33
\nBid-YTW : 4.00 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RY.PR.A<\/td>\nPerpetual-Discount<\/td>\n30,100<\/td>\nYTW SCENARIO
\nMaturity Type : Limit Maturity
\nMaturity Date\t: 2039-10-08
\nMaturity Price : 20.06
\nEvaluated at bid price : 20.06
\nBid-YTW : 5.63 %<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This is way, way, way WAY off topic, but I grew up with Vivien Leigh telling the Beatrix Potter stories (on 45s – if anybody remembers what those were) and have been looking for re-releases …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8218","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8218","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8218"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8218\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8218"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8218"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prefblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8218"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}