Monetary stimulus appears to be having an effect in the UK:
By buying government securities to increase the supply of money, Bank of England Governor King is taking a step that Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke has only talked about. Early results have been encouraging: Yields on 10-year U.K. government bonds fell to 2.94 percent March 13, at least a 20-year low, from 3.64 percent before King announced the policy March 5.
“The BOE is providing an actual experiment in answering some of the concerns that the Fed has about the effectiveness” of using the strategy to effectively print more money, says former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer, now vice chairman of St. Louis-based Macroeconomic Advisers LLC.
…
King — whose office adjoined Bernanke’s when the two were visiting professors at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts, during the 1980s — is pursuing both approaches.Gilt Purchases
He is aiming to expand reserves in the financial system through purchases of U.K. government bonds, known as gilts — a strategy he describes as “conventional unconventional” monetary policy. He will also buy private-sector assets as Bernanke is doing — an approach the Bank of England chief calls “unconventional unconventional.”
Nobody knows what to call things nowadays! I called it “monetary stimulus” because it is government securities that are being purchased; I would not call this “quantitative easing”. I presume that King refers to the process as “conventional unconventional” because “conventional conventional” would be buying government securities at issue time.
The crisis is going to re-write the economics textbooks all right! Especially the glossary!
Tempers are flaring about TARP’s populism and stress tests:
When the U.S. Treasury persuaded the nation’s nine biggest banks to accept capital investments in October, it signaled the whole industry was weak, Kovacevich, 65, said in a March 13 speech at Stanford University in California. Even though Wells Fargo didn’t want the money, it must comply with the same rules that the government placed on banks that did need it, he said.
“Is this America — when you do what your government asks you to do and then retroactively you also have additional conditions?” Kovacevich said. “If we were not forced to take the TARP money, we would have been able to raise private capital at that time” and not needed to cut the dividend to preserve cash, he said.
…
Kovacevich said the government is still making mistakes as it tries to save the industry. The “stress test,” designed to determine which of the 19 largest U.S. banks need more capital, provides opportunities for short-sellers to drive down bank stocks and can hurt confidence in the system even more, he said.
…
“We do stress tests all the time on all of our portfolios,” Kovacevich said. “We share those stress tests with our regulators. It is absolutely asinine that somebody would announce we’re going to do stress tests for banks and we’ll give you the answer in 12 weeks.”
I noted on March 12 that CIBC had issued a collateral call to MAV Trust (the successor to non-bank ABCP) … it wasn’t met:
As noted in the DBRS press release dated March 12, 2009, the deadline for providing additional collateral was 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 2009. DBRS was advised that MAVII did not receive the funding of $19.3 million. Since no funding was advanced, CIBC had the option to terminate all or a portion of the leveraged credit default swap transactions collateralized by MAVII. The resulting reduction in collateral supporting the MAVII notes is capped at $107,742,597 (or approximately 1.1% of the assets of MAVII). DBRS was advised today that the entire notional amount of these credit default swap transactions was terminated.
As indicated in the DBRS press release dated March 6, 2009, confirming the ratings of the MAVI and MAVII Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes (the Notes), the potential for transactions not subject to the 18-month moratorium to unwind was considered by DBRS when assigning the “A” rating to the Notes, and no rating action is warranted at this time.
Willem Buiter writes an interesting piece on VoxEU regarding resolution of the banking crisis – but it is crippled by his idea that markets are efficient. They’re not. There must be some way of cross-training academics & market practitioners such that the former could lose some their awe for the latter. Perhaps an in-depth study of some of the successful pension funds might be a good start?
Another good day for PerpetualDiscounts, which have now recovered 3.88% from their recent low on March 10 … but they’re still down 6.55% from their 2009 high reached on January 13.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.4537 % | 800.9 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.4537 % | 1,295.3 |
Floater | 4.94 % | 6.05 % | 60,732 | 13.86 | 3 | 0.4537 % | 1,000.6 |
OpRet | 5.30 % | 5.01 % | 133,362 | 3.90 | 15 | 0.0918 % | 2,044.0 |
SplitShare | 7.07 % | 10.53 % | 54,290 | 4.77 | 6 | 0.2535 % | 1,572.3 |
Interest-Bearing | 6.18 % | 11.36 % | 34,883 | 0.75 | 1 | -0.4103 % | 1,900.3 |
Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.8364 % | 1,476.5 |
Perpetual-Discount | 7.32 % | 7.47 % | 160,248 | 12.01 | 71 | 0.8364 % | 1,359.8 |
FixedReset | 6.22 % | 5.86 % | 631,360 | 13.71 | 30 | 0.2696 % | 1,779.4 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
BNA.PR.B | SplitShare | -4.05 % | Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2016-03-25 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.16 Bid-YTW : 8.78 % |
GWO.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | -3.25 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.90 Evaluated at bid price : 14.90 Bid-YTW : 8.19 % |
SBN.PR.A | SplitShare | -3.01 % | Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of March 5 according to Mulvihill. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-12-01 Maturity Price : 10.00 Evaluated at bid price : 8.05 Bid-YTW : 9.85 % |
PWF.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | -2.53 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 17.70 Evaluated at bid price : 17.70 Bid-YTW : 8.30 % |
PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | -2.41 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.55 Evaluated at bid price : 14.55 Bid-YTW : 8.70 % |
BAM.PR.O | OpRet | -2.16 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Option Certainty Maturity Date : 2013-06-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.40 Bid-YTW : 10.43 % |
PWF.PR.L | Perpetual-Discount | -1.65 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 15.50 Evaluated at bid price : 15.50 Bid-YTW : 8.40 % |
BAM.PR.J | OpRet | -1.40 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2018-03-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 17.60 Bid-YTW : 10.60 % |
POW.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 18.77 Evaluated at bid price : 18.77 Bid-YTW : 7.91 % |
SLF.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | -1.14 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 13.85 Evaluated at bid price : 13.85 Bid-YTW : 8.08 % |
TCA.PR.Y | Perpetual-Discount | -1.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 45.09 Evaluated at bid price : 47.01 Bid-YTW : 6.00 % |
PWF.PR.M | FixedReset | -1.00 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 24.60 Evaluated at bid price : 24.65 Bid-YTW : 5.43 % |
BNA.PR.A | SplitShare | 1.08 % | Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2010-09-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.50 Bid-YTW : 13.89 % |
BNS.PR.L | Perpetual-Discount | 1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.79 Evaluated at bid price : 16.79 Bid-YTW : 6.83 % |
RY.PR.P | FixedReset | 1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2019-03-26 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.59 Bid-YTW : 5.95 % |
BAM.PR.K | Floater | 1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 7.25 Evaluated at bid price : 7.25 Bid-YTW : 6.05 % |
CM.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | 1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 15.37 Evaluated at bid price : 15.37 Bid-YTW : 7.47 % |
GWO.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | 1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.18 Evaluated at bid price : 16.18 Bid-YTW : 8.08 % |
IAG.PR.C | FixedReset | 1.16 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 21.71 Evaluated at bid price : 21.75 Bid-YTW : 6.22 % |
BNS.PR.M | Perpetual-Discount | 1.16 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.51 Evaluated at bid price : 16.51 Bid-YTW : 6.94 % |
CM.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | 1.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 18.00 Evaluated at bid price : 18.00 Bid-YTW : 7.66 % |
SLF.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 1.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.80 Evaluated at bid price : 14.80 Bid-YTW : 8.16 % |
RY.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 1.36 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.43 Evaluated at bid price : 16.43 Bid-YTW : 6.86 % |
CL.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 1.45 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 20.96 Evaluated at bid price : 20.96 Bid-YTW : 7.50 % |
CIU.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 1.46 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.65 Evaluated at bid price : 16.65 Bid-YTW : 6.99 % |
BMO.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 1.46 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 18.01 Evaluated at bid price : 18.01 Bid-YTW : 7.39 % |
RY.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 1.51 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.76 Evaluated at bid price : 16.76 Bid-YTW : 6.96 % |
NA.PR.L | Perpetual-Discount | 1.53 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.61 Evaluated at bid price : 16.61 Bid-YTW : 7.42 % |
BAM.PR.H | OpRet | 1.55 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2012-03-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.00 Bid-YTW : 8.77 % |
TD.PR.R | Perpetual-Discount | 1.59 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 20.45 Evaluated at bid price : 20.45 Bid-YTW : 6.97 % |
TD.PR.C | FixedReset | 1.65 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 24.01 Evaluated at bid price : 24.05 Bid-YTW : 4.99 % |
BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | 1.71 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 12.52 Evaluated at bid price : 12.52 Bid-YTW : 9.56 % |
TD.PR.Q | Perpetual-Discount | 1.71 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 20.85 Evaluated at bid price : 20.85 Bid-YTW : 6.84 % |
BMO.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 1.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 20.01 Evaluated at bid price : 20.01 Bid-YTW : 6.71 % |
RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 1.90 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 22.46 Evaluated at bid price : 22.50 Bid-YTW : 4.45 % |
IGM.PR.A | OpRet | 1.95 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2009-07-30 Maturity Price : 26.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.10 Bid-YTW : 3.86 % |
POW.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 2.02 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 17.65 Evaluated at bid price : 17.65 Bid-YTW : 7.76 % |
RY.PR.W | Perpetual-Discount | 2.09 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 18.08 Evaluated at bid price : 18.08 Bid-YTW : 6.87 % |
RY.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 2.10 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.55 Evaluated at bid price : 16.55 Bid-YTW : 6.89 % |
SLF.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 2.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.46 Evaluated at bid price : 14.46 Bid-YTW : 8.26 % |
RY.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 2.25 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.36 Evaluated at bid price : 16.36 Bid-YTW : 6.89 % |
BNA.PR.C | SplitShare | 2.26 % | Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2019-01-10 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 10.87 Bid-YTW : 16.10 % |
CM.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | 2.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 19.28 Evaluated at bid price : 19.28 Bid-YTW : 7.61 % |
RY.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | 2.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.50 Evaluated at bid price : 16.50 Bid-YTW : 6.91 % |
RY.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | 2.49 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.45 Evaluated at bid price : 16.45 Bid-YTW : 6.93 % |
POW.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 2.50 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 18.45 Evaluated at bid price : 18.45 Bid-YTW : 7.77 % |
MFC.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 2.75 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.59 Evaluated at bid price : 14.59 Bid-YTW : 7.78 % |
ELF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 2.75 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.95 Evaluated at bid price : 14.95 Bid-YTW : 9.10 % |
BNS.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 2.81 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 17.94 Evaluated at bid price : 17.94 Bid-YTW : 6.81 % |
SLF.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 2.86 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.05 Evaluated at bid price : 14.05 Bid-YTW : 7.97 % |
PWF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 2.94 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 17.51 Evaluated at bid price : 17.51 Bid-YTW : 7.65 % |
DFN.PR.A | SplitShare | 3.03 % | Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of February 27 according to the company. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-12-01 Maturity Price : 10.00 Evaluated at bid price : 7.83 Bid-YTW : 10.53 % |
TD.PR.P | Perpetual-Discount | 3.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 19.20 Evaluated at bid price : 19.20 Bid-YTW : 6.96 % |
BMO.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | 3.36 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.59 Evaluated at bid price : 16.59 Bid-YTW : 6.87 % |
RY.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 3.79 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 17.51 Evaluated at bid price : 17.51 Bid-YTW : 6.80 % |
LFE.PR.A | SplitShare | 4.17 % | Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 27 according to the company. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2012-12-01 Maturity Price : 10.00 Evaluated at bid price : 7.00 Bid-YTW : 16.60 % |
BNS.PR.O | Perpetual-Discount | 4.69 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 21.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.00 Bid-YTW : 6.79 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
TD.PR.I | FixedReset | 96,510 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 23.13 Evaluated at bid price : 24.98 Bid-YTW : 5.94 % |
RY.PR.T | FixedReset | 95,648 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 23.13 Evaluated at bid price : 24.99 Bid-YTW : 5.86 % |
GWO.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 93,650 | National crossed 79,800 at 14.95. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.90 Evaluated at bid price : 14.90 Bid-YTW : 8.19 % |
BMO.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | 44,000 | Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 16.80. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 16.59 Evaluated at bid price : 16.59 Bid-YTW : 6.87 % |
PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 34,421 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-03-16 Maturity Price : 14.55 Evaluated at bid price : 14.55 Bid-YTW : 8.70 % |
DFN.PR.A | SplitShare | 33,100 | RBC crossed 19,900 at 7.83. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-12-01 Maturity Price : 10.00 Evaluated at bid price : 7.83 Bid-YTW : 10.53 % |
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Hello,
I have been more often thanked for asking questions people did not dare asking than ridiculised for having asking stupid questions but it is always hard to ask something everyone else might know the answer. So, sorry in advance if my question is silly:
We read more and more about Bernanke and the BoE “printing” money by or in connection with the Fed or BoE buying long term treasuries or governemanal bonds. My effort to understand / rationalise this is that the BOE or FED would not be actually printing more money, it would simply purchase back treasuries or governmental bonds maturing in 10 years or more with shorter term debt they would issue. By buying a 10 year treasury bond yielding say 3.9% with new issues yielding only 1% the government is saving 2.9% while, with increading the demand for longer term of its own debts, it is increasing their value (thus lowering their effective yield) while lowering the effective yield and value of short term treasuries by having to issue more of those. By doing so, the idea is to force the short term treasury holders to get rid of their treasuries since they do not increase much in value (they are already at their top) while giving insignificant effective yield. The idea is to give more incentive to the holders of treasuries to sell them and go for something more risky but more stimulating for the economy like equities or lending their money to corporations. Is my understanding / assumption / attempt to understand with a limited QI correct? Thks
You’ve got it mostly right. Most efforts to unlock the credit markets to date have involved not so much the printing of new money, but the substitution of one kind of Central Bank asset (Government securities) with another (e.g., mortgage-backed securities in Canada).
However, as discussed in the BoE Feb 2009 Inflation Report, pages 44-45, the BoE is now trying something new: purchase of financial assets using newly created central bank reserves. This is “printing money” and it is – explicitly – inflationary.
They want it to be inflationary because right now the risk is deflation.
This is not as bad as it usually is, because the money printed is being used to buy private sector financial assets (when they use it to buy non-government securities). The monetary stimulus effect can be reversed simply by letting these assets mature and, therefore, being paid back by the private sector. ‘Printing Money’ is bad when it is used to pay for goods and services that disappear instantly, which is the case with government deficits.
And yes, part of the rationale for doing all this is to change the risk/reward characteristics of private credit instruments, get banks and private investors to invest in private paper again, so the central banks can get out of the business.