PrefBlog

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close November 29, 2019, was $7.8207. Performance was adversely affected in November, 2019, as the assumption of DeemedRetraction was cancelled in the wake of the IAIS decision included in ICS 2.0. This was probably a major factor in recent underperformance of low-spread Insurance issues, in which the portfolio is overweighted.

On a brighter note, this cancellation of this assumption means that the preferred share universe has become much more homogeneous and I anticipate a higher level of trading in the future.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

The preferred share market continues to suffer, leaving a lot of room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is extremely elevated (chart end-date 2019-11-08):

Note that the Seniority Spread was 370bp on November 27, a widening from the October 30 figure of 355bp. As a good practical example of the spreads between markets, consider that CIU issued a long-term bond in early September yielding 2.963%, about 411bp cheaper than the interest-equivalent figure of 7.07% for CIU.PR.A, which was then yielding about 5.44% as a dividend. Shaw Communications issued 30-year notes at 4.25% interest on December 5, when their FixedResets, SJR.PR.A, were yielding 6.59% dividends.

As has been noted, the increase in the Seniority Spread over the past year has been due not to an increase in yield (drop in prices) of Straight Preferreds over the year, but because the yield of the Straight Preferreds has remained relatively constant while the yield of long-term corporate bonds has dropped dramatically.

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2019-11-8):

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

It seems clear that many market players are, wittingly or not, using FixedResets to speculate on future moves in the Canada 5-Year yield. This is excellent news for those who take market action based on fundamentals and the long term characteristics of the market because nobody can consistently time the markets. The speculators will, over the long run and in aggregate, lose money, handing it over to more sober investors.

It should be noted that I have been unable to explain the very strong performance of Floor issues over the past year relative to their non-Floor counterparts. See the discussions on PrefBlog at LINK, LINK and LINK.

I believe the bear-market outperformance by the Floor issues is a behavioural phenomenon with very little basis in fundamentals. When interest rates in general move, FixedReset prices should not change much (to a first approximation), since in Fixed Income investing it is spreads that are important, not absolute yields. There should be some effect on Floor issues, which should move up slightly in price as yields go down since the ‘option’ to receive the floor rate will become more valuable. Adjustments due to this effect should be fairly small, however – and over the past year issues with a floor, that started the period being expensive, have simply gotten even more expensive, relative to their non-floored counterparts.

And the tricky thing about behavioural models of investing is that they can lose their explanatory power very quickly when an investment fashion shifts, whereas fundamentals will always be effective. Just to give an example from the preferred share market – until the end of 2014, FixedResets were priced relative to each other according to their initial dividend; when the reset of TRP.PR.A shocked a lot of investors, relative pricing became much more dependent upon the Issue Reset Spread, a much more logical and fundamental property.

FixedReset (Discount) performance on the month was +1.45% vs. PerpetualDiscounts of +0.96% in November; the two classes finally decoupled in mid-November, 2018, after months of moving in lockstep, but it still appears to me that yields available on FixedResets are keeping the yields of PerpetualDiscounts up, even though a consistent valuation based on an expectation of declining interest rates would greatly increase the attractiveness of PerpetualDiscounts:

Floaters continued to recover, returning +2.83% for November but the figure for the past twelve months remains horrific at -24.80. Look at the long-term performance:

Some Assiduous Readers will be interested to observe that the ‘Quantitative Easing’ decline was not initially as bad as the ‘Credit Crunch’ decline, which took the sector down to the point where the 15-year cumulative total return was negative. I wrote about that at the time. but it became worse in August, 2019! On August 30, 2019 the HIMI Floater Index (total return) value was calculated as 1906.6; the index first surpassed this value on 2003-8-13. Thus, cumulative total return (that is, including dividends) was negative over a period of slightly-over sixteen years.

It seems clear that Floaters are used, wittingly or otherwise, as a vehicle for speculation on the policy rate and Canada Prime, while FixedResets are being used as a vehicle for speculation on the five-year Canada rate. In support of this idea, I present an Implied Volatility analysis of the TRP series of FixedResets as of November 29, which is comprised of six issues without a Minimum Rate Guarantee and two issues which do have this feature:

The two issues with floors, TRP.PR.J (+469, minimum 5.50%) and TRP.PR.K (+385, minimum 4.90%) are $2.82 and $4.73 rich, respectively. These are modest decreases from last month, despite the fact that their floor will not become effective unless five-year Canadas dip below 0.81% and 1.05%, respectively. For all the gloom, we’re still above those levels!

Lest this be considered a fluke, I also show results for the BAM series of FixedResets, which includes three issues with dividend floors: BAM.PF.H (+417, Minimum 5.00%); BAM.PF.I (+386, Minimum 4.80%); and BAM.PF.J (+310, Minimum 4.75%); these issues are all rich compared to their non-floor siblings, being 2.01, 3.63 and 5.11 expensive, respectively, wider in aggregate thatn last month’s figures of $2.07, $3.43 and $4.84.

Relative performance during the month was not correlated with Issue Reset Spreads for either “Pfd-2 Group” or “Pfd-3 Group” issues:

… and results over the quarter were similar (Pfd-3 Group correlation was 11%):

In both charts the poor performance of the low-spread insurance issues may be observed. These issues are GWO.PR.N (Issue Reset Spread 130bp, 1-Month performance -2.91%); IFC.PR.A (172bp, -1.46%); MFC.PR.F (141bp, -0.69%); and SLF.PR.G (141bp, -0.59%). There are sufficient MFC FixedReset issues to do an Implied Volatility Analysis:

If anything, MFC.PR.F now appears to be somewhat cheap to its peers, indicating that if its recent weakness is due to speculators dumping their positions, there is little reason to fear continued relative declines.

As for the future, of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. The same caution applies for an end to the overpricing of issues with a minimum rate guarantee. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment.

On the other hand, I will pass on my observation that international interest in the Canadian preferred share market is increasing, as other Floating Rate indices globally are doing much better. Consider, for example the Solactive Australian Bank Senior Floating Rate Bond Index, which “provides exposure to the largest and most liquid floating rate debt securities issued by selected Australian banks. The index is comprised of investment grade floating rate debt securities denominated in AUD and calculated as a Total Return Index” (LINK although the index constituents currently all have a remaining term of less than five years), and the S&P U.S. Floating Rate Preferred Stock Index.

Yields on preferred shares of all stripes are extremely high compared to those available from other investments of similar quality. As I told John Heinzl in an eMail interview in late November, 2018, the best advice I can offer investors remains Shut up and clip your coupons!

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

The large drop this month in the projected sustainable yield is due to the fact that in November, 2019, the assumption of DeemedRetraction was cancelled in the wake of the IAIS decision included in ICS 2.0.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

This entry was posted on Sunday, December 8th, 2019 at 7:32 pm and is filed under MAPF. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.