June 26, 2014

June 26th, 2014

The trouble with financial crises is that they’re boring. Originally, crises with global implications all came from the UK. Then they all came from the US. Nobody else had the size of capital and global connections to transmit mistakes to other countries. However, there is some hope that the next crisis will come from China:

China’s chief auditor discovered 94.4 billion yuan ($15.2 billion) of loans backed by falsified gold transactions, adding to signs of possible fraud in commodities financing deals.

Twenty-five bullion processors made a combined profit of more than 900 million yuan by using the loans to take advantage of the difference between onshore and offshore interest rates, and the appreciation of Chinese currency, according a report on the National Audit Office’s website. China is the biggest producer and consumer of gold.

Public security authorities are also probing alleged fraud at Qingdao Port where the same stockpiles of copper and aluminum may have been pledged multiple times as collateral for loans. As much as 1,000 tons of gold may be tied up in financing deals in China, in which commodities including metals and agricultural products are used to get credit amid restrictions on lending, according to World Gold Council estimates through 2013.

A recent lawsuit illustrates the total intellectual bankruptcy of the money management industry:

Schneiderman’s case is the boldest initiative and may open fissures in the decade-old defense of U.S. equity markets that has been championed by brokerages and traders. In their version of the story, dark pools serve as havens for institutional investors tired of seeing orders to buy and sell stocks front-run on public exchanges. According to Schneiderman, institutions may not have been much safer on Barclays’ platform.

“There’s going to be a significant amount more scrutiny on routing practices at dark pools, and I think you’re going to see more oversight,” said Larry Tabb, chief executive officer of Tabb Group LLC.

Barclays was so bent on lifting its private trading venue to the upper ranks of Wall Street dark pools that it falsified marketing materials to hide how much high-frequency traders were buying and selling, the complaint said.

Seeking to reassure customers that their stock orders wouldn’t be picked off by predatory counterparts, Barclays touted a system designed to keep that from happening called liquidity profiling, according to the complaint. Marketing material including charts purported to show that very little of the trading within the dark pool was “aggressive” and that operating there was safe for institutions.

“The representations were false,” according to the complaint. The chart and accompanying statements obscured the trading taking place in Barclays’ dark pool. Senior Barclays personnel de-emphasized the presence of high-frequency traders and left out reference to one of the largest and most toxic participants, it said.

Um … who cares? If your order is filled, it’s filled. If it ain’t, it ain’t. Only morons care about the identity of their counterparty. “Sorry, Mr. Smith, your portfolio underperformed the benchmark by 500bp, but on the positive side, we traded only with retired Sunday School teachers.”

You don’t choose a broker on the basis of its marketing materials, for God’s sake. You make a choice based on execution. But maybe I’m just old fashioned.

Here’s a good reason to pay cash – always:

You may soon get a call from your doctor if you’ve let your gym membership lapse, made a habit of picking up candy bars at the check-out counter or begin shopping at plus-sized stores.

That’s because some hospitals are starting to use detailed consumer data to create profiles on current and potential patients to identify those most likely to get sick, so the hospitals can intervene before they do.

Information compiled by data brokers from public records and credit card transactions can reveal where a person shops, the food they buy, and whether they smoke. The largest hospital chain in the Carolinas is plugging data for 2 million people into algorithms designed to identify high-risk patients, while Pennsylvania’s biggest system uses household and demographic data. Patients and their advocates, meanwhile, say they’re concerned that big data’s expansion into medical care will hurt the doctor-patient relationship and threaten privacy.

I told you guys this was coming! I told you! But does anybody ever listen to me? No.

Could it be that Putin’s policies are creating Soviet Union Redux:

State enterprises now account for more than half of the economy, up from 30 percent when Putin came to power at the end of 1999, according to BNP Paribas SA. (BNP) As the bureaucracy swelled during that period, Russia emerged as the world’s most corrupt major economy. It ranks alongside Pakistan and Nicaragua at 127th, out of 176 nations, by Transparency International, down from 82nd in 2000.

With Russia’s $2 trillion economy stagnating, fixed investment falling and the U.S. and the EU warning of a tougher round of sanctions over the pro-Russian revolt in eastern Ukraine, Putin’s solution is a list of proposals revealed in May that involve a greater role for the state. He ordered the central bank to set up long-term financing for manufacturers and called for rules to force “systemically important” companies to move their registrations inside Russia.

On the other hand, there are sufficient interconnections to keep things interesting:

Western companies are already wrestling with the thorny problem of complying with existing curbs on dealings with a limited number of wealthy Putin allies and their businesses, many of which have murky ownership structures and bases in tax havens. Now, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers have taken out full-page ads in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post to decry the prospect of unilateral sanctions that would only hurt U.S. companies in foreign markets, while benefiting their competitors.

Indeed, 83 per cent of economists polled by Bloomberg now think Washington will steer clear of stronger sanctions, compared with 66 per cent a month earlier. And 96 per cent expect no further action from the European Union.

“There is no sense in seeking sanctions which would harm the EU as much as Russia,” Czech State Secretary for European Affairs Tomas Prouza declared.

Bullard is sounding rather like a hawk:

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard predicted the central bank will raise interest rates starting in the first quarter of 2015, sooner than most of his colleagues think, as unemployment falls and inflation quickens.

Asked about his forecast for the timing of the first interest-rate increase since 2006, he said: “I’ve left mine at the end of the first quarter of next year.”

“The Fed (FDTR) is closer to its goal than many people appreciate,” Bullard said today in an interview with Fox Business Network. “We’re really pretty close to normal.”

Bullard predicted the jobless rate may fall below 6 percent and inflation rise near 2 percent by the end of this year.

If his forecasts bear out, “you’re basically going to be right at target on both dimensions possibly later this year,” Bullard said. “That’s shocking, and I don’t think markets, and I’m not sure policy makers, have really digested that that’s where we are.”

It was another positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 12bp, FixedResets up 8bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. Volatility was average. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3598 % 2,532.3
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.59 % 28,940 18.17 1 0.9170 % 3,978.1
Floater 2.90 % 2.97 % 44,444 19.79 4 0.3598 % 2,734.1
OpRet 4.37 % -12.58 % 22,419 0.08 2 0.0194 % 2,716.3
SplitShare 4.72 % 4.06 % 58,336 3.16 6 -0.1439 % 3,106.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0194 % 2,483.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -1.35 % 80,718 0.09 17 -0.0809 % 2,408.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.25 % 114,610 14.98 20 0.1202 % 2,556.7
FixedReset 4.45 % 3.68 % 204,092 4.80 78 0.0776 % 2,551.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % -0.28 % 140,668 0.09 43 0.0204 % 2,541.0
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.31 % 120,668 3.87 6 0.0658 % 2,502.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.92
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.K FixedReset 486,751 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 0.20 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 208,951 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.14; Scotia crossed 75,000 at the same price. Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 163,470 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 160,518 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.20; TD crossed 30,000 at 26.20. RBC crossed 68,500 at 26.25, and Scotia crossed another 25,000 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 102,000 Scotia crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 25.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 82,859 RBC crossed 80,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.80 – 24.33
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.2984

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.76 – 23.20
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2870

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-26
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.76
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.20 – 26.54
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2034

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.92 – 23.37
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3290

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.92
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

BNA.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 24.51 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2217

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.61 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2754

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

NEW.PR.D Reaches Significant Premium on First Day Out

June 26th, 2014

Scotia Managed Companies has announced:

NewGrowth Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce that is has completed its public offering of Class B preferred shares, series 3 (“Preferred Shares”) and Class A capital shares (“Capital Shares”), raising $91,796,616 through the issuance of 2,644,235 Preferred Shares and 165,000 Capital Shares at a price per share of $32.07 and $42.40, respectively. In addition, the Company has redeemed all of its outstanding Class B preferred shares, series 2. The Preferred Shares and Capital Shares were offered to the public on a best efforts basis by a syndicate of agents led by Scotiabank which included CIBC, TD Securities Inc., BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Burgeonvest Bick Securities Limited, Desjardins Securities Inc., Mackie Research Capital Corporation and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

NewGrowth Corp. is a mutual fund corporation created to invest its assets in common shares of selected large capitalization Canadian companies (the “Portfolio Shares”) with growth potential and an attractive dividend yield in order to generate dividend income for holders of its preferred shares and to enable the holders of the Company’s Capital Shares to participate in any capital appreciation in the Portfolio Shares.

\

NEW.PR.D is a SplitShare, 4.15%, maturing 2019-6-26. Regrettably, it is redeemable every June 26 until maturity at par; this adds a certain amount of risk to secondary market trading, as the asymmetry of potential returns is increased. This issue has been rated Pfd-2 by DBRS.

The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the SplitShare subindex.

NEW.PR.D traded 34,250 shares today in a range of 32.10-40 before closing at 32.30-75, 26×3. Vital statistics are:

NEW.PR.D SplitShare YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-06-26
Maturity Price : 32.07
Evaluated at bid price : 32.30
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

OSFI’s Zelmer Advocates Increased Micro-Management

June 26th, 2014

Mark Zelmer gave a speech touting OSFI at the C.D. Howe Institute Housing Policy Conference titled OSFI is on the Case: Promoting Prudent Lending in Housing Finance:

But, by same token, it is clear that the ability of the household sector as a whole to absorb major shocks is less now than it was a decade ago. Moreover, with interest rates near record low levels, there is not much scope for interest rates in Canada or the United States to fall further – something that helped people weather storms in the past. Governor Poloz recently noted in his testimony before the Senate that the Bank of Canada continues to expect a soft landing for the housing market and Canada’s household debt-to-income ratio to stabilize.Footnote 2 But he also acknowledged that imbalances in the housing sector remain elevated and could pose a significant risk should economic conditions deteriorate.

So from a prudential perspective, the environmental risks associated with lending to households are higher now than in the past. With interest rates expected to remain exceptionally low and household indebtedness high, these risks are likely to remain elevated for the foreseeable future.

Well, in the first place, he disingenuously declines to acknowledge the fact that from the banks’ perspective, a huge proportion of their mortgage debt is just as credit-worthy as Canada bonds, given that it’s insured by CMHC. This is the chief imprudence in the current situation and, I believe, the primary source of whatever bubble there might be in the housing market.

He then tries to insert a little revisionist history into the equation:

You may wonder what more a prudential supervisor really needs to do if lenders and private mortgage insurers are well capitalized. But in stress situations, creditors and investors often lose confidence in these institutions before they run out of capital. Recall that some financial institutions lost access to funding markets in the midst of the global financial crisis even though they were reporting healthy regulatory capital ratios at the time. Sitting back and relying on capital is not enough for either financial institutions or prudential supervisors.

Yes, and I also recall that numerous financial institutions went bust even though they were reporting healthy regulatory capital ratios. So let’s not have any more nonsense about healthy regulatory capital ratios.

In the wake of the global financial crisis, many observers are suggesting that bank regulators need to think about their tool kit and employ macro‑prudential tools like changes in loan‑to‑value limits to lean against rising environmental risks. But at OSFI we believe it makes more sense to promote prudent lending all of the time. Hence, the 80 per cent loan‑to‑value limit on conventional mortgages enshrined in the federal legislation; and, where necessary, deep dives like the ones I just described in the current environment.

Conveniently, none of these observers are named or cited, so we can’t check up on this. But the bit about ‘prudent lending’ is a little odd: is he saying that extending a mortgage is imprudent even when it carries a 100% government guarantee?

By the same token, let me note the focus in the B-20 and B-21 guidelines on governance and risk management principles. Such principles are meant to stand the test of time. They do not lend themselves to hard limits that one can vary in response to changing economic and financial conditions.

Frankly, OSFI generally prefers to take a principles-based approach in setting our regulatory and supervisory expectations. Hard limits like the 65 per cent LTV limit on Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs) are more the exception than the rule. The key advantage of a principles-based approach is that it provides us the flexibility we need to tailor supervisory expectations to the situation at hand. This avoids safe harbours and compliance mentalities that breed complacency on the part of regulated entities, not to mention supervisors. Instead, principles help to underscore the point that regulated institutions are expected to use judgment and apply the guidelines to the situations they face on the ground within their own organizations.

And this is exactly the problem: the last thing we need is more herd mentality and nod-and-wink regulation; we know where that got us with Manulife in Canada and other institutions in other places.

All his points about high consumer debt-to-income ratios and so on is not an indicator of the need for principles-based regulation; it is indicative of a need for a counter-cyclical capital buffer. Why don’t we see any interest, let alone any research, into a counter-cyclical capital requirement based on debt-to-income? Funded by, but certainly not executed by, OSFI – we know what happens when those guys pretend to be academics.

At the end of the day, mortgage lenders and insurers must accept that they are responsible for the loans they are granting and insuring, and thus the risks they are running.

Ha! No they ain’t, buddy. The Feds are responsible for CMHC losses … no moral hazard there, no sir, not one bit!

Update: On a related note, Mark Gilbert of Bloomberg writes about Mark Carney’s Central Bank Mission Creep:

No matter how Governor Mark Carney dresses it up, the Bank of England’s decision today to impose caps on mortgage lending amounts to an explicit effort by the central bank to manage asset prices.

Today, he said: “We don’t target house prices, we care about indebtedness. We think that price dynamics in the housing market are going to slow in about a year as incomes pick up.”

There was also a half-buried message in today’s press conference about the central bank’s reluctance to raise interest rates for fear of missing its target of getting inflation back up to an annual pace of 2 percent. By imposing restrictions on lenders, “monetary policy does not need to be diverted to address a sector-specific risk in the housing market,” Carney said. In other words, if Carney can cool the housing market with tighter controls on mortgages, he can keep rates lower for longer.

June 25, 2014

June 25th, 2014

The first quarter in the US was worse than we thought:

The U.S. economy contracted in the first quarter by the most since the depths of the last recession as consumer spending cooled.

Gross domestic product fell at a 2.9 percent annualized rate, more than forecast and the worst reading since the same three months in 2009, after a previously reported 1 percent drop, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. It marked the biggest downward revision from the agency’s second GDP estimate since records began in 1976. The revision reflected a slowdown in health care spending.

The revision reflected a drop in spending tied to health care services. The Bureau of Economic Analysis had estimated that major provisions of President Obama’s signature health care law would boost outlays. A quarterly services survey released this month showed the assumptions were too optimistic. Outlays for health spending actually slowed in the first quarter, subtracting 0.16 percentage point from GDP. The Commerce Department previously estimated those outlays added 1 percentage point to GDP.

Naturally, the US government wants Treasury debt to be unaffected by corporate-like inventory constraints:

  • •The Volcker Rule bars banks from “proprietary trading” in credit.
  • •But it allows proprietary trading in rates products such as Treasury and agency bonds.
  • •So Citi set up a prop desk to trade agency bonds, managing over $1 billion of Citi’s money.
  • •It’s run by a woman named Anna Raytcheva, who lost billions of dollars trading agency bonds during the financial crisis.

Obviously, some people are scandalized because people are scandalized by everything related to the Volcker Rule. And because the Volcker Rule is light on coherence. For instance, why does the Volcker Rule allow prop trading in rates? Well:

Lawmakers sought the flexibility to finance government spending and didn’t see the trading as particularly risky, said Barney Frank, who as a Massachusetts congressman helped draft the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act that mandated the Volcker Rule.

“To the extent the instruments being traded are completely secure, some of the rationale for the rule disappears,” Frank, a Democrat, said in a phone interview.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 9bp, FixedResets winning 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. Volatility was well above average and dominated by winning FixedResets. Volume was above average, with the highlights dominated by RY issues for some reason; the top two are both extremely likely to be called in August, for what that’s worth.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7528 % 2,523.2
FixedFloater 4.36 % 3.61 % 29,246 18.08 1 0.6925 % 3,941.9
Floater 2.91 % 2.99 % 44,680 19.74 4 0.7528 % 2,724.3
OpRet 4.37 % -12.73 % 22,611 0.08 2 0.0000 % 2,715.8
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.50 % 60,733 4.09 5 0.1196 % 3,110.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,483.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -1.05 % 81,512 0.08 17 0.0916 % 2,410.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.24 % 115,928 15.00 20 0.0943 % 2,553.7
FixedReset 4.45 % 3.68 % 204,507 6.66 78 0.1206 % 2,549.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 0.52 % 141,673 0.10 43 0.0584 % 2,540.5
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.32 % 121,003 3.87 6 0.0395 % 2,500.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 21.83
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.14
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 440,249 RBC crossed one block of 275,000 shares and two of 75,000 each, all at 25.38. TD crossed 11,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 0.81 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 406,928 TD crossed blocks of 248,000 shares, 27,000 and 121,800, all at 25.38.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 1.05 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 202,641 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 102,657 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.33 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 97,062 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 0.19 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 93,604 Scotia crossed 89,600 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.11 – 22.58
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3122

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 21.83
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.93 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2189

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.78 – 23.05
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1993

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-25
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %

TD.PR.Z FloatingReset Quote: 25.15 – 25.33
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 25.15 – 25.34
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1262

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.41 – 25.62
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1496

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %

June 24, 2014

June 24th, 2014

Looks like we’ve entered the Even Greater Moderation:

Expectations for price swings in the dollar-yen currency pair fell to a record as signs of an uneven U.S. economic recovery fueled bets the Federal Reserve will keep borrowing costs at unprecedented lows.

Three-month implied volatility in dollar-yen was at 5.795 percent at 6:46 a.m. in London after declining to 5.715 percent, the lowest level since Bloomberg began compiling the data in December 1995.

The SEC has demanded a test of small-stock tick-sizes to see whether a larger tick-size improves liquidity of these stocks:

The experiment was sought by exchange operators including Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. (NDAQ) and Intercontinental Exchange Inc. (ICE), which have seen their share of trading fall as private platforms such as dark pools have taken 37 percent of total share volume, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The test will prevent trading outside the exchanges unless a competing venue or broker offers a significantly better price or size lot to investors, according to an order posted on the SEC’s website.

Other features of the program, which will last one year, will strictly test the impact of rolling back penny pricing in stocks of smaller-cap companies. Under that experiment, the shares of companies with market values under $5 billion will only be quoted in five-cent increments.

Supporters of the test say it will encourage market makers that facilitate trading to buy and sell more shares and create conditions that would persuade more companies to go public. The SEC has been considering the experiment for more than a year as some lawmakers in Congress have pushed legislation to force a change.

Regrettably, other tests have not been announced – repealing Sarbanes-Oxley for these companies, for instance, or reducing capital requirements for market-makers who are banks, or actually increasing maker-taker exchange pricing for these issues.

Manulife Financial, proud issuer of MFC.PR.A, MFC.PR.B, MFC.PR.C, MFC.PR.E, MFC.PR.F, MFC.PR.G, MFC.PR.H, MFC.PR.I, MFC.PR.J, MFC.PR.K and MFC.PR.L, has been confirmed at Pfd-2(high) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the ratings on Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife or the Company) and its affiliates, including The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, its primary operating company. The rating on the Senior Unsecured Notes issued by Manulife Finance Holdings Limited has been discontinued due to repayment. All trends are Stable.

The ratings reflect the Company’s strong position in a number of geographic and product markets, including Canada and the fast-growing Asian market through the Manulife brand, and in the United States through the John Hancock brand. The Company is also well diversified by customer, distribution channel and product line. Risk management policies and procedures are rigourous, giving rise to a high-quality asset portfolio, though legacy issues associated with the Company’s policy liabilities continue to be a potential source of adverse reserve development given the macroeconomic and regulatory environments. While DBRS regards Manulife’s reduction of market-related risks over the past few years as having been critical to maintaining the Company’s high rating, it also notes that with unexceptional financial risk metrics, under DBRS’s methodology it is the Company’s franchise strength and business that provide most of the rating strength.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpatualDiscounts down 19bp, FixedResets up 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. Volatility was a little more than usual, heavily skewed towards winning FixedResets. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5185 % 2,504.3
FixedFloater 4.39 % 3.64 % 28,725 18.03 1 1.0733 % 3,914.8
Floater 2.93 % 3.02 % 45,055 19.66 4 0.5185 % 2,704.0
OpRet 4.37 % -12.88 % 22,215 0.08 2 0.1557 % 2,715.8
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.50 % 56,226 4.09 5 0.0080 % 3,106.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1557 % 2,483.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % -1.92 % 82,567 0.08 17 0.0762 % 2,408.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.27 % 5.24 % 112,025 15.00 20 -0.1905 % 2,551.3
FixedReset 4.45 % 3.69 % 205,566 6.66 78 0.0896 % 2,546.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.23 % 141,528 0.17 43 0.0148 % 2,539.0
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.25 % 111,025 3.87 6 0.1846 % 2,499.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.28
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 21.66
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 17.33
Evaluated at bid price : 17.33
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 21.12
Evaluated at bid price : 21.12
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 221,485 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.13; Nesbitt crossed 65,000 at 25.14; TD crossed 80,000 at 25.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 155,730 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 0.77 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 105,705 Desjardins crossed 99,200 at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 22.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 83,525 Scotia crossed 70,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 64,615 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 40,230 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 26.27 – 26.70
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2570

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %

ENB.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 23.70 – 24.14
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2783

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.07 – 22.53
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3189

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 21.77
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.59 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2355

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.10 – 17.43
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2163

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.15 – 17.44
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1952

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-24
Maturity Price : 17.15
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %

BNS.PR.K Called For Redemption

June 24th, 2014

Scotiabank has announced:

that it intends to exercise its right to redeem all outstanding Non-cumulative Preferred Shares Series 13 of Scotiabank (the “Preferred Shares Series 13”) on July 29, 2014 at a price equal to $25.00 per share, together with all declared and unpaid dividends. Formal notice will be issued to shareholders in accordance with the share conditions.

The redemption has been approved by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and will be financed out of the general funds of Scotiabank.

On May 26, 2014, the Board of Directors of Scotiabank approved a quarterly dividend of $0.30 per Series 13 Share. This will be the final dividend on the Series 13 Shares and will be paid in the usual manner on July 29, 2014 to shareholders of record at the close of business on July 2, 2014, as previously announced. After July 29, 2014, the Series 13 Shares will cease to be entitled to dividends.

Is this the beginning of a wave of redemptions of bank DeemedRetractibles? Probably not, unless the banks want to pay a premium. I confess to some surprise that Scotia didn’t come up with a shareholder vote to change the terms of this issue; or alternatively, set up an exchange offer. Be that as it may, bank DeemedRetractibles with higher coupons are:

Bank DeemedRetractibles
Coupon > $1.20 p.a.
Ticker Annual Dividend First Par Call
NA.PR.M 1.5000 2017-5-15
BMO.PR.L 1.4500 2017-5-25
TD.PR.R 1.4000 2017-4-30
TD.PR.Q 1.4000 2017-1-31
BNS.PR.O 1.4000 2017-4-26
BNS.PR.N 1.3125 2017-1-27
BMO.PR.K 1.3125 2016-11-25
TD.PR.P 1.3125 2016-11-1
HSB.PR.C 1.2750 2014-6-30
HSB.PR.D 1.2500 2014-12-31
NA.PR.L 1.2125 Current
TD.PR.O 1.2125 2014-10-31

June 23, 2014

June 23rd, 2014

Matt Levine of Bloomberg ran a thoughtful – if disjointed – piece on bond market structure philosophy titled SEC Wants to Give Everyone a Chance to Be a Bond Trader:

There are more fundamental structural worries about declining liquidity in the bond markets: What will happen if investors want to sell and there are no dealers to buy?7 How risky is it to have so many bonds held by ETFs? Should big bond managers such as BlackRock and Pimco be regulated as too-big-to-fail risks to financial stability?

These are tough questions, but one plausible way of addressing them might be to open up trading of bonds somewhat. The current model of investors calling dealers for quotes makes sense if dealers provide a lot of liquidity; but if the dealers are just working as well-paid, information-hoarding middlemen between investors, then maybe there are more efficient ways for investors to interact. And in fact there have been efforts to develop electronic, inter-institution trading platforms that would make the bond markets a bit more like the stock markets, by allowing investors and dealers to post quotes in the same place, and trade directly with each other.

But what’s gotten attention was [chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Mary Jo] White’s call for more transparency in bond markets. In particular, White wants more technology-supported pre-trade transparency: That is, she wants more publicly available, electronically distributed, quotes for bonds, so you can know before you trade what prices are being offered in the market for the bond you want to buy. This would be a move toward making the bond market more like the equity market, with publicly posted quotes and potentially electronic (and high-frequency! maybe) trading.

The SEC’s job is to regulate the financial markets. One way to approach that job would be to put a priority on optimizing market efficiency and stability. Another way to approach it would be to put a priority on protecting retail investors and preventing two-bit frauds. Obviously both are good but one is more important. If you think about bond market structure in terms of protecting the little guy, you will make one set of choices; if you think about it in terms of providing a stable liquid platform for massive flows of capital, you will make a second, probably somewhat different, set of choices.14 The second set of choices is probably right.

Quite right, and this is something I have reiterated in PrefBlog to the point of boredom. Increased price transparency will result in shallower, more brittle bond markets; there’s tons of evidence supporting this thesis. But the SEC is leaning in the other direction:

The main U.S. securities regulator is ramping up calls to democratize a $40 trillion bond market, proposing that smaller investors receive more price information to avoid getting fleeced when buying less-traded debt.

The Securities and Exchange Commission wants retail investors to have the same access to privately negotiated bond prices as big institutions, allowing them to make better decisions about how much to pay for the securities, Chair Mary Jo White said yesterday. Releasing such information on corporate and municipal transactions would promote competition and better execution, she said.

Finra is expanding its bond-price reporting into the $1.5 trillion market for private company debt, which is only sold to institutional buyers.

Another effect will be the continued acceleration of the current trend towards private placements. So retail will be able to get lots of pricing information on every publicly traded bond there is, but there won’t be too many. So we’ll see even more retail portfolios highly concentrated with big household names – the GMACs and GMs of this world, as worked out so well during the Credit Crunch. Another possibility, that I would like to see more of, would be institutional accounts trading directly with each other, bypassing the dealers completely. Naturally, you’ll get a few institutional houses running hedge-fund-like actively managed bond portfolios dominating the market – I see nothing wrong with that.

There are few inflation worries in the Treasury market:

In the past 13 months, the gap between yields of two- and five-year Treasuries has doubled to 1.22 percentage points, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. At the same time, the difference between those of five- and 30-year securities has narrowed to the least since 2009 as the long bond rallied.

Because yields on longer-dated debt usually rise more than shorter-term notes when investors see faster inflation spurring rate increases, the moves suggest a more sanguine outlook, according to Priya Misra, the New York-based head of U.S. rates strategy at Bank of America Corp., one of 22 primary dealers obligated to bid at U.S. debt auctions.

Taken together, the relationship now implies that while investors anticipate the Fed will eventually lift its benchmark rate after holding it close to zero for six years, they don’t foresee the central bank’s stimulus measures creating the kind of inflationary pressures that would force its hand, she said.

“The bond vigilantes have all been quieted,” Misra said by telephone on June 19. “The idea that just the act of printing money gets you inflation has been debunked.”

That view also indicates there’s little concern over a repeat of 1994, one of the worst years for bonds when Treasuries lost more than 4 percent in the first six months as the Fed began to double its benchmark rate to 6 percent, according to the Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. Treasury Index. In part because of the Fed’s success as an inflation fighter, Treasuries generated returns in 2004, 2005 and 2006 even though the bank boosted rates to 5.25 percent from 1 percent.

This year, Treasuries have advanced 2.58 percent in the biggest year-to-date gain since 2011, even as the Fed began to pare back its $85 billion-a-month bond buying program.

I’ll believe it’s not 1994 all over again when the Fed actually hikes its policy rate! But we’ll see.

There is some concern about the bond market’s vulnerability to mass ETF redemptions – particularly in odd sectors:

It’s never been easier for individuals to enter some of the most esoteric debt markets. Wall Street’s biggest firms are worried that it’ll be just as simple for them to leave.

Investors have piled more than $900 billion into taxable bond funds since the 2008 financial crisis, buying stock-like shares of mutual and exchange-traded funds to gain access to infrequently-traded markets. This flood of cash has helped cause prices to surge and yields to plunge.

Now, as the Federal Reserve discusses ending its easy-money policies, concern is mounting that the withdrawal of stimulus will lead to an exodus that’ll cause credit markets to freeze up. While new regulations have forced banks to reduce their balance-sheet risk, analysts at JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) are focusing on the problems that individual investors could cause by yanking money from funds.

That concern is also revealed in BlackRock Inc.’s pitch in a paper published last month that regulators should consider redemption restrictions for some bond mutual funds, including extra fees for large redeemers.

A year ago, bond funds suffered record withdrawals amid hysteria about a sudden increase in benchmark yields. A 0.8 percentage point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield in May and June last year spurred a sell-off that caused $248 billion of market value losses on the Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate and High Yield Index.

Of course, yields on 10-year Treasuries (USGG10YR) have since fallen to 2.6 percent from 3 percent at the end of December and company bonds have resumed their rally. Analysts are worrying about what happens when the gift of easy money goes away for good.

US municipalities are a little gun-shy when it comes to infrastructure:

Across the U.S., localities are refraining from raising new funds in the $3.7 trillion municipal-bond market after the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression left them with unprecedented deficits. Rather than take advantage of Federal Reserve (FDTR) policy that’s held benchmark interest rates at historic lows since December 2008, they’re repaying obligations by the most on record.

Issuance this year has tumbled to $123 billion nationwide through June 13, down 20 percent from the 2013 pace, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. It’s also 30 percent below levels seen in 2010, the final year of the federally subsidized Build America Bonds program, which was designed to spur infrastructure investment.

Since 2010, states and localities have lowered their bond load by $111 billion, the most since the Fed began keeping records in 1945. They’ve paid down the liabilities even as yields on 20-year general obligations have averaged 4.25 percent in the five years since the recession, the lowest since 1969, according to Bond Buyer data.

America’s governments would need to spend about $3.6 trillion through 2020 to put everything from roads and water to sewers and electricity networks into adequate shape, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers, based in Reston, Virginia. That’s about $1.6 trillion more than governments are expected to dispense.

Meanwhile, the Minister of Asset Allocation has market-timing advice:

Canada’s Finance Minister Joe Oliver warned on Monday that investors could be mispricing risk as they hunt for better investment returns, and said policymakers should keep the issue under close review.

Oliver is in London to promote trade and investment, and told Reuters in an interview that the global economy remained vulnerable to financial shocks.

“We’ve said again and again … that international financial markets are still fragile. Part of that is macroeconomic and monetary issues, but there is a geopolitical issue,” he said at the London residence of Canada’s envoy to London.

James Langton of Investment Executive highlights some interesting research in his piece Video better than text in boosting financial literacy:

New research finds that online video may be a particularly effective way of bolstering financial literacy.

According to a new paper (Visual Tools and Narratives: New Ways to Improve Financial Literacy) published by the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), video appears to be better at improving basic financial literacy than text-based approaches. The conclusion is based on an experiment financed by a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA), and funded as part of the Financial Literacy Research Consortium.

Researchers developed four different online approaches to explaining the concept of risk diversification — a brochure, an interactive visual tool, a written narrative, and a video — and then tested them with a sample of 900 people. Overall, they found that video performed the best at both improving financial literacy scores and increasing people’s levels of confidence in their financial knowledge.

The actual paper is titled Visual Tools and Narratives: New Ways to Improve Financial Literacy:

We developed and experimentally evaluated four novel educational programs delivered online: an informational brochure, a visual interactive tool, a written narrative, and a video narrative. The programs were designed to inform people about risk diversification, an essential concept for financial decision- making. The effectiveness of these programs was evaluated using the RAND American Life Panel. Participants were exposed to one of the programs, and then asked to answer questions measuring financial literacy and self-efficacy. All of the programs were found to be effective at increasing self-efficacy, and several improved financial literacy, providing new evidence for the value of programs designed to help individuals make financial decisions. The video was more effective at improving financial literacy scores than the written narrative, highlighting the power of online media in financial education.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Well, I’m not paying for it.

Anyway, I had been hoping to read it to check what their actual conclusion regarding videos is. I suspect – although without reading the paper this is mere speculation, of course – that what they have measured is people’s ease of learning via different media, rather than anything specific to financial literacy. I hate videos and lectures. If I’m going to learn anything, I’ve got to read it. It’s entirely possible that all that has been discovered is that I am in the minority, which I knew already.

Nice to see such work being done, though. Here in Canada, potential funding for such research is instead splashed out to cronies with zero public benefit.

It was a modestly good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 7bp, FixedResets winning 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 8bp. Volatility was average, skewed to winners. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4787 % 2,491.4
FixedFloater 4.43 % 3.69 % 28,816 17.95 1 -0.0932 % 3,873.3
Floater 2.94 % 3.06 % 44,199 19.58 4 0.4787 % 2,690.0
OpRet 4.38 % -9.03 % 23,129 0.08 2 0.0195 % 2,711.6
SplitShare 4.83 % 4.41 % 58,130 4.09 5 -0.0399 % 3,106.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0195 % 2,479.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -0.94 % 80,996 0.09 17 0.0739 % 2,406.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.26 % 112,725 14.97 20 0.0664 % 2,556.1
FixedReset 4.46 % 3.69 % 206,436 6.66 78 0.0855 % 2,543.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 1.30 % 132,472 0.17 43 0.0751 % 2,538.6
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.39 % 123,281 3.94 6 -0.1579 % 2,495.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 17.05
Evaluated at bid price : 17.05
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.40
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.84
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.H FixedReset 292,590 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 215,075 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 45,000 and 100,000, both at 25.14. Scotia crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 108,216 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 101,430 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 99,425 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 75,201 TD crossed 70,000 at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.06 – 23.85
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.6585

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.12 – 22.44
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2372

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %

BNA.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 24.79 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1341

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.29 – 22.53
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1642

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.29
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.87 – 21.25
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.3183

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-23
Maturity Price : 20.87
Evaluated at bid price : 20.87
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.51 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2286

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %

New Issue: ALA FixedReset, 4.75%+306

June 23rd, 2014

AltaGas Ltd. has announced:

that it will issue 6,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series G (the “Series G Preferred Shares”), at a price of $25.00 per Series G Preferred Share (“the Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million on a bought deal basis. The Series G Preferred Shares will be offered to the public through a syndicate of underwriters co-led by RBC Capital Markets, Scotiabank and TD Securities Inc.

Holders of the Series G Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend for the initial period ending on but excluding September 30, 2019 (the “Initial Period”) at an annual rate of 4.75%, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of AltaGas. The first quarterly dividend payment is payable on September 30, 2014 and shall be $0.2896 per Series G Preferred Share. The dividend rate will reset on September 30, 2019 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.06%. The Series G Preferred Shares are redeemable by AltaGas, at its option, on September 30, 2019 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series G Preferred Shares will have the right to convert all or any part of their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series H (the “Series H Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2019 and on September 30 every fifth year thereafter. Holders of Series H Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly floating dividend at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.06%, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of AltaGas.

The Offering is expected to close on or about July 3, 2014. Net proceeds will be used to reduce outstanding indebtedness and for general corporate purposes. AltaGas has granted to the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing of the Offering, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series G Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per share.

The Series G Preferred Shares will be issued pursuant to a prospectus supplement that will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in Canada under AltaGas’ short form base shelf prospectus dated August 23, 2013. The Offering is only made by way of a prospectus. The prospectus contains important detailed information about the securities being offered. The Offering is subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory and stock exchange approvals.

This looks like it is being issued with some concession to the market – ALA.PR.E, which is a FixedReset 5.00%+317, closed today at 25.46-55, 2×21, on heavy volume.

June 20, 2014

June 20th, 2014

The hot news today was an unexpectedly high inflation number:

Inflation exceeded the Bank of Canada’s target last month for the first time in more than two years, an unexpected acceleration led by energy costs that sparked increases in the currency and bond yields.

The consumer price index rose 2.3 percent in May from a year ago following April’s 2 percent pace, Statistics Canada said today from Ottawa. The core rate, which excludes eight volatile products, increased 1.7 percent after a gain of 1.4 percent the prior month. Both increases were higher than all forecasts in Bloomberg economist surveys that called for total inflation of 2 percent and core prices to rise 1.5 percent.

Which had an effect on policy expectations which had an effect on the dollar:

The loonie, nicknamed for the image of the aquatic bird on the C$1 coin, appreciated 0.6 percent to C$1.0758 per U.S. dollar at 5 p.m. in Toronto. It touched C$1.0752, the strongest since Jan. 7, after weakening on March 20 to C$1.1279. One loonie buys 92.95 U.S. cents. The Canadian dollar gained 0.9 percent this week in its second five-day advance.

The currency is the top performer for the past three months in a basket of 10 developed-market currencies tracked by the Bloomberg Correlation Weighted Index, strengthening 4.5 percent. It has lost 2 percent this year.

The Canadian government’s two-year note dropped, pushing the yield to as high as 1.15 percent, the most since Jan. 6. Benchmark 10-year bond yields rose as much as seven basis points, or 0.07 percentage point, the most since March 19, to 2.33 percent before trading at 2.29 percent. The 2.5 percent security maturing in June 2024 lost 29 cents to C$101.84.

The yield on June 2015 bankers’ acceptance contracts reached 1.46 percent today, the highest since April 4, suggesting investors are moving up their expected date for the Bank of Canada to begin raising interest rates.

David Parkinson of the Globe dismisses Exchange Rate Pass Through (ERPT) as the rationale:

Meanwhile, one has to wonder how long “exchange-rate pass-through” should be expected to distort the inflation trend. The Canadian dollar did fall more than 10 cents against its U.S. counterpart in the span of a year – but for the past five months the currency has actually been stable, in the 90 to 92 cents (U.S.) range. Certainly it would take a while for last year’s decline in the loonie to work its way fully through pricing for imported goods (and goods dependent on imported inputs), but presumably the impact should already be softening in the month-to-month numbers as the currency continues to hold its footing. Yet on a month-to-month basis, core CPI was up 0.5 per cent (unadjusted for seasonal effects) in May, in a month when the dollar actually rose.

The BoC has lots of research that suggests ERPT is not really all that important. F’rinstance, a 2004 review by Jeannine Bailliu and Hafedh Bouakez titled Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Industrialized Countries:

    • Although estimates of exchange rate passthrough vary both by industry and by country, it appears that the full effect of a depreciation or appreciation of the domestic currency is not passed through to local currency import prices across industrialized countries.

  • • Many industrialized countries seem to have experienced a decline in exchange rate passthrough to consumer prices in the 1990s, despite large exchange rate depreciations in many of them.
  • • The fact that this documented decline in exchange rate pass-through has coincided with the low-inflation period that most industrialized countries entered a decade or so ago has popularized the view that these two phenomena could be linked.
  • • Assessing the extent of exchange rate passthrough, and whether it has indeed declined, has important implications for the conduct and design of monetary policy.

    Assuming for a moment that the prices of domestically produced goods do not respond to exchange rate changes, there are at least two reasons why passthrough to consumer prices might not equal the share of imports in the consumption basket even if passthrough to import prices is complete. First, local distribution costs, such as transportation costs, marketing, and services, will cause import and consumer prices to diverge, and the wedge between the two prices will fluctuate if distributors adjust their profit margins in response to movements in the exchange rate. Second, as discussed in Bacchetta and vanWincoop (2002), differences in the optimal pricing strategies of foreign wholesalers and domestic retailers can explain why pass-through to consumer prices is lower than the share of imports in the CPI even when pass-through to import prices is complete. Indeed, this discrepancy can occur if foreign exporting firms price their goods in the exporter’s currency, while domestic retailers resell these goods priced in domestic currency

… and Stephen Murchison’s October 2009 paper Exchange Rate Pass-through and Monetary Policy: How Strong is the Link?:

Several authors have presented reduced-form evidence suggesting that the degree of exchange rate pass-through to the consumer price index has declined in Canada since the early 1980s and is currently close to zero. Taylor (2000) suggests that this phenomenon, which has been observed for several other countries, may be due to a change in the behaviour of inflation. Specifically, moving from a high to a low-inflation environment has reduced the expected persistence of cost changes and, by consequence, the degree of pass-through to prices. This paper extends his argument, suggesting that this change in persistence is due to a change in the parameters of the central bank’s policy rule. Evidence is presented for Canada indicating that policy has responded more aggressively to inflation deviations over the low pass-through period relative to the high pass-through period. We test the quantitative importance of this change in policy for exchange rate pass-through by varying the parameters of a simple monetary policy rule embedded in an open economy, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Results suggest that increases in the aggressiveness of policy consistent with that observed for Canada are sufficient to effectively eliminate measured pass-through. However, this conclusion depends critically on the inclusion of price-mark-up shocks in the model. When these are excluded, a more modest decline to pass-through is predicted.

… and a review by Jeannine Bailliu, Wei Dong and John Murray titled Has Exchange Rate Pass-Through Really Declined? Some Recent Insights from the Literature:

  • • A substantial empirical literature has shown that the correlation between changes in consumer prices and changes in the nominal exchange rate has been quite low and declining over the past two decades for a broad group of countries.
  • • The issue of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) has recently been explored more fully in the context of sticky-price, open-economy, dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) models. The findings of these studies put into question results from previous work based on reduced-form equations. In particular, ERPT to import prices may remain larger than the estimated parameters from
    reduced-form regressions would indicate, owing to an econometric bias related to the endogeneity of the exchange rate.

  • • Nevertheless, there is fairly convincing evidence to suggest that measured short-term ERPT to consumer prices has declined because of a shift to more credible monetary policy regimes, and, in this case, the findings from DSGE models confirm the results of reduced-form models.
  • • Studies using microdata are a promising area of research, since they provide additional insights that help us to better understand the phenomenon of ERPT by providing evidence of some of its drivers at the micro level.


If the price of an imported good rises because of a depreciation, domestic importers may simply switch suppliers. This would be measured as low pass-through, even though pass-through may be complete.

As discussed by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003), the insensitivity of consumer prices to changes in the exchange rate may be the outcome of an optimal strategy from the retailer’s perspective. Indeed, when there is rising competition in the local market, it may be optimal for retailers to absorb some of the fluctuations in the exchange rate into their margins, regardless of the sensitivity of border prices to exchange rates. Moreover, when there is limited substitution between non-tradable goods and imported goods, the prices of non-tradable goods can be very sticky, even after large exchange rate movements, leading to very little response in aggregate consumer prices.

… and a paper by Abdul ALEEM and Amine LAHIANI from 2010, Monetary Policy Credibility and Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Some evidence from Emerging Countries:

Considering external constraints on monetary policy in emerging countries, we propose a vector autoregressive model with exogenous variables (VARX) to examine the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices. We demonstrate that a lower exchange rate pass-through is associated with a credible monetary policy aiming at price stability. The empirical results suggest that the exchange rate pass-through is higher in Latin American countries than in East Asian countries. The exchange rate pass-through has declined after the adoption of inflation targeting monetary policy.

All this talk of distributors and retailers absorbing exchange rate fluctuations is fascinating in view of the federal government’s musing on price controls:

Minister Flaherty has once again proven that the Competition Act is vulnerable to politically expedient amendments developed to respond to perceived exploitative conduct. Following on statements in the 2013 Throne Speech, Minister Flaherty indicated in the 2014 Budget that the government will introduce legislation to address geographic price discrimination “that is not justified by higher operating costs in Canada, and to empower the Commissioner of Competition to enforce the new framework.” While Canadians will not know what this really means until the proposed legislation is disclosed, the language in the 2014 Economic Action Plan suggests the Commissioner of Competition may become a price regulator in addition to its role as enforcer of Canada’s competition law.

The 2014 Budget tabled in Parliament on February 11 states that the Harper government

“proposes to address another source of the price gap identified by the Senate Committee: country pricing strategies—that is, when companies use their market power to charge higher prices in Canada that are not reflective of legitimate higher costs. Evidence suggests that some companies charge higher prices in Canada than in the U.S. for the same goods, beyond what could be justified by higher operating costs. Higher prices brought on by excessive market power hurt Canadian consumers.

The Government intends to introduce legislation to address price discrimination that is not justified by higher operating costs in Canada, and to empower the Commissioner of Competition to enforce the new framework. Details will be announced in the coming months.”

Not surprisingly, there was no mention of this mechanism in the Pack of Useless Hacks, Has-Beens and Bag-Men’s report The Canada-USA Price Gap, although it seems to me that if distribution/retail margins are reduced when purchasing power goes down, then distribution/retail margins should be _____________ when purchasing power goes up. [Fill in the blank: Three Marks]

The government’s plan was attacked by my old school buddy Andrew Coyne:

You might have wondered quite how this mad scheme could have been produced by a government that occasionally proclaims its belief in a free market economy, but only if you had not been paying attention: This was simply the latest expression of how far populism has displaced market liberalism in the Conservatives’ thinking. Still, this was taking things, as they say, to another level: an expensive, bureaucratic muddle that, on its own, would undo much of whatever good the late Jim Flaherty might have achieved in his time at Finance.

But don’t take my word on it. The C.D. Howe Institute has just released a report, drawing on the advice of a panel of the country’s foremost competition policy experts. They include three former directors of investigation at the Competition Bureau, a former Commissioner of Competition, as well as leading economists and practitioners in competition law. Their conclusion: the plan is “profoundly wrong-headed,” “wholly impractical,” “misguided” and “unenforceable” and probably illegal under international trade law. In sum, they said, it was “destined for costly failure” and “should be abandoned forthwith.”

It is, in sum, a thoroughgoing policy debacle in the making; the government would do well to heed to the panel’s advice, and deep-six it. Will it? Or will it once again treat overwhelming expert opposition to one of its policies as evidence, not that the policy is wrong, but that the experts are biased against it?

In other news, retail sales increased:

This came as a separate reading by the agency showed Canadian shoppers out in force in April, as retail sales climbed 1.1 per cent, driven by cars and car parts.

Still, the gains across Canada were exceptionally broad-based, with sales up in 10 of 11 sectors measured, or 98 per cent.

“The advance in retail volumes is welcome news, and suggest Canadian consumers are bouncing back after a tepid first quarter,” said senior economist Krishen Rangasamy of National Bank.

“The overall picture for April is good, with a trifecta of volume gains in retailing, wholesaling and manufacturing, enough in our view to prop up GDP by around 0.2 per cent in the month.”

Bloomberg carries an interesting exchange of views on High-Frequency Trading. In his piece Slow Your Judgments on Fast Trading, Noah Smith conflates slippage and market impact, claiming that:

Slippage, also called implementation shortfall, is the difference between the price that triggers the decision to trade and the actual execution price. It matters for people who use market orders, or the best immediate price. Price impact matters to people who split their trades into pieces.

This, not to put too fine a point on it, is bullshit. From the links:

slippage is the difference between where the computer signaled the entry and exit for a trade and where actual clients, with actual money, entered and exited the market using the computer’s signals.[1] Market-impacted, liquidity, and frictional costs may also contribute.

and

market impact is the effect that a market participant has when it buys or sells an asset. It is the extent to which the buying or selling moves the price against the buyer or seller, i.e. upward when buying and downward when selling. It is closely related to market liquidity; in many cases “liquidity” and “market impact” are synonymous.

So it should be clear that “slippage” is almost always merely bafflegab spouted by useless pseudo-quants of the ‘Look mummy, I gotta spreadsheet’ school of investing. Any trading decision is binary: you either do it or you don’t do it, given the market prices. If a properly written quantitative investment programme tells you it would be a good thing if you sold A and bought B at a take-out of $1.00 and no less, you can’t do the trade at $0.95 and then whimper to your gullible clients about “slippage”. If you can do some of the desired trade at a take-out of $1.00 or better, great! If the market impact of the first part of your trade moves the take-out to $0.95, YOU DON’T FUCKEN DO THE SECOND PART OF THE TRADE!

There is only sequence of events for which I can imagine “slippage” being a legitimate concept. Exchange trades are independent; you can’t make one contingent on another – you can do this with a dealer, but then he’s going to be building in a margin. So it is possible that you see your take-out of $1.00, execute your sale of A, and then be chagrined to learn that the offer of B you were counting on doesn’t exist any more, leaving you with the grim choice of buying back your A (almost certainly at a loss), or gritting your teeth and executing the purchase of B at the higher price anyway. This can be minimized by algorithmic trading, with which you can execute the two sides of the trade with as little time separation as possible, and by reducing your trade sizes to minimize the harmful impact of such a disappearance … and note that the latter strategy might give HFT the signals it needs to scoop things up, so be careful!

So “slippage” is not another word for “implementation shortfall”. “Slippage” is, in fact, another word for “gross incompetence”. And, in fact, the cited paper by Jones defines:

These price impacts can be measured by looking at the response of share prices to a particular trade. However, the preferred trading cost measure for institutions is known as implementation shortfall. It is calculated as the average execution price for the large order compared to the price of the stock prior to the start of execution. As with spreads, implementation shortfalls are usually calculated on a proportional basis relative to the amount traded, and implementation shortfall is usually reported in basis points.

This definition is OK, but brings with it the potential for more incompetent bafflegab. Let us say we are competent investment managers running assets as well as we can. “A” can be swapped into “B” on favourable terms with a take-out of $1.05, but we don’t do it, because we’re looking for $1.10. Suddenly there’s a discontinuity in the market – a policy announcement, or a large trade or new issue somewhere changes the overall pricing in an entire sector, could be anything – and our desired take-out changes to $1.00, even though the relative prices of A and B haven’t changed. Hurray! We’re generating a trade signal, so let’s get to work … we do half the desired trade size at $1.05, but then our price impact moves the price to takeout of $0.95. So what do you do?

If you are a moron, you do the other half at $0.95, and then ring up your mummy and tell her you just did a gigantic trade at an average take-out of your desired $1.00. If you are a reasonably rational person (not employed by a bank, obviously), you stop trading, satisfied that you did half the trade at better than necessary prices, and recommence running your programme, hoping for another opportunity. You don’t do a trade on unfavourable terms just because the price ten minutes ago, with your portfolio as of ten minutes ago, was favourable. That’s just stupid.

So the moral of the story is: let’s ignore Noah Smith’s use of the word slippage and see if his essay makes any sense with proper terminology.

As it turns out, it doesn’t really matter: one of the major assertions in his essay Slow Your Judgments on Fast Trading is:

If HFTs have big speed advantages and very good guesses about the decisions of non-HFT investors, they might theoretically be able to increase slippage and price impact for non-HFTs. That would increase total trading costs for non-HFTs, thus discouraging them from trading. If non-HFTs are bringing important information to the market by their trading, then the net effect of HFT could reduce the informational efficiency of markets.

But a word of caution — the decrease in slippage and price impact might be happening because informed traders are now staying out of the market in response to HFT itself. If that’s happening, it isn’t a reason for celebration — it’s like saying the Spanish flu decreased the death rate from heart disease. The problem is that it’s very hard, if not impossible, to tell how much information is getting pumped into market prices via trading. The increase in the use of dark pools might be the result of informed traders fleeing the public exchanges in an effort to escape HFTs.

OK, so yes, it is possible for an HFT to increase the price impact of the first moiety of my trade at $1.05; I could do a portion at $1.05, but before I can do my second portion at $1.04, HFT swoops in and the take-out is suddenly $0.95, even though I’ve traded a quarter of my desired size when in the absence of HFT I could have done half. The problem with his reasoning is the next sentence:

That would increase total trading costs for non-HFTs, thus discouraging them from trading.

No, it doesn’t increase total trading costs for all non-HFTs; it only increases the trading costs for morons, who insist on doing all their trade, even at prices that don’t make sense any more. It certainly doesn’t increase my trading costs; it might even be said to decrease them, since I did one-quarter of my desired trade at 1.05, instead of half at an average take-out of $1.045.

It would have been nicer, of course, to have scooped up all the available trade, but that’s my fault. If I had been a little quicker, a little smarter, then I actually would have scooped up everything available; but as it was, my sluggishness and stupidity gave HFT the opportunity the chance to (i) read my signal, (ii) interpret my signal and (iii) get his own trade in. So my clients are less happy than they might otherwise be and his clients are happier than they might otherwise be, and this has come about because he was smarter than me (this time!). And that’s exactly the way it should be. I see no problems here. I’ll just have to get better at what I do.

In his counterpoint Why I Love High-Speed Trading, Clifford S. Asness makes some very good points:

Smith’s lead point is that I claim HFTs don’t front-run because I used an outdated definition of the term. That is, I take “front-running” to mean using information you’ve been entrusted with and promised not to use to the disadvantage of whoever entrusted that information to you (usually a paying client). Smith says the definition must be broadened to encompass “order anticipation with speed advantages.” Therefore, he says, it is legitimate to say that HFTs engage in front-running.

He’s wrong. First, you can’t just change the definition of a word used to describe a crime and apply it to something that’s both legal and ethical. Perhaps all of us should have used the more straightforward term “guessing,” because that is all “order anticipation” means. Traders have always made educated guesses about who is going to buy and sell what, and they’ve always tried to do it faster than the other guy. They did this long before HFT. In fact, what are traders doing if not trying to make educated guesses about who plans to buy and sell what and then act before other traders? If these traders — HFT or not — are using legal, public information, this is exactly what they’re supposed to be doing. To say “we’ll call that front-running as we’ve broadened the term” is ridiculous.

Yes, very good. It’s much like the Peter ‘My Word Is My Bond, Sometimes’ MacKay’s attempt to reclassify prostitutes’ clients as “perverts”.

Asness’ other good point is:

But Smith is creative! He advances the untestable hypothesis that perhaps fewer people are bothering to become informed traders because HFTs will just take their profits, and as a result markets are less efficient. As we have pointed out, HFTs shouldn’t be judged against an unattainable nirvana of zero bid-ask spreads and infinite liquidity, but against the system that preceded it. Before the advent of HFTs, human market-makers engaged in order anticipation and moved prices away from large traders all while earning much fatter profits.1 Any informed trader discouraged because potential profits are syphoned away by HFTs would have been even more discouraged under the old trading regime.

Yes, yes and yes again! As I have often pointed out, much of the controversy regarding HFT is fuelled by the pique and despair of the old-money smiley-boy crowd, dismayed that some parvenus are eating their lunch. Since they don’t have the talent to do their jobs properly, they prefer to whine to teacher.

The paper on implementation costs was by Charles M. Jones, by the way, and titled What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading?:

This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical research on high-frequency trading (HFT). Economic theory identifies several ways that HFT could affect liquidity. The main positive is that HFT can intermediate trades at lower cost. However, HFT speed could disadvantage other investors, and the resulting adverse selection could reduce market quality.

Over the past decade, HFT has increased sharply, and liquidity has steadily improved. But correlation is not necessarily causation. Empirically, the challenge is to measure the incremental effect of HFT beyond other changes in equity markets. The best papers for this purpose isolate market structure changes that facilitate HFT. Virtually every time a market structure change results in more HFT, liquidity and market quality have improved because liquidity suppliers are better able to adjust their quotes in response to new information.

Does HFT make markets more fragile? In the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash, for example, HFT initially stabilized prices but were eventually overwhelmed, and in liquidating their positions, HFT exacerbated the downturn. This appears to be a generic feature of equity markets: similar events have occurred in manual markets, even with affirmative market-maker obligations. Well-crafted individual stock price limits and trading halts have been introduced since. Similarly, kill switches are a sensible response to the Knight trading episode.

Many of the regulatory issues associated with HFT are the same issues that arose in more manual markets. Now regulators in the US are appropriately relying on competition to minimize abuses. Other regulation is appropriate if there are market failures. For instance, consolidated order-level audit trails are key to robust enforcement. If excessive messages impose negative externalities on others, fees are appropriate. But a message tax may act like a transaction tax, reducing share prices, increasing volatility, and worsening liquidity. Minimum order exposure times would also severely discourage liquidity provision.

And in other, other news, Jed Kolko of Trulia addresses fears that boomer downsizing will devastate house prices in his piece Baby-Boomer Downsizing? Perhaps Not So Fast:

Let’s start by looking at the age when older households move from single-family homes to multi-unit buildings. Based on the 2013 Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) – the most recent detailed demographic data available – baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964, which means 50-68 years old in 2014) are less likely than almost any other age group to live in multi-unit buildings as opposed to single-family homes. The only age group less likely to live in multi-unit buildings is 70-74 year-olds, which is the age group that baby boomers will start to enter in the coming years.

In later years, the share of households in multi-unit buildings rises, but by less than you might guess. Just 25% of households headed by 80-84 year-olds live in multi-unit buildings – which is a lower share than 40-44 year-olds. Even among households headed by adults aged 85 and older, only one-third live in multi-unit buildings – and that’s only counting those who head their own household are not living with adult children or in institutions.

Therefore, as today’s baby boomers age, they’ll grow into age groups first with a lower likelihood of living in multi-unit buildings (70-74 year-olds). Multi-unit living starts rising slightly at age 75-79, and rises more notably only when heads of household reach their 80s.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 6bp, FixedResets gaining 3bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. Volatility wasn’t much – boosted by Floaters reversing yesterday’s jump. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8239 % 2,479.5
FixedFloater 4.43 % 3.68 % 29,984 17.97 1 0.1401 % 3,876.9
Floater 2.96 % 3.08 % 44,727 19.52 4 -0.8239 % 2,677.2
OpRet 4.38 % -8.59 % 24,084 0.08 2 0.0779 % 2,711.1
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.30 % 58,447 4.11 5 -0.2307 % 3,107.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0779 % 2,479.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -0.53 % 81,978 0.08 17 -0.1269 % 2,404.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.27 % 113,553 14.97 20 -0.0621 % 2,554.4
FixedReset 4.46 % 3.70 % 208,740 6.68 78 0.0327 % 2,541.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % -0.21 % 132,821 0.11 43 -0.0111 % 2,536.7
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.33 % 123,702 3.95 6 0.0000 % 2,499.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 16.88
Evaluated at bid price : 16.88
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.74
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.H FixedReset 362,196 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 314,340 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 62,801 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 57,326 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 21.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset 55,100 Scotia crossed 48,900 at 25.27.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 32,523 Scotia crossed 31,100 at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-20
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : -16.43 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.55 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4175

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.91 – 23.55
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.3998

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.00 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.5143

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.51 – 23.90
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2645

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 21.40 – 21.75
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2363

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.74 – 25.10
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2470

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-20
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.74
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %

UST.PR.B Upgraded to Pfd-2 by DBRS

June 20th, 2014

DBRS has announced that it:

has today upgraded the rating of the Class B Preferred Securities issued by Utility Split Trust (the Fund) to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low). Approximately 1.2 million Class B Preferred Securities were issued on December 19, 2011, following the redemption of the previously outstanding Preferred Securities in accordance with their original terms as part of a share capital reorganization. The final redemption date for the Class B Preferred Securities is December 31, 2016.

Based on the current dividend yields on the underlying portfolio entities, the dividend coverage ratio (net of expenses) is approximately 0.77 times. Shortfalls are expected to be funded through the sale of portfolio securities or drawing upon a loan facility. Holders of the Capital Units are currently receiving $0.05 per unit each month after the Class B Preferred Securities distributions and other expenses of the Fund have been paid.

Since the rating was confirmed in December 2013, Fund performance has been steadily improving. The net asset value (NAV) of the Fund has increased to $29.54 from $26.32,, with downside protection available to holders of the Class B Preferred Securities increasing to approximately 66.2%. From time to time the Portfolio has had a large cash and cash equivalents position that has decreased the income received by the Fund, resulting in a grind on the Portfolio. The Pfd-2 rating of the Class B Preferred Securities is based primarily on the downside protection available, as well as on the measures in place to protect the distributions to and repayment of the Class B Preferred Securities (i.e., the Class B Preferred Security Test, which does not permit any distributions to the Capital Unit holders if the NAV of the Portfolio is less than 1.5 times the outstanding principal amount for the Class B Preferred Securities).

UST.PR.B was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was issued in a refunding transaction. The issue is not tracked by HIMIPref™ since, with a market capitalization of about $12.3-million, it is too small.