Archive for March, 2010

Best & Worst Performers: March 2010

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

March 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “March 31”)
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -8.18% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.26% based on a bid of 20.51 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.56% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.52% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 19.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.51% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.36 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -5.46% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.86 and a limitMaturity.
TRI.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.40%  
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.55% The second-best performer in February.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.84% The third-best performer in February, the best performer in January and the second-best performer in December.
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Pfd-2(low) +7.56% The fifth-best performer in February. Strong pair with BAM.PR.E
BAM.PR.E Ratchet Pfd-2(low) +8.85% The best performer in February. Strong Pair with BAM.PR.G

Momentum is still amazing, with the Floating Rate sector continuing to shine.

March 31, 2010

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010

Greek bonds are getting hammered:

Europe’s week-old rescue plan for Greece has so far failed to do what its leaders predicted: reduce borrowing costs for the region’s most indebted country.

The yield on 10-year Greek government bonds has increased 24 basis points to 6.522 percent since EU leaders agreed to the aid blueprint on March 25. That’s the highest in a month and more than double the rate paid by Germany. Seven-year bonds sold by Greece on March 29 fell for a second day today.

“What they were hoping for was to set up some sort of arrangement that never has to be used,” said Phyllis Reed, head of bond research in London at Kleinwort Benson, which manages about $32 billion. “The markets have sniffed that out and it seems like we’re heading back to square one.”

The Brookfield/General Growth affair is winding its way through court:

General Growth Properties Inc.’s proposal to exit bankruptcy with funding from Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has a clause that will give the company until the end of the year to complete a takeover deal with another party, according to two people with knowledge of the plan.

The provision would give Chicago-based General Growth time to explore a takeover bid from Simon Property Group Inc., whose $10 billion offer was turned down by its rival last month. Simon is preparing a new bid, according to a person with knowledge of that plan. Brookfield’s plan is subject to the approval of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper, who gave General Growth an Aug. 26 deadline to control its case.

Citigroup has spent a lot of money upgrading its algorithmic trading software:

Citigroup Inc. is overhauling its platform of trading strategies in an attempt to grow its share of U.S. equities from 14 percent, according to Young Kang, global head of algorithmic products at the firm.

A global group of 20 quantitative analysts and more than 50 developers, overseen by Kang, built the algorithms and the technology supporting the new platform, which has been used on Citigroup’s cash equities and program trading desks. The strategies have been tested in recent months by some hedge funds and institutional clients.

Citigroup is also making changes to ColorBook, the smart router from Lava Trading, a unit within the broker, to execute orders faster. Smart routers are used by brokers to craft an execution strategy for the smaller orders generated once an algorithm or trading desk has decided how to transact a stock.

ColorBook currently executes orders in 700 microseconds, or 0.0007 second, Swanson said. The firm is trying to reduce that to 200 microseconds.

There is as yet no word on the take-up of the WFS warrants, which expired today out of the money, or regarding the SBN warrants, likewise.

Volume was highly elevated again today as the Canadian preferred share market staggered into quarter end. PerpetualDiscounts were down 35bp while FixedResets lost 38bp to take the yield on the latter index back above 3.50%, to 3.55%. The only winner in the performance highlights is W.PR.H, which is merely a dead-cat bounce from yesterday.

The yield on PerpetualDiscounts is now 6.16%, equivalent to 8.62% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.8%, having achieved a total return of +88bp on the month and +5.02% on the year-to-date, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 285bp, a sharp increase from the 265bp reported March 24 and getting very close to their one-year high in the low 290s.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.56 % 2.61 % 57,956 20.98 1 0.2273 % 2,162.1
FixedFloater 4.93 % 3.05 % 49,216 20.11 1 0.2272 % 3,207.1
Floater 1.89 % 1.65 % 48,457 23.45 4 0.5562 % 2,436.5
OpRet 4.84 % 3.35 % 109,163 0.16 12 -0.0711 % 2,310.7
SplitShare 6.38 % 5.08 % 139,530 0.08 2 -0.2853 % 2,138.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0711 % 2,112.9
Perpetual-Premium 6.00 % 6.08 % 124,177 13.73 7 -0.1386 % 1,859.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.09 % 6.16 % 187,682 13.72 71 -0.3455 % 1,741.8
FixedReset 5.37 % 3.55 % 381,165 3.65 43 -0.3771 % 2,196.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.51
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 160,848 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from anonymous at 28.22; RBC bought three blocks of 10,000 each from TD at 28.05. RBC crossed 40,200 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 119,398 RBC crossed 97,500 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 104,645 Nesbitt bought blocks of 20,000 and 16,400 from TD at 28.50, then crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.45
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 103,633 Nesbitt bought 10,000 each from National and anonymous at 28.25, followed by 10,000 from CIBC at 28.10. Desjardins bought 14,800 from TD at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 100,805 TD crossed 40,000 at 28.12, Nesbitt crossed 24,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.12
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 78,300 Nesbitt crossed 37,500 at 23.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Tranche Retention in the sub-prime CDO Market

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010

Bloomberg has a fascinating story today titled How Lou Lucido Let AIG Lose $35 Billion With Goldman Sachs CDOs.

Without having to ask AIG’s permission, firms such as TCW, hired to oversee funds called collateralized debt obligations, replaced maturing assets with junk that quickly went bad. Managers including Lucido said they didn’t realize how severe the mortgage crash would be and were called upon by CDO contracts to reinvest. At the same time, buying riskier assets could mean bigger paydays.

Lucido’s team, following criteria set by [under-writer] Goldman Sachs, changed almost one-third of the collateral in Davis Square III after the CDO’s creation in 2004, according to data compiled by Bloomberg from Moody’s Investors Service reports. The securities were mostly backed by the types of newer loans that are going bad at more than twice the rate of older ones. By November 2008, after U.S. taxpayers rescued AIG with a bailout that later swelled to $182.3 billion, even the highest-rated parts of Davis Square III had lost almost half their value.

When the Financial Products unit agreed to guarantee certain top-rated CDO pieces, it didn’t envision that assets added later could cause losses, according to a person with knowledge of AIG’s thinking who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to comment.

As long as managers adhered to investment criteria outlined in the prospectus, there was little AIG could do, according to Mark Herr, a spokesman for the insurer.

The tiniest slice, less than 1 percent in the case of Davis Square III, was made up of what’s called equity, which wasn’t rated by credit companies. Equity investors were paid only after everyone else. They received a higher return while the going was good because they took the most risk and were the first ones wiped out if borrowers quit paying their mortgages.

While Lucido said he didn’t own a stake in Davis Square III, he said he did have his own money riding on the equity pieces of some CDOs.

Goldman Sachs did own an equity stake in Davis Square III, according to Michael DuVally, a spokesman for the firm, who declined to say how much it was. Even so, the bank didn’t try to influence TCW’s investment decisions, DuVally said.

It didn’t have to. TCW was promised 20 percent of what was left over after equity investors got 10 percent returns, according to a Goldman Sachs sales pitch to potential equity investors dated September 2004. That was on top of its fee of 0.10 percent of the CDO’s assets, according to the prospectus.

[Andrey Krakovsky, chief investment officer at New York-based asset manager Tacticus Capital LLC,] said managers often owned equity pieces of CDOs and earned fees linked to their returns.

More than $16 billion of CDOs managed by TCW have defaulted, been liquidated or stopped paying some investors, according to RBS Securities Inc.

TCW now finds itself defending Gundlach’s team at the same time it’s suing him for having “no understanding or respect for the obligations of a fiduciary,” according to a complaint filed Jan. 7 in Los Angeles Superior Court.

It is unfortunate, but nowhere does the article discuss the track record records of the managers of these CDOs. Like so much other smiley-boy stuff, it prefers to talk about “experience”.

However, my point in highlighting this article has more to do with tranche-retention than investment management. Tranche retention has been both disparaged and and praised as a method for encouraging investment managers to think about what they’re doing; this article represents another small, but useful, point against the concept.

March 30, 2010

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010

RBC is expanding its US investment banking business:

RBC Capital Markets plans to be a top 10 investment bank in the U.S. by attracting business from American companies worth as much as $10 billion, five times larger than its traditional client base.

“Our goal over the next two to three years is to be top 10 in the U.S. market,” said Blair Fleming, who heads the U.S. investment-banking unit of Royal Bank of Canada in New York.

It’s an interesting strategy in light of the recent deprecation of earnings volatility.

Global corporates are doing well this quarter:

Corporate bonds are rallying for the fourth straight quarter, the longest streak since 2004, extending a record advance as 72 percent of companies beat analysts’ earnings expectations.

The securities returned 2.6 percent this quarter through March 30, following a 16.3 percent gain in 2009, according to a Bank of America Merrill Lynch index. The extra yield, or spread, investors demand to own corporate bonds fell 0.26 percentage point since year-end relative to benchmarks to 1.5 percentage points as of yesterday, the narrowest since November 2007.

Company debt rallied on signs the global economy is improving, with U.S. consumer confidence gaining in March and corporate defaults declining from record levels. Borrowing costs declined to the lowest since 2005, spurring $730 billion of bond issuance globally this quarter, a 25 percent increase from the final period of last year.

The Canadian DEX Universe All Corporate Bond Index is up 2.06% year-to-date.

Volume soared today in the Canadian preferred share market in a rush for the exits … quarter-end window dressing? PerpetualDiscounts were clobbered, losing 67bp, while FixedResets were not immune to the downdraft, losing 28bp. A lengthy performance highlights list is comprised entirely of losers

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.56 % 2.62 % 57,533 20.97 1 0.8249 % 2,157.2
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.06 % 51,108 20.09 1 0.0000 % 3,199.9
Floater 1.90 % 1.67 % 49,981 23.41 4 0.3153 % 2,423.0
OpRet 4.84 % 3.28 % 108,864 0.33 12 -0.0646 % 2,312.4
SplitShare 6.37 % 4.84 % 137,973 0.08 2 -0.0877 % 2,144.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0646 % 2,114.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.99 % 6.05 % 123,990 13.76 7 -0.3578 % 1,861.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.07 % 6.14 % 183,434 13.74 71 -0.6720 % 1,747.8
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.40 % 369,864 3.66 43 -0.2786 % 2,205.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -4.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -4.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.23
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 23.89
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.86
Evaluated at bid price : 19.86
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.23
Evaluated at bid price : 19.23
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.57
Evaluated at bid price : 21.86
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.22
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 18.83
Evaluated at bid price : 18.83
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.67
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater 153,500 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 23.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 1.61 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 127,322 CIBC bought 27,000 from National at 28.25; RBC bought 10,000 from GMP at 28.20. RBC then crossed 50,000 at 28.28.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.22
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 86,776 Nesbitt bought 50,000 from National at 28.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.11
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 86,655 RBC crossed 10,000 at 28.30; Nesbitt bought two blocks of 11,000 each from anonymous at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.10
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 61,439 RBC bought 10,000 from Scotia at 28.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.24
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 55,703 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
There were 71 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Irish Bank Capital Requirements Skyrocket

Tuesday, March 30th, 2010

The Irish Financial Regulator has announced new capital requirements after its Prudential Capital Assessment Review:

A target level of 8% core tier 1 capital should be attained after taking account of the realisation of future expected losses and other financial developments under a base case scenario. This test is designed to ensure the credit institutions are capitalised to a level which reflects prudential requirements and current market expectations, after taking account of forecast loan losses through to 2012. As a further prudent requirement, the capital used to meet the base case target must be principally in the form of equity, the highest quality form of capital, with 7% equity as the target level. In calculating the requirements, individually specified amounts have been added to the institutions’ estimates of expected losses to take account of the uncertainty of loss forecasts for particular portfolios.

A target level of 4% core tier 1 capital that should be maintained to meet a stress scenario or a portfolio level sensitivity analysis. This capital test, which is similar to that employed by US and UK supervisory authorities, is designed to ensure the credit institutions have a sufficient capital buffer to withstand losses under an adverse scenario significantly worse than currently anticipated.

This, together with worse than expected valuations of their loan books, has resulted in enormous capital requirement numbers:

Ireland’s banks may need at least 31.8 billion euros ($42.7 billion) in new capital after a real- estate slump left them crippled by mounting bad loans.

The fund-raising requirement was announced after the National Asset Management Agency, the country’s so-called bad bank, said it will apply an average discount of 47 percent on the first block of loans it is buying from lenders, and the financial regulator set new capital targets. The discount compares with the government’s initial 30 percent estimate.

Irish banks were last discussed on PrefBlog in the post Why weren’t Irish Banks Resilient?

Boston Fed Releases 2H09 Research Review

Monday, March 29th, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released the Research Review July 2009 – December 2009 with summaries of:

Public Policy Discussion Papers:

  • Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization
  • Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from a Lender Cutoff Rule
  • Reinvigorating Springfield’s Economy: Lessons from Resurgent Cities
  • Did Easy Credit Lead to Overspending? Home Equity Borrowing and Household Behavior in the Early 2000s
  • A TIPS Scorecard: Are TIPS Accomplishing What They Were Supposed to Accomplish? Can They Be Improved?
  • Impending Spending Bust? The Role of Housing Wealth as Borrowing Collateral
  • The 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice
  • Jobs in Springfield, Massachusetts: Understanding and Remedying the Causes of Low Resident Employment Rates

The TIPS paper has been discussed on PrefBlog.

Working Papers

  • Trends in U.S. Family Income Mobility, 1967–2004
  • Real Estate Brokers and Commission: Theory and Calibrations
  • Efficient Organization of Production: Nested versus Horizontal Outsourcing
  • Estimating the Border Effect: Some New Evidence
  • Social and Private Learning with Endogenous Decision Timing
  • Housing and Debt Over the Life Cycle and Over the Business Cycle
  • Financial Leverage, Corporate Investment, and Stock Returns
  • Inflation Persistence
  • Closed-Form Estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with Time-Varying Trend Inflation
  • Estimating Demand in Search Markets: The Case of Online Hotel Bookings
  • Multiple Selves in Intertemporal Choices
  • The Valuation Channel of External Adjustment
  • Productivity, Welfare, and Reallocation: Theory and Firm-Level Evidence
  • State-Dependent Pricing and Optimal Monetary Policy
  • Seeds to Succeed? Sequential Giving to Public Projects

Public Policy Briefs

  • A Proposal to Help Distressed Homeowners: A Government Payment-Sharing Plan

March 29, 2010

Monday, March 29th, 2010

I was flattered and amused to read on the Feldsparia blog:

The February 3, 2010 edition of the Report on Business had this image of James Hymas, actually the image above is cropped from a larger photo that appeared in the physical paper, in a article about preferred shares, An investor with a preference for preferreds. What I found interesting is that everything in the photograph, the man at the desk with flowing beard, the desk, the Persian carpet, the fireplace, the suit look as through they are from 1899. When I asked several people to point out what doesn’t belong it woulkd take them a while to find the laptop.

And I am pleased to report that I did not go insane on September 24, 2007. Readers will recall that I asked:

Does the phrase “Abu Dhabi Honeymoon” ring a bell with anybody besides me? I was convinced it was a movie title, but it’s not listed on IMDB. Maybe it was a fake movie that the Flintstones went to see, or something? Please help!

Well, I have now discovered that it isn’t “Abu Dhabi Honeymoon”, it’s Aba Daba Honeymoon. And it’s not a movie, it’s a song; which has been charmingly covered. So my memory was a little off, sure, but that’s a lot better than being completely nuts.

Greece will offer 7-year debt at 336bp over Bunds:

Greece will price the 5 billion euros ($6.7 billion) of seven-year bonds to yield 310 basis points more than the benchmark mid-swap rate, according to a banker involved in the transaction, who declined to be identified before the sale is completed.

The bonds’ 6 percent yield equates to about 336 basis points more than seven-year German bunds, Europe’s benchmark government securities. That compares with a yield premium, or spread, of 61 basis points for similar-maturity Spanish debt and 114 basis points on Portugal’s government bonds due 2017, according to composite prices on Bloomberg. Italy’s seven-year bonds yield 45 basis points more than bunds, the prices show.

“Greece’s borrowing costs exceed those of Spain and Portugal as it still needs to convince the market that it can roll over existing debt,” said Michiel De Bruin, who will probably buy the securities for the $28 billion of assets he helps manage as head of euro government bonds at F&C Investments in Amsterdam. “Only then is it likely that borrowing costs will fall.”

Union Bank of Singapore had some good results from fixed-income trading:

UBS AG generated about $2.3 billion of revenue at its fixed-income division in the first quarter as Switzerland’s biggest bank rebuilt the unit following record losses, people with knowledge of the situation said.

UBS may have revenue of almost $1 billion from credit alone, said the people, who declined to be identified because the figures haven’t been publicly released. UBS hired about 350 people at its fixed-income unit, which includes emerging markets and foreign exchange, in the past 12 months.

The performance would mark a reversal of fortune for the bank’s debt unit, which was responsible for most of the $57.5 billion in writedowns and losses during the credit crisis. Zurich-based UBS had a loss of 1.97 billion Swiss francs ($1.85 billion) from fixed-income sales and trading in the first quarter of 2009, the company reported.

Let’s hope – for our own well-being, if not theirs – that they remember they’re traders, not investors!

A poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 23bp and FixedResets down 15bp, but volume continued to be heavy – particularly for FixedResets, which scored a shut-out on the volume highlights table, possibly aided by the announcement of a new BNS FixedReset 3.85%+100 issue.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.59 % 2.66 % 59,676 20.93 1 2.3730 % 2,139.5
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.06 % 50,131 20.09 1 -0.6321 % 3,199.9
Floater 1.91 % 1.68 % 46,189 23.36 4 0.3285 % 2,415.4
OpRet 4.84 % 3.21 % 108,372 0.58 12 0.0744 % 2,313.9
SplitShare 6.36 % 5.08 % 136,786 0.08 2 -0.0219 % 2,146.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0744 % 2,115.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.96 % 6.03 % 120,026 13.71 7 -0.1891 % 1,868.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.02 % 6.08 % 180,141 13.81 71 -0.2288 % 1,759.6
FixedReset 5.34 % 3.39 % 363,804 3.66 43 -0.1480 % 2,211.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 18.61
Evaluated at bid price : 18.61
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 23.58
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.02
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.82
Bid-YTW : 2.66 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 131,637 RBC crossed 35,000 at 28.32; CIBC bought 13,400 from National at 28.30. Scotia solde 12,100 to RBC at 28.29 and 19,900 to Nesbitt at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.27
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 94,175 RBC crossed 43,000 at 28.34 and bought 10,000 from National at the same price. National sold 16,300 to CIBC at 28.34, then RBC crossed 39,700 at the same price again. Finally, RBC bought 12,000 from National at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.28
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 73,143 RBC crossed 39,700 at 28.34 and bought 12,000 from National at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.27
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 70,064 RBC crossed 39,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.11
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 63,603 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-29
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 51,316 Nesbitt bought 25,000 from National at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.25
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

New Issue: BNS FixedReset 3.85%+100

Monday, March 29th, 2010

The Bank of Nova Scotia has announced:

a domestic public offering of 10 million non-cumulative 3.85% 5-year rate reset preferred shares Series 30 (the “Preferred Shares Series 30”) at a price of $25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of $250 million.

Holders of Preferred Shares Series 30 will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly fixed dividend for the initial period ending April 25, 2015 yielding 3.85% per annum, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a rate equal to 1.00% over the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield. Holders of Preferred Shares Series 30 will, subject to certain conditions, have the right to convert all or any part of their shares to non-cumulative floating rate preferred shares Series 31 (the “Preferred Shares Series 31”) of Scotiabank on April 26, 2015 and on April 26 every five years thereafter.

Holders of the Preferred Shares Series 31 will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly floating dividend at a rate equal to the 3-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 1.00%, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank. Holders of Preferred Shares Series 31 will, subject to certain conditions, have the right to convert all or any part of their shares to Preferred Shares Series 30 on April 26, 2020 and on April 26 every five years thereafter.

The Bank has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series 30 to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc. on a bought deal basis. The Bank has granted to the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 2 million Preferred Shares Series 30 at closing, which option is exercisable by the underwriters any time up to 48 hours before closing.

Closing is expected to occur on or after April 12, 2010. This domestic public offering is part of Scotiabank’s ongoing and proactive management of its Tier 1 capital structure.

Plus-100 is an awfully skinny spread against five-year Canadas and I suspect – basically for the first time, when it comes to bank FixedResets – that this really is intended to be perpetual money.

It is somewhat amusing that BNS is the first bank in a long while to be offering FixedResets – their brokerage arm has been insisting that no such issuance is likely due to proposed Tier 1 rules – an assertion I never understood.

Update: Using the Break-Even Rate Shock Calculator with values of 5.91% yield on BNS Straights and a 5-year term to reset, the Break-Even Rate Shock for this issue is a stunning 318bp.

BSD.PR.A Mails Extraordinary Motion Paperwork

Sunday, March 28th, 2010

Brascan Soundvest Rising Distribution Split Trust has released via SEDAR the materials for the Extraordinary Meeting of Capital Unitholders previously reported on PrefBlog.

Sadly, it appears that no material change in the management of the fund can be expected – it is merely a name change and ownership shuffle. It appears that Kevin Charlebois, who has presided over the appallingly poor performance of the trust since inception, will continue his endeavors.

Two elements of the reorganization not previously reported are:

(b) removing the fixed termination date for the Fund, which is currently set at March 31, 2015;

(c) permitting the Manager, in its sole discretion, to wind-up the Fund should the net asset value (“NAV”) of the Fund fall below $15 million, subject to compliance with the trust indenture between the Fund and CIBC Mellon Trust Company dated March 16, 2005 governing the 6% Preferred Securities (the “Trust Indenture”);

The second of those items is of great interest since:

The Fund was launched in 2005 with a mandate to deliver a stable stream of monthly distributions and to maximize long-term total return. As of March 12, 2010, the Fund had 5,662,643 Units and 5,662,643 Preferred Securities outstanding, and its total NAV was $17,211,757 or $3.04 per Unit. The Fund’s Units closed at $2.36 on the TSX on March 12, 2010.

While the manager’s abuse of discretion in suspending the annual retraction does not provide a lot of hope that they will exercise their discretion to shut down the fund in the event of continued poor performance, the availability of that discretion must be considered a Good Thing.

RY.PR.R Bid at under 3% Yield

Friday, March 26th, 2010

I’m not entirely sure that this is the first time it’s happened, because I don’t keep track of such things … but at the very least, it’s one of the first times this has happened!

RY.PR.R is a 6.25%+450 FixedReset, announced 2009-1-21. It is callable 2014-2-24 at par and was most recently mentioned in the volume highlights for 2010-3-22.

It traded 5,593 shares today in a range of 28.24-43 before closing at 28.31-40, 20×35.

HIMIPref™ reports that the yield to a call 2014-3-26 at par is now 2.93% (pre-tax, bond-equivalent); recall that a slight inaccuracy in HIMIPref™ conventions means that the calculated call date is maturityNoticePeriod days after the actual call date.

That’s a pretty low yield! The reset to +450bp makes it almost certain to be called at the first opportunity, but one of the words that can hurt in the investment game is “almost”!

I have uploaded two charts for your edification and amusement:

RY.PR.R was last mentioned on PrefBlog (other than in routine reports) when it was added to TXPR in July 2009. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is a member of the FixedReset index.