Archive for September, 2012

MAPF Portfolio Composition: September 2012

Sunday, September 30th, 2012

Turnover was almost non-existent in September, falling to about 2%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to disappear for most practical purposes.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 28 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-9-28
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 10.1% (+0.1) 5.10% 5.43
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 19.8% (-0.1) 2.30% 1.59
Deemed-Retractible 61.8% (+1.2) 5.09% 7.47
Scraps (Various) 8.0% (-0.6) 6.22% 11.54
Cash 0.3% (-0.6) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.61% 6.40
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-9-28
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 54.0% (+0.7)
Pfd-2(high) 27.6% (+0.4)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.1% (+0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 0.3% (-1.2)
Pfd-3 3.1% (+1.0)
Pfd-4(high) 0.6% (0)
Pfd-4 2.6% (0)
Pfd-4(low) 1.4% (0)
Pfd-5(low) 0% (-0.3)
Cash 0.3% (-0.6)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-8-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 13.7% (+8.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 1.1% (-8.4)
$100,000 – $200,000 49.2% (-3.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 26.2% (+3.0)
>$300,000 9.5% (+0.5)
Cash 0.3% (-0.6)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

September 28, 2012

Friday, September 28th, 2012

There’s renewed grumbling about currency manipulation:

The new idea in trade negotiations is an old idea: punish currency manipulation.

Avery Shenfeld, chief economist at CIBC World Markets, said Thursday in a new commentary that currency policy should be included in any new free-trade agreements.

“Free trade, but free currencies as well,” Mr. Shenfeld wrote. “Trade may be liberalized, but are the exchange rates that set relative prices and costs also going to have their shackles removed? If not, the free market will be anything but free.”

Mr. Shenfeld says that since 2007, international investors have purchased Canadian-dollar bonds worth $280-billion, compared with $65-billion over the previous five years.

That demand is partly explained by a healthy appetite for AAA-rated securities. But international investors also are buying Canada because they are being pushed out of other markets by interventionist central banks. Canada’s dollar is among the most overvalued in the world, Mr. Shenfeld said, citing calculations by the International Monetary Fund.

I can’t agree that great excitement is required over currency manipulation. Just as security price manipulation gives rise to exploitable opportunities for fundamental investors, so does currency manipulation allow consumers and cross-border purchasers to make a killing. If the Chinese want to sell me $1.00 worth of goods for $0.50, I say ‘Fine! Back up the truck!’

On a related note, Spend-Every-Penny has realized it’s good to lock in low yields for longer terms:

The Honourable Jim Flaherty, Minister of Finance, today highlighted adjustments to the debt strategy plan for 2012–13. These adjustments include the temporary reallocation of short-term bond issuance towards long-term bonds.

Since the release of the 2012–13 Debt Management Strategy, published as part of Budget 2012, long-term interest rates have continued to fall and remain near historically low levels.

“Given this environment, it is both advantageous and prudent for our Government to lock in additional long-term funding,” said the Minister. “These adjustments help us meet our goal of raising stable and low-cost funding to meet the financial needs of our Government to best serve taxpayers.”

Further details are provided in the Notice accompanying the Quarterly Bond Schedule on the Bank of Canada website.

The Bank of Canada highlights:

As an extension of the plan outlined in the Debt Management Strategy for 2012-13 to lock in funding at attractive rates, the Government plans to reallocate short-term bond issuance toward long-term bonds. Consequently, for the remainder of 2012-13, the following changes are planned:

Bond Auctions
•10-year bonds – one additional auction will be held in the last quarter of 2012-13;
•30-year nominal bonds – one additional auction will be held, resulting in a total of four auctions in 2012-13; and
•The size of 10-year and 30-year nominal bond auctions may be increased, subject to market conditions.

Regular Bond Buyback Program
•30-year bond buyback operations on a cash basis – operations will be halted for the remainder of 2012-13; and
•30-year bond buyback operations on a switch basis – one additional operation will be conducted in the last quarter of 2012-13.

In all other respects, the implementation of the medium-term debt strategy, announced in Budget 2011, will continue. The adjustments to the debt strategy outlined above will be monitored and, if necessary, modified to ensure that the market for Government of Canada securities continues to function well.

The problem with the Bank of Canada’s debt management process is that the planning horizon is only ten years. This reduces the advantage of issuing long bonds relative to a more rational thirty-year planning horizon.

It looks like there’s a little bit of profit-taking in the junk bond market:

Speculative-grade bonds in the U.S. are poised for their biggest weekly loss since May as buyers withdraw money from domestic funds that buy the debt for the first time in more than three months.

The securities lost 0.6 percent this week through yesterday after gains in the five previous periods, Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data show. Funds that buy the notes reported $5 million of outflows, with investors pulling $65 million from exchange-traded funds, according to a Sept. 27 Bank of America Corp. (BAC) report.

Yields on speculative-grade bonds closed at 7.125 percent yesterday, up from a record low 6.948 percent reached on Sept. 19 as an unexpected drop in demand for U.S. durable goods other than transportation signaled a slowdown in business investment and exports. Investors sold the debt as concern mounted that the European Central Bank’s current bailout funds would be insufficient to prevent a sovereign default.

“There was legitimate selling for the first time,” said Timothy Gramatovich, chief investment officer at Peritus Asset Management LLC. “This is the first week in recent memory that we actually saw bonds offered out there.”

Investors yanked 3.9 million shares, worth about $157 million, from State Street Corp.’s ETF that buys junk bonds on Sept. 27, the biggest outflow since May 21, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. U.S. high-yield bond funds reported net withdrawals of $310 million, the first decline after 13 consecutive weeks of inflows, according to Lipper.

The regulatory pretense of concern over LIBOR has had its intended effect:

Oversight of Libor will be handed to the U.K.’s financial regulator, and dozens of the currencies and maturities that make up the benchmark axed, under proposals designed to revive confidence in a rate tarnished by scandal.

The British Bankers’ Association should be stripped of the responsibility for managing the rate and other organizations invited to replace it, Financial Services Authority Managing Director Martin Wheatley said in London today. More than 100 Libor rates tied to currencies and maturities where there isn’t enough trading data to set them properly should be scrapped, and a code of conduct introduced for how lenders contribute to the benchmark backed by criminal penalties, he added

“Governance of Libor has completely failed,” Wheatley said as he unveiled a report on the future of Libor. “This problem has been exacerbated by a lack of regulation and a comprehensive mechanism to punish those who manipulate the system.”

The FSA should receive greater powers to vet bankers who contribute to the rate, according to Wheatley, who will become the chief executive officer of the Financial Conduct Authority, when the FSA splits into two agencies next year.

The “first priority” of Libor’s new administrator will be to create a code of conduct for rate submitters with specific guidelines that the submissions be corroborated by trade data, he said.

“Transactions will need to be recorded and there needs to be a requirement for regular external audit of submitting firms,” Wheatley said.

The Bank of Canada has released a completely unconvincing discussion paper by David Xiao Chen, H. Evren Damar, Hani Soubra and Yaz Terajima titled Canadian Bank Balance-Sheet Management: Breakdown by Types of Canadian Financial Institutions. My hackles rose as early as the third paragraph:

Our main findings regarding the first objective are summarized as follows. First, risk indicators have decreased during the past three decades for most non‐Big Six financial institutions, and have remained relatively unchanged for the Big Six banks. As a result, a divergence between non‐Big Six and the Big Six banks is observed, especially in leverage and capital ratios. Second, heterogeneity among non‐Big Six financial institutions has increased, especially in capital and funding ratios. The observed overall decline and increased heterogeneity in the risk indicators follow certain regulatory changes, such as the introduction of liquidity guidelines on funding in 1995 and the implementation of bank‐specific leverage requirements in 2000. This suggests that regulatory changes have had significant and heterogeneous effects on the management of balance sheets by financial institutions and, given that these regulations required more balance‐sheet risk management, they contributed to the increased resilience of the banking sector.

Excuse me? Isn’t that last line a bit of circular reasoning? Regulating funding and leverage certainly had an effect on funding and leverage. Whether this has any connection with “resilience” is another matter entirely, one that is not addressed in the paper.

The mystery is resolved in the concluding statements:

The resilience of the Canadian financial system could be attributed to the conservatism and prudent approach of its regulatory bodies. Over the past couple of decades, Canadian banks were resilient to several financial stresses that, for the most part, originated outside Canada’s borders. More
recently, at the onset of the 2007 financial crisis, while many international foreign banks faced difficulties and required public capital injections and debt guarantees, the Canadian financial system did not require any public assistance or experience any bank failures. It has been argued that this was due in large part to the tighter regulatory ratios set by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), which exceeded international minimums. Potentially more important is OSFI’s regulatory approach based on individual financial institutions. A part of the observed heterogeneity in balance‐sheet ratios among Canadian banks is likely attributable to this.

OK, so the purpose of the paper was to evangelize OSFI-worship. Next!

The Canadian preferred share market closed the month and quarter with a good day: Perpetual premiums won 18bp, FixedResets gained 7bp and DeemedRetractibles were up 2bp. Volatility was average. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4917 % 2,449.5
FixedFloater 4.42 % 3.80 % 35,785 17.68 1 0.0466 % 3,601.2
Floater 2.99 % 3.01 % 59,265 19.69 3 -0.4917 % 2,644.8
OpRet 4.66 % 3.35 % 54,048 1.44 4 -0.1726 % 2,550.4
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.91 % 73,317 4.56 3 0.1191 % 2,822.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1726 % 2,332.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.07 % 93,565 0.40 28 0.1777 % 2,299.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.91 % 4.88 % 105,397 15.69 3 0.2625 % 2,578.7
FixedReset 4.96 % 2.95 % 176,613 4.03 72 0.0687 % 2,436.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.48 % 124,996 1.06 46 0.0194 % 2,375.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -3.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.23 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 149,445 National crossed blocks of 50,000 and 19,800 at 25.75; they also bought blocks of 47,100 and 22,700 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 125,845 Scotia bought 13,400 from RBC at 26.95; TD crossed two blocks of 50,000 each at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 1.87 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 87,095 Scotia bought 77,800 from RBC at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.54
Bid-YTW : 1.89 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 86,580 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-28
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 72,726 National crossed 30,000 at 25.93, then bought 39,200 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 72,176 RBC sold 48,100 to Scotia at 26.48, then crossed 19,100 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.49
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 23.20 – 24.05
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.5704

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.27 – 51.89
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.3999

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.27
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %

BNA.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 24.10 – 24.43
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2029

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.30 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1744

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -11.74 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.47 – 26.88
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3259

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.47
Bid-YTW : 1.14 %

BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.58 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1404

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %

Omega Preferred Equity Fund to be Closed to New Investors

Friday, September 28th, 2012

National Bank Securities has announced:

the Omega Preferred Equity Fund’s closure to new investors as of September 30, 2012. The closure of the Omega Preferred Equity Fund will allow the fund’s portfolio manager (Intact Investment Management Inc.) to continue applying its current investment philosophy. After the fund’s closure to new investors, the fund will continue to be available to existing investors, and shall also remain available to certain other investors, including funds that are managed by NBSI or its affiliates.

“The Omega Preferred Equity Fund was launched in 2007 and has proven to be a superior investment product for investors looking for stable distributions of tax-efficient dividend income” said Michel Falk, President of NBSI. The fund has grown steadily in size since its inception, recently surpassing $470 million in assets under management.

NBSI will be launching the Altamira Preferred Equity Fund for new investors seeking dividend income and capital preservation. This fund will aim to invest in a diversified portfolio of dividend-paying preferred equities.

A preliminary simplified prospectus relating to the Altamira Preferred Equity Fund has been filed with the Canadian securities authorities. Units of the Altamira Preferred Equity Fund cannot be acquired until the relevant securities authorities issue receipts for the simplified prospectus of the fund. Please read the prospectus before investing. There may be commissions, trailing commissions, management fees and expenses associated with mutual fund investments. Mutual funds are not guaranteed, their values change frequently and past performance may not be repeated.

Essentially, this means that National has decided that all new money will be managed in-house. It will be remembered that National Bank owns Altamira.

I can’t find anything about “Altamira Preferred” on SEDAR.

September 27, 2012

Friday, September 28th, 2012

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission member Daniel Gallagher is favourably disposed towards a floating NAV for money-market funds:

Requiring money funds to have a fluctuating share price “is an attractive option that I am likely to support,” Gallagher, a Republican, said in an interview.

Gallagher said he couldn’t vote for Schapiro’s plan because its centerpiece was to make the funds hold extra capital. The cushion was too small to protect investors, Gallagher said, leading him to believe the money would be used as collateral in case the funds needed to borrow from the Federal Reserve.

Schapiro has argued that the funds’ $1 share price encourages investors to flee at the first sign of trouble. That’s because those who react quickly can sell their shares at $1 each even if the net asset value has dropped below that level.

The industry has maintained that a floating share price would make money funds unworkable for many investors by saddling them with new accounting and tax obligations. In addition, insurers, municipalities and other large users of money funds are often legally bound to invest assets they account for as cash in funds with a stable share price.

Schapiro gave up on her plan on Aug. 22 after three of the five commissioners — Republicans Gallagher and Troy Paredes, joined by Democrat Luis Aguilar — told her they wouldn’t vote to issue it for public comment. Her proposal spelled out two options, the capital cushion coupled with some restrictions on redemptions, or the floating share price.

On Aug. 28, Gallagher and Paredes said they supported an alternative that would allow firms running money funds to prohibit withdrawals to stop investor flight in the event of a run. They backed Aguilar’s call for further study on whether new rules could cause investors to move money from money-market funds to other unregulated investments.

In the interview, Gallagher said his support of a floating share price was contingent on the SEC “fully understanding and addressing” the tax and accounting issues that could arise with the change. Gallagher said a fluctuating share price may need to be coupled with other protections, such as the freezing redemptions option that he and Paredes had suggested.

If anybody knows what the ‘capital used as collateral’ idea is all about, please let me know, because I haven’t the faintest notion regarding what is being implied. I think the redemption freeze idea is just plain stupid.

I am advised of a government checklist for choosing investment advisors:

Does your financial professional try to “time” the market?
•Financial professionals cannot forecast market changes successfully on a consistent basis. For most people, changing strategies or buying and selling investments frequently will just result in higher costs and more losses. The right financial strategy should do well without frequent changes, in good markets and bad.

Now, I’m not much of a fan of market timing, but nevertheless this seems a bit overreaching to me. We have a government agency pronouncing officially on the relative merits of investment strategies? It’s actually a little scary!

Good fiscal news federally, not so much provincially:

Ottawa’s cost-cutting measures have put it on a sound fiscal track for the future, but the provinces are left holding the bag, says Canada’s budget watchdog.

Mr. Page also judges the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan fiscally sound.

But the report, released Thursday, shows provinces and municipalities adding so much debt over the next 70 years or so they would resemble Greece and Italy if something is not done.

The report calculates that provinces and their municipalities have a fiscal gap of about 2 per cent of gross domestic product now – or $36-billion – and by 2086 will have debt worth 350 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, Ottawa will be in a structural surplus.

While he has been critical of the Harper government in the past for failing to acknowledge it was in a structural deficit several years ago – for which he took personal blow-back – Mr. Page said Ottawa has acted to rectify the situation.

In the past two years, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty put a limit to growth on health transfers to provinces, essentially froze program spending for five years, and raised the age of eligibility for benefits under Old Age Security to 67 from 65.

The change in health transfers alone is responsible for about three-quarters of the provincial fiscal gap, Mr. Page says, or about $25-billion in fiscal room.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 4bp, FixedResets winning 19bp and DeemedRetractibles up 12bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0567 % 2,461.6
FixedFloater 4.42 % 3.80 % 36,221 17.68 1 0.7977 % 3,599.6
Floater 2.98 % 2.99 % 54,840 19.73 3 -0.0567 % 2,657.9
OpRet 4.65 % 3.25 % 54,039 0.71 4 0.3561 % 2,554.8
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.90 % 73,181 4.56 3 0.0000 % 2,818.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3561 % 2,336.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 2.45 % 94,382 1.02 28 0.0414 % 2,295.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.92 % 4.91 % 105,571 15.67 3 0.0783 % 2,572.0
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.06 % 173,154 4.03 72 0.1882 % 2,435.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.93 % 3.54 % 122,425 1.12 46 0.1197 % 2,375.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 237,088 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-27
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 144,644 TD crossed 129,400 at 25.20; Scotia crossed 10,600 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-27
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 46,279 TD bought 38,400 from Nesbitt at 25.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 43,981 RBC sold 20,000 to Scotia at 26.94, then crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 1.91 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 36,262 RBC crossed 34,300 at 26.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 1.10 %
CM.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 33,275 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 0.74 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.25 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2225

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.75 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1560

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-27
Maturity Price : 24.47
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.35 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2673

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : -14.16 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.27 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1190

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-27
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.64 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1440

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.67 – 25.86
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1404

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

September 26, 2012

Wednesday, September 26th, 2012

I’m all in favour of a cap on leverage at banks … but a leverage cap of 12.5:1 seems quite extreme:

Banks should be required to reduce by half the amount they can borrow against equity to make the financial system safer, according to former Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair.

Bair called for a “hard-and-fast” leverage ratio of 8 percent in “Bulls by the Horns,” her memoir of the financial crisis published this month. That’s double the 4 percent ratio U.S. banks must adhere to currently and more than twice the 3 percent called for by new global rules on bank capital.

Lenders could borrow about 13 times their equity, based on Bair’s suggestion, compared with 25 times under existing U.S. rules. Bair, 58, who stepped down from the FDIC last year, was a proponent of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introducing a simple leverage ratio, which ignores the riskiness of different loans in setting minimum capital requirements. While the Basel committee agreed on including such a ratio, European countries have balked at implementation.

The Basel committee narrowed the definition of what counts as capital. It also devised a method of tallying assets for calculating leverage ratio that puts aside the different accounting standards used in the U.S. and Europe. The new method would increase the balance sheets of U.S. banks because of differences in how derivatives are treated.

Using Basel’s narrower capital definition, the two largest U.S. banks would have to raise about $100 billion of capital to comply with Bair’s leverage recommendation. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) would have a leverage ratio of 5.8 percent under the new capital definition, and No. 2 Bank of America Corp.’s would be 5.9 percent. Neither bank has yet reported what their ratios would be under the new Basel method of calculating assets.

At some point, we’re going to be so safe that nothing happens. An unchanging world of tick-boxes … the regulators’ dream.

The CDHowe Institute has issued a plea for more RRBs – More RRBs, Please! Why Ottawa Should Issue More Inflation-Indexed Bonds:

This Commentary explores the potential impact of a larger RRB issue over the next five years than Ottawa currently plans. Rather than the $2.4 billion annually now planned, we suggest $7.2 billion annually. We further recommend that two-thirds of the larger RRB issue have 10-year maturities rather than the 30-year maturities exclusively issued to date. A plausible estimate of the net interest savings on federal debt comes to $200 million in 2016/17 and $500 million over the period until then. We canvass a number of ways the federal government can ensure that this higher RRB issue does not hurt the depth and liquidity of the market for its nominal debt.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 18bp, FixedResets down 5bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. Volatility was average. Volume was low.

PerpetualDiscounts (all three of them!) now yield 4.91%, equivalent to 6.38% interest. Long corporates now yield about 4.25% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 215bp, a sharp increase from the 200bp reported September 19.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3794 % 2,463.0
FixedFloater 4.46 % 3.83 % 36,644 17.61 1 -0.0469 % 3,571.1
Floater 2.98 % 2.99 % 55,432 19.73 3 0.3794 % 2,659.4
OpRet 4.67 % 3.37 % 53,378 1.45 4 -0.2304 % 2,545.7
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.89 % 71,815 4.56 3 0.1193 % 2,818.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2304 % 2,327.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.44 % 94,811 1.03 28 0.1760 % 2,294.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.91 % 4.91 % 104,855 15.66 3 0.2762 % 2,570.0
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.06 % 177,765 4.25 72 -0.0541 % 2,430.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.65 % 121,261 1.90 46 0.0088 % 2,372.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.95
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 91,570 Scotia crossed blocks of 20,000 and 50,000 at 25.20, and bought 10,000 from TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-26
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 56,460 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-26
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 55,650 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.16 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 49,205 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 44,687 TD crossed 29,800 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-26
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : -5.40 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 29,950 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.87
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 23.50 – 24.20
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4107

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.95 – 24.46
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3335

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.48 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2321

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %

MFC.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.42 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1998

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %

CM.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.35 – 26.66
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1941

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %

RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.07
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1715

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

SBC.PR.A Announces Term Extension Details

Wednesday, September 26th, 2012

Brompton Split Banc Corp has announced:

At a special meeting held on March 29, 2012, shareholders of Brompton Split Banc Corp. (the “Fund”) approved a special resolution to allow the Board of Directors to extend the term of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares for up to 5 years and to determine the distribution rates for the extended term. The Board of Directors is pleased to announce that it has approved a 5 year extension to the term of the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares to November 29, 2017. The Fund was originally scheduled to terminate on November 30, 2012. The distribution rate for the Fund’s Preferred Shares for this new 5 year term which commences on December 1, 2012 will be $0.45 per annum paid in equal quarterly amounts. The new Preferred Share distribution rate is based on current market rates for preferred shares with similar terms. The Preferred Share distribution for the quarter ended December 31, 2012 is expected to be $0.12493 per Preferred Share which takes into account the new distribution rate for December and the previous distribution rate for October and November. In addition, the Fund intends to maintain the targeted monthly Class A Share distribution at $0.10 per Class A Share.

The extension allows shareholders to continue to enjoy the benefit of the Fund’s portfolio of common shares of six Canadian Banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank. Canadian banks have stood out amongst their global peers as examples of stability over the long term and through the credit crisis. Canadian banks continue to have attractive dividend yields and return on equity. As well, the extension of the term of the Fund is not a taxable event and enables shareholders to defer potential capital gains tax liability that would have otherwise been realized on the redemption of the Class A Shares or Preferred Shares until such time as such shares are disposed of by shareholders.

In connection with the extension, those shareholders who do not wish to continue their investment in the Fund, may retract their Preferred Shares or Class A Shares on November 30, 2012 pursuant to a special retraction right and receive a retraction price that is calculated in the same way that such price would be calculated if the Fund were to terminate on November 30, 2012. The notice expiry for the special retraction is October 31, 2012 at 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time).

The favourable vote for the extension was reported on PrefBlog. SBC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with its semi-annual report for 12H1. The issue was recently confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS.

SBC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

September 25, 2012

Wednesday, September 26th, 2012

Charles Plosser of the Philiadelphia Fed outlined his opposition to QE3, including one very good point:

Continued expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet has other costs as well. By greatly expanding the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, the new asset-purchase program will exacerbate the challenges that the Fed will face when it comes time to exit this period of extraordinary accommodation, risking higher inflation and harm to the Fed’s reputation and credibility. I have been a student of monetary theory and policy for over 30 years. One constant is that central banks tend to find it easier to lower interest rates than to raise them. Moreover, identifying turning points is difficult even in the best of times, so timing the change in the direction of policy is always a challenge. But this time, exit will be even more complicated and risky. With such a large balance sheet, our transition from very accommodative policies to less accommodative policies will involve using tools we have not used before, such as the interest rate on reserves, term deposits, and asset sales. Once the recovery takes off, long rates will begin to rise and banks will begin lending the large volume of excess reserves sitting in their accounts at the Fed. This loan growth can be quite rapid, as was true after the banking crisis in the 1930s, and there is some risk that the Fed will need to withdraw accommodation very aggressively in order to contain inflation. At this point, it is impossible to know whether such asset sales will be disruptive to the market. A rapid tightening of monetary policy may also entail political risks for the Fed. We would likely be selling the longer maturity assets in our portfolio at a loss, meaning that we may be unable to make any remittances to the U.S. Treasury for some years. Yet, if we don’t tighten quickly enough, we could find ourselves far behind the curve in restraining inflation.

The SEC has hardened its stance that investing has nothing to do with fundamentals:

A New York-based brokerage allowed overseas clients to run a scheme aimed at distorting stock prices by rapidly canceling orders, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Clients of Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services were “repeatedly manipulating publicly traded stocks” by placing and erasing orders in an illegal strategy designed to trick others into buying or selling, the SEC said today in a release. Hold Brothers, its owners, and the foreign firms Trade Alpha Corporate Ltd. and Demonstrate LLC agreed to settle allegations that the New York broker failed to supervise customers and pay $4 million in total SEC fines.

The SEC complaint targeted practices that abused high-speed computer trading on American equity venues. As high-frequency activity has grown in recent years, the agency’s efforts to stop fraudulent practices such as “layering” or “spoofing” have extended to the automated trading tactics.

“The fairness principle that underlies the foundation of our markets demands that prices of securities accurately reflect a genuine supply of and demand for those securities,” Daniel M. Hawke, the chief of the SEC’s enforcement division’s market abuse unit, said in the statement. “The SEC will not tolerate any abusive practice that is designed to distort these natural forces.”

Bluffing is part of the trading game. A fundamental investor can often take advantage of the little boys’ games. But logic has no relevance to regulation.

The Kansas City Fed has a good review of deposit insurance:

The effect on the financial system of this emergency assistance and related risk-taking incentives is difficult to assess and measure. However, a unique circumstance in the 1930s provides an insight into how a piece of the federal safety net—federal deposit insurance—has altered the financial landscape. The vast majority of U.S. banks quickly became insured after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) began offering deposit insurance in 1934. Many state-chartered banks in Kansas, however, chose to remain uninsured. Why
did these Kansas banks think they could operate successfully without deposit insurance following the worst banking crisis in U.S. history?
Also, how did these banks differ from the banks that quickly adopted deposit insurance, and what might these differences tell us about
deposit insurance?

Another forthcoming article asks have cheques met their match?:

During the last decade, both demand-side and supply-side factors have contributed to a surge in new methods of making person-to-person (P2P) payments. On the demand side, the driving factors have been the emergence of new forums for commerce such as online auctions and the increasing desire by consumers to monitor and control payments. On the supply side, the main factors have been technological advancements such as faster Internet speeds, increased computing power and smartphones. Despite the surge in new P2P payment methods, studies show that consumers in the United States still prefer to make payments to other people with checks and cash. In fact, P2P payments by check are the only type of check payment that is still increasing. If consumers could be induced to use a digital alternative to P2P payments by cash and check, the efficiency and safety of the U.S. payments system might be enhanced.

It was a moderately good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 13bp, FixedResets gaining 4bp and DeemedRetractibles up 6bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume returned to low levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2663 % 2,453.7
FixedFloater 4.46 % 3.83 % 38,145 17.62 1 1.4755 % 3,572.8
Floater 2.99 % 3.00 % 56,206 19.71 3 0.2663 % 2,649.4
OpRet 4.66 % 3.29 % 53,606 1.45 4 0.0576 % 2,551.6
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.89 % 70,719 4.57 3 0.0663 % 2,815.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0576 % 2,333.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 3.03 % 93,128 1.02 28 0.1345 % 2,290.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.92 % 4.93 % 105,396 15.63 3 0.4718 % 2,562.9
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.07 % 178,915 4.30 72 0.0414 % 2,431.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.52 % 121,554 1.06 46 0.0671 % 2,372.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-25
Maturity Price : 22.13
Evaluated at bid price : 21.32
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 361,615 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-25
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 120,157 TD crossed 100,000 at 26.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 100,414 TD crossed 100,000 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 2.81 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 59,808 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 0.47 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 53,414 TD crossed 49,600 at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 2.28 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 31,993 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.15 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1407

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.12 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2782

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.40 – 25.65
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1625

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-25
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %

RY.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1629

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %

BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.01 – 27.19
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1108

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 0.39 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.36 – 25.55
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1316

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %

September 24, 2012

Tuesday, September 25th, 2012

US regulators are in disarray regarding the MetLife / GE Capital deal. It’s too complex to summarize, so you’ll have to read the whole article.

Financial Repression is alive and well … there may be many forced buyers of sovereigns:

Under Dodd-Frank, as well as under Europe’s new Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), asset management firms must abide but the same central clearing rules as the banks. For that reason, they will need a hefty amount of both cash and AAA-rated sovereign bonds to pledge as collateral. The problem, though, is that many of them aren’t ready for the new rules to be implemented in just a few months.

As the FT noted, a recent report from Moody’s projected that the collateral shortfall could fall between $700-billion (U.S.) and $1.2-trillion. Those figures are based on projections from places like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which is heavily engaged in swap clearing and estimates that its margins for interest rate swaps will be about 3 to 4 per cent for 10-year U.S. interest rate swaps and 9 to 10 per cent for a 30-year swap, according to Moody’s.

The fear is that once asset managers realize how big their collateral shortfall is, they’ll race out to buy things like Treasury bonds, which will push their yields even lower. Moody’s also worries that asset managers may put these bonds into segregated custodian accounts that prevent them from being re-used, effectively removing them from the market.

The Financial Times article is here; the Moody’s report is for subscribers only:

New over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulations will likely cause a surge in demand for liquid, high-quality government securities that are eligible as collateral to meet these requirements, says Moody’s Investors Service in a new Special Comment published today.

Increased collateral requirements for derivatives transactions will result in a sounder credit environment for the market as a whole; however, Moody’s says that lower yields on government securities resulting from their increased demand from regulatory requirements may lead to a shift in bond and money market fund allocations into riskier, lower credit-quality investments to seek higher yields.

The new report, entitled “Managed Funds: New OTC Regulations Will Boost Demand for Eligible Collateral” is now available on www.moodys.com. Moody’s subscribers can access this report via the link provided at the end of this press release.

Moody’s says that the regulations require central clearing for standardised derivatives and global standards on margins for uncleared trades. As the new regulations come into effect by the end of 2012, the demand for government securities will increase and exert downwards pressure on yields, which will lower returns for the funds that are mandated to invest in these securities.

Moody believes that the new regulations will exacerbate conditions that are already exerting pressure on yields, such as (i) government benchmark yields have fallen, some to negative territory, with a flight to quality; (ii) the supply of higher-rated investment-grade corporate, supranational and agency bonds remains limited; and (iii) the use of higher credit-quality corporate and agency bonds as eligible collateral is beginning to be seen in the market, although the level of usage remains low.

Canaccord, proud issuer of CF.PR.A and CF.PR.C is experiencing some difficulty:

Canaccord, one of Canada’s biggest independent securities dealers, is closing 16 branches and keeping 16. Canaccord is also cutting loose 35 advisory teams in the offices that remain. Toronto-based Canaccord lost about $6.5-million in the most recent quarter handling accounts for individuals, but will now “operate in a near break-even basis in current market conditions,” the firm said.

Canaccord was put on Trend-Negative by DBRS last December:

Benefiting from revenue and expense synergies associated with larger and more diversified operating platforms, the Company is well-positioned to grow its revenues and earnings substantially when the global capital markets stabilize. In the meantime, the more stable wealth management and advisory revenues of Collins Stewart add favourable diversification to the Company’s overall business risk profile, which otherwise remains concentrated in the small and mid-cap Canadian equity markets. While the Pfd-3 (low) rating with a Stable trend assigned to the Canaccord preferred shares in June 2011 took into account anticipated volatility associated with broker-dealers, this material acquisition in the current uncertain economic and market environment introduces an additional degree of risk that cannot be ignored. The ambiguity regarding longer-term take-out financing was also a consideration in assigning a Negative trend at this time.

AltaGas, proud issuer of ALA.PR.A, was confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the rating on the Medium-Term Notes (MTNs) and the Issuer Rating of AltaGas Ltd. (AltaGas or the Company) at BBB and on the Preferred Shares – Cumulative at Pfd-3, all with Stable trends. The confirmation reflects: (1) continuing progress on the Company’s goal to grow and diversify earnings and cash flow while reducing its business risk; (2) mitigation of cost overrun risks on its major growth projects and (3) a reasonable financing plan for the 2011 to 2014 growth phase, supported by strong liquidity.

On August 30, 2012, AltaGas acquired SEMCO Holding Corporation (SEMCO), the sole shareholder of SEMCO Energy, Inc., a regulated public utility company with natural gas distribution and storage operations in Michigan and Alaska (see DBRS press release dated February 1, 2012, for details). DBRS expects the overall impact of the acquisition on AltaGas’s credit profile to be modestly positive, with improvement in AltaGas’s business risk profile through the addition of relatively low-risk, regulated natural gas distribution and storage assets in Michigan and Alaska being partly offset by a negative impact on key credit metrics.

DBRS estimates that, with the SEMCO acquisition and related financing, combined with the $144 million common share offering completed on November 15, 2011, and the December 20, 2011, Pacific Northern Gas Ltd. (PNG) acquisition, total debt-to-capital ratio would rise from 47% as at September 30, 2011, to 55% on a pro forma basis as at June 30, 2012, and its cash flow-to-debt ratio would drop from 20% to 12%.

As noted previously, DBRS expects some deterioration in the Company’s key credit metrics during its growth phase from 2011 to 2014, with recovery expected toward the end of the period as cash shortfalls are to be primarily funded by debt. DBRS expects AltaGas to manage the construction period risks (e.g., cost overruns, completion delays, large financing requirements and potential deterioration of credit metrics) for all of its projects, and the PNG and SEMCO acquisitions, within the context of its current BBB rating and total debt-to-capital ratio in the low-to-mid-50% range, with cash flow-to-debt in the high-teens to low-20% range, as calculated by DBRS. If the Company’s ratios do not move closer to the above-noted ranges (from the pro forma levels) over the near to medium term, its credit ratings could come under negative pressure.

It was a mildly positive date for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 5bp, FixedResets winning 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. Volatility was negligible. Volume was high! Yes, high! It’s been a long time since it was last possible to say that!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1333 % 2,447.2
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.88 % 37,854 17.49 1 0.0000 % 3,520.8
Floater 3.00 % 3.00 % 56,894 19.71 3 0.1333 % 2,642.3
OpRet 4.66 % 3.41 % 53,091 1.45 4 0.1347 % 2,550.1
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.93 % 71,505 4.57 3 0.0796 % 2,813.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1347 % 2,331.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.83 % 93,257 1.02 28 0.0465 % 2,287.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.94 % 4.93 % 104,719 15.63 3 0.2783 % 2,550.8
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.06 % 179,694 4.26 72 0.0580 % 2,430.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.56 % 122,755 1.91 46 0.0255 % 2,370.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 101,251 National crossed 35,000 at 25.58; so did TD. Desjardins crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 64,345 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-24
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 63,400 National sold 19,000 to Nesbitt at 26.83 and crossed 29,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 2.45 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 47,541 RBC crossed 40,000 at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 47,238 RBC crossed 12,800 at 25.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 24,965 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-24
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.01 – 21.59
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4039

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-24
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.01 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2896

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.00 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3718

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 26.75 – 27.15
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2914

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %

SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.20 – 23.47
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1765

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %

PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.52 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1801

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : -8.02 %

September 21, 2012

Saturday, September 22nd, 2012

More regulation! It appears a Senate committee wants to ban hedging:

A U.S. Senate panel probing the multibillion-dollar trading loss by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) plans to unveil its findings at a hearing this year to press regulators to tighten the Volcker rule, according to three people briefed on the matter.

Staff members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, headed by Senator Carl Levin, have interviewed JPMorgan officials as well as examiners and supervisors at the institution’s regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the inquiry isn’t public.

One focus of the queries is whether JPMorgan’s wrong-way bets on derivatives would have been permitted under regulators’ initial draft of the Volcker ban on proprietary trading, the people said. The lender lost $5.8 billion on the trades in the first six months of the year.

Levin of Michigan and Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon, both Democrats, inserted the trading ban into the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, leaving the details largely up to regulators. The senators have said that the JPMorgan loss highlights a loophole in the regulators’ draft that would allow banks to continue hedging their portfolio risks, and they said it should be closed.

It will be interesting to see how far that goes. If you buy a big block of 29-year Treasuries from a client, will you be allowed to sell 30-year Treasuries to hedge? How about futures on 30-year Treasuries? My continuing question is – has anybody given the slightest thought to just where we’re going on all this? What does the perfect world look like? Or are things just going to be banned willy-nilly, on the grounds that more regulation is better regulation?

Canadian inflation is at low levels:

The Bank of Canada is running out of reasons to raise interest rates anytime soon.

Consumer prices rose 1.2 per cent in August from a year earlier, Statistics Canada reported Friday, compared with 1.3 per cent in July. That’s comfortably below the central bank’s target of 2 per cent. At the same time, wholesalers are struggling. Statscan said in a separate report that wholesale trade plunged 0.6 per cent in July, to $49.5-billion. Most Bay Street analysts were expecting a small gain.

These figures imply Canada’s economy is sputtering. The wholesale numbers, combined with weak factory data last week, suggest third quarter growth will be weak. And little economic growth suggests little inflation. Krishen Rangasamy, a senior economist at National Bank Financial in Montreal, says third-quarter inflation is running well behind the pace that the Bank of Canada was expecting: 1.1 per cent for the headline number, compared with the central bank’s current estimate of 1.2 per cent; and, more importantly, core inflation, which deducts volatile food and energy prices, is tracking 1.4 per cent v. the Bank of Canada’s estimate of 1.9 per cent.

S&P has a cheerful recession scenario:

The Downside Case (20%-25%): We All Fall Down

In our double-dip scenario, a recession takes hold in the fourth quarter of this year. The U.S. enters into a recession as the ongoing political wrangling of U.S. lawmakers over fiscal policy results in the failure of the government to agree on a sound budget deficit-cutting plan before 2013. Despite central bank efforts, the eurozone continues to be broadsided by fiscal austerity and its political backlash, a deep recession, financial system turmoil, and a loss of investor and consumer confidence. And emerging Asian economies continue their slowdown, amplifying the U.S. recession as exports take a hit.
The recession lasts until the second quarter of 2013, but political uncertainty in Europe and the U.S. and government austerity keep the recovery very weak. Despite tensions in the Middle East, the global slowdown pushes oil prices lower, down to $77 per barrel in the first quarter of 2013 from $94 per barrel in second-quarter 2012.

As businesses rein in hiring, the unemployment rate rises to 8.8% in 2013 and peaks above 9% the following year. Rising unemployment will put an even tighter squeeze on consumers. Nonfarm productivity contracts by 1.0% in the fourth quarter and by 0.8% in 2013.

The slumping economy, political wrangling, weak exports, and higher costs of federal retirement and health care programs all have an impact on the budget deficit. Congress’ reluctance to compromise forces an austere fiscal policy. After widening to $1.14 trillion in 2012, the deficit narrows to $970 billion in fiscal 2013 as a result of the automatic sequestration. The damage in the first quarter causes policymakers to agree on extending the expiring measures one more year. But, deficit hawks convince policymakers to let them expire in 2014. Additional austerity further slows the recovery.

The 10-year Treasury note yield falls to averages of 1.7% and 1.3% in 2012 and 2013, respectively, as investors rush to safety. The current account deficit narrows to $353 billion in 2013, from the record $801 billion in 2006, on lower prices and weak domestic demand for most imports.

The result is another recession before the recovery is complete

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 3bp, FixedResets down 7bp and DeemedRetractibles up 4bp. There was no volatility. None. Zip, zero, zilch. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3632 % 2,443.9
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.88 % 35,055 17.50 1 0.2864 % 3,520.8
Floater 3.00 % 3.01 % 59,055 19.71 3 0.3632 % 2,638.8
OpRet 4.67 % 3.34 % 53,789 1.46 4 -0.1537 % 2,546.7
SplitShare 5.46 % 4.97 % 72,557 4.57 3 0.0133 % 2,811.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1537 % 2,328.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 2.92 % 96,018 1.03 28 0.0284 % 2,286.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.96 % 4.95 % 103,833 15.58 3 -0.2221 % 2,543.8
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.12 % 175,768 4.05 72 -0.0741 % 2,429.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.52 % 122,703 1.60 46 0.0434 % 2,370.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 88,874 National Bank crossed 85,700 at 25.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 66,390 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-21
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 47,700 National crossed 25,000 at 26.87.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 44,295 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 31,725 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-21
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : -30.32 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 28,955 TD crossed 15,500 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.43 – 17.86
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2558

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-21
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.60 – 52.09
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3592

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.60
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.97 – 24.26
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1725

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-21
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 23.97
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.01 – 21.33
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2109

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-21
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.95 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 26.85 – 27.09
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1724

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %

TCL: S&P Says Outlook Negative

Saturday, September 22nd, 2012

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • •We are revising our outlook on Montreal-based Transcontinental Inc. to negative from stable.
  • •We base the outlook revision on our view of the ongoing headwinds the company faces in the medium term, with possible declines in both organic revenue and profitability given challenging industry fundamentals.
  • •We are also affirming our ratings on the company, including the ‘BBB’ long-term corporate credit rating.
  • •The negative outlook reflects Standard & Poor’s view that Transcontinental could continue to experience declining organic revenue and margin pressure in the medium term.


Transcontinental’s operating performance was below our expectations in the nine months ended July 31, 2012, with reported revenue and adjusted operating profit declining 2.5% and 15.5%, respectively, on an organic basis, compared with the same period in 2011. We believe that soft economic conditions in the past few years have accelerated the digital substitution of content and advertising from print, which will continue pressuring the company’s print and publishing-related businesses in the medium term.

The negative outlook reflects Standard & Poor’s view that Transcontinental might experience continued declining organic revenue and margin pressure given difficult industry fundamentals. We could lower the ratings if Transcontinental’s operating performance remains soft or if we believe secular risks have increased to an extent that changes our view of the company’s business risk profile or if debt leverage approaches 2.5x. Alternatively, we could revise the outlook to stable if Transcontinental demonstrates sustainable improvement in its operating performance, while maintaining adjusted debt to EBITDA between 1.5x-2.0x.

Transcontinental has a single preferred share issue outstanding: TCL.PR.D, which S&P upgraded to P-3(high) in December 2010. The issue commenced trading October 2, 2009 and is a FixedReset, 6.75%+416. The issue was recently downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS.

TCL.PR.D is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.