Category: MAPF

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close November 31, 2025, was $12.0945.

The above figure incorporates the following amounts per unit with respect to the probable Capital Gain distribution at year-end:

• Prior losses carried forward: ($0.1017)
• Realized Capital Gains: $1.4009
• Unrealized Capital Gains: $0.9835

Fund returns were adversely affected by CU.PR.C (-1.74%) and MFC.PR.B (-1.36% following last month’s outperformance); but benefitted from good performance by FTS.PR.M (+2.04%) [small holdings are not considered for individual mention here].

FixedResets continue to yield slightly more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts; on November 28, I reported median YTWs of 5.89% and 5.60%, respectively, for these two indices; compare with mean Current Yields of 5.89% and 5.50%, respectively.

The five-year Canada yield increased, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) moving from 2.64% at October month-end to 2.79% at November month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 260bp on 2025-11-26 widening dramatically from the 240bp on 2025-10-29 and giving back the narrowing experienced last month (chart end-date 2025-11-14).

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly (despite recent narrowing) from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to a level of 503bp (as of 2025-11-26)… (chart end-date 2025-11-14):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -44bp (as of 2025-11-26) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2025-11-14):

There is no correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 Group or for Pfd-3 Group issues.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 group or the Pfd-3 group between the Issue Reset Spread and 3-month performance for discounted FixedResets.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset:

… while the three-month returns vs. Term to Reset, shows a correlation for the Pfd-2 Group (14%) but none for the Pfd-3 Group:

It should be noted that to some extent a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit (adverse effects) of higher (lower) projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August 2022 PrefLetter.

Upward-sloping correlations of Performance vs. Term are to be expected when GOC-5 declines.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and it still exceeds – by a much smaller margin than previously – dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past few years has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in the fairly near future. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2025-11-14).

I will note that the fund’s current holdings of FixedResets are now paying dividends based on their previous reset at an average GOC-5 rate of 2.67% (for discounted FixedResets only, weighted by shares held)

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Turnover declined to 10% in November. Trades were mostly optimization trades between issues in the same category..

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on November 28, 2025, was:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

I am pleased to announce that it is probable – virtually certain might be more accurate! – that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund will make a Capital Gains Distribution at year-end. This will be the first Capital Gains Distribution since 2012!

There was a long, hard bear market during much of the intervening time, but the past three years have been excellent and made the long-term returns look much more like they should. Thirteen year returns for the fund are +6.16% (annualized, after expenses but before fees), while the comparable TXPR Total Return Index return is +3.80%. It is of interest to note that the the TXPR Price Index closed at 693.26 on October 31, while it stood at 856.99 on 2012-12-31.

As of October 31, 2025, the NAVPU of the fund was 12.1172. This figure incorporated the following per-unit elements:

• Prior Losses Carried Forward: -0.101700
• Realized Capital Gains: 1.264479
• Unrealized Capital Gains: 1.218465

The latter two figures will vary, perhaps dramatically, between now and year end, when the actual Capital Gain Distribution (assuming that Realized Capital Gains continues to dominate the Prior Losses Carried Forward!) will be calculated. It will all depend on what the market does between now and then and how much trading there is: I cannot forecast the effect of either of these influences.

Clients have been sent letter with this information, together with estimates of their total CG Distribution based on October 31 figures. Their current choices for distribution disposition (pay-out vs. reinvest is the main decision) are specified in the letter as a reminder (after so long!).

I am providing this information to clients so that they may ensure that the disposition of the (still potential, at this stage!) CG Distribution meets their current needs and, perhaps, engage in any tax planning that may be necessary, as any CG Distribution will be reported on the 2025 T3 Tax Slip.

Clients – and those who want to become clients! – may contact me for details and updates at their convenience.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close October 31, 2025, was $12.1172.

Quotes at October month-end were of poor quality, as is often the case when reinvestment of redemption proceeds leads to a late-day pop in prices – to the detriment of the reinvesting funds’ customers, but who cares about them?

There were no issues this month that stood out as significantly held poor performers; the fund benefitted from good performance by MFC.PR.B (+4.51% following last month’s poor performance) and SLF.PR.D (+3.75% following last month’s poor performance) [small holdings are not considered for individual mention here].

FixedResets continue to yield slightly more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts; on October 31, I reported median YTWs of 5.87% and 5.56%, respectively, for these two indices; compare with mean Current Yields of 5.88% and 5.48%, respectively.

The five-year Canada yield decreased, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) moving from 2.75% at September month-end to 2.64% at October month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 240bp on 2025-10-29 sharply narrowing from the 255bp on 2025-10-01 and regaining most of the widening experienced last month (chart end-date 2025-10-10).

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly (despite recent narrowing) from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to a level of 492bp (as of 2025-10-29)… (chart end-date 2025-10-10):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -47bp (as of 2025-10-29) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2025-10-10):

There is no correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 Group or for Pfd-3 Group issues.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 group or the Pfd-3 group between the Issue Reset Spread and 3-month performance for discounted FixedResets.

There is a very small correlation for the Pfd-2 Group (10%) but none for the Pfd-3 Group for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset:

… while the three-month returns vs. Term to Reset, shows no correlation for the Pfd-2 Group but there is a small one for the Pfd-3 Group (11%):

It should be noted that to some extent a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit (adverse effects) of higher (lower) projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August 2022 PrefLetter.

Upward-sloping correlations of Performance vs. Term are to be expected when GOC-5 declines.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and it still exceeds – by a much smaller margin than previously – dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past few years has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in the fairly near future. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2025-10-10).

I will note that the fund’s current holdings of FixedResets are now paying dividends based on their previous reset at an average GOC-5 rate of 2.56% (weighted by shares held)

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Turnover increased to 15% in October, largely due to a migration from FixedReset-Discounts to FixedReset-Premium issues.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on October 31, 2025, was:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 30, 2025, was $11.7912 after a dividend distribution of $0.153685.

Quotes at September month-end were of fair quality.

Performance was affected by poor performance from SLF.PR.D (-1.50% following fine performance in July and August), BN.PR.B (-0.80%) and MFC.PR.B (-0.46%), offset by contributions from FTS.PR.M (+2.17%) and CU.PR.C (+1.20% following poor performance in August) [small holdings are not considered for individual mention here].

FixedResets continue to yield slightly more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts; on September 30, I reported median YTWs of 6.00% and 5.66%, respectively, for these two indices; compare with mean Current Yields of 5.89% and 5.59%, respectively.

The five-year Canada yield decreased, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) moving from 2.98% at August month-end to 2.75% at September month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 235 on 2025-8-27 (chart end-date 2025-09-12).

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly (despite recent narrowing) from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to a level of 512bp (as of 2025-10-1)… (chart end-date 2025-9-12):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -45bp (as of 2025-10-01) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2025-9-12):

There is no correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 Group or for Pfd-3 Group issues.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 group or the Pfd-3 group between the Issue Reset Spread and 3-month performance for discounted FixedResets.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset:

… while the three-month returns vs. Term to Reset, shows no correlation for the Pfd-2 Group but there is one for the Pfd-3 Group (19%):

It should be noted that to some extent a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit (adverse effects) of higher (lower) projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August 2022 PrefLetter.

Upward-sloping correlations of Performance vs. Term are to be expected when GOC-5 declines.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and it still exceeds – by a much smaller margin than previously – dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past few years has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in the fairly near future. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2025-9-12).

I will note that the fund’s current holdings of FixedResets are now paying dividends based on their previous reset at an average GOC-5 rate of 2.56% (weighted by shares held)

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Turnover increased to 12% in September, largely due to a migration from CM.PR.S to other premium issues.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 30, 2025, was:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close August 29, 2025, was $11.8921.

Quotes at August month-end were of fair quality – relative to the Toronto Exchange’s usual efforts, anyway!

Performance was affected by poor performance from TRP.PR.E (-3.12% after July’s stellar return) and CU.PR.C (-1.60%), offset by contributions from SLF.PR.D (+1.53% following July’s fine performance ) and PWF.PF.A (+1.51%) [small holdings are not considered for individual mention here].

FixedResets continue to yield slightly more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts; on August 29, I reported median YTWs of 6.16% and 5.69%, respectively, for these two indices; compare with mean Current Yields of 5.68% and 5.59%, respectively.

The five-year Canada yield decreased, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) moving from 3.09% at July month-end to 2.98% at August month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 235 on 2025-8-27, down significantly from the 255bp on 2025-7-30 (chart end-date 2025-08-08).

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly (despite recent narrowing) from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to a level of 512bp (as of 2025-8-27) … (chart end-date 2025-8-8):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -68bp (as of 2025-08-27) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2025-7-11):

There is no correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 Group or for Pfd-3 Group issues.

There is a correlation for the Pfd-2 group (14%) but none for the Pfd-3 group between the Issue Reset Spread and 3-month performance for discounted FixedResets.

There is no correlation for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset:

… while the three-month returns vs. Term to Reset, shows no correlation for the Pfd-2 Group but there is one for the Pfd-3 Group (19%):

It should be noted that to some extent a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit (adverse effects) of higher (lower) projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August 2022 PrefLetter.

Upward-sloping correlations of Performance vs. Term are to be expected when GOC-5 declines.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and it still exceeds – by a much smaller margin than previously – dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past few years has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in the fairly near future. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2025-7-11).

I will note that the fund’s current holdings of FixedResets are now paying dividends based on their previous reset at an average GOC-5 rate of 2.55% (weighted by shares held)

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Turnover remained very low at 4% in August.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on August 29, 2025, was:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 31, 2025, was $11.8941.

Quotes at July month-end were of fair quality, but now without the occasional howler. The quote for MFC.PR.B, for instance, had to be adjusted for fund valuation purposes, with the bid adjusted from 20.65 to 21.97.

Performance was affected by poor performance from IFC.PR.C (-0.54%) and CM.PR.S (+1.06%), more than offset by contributions from FTS.P.M (+4.99%); SLF.PR.D (+5.28%); and TRP.PR.E (+9.56%) [small holdings are not considered for individual mention here].

FixedResets continue to yield slightly more, in general, than PerpetualDiscounts although the spread narrowed somewhat in June; on June 30, I reported median YTWs of 6.25% and 5.74%, respectively, for these two indices; compare with mean Current Yields of 5.54% and 5.65%, respectively.

I must say, reporting by the banks was exceptionally poor this month. No data are yet available at the usual locations for the two National Bank preferred share funds in the table above; nor has the TD fund had a performance update. RBC just barely saved their bacon with respect to the two funds they report – they did not have July data as of late last night (August 8) when I checked, but it is available on the morning of August 9. The “Other People’s Money” department at banks is generally sub-standard, but this month is egregious. One would think that if anybody in Canada had the scale to automate absolutely everything and have little cron-job programmes running regularly to ensure that all necessary data was collected promptly and carefully inserted into its proper place (or an exception report generated after a proper interval and sent to the appropriate escalation level of management), it would be the banks … but this appears to be the purview of giant operations like Hymas Investment Management Inc.

The five-year Canada yield decreased, with the five-year Canada yield (“GOC-5”) moving from 2.85% on June 30 to 3.09% at July month-end.

The Seniority Spread (between long-term corporate bonds and interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts) was 255bp on 2025-7-30, down significantly from the 280bp on 2025-6-25 (chart end-date 2025-07-11).

The situation with FixedResets is interesting, with the spread between GOC-5 and the interest-adjusted FixedReset (Discount) rate widening significantly (despite recent narrowing) from its 2021-11-10 low of 344bp to a level of 506bp (as of 2025-7-30) … (chart end-date 2025-7-11):

…while at the same time the interest-equivalent spread between FixedReset (Discounts) and PerpetualDiscounts has narrowed to -58bp (as of 2025-07-30) from its 2021-7-28 level of +170bp (chart end-date 2025-7-11):

There is no correlation between the Issue Reset Spread and 1-month performance for discounted FixedResets for either the Pfd-2 Group or for Pfd-3 Group issues.

There is no correlation for the Pfd-2 group but there is one for the Pfd-3 group (20%) between the Issue Reset Spread and 3-month performance for discounted FixedResets.

There is no correlation for the Pfd-2 Group but one for the Pfd-3 Group (19%) for 1-Month performance against term-to-reset:

… while the three-month returns vs. Term to Reset, shows no correlations for either the Pfd-2 Group or the Pfd-3 Group:

It should be noted that to some extent a dependence (of performance on term-to-reset) can be justified as the nearer-term issues will receive the benefit (adverse effects) of higher (lower) projected dividend rates sooner as a result of higher GOC-5 yields and therefore, perhaps, for longer. Equations for the relationship between correlation slope and change in GOC-5 were derived in the August 2022 PrefLetter.

Upward-sloping correlations of Performance vs. Term are to be expected when GOC-5 declines.

I keep talking about ‘Sustainable Income’ and it still exceeds – by a much smaller margin than previously – dividends that are currently being distributed. This is because Sustainable Income is the average yield-to-worst (YTW) of the portfolio when the YTW is calculated to perpetuity (or to redemption, of course, if the yield to redemption is lower), including resets at the current GOC-5 rate. The sharp increase in GOC-5 in the past few years has caused the difference between YTW and Current Yield to skyrocket, but one way or another I expect that these two values will become much closer – slowly at first, but quickening in the fairly near future. We have to wait for the reset date of the MAPF portfolio securities before we see a change in actual cash receipts – and, of course, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the rate used for estimation purposes now will be used for the actual calculation in the future (chart prepared as of 2025-7-11).

I will note that the fund’s current holdings of FixedResets are now paying dividends based on their previous reset at an average GOC-5 rate of 2.54% (weighted by shares held)

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows: