Archive for March, 2015

March 30, 2015

Monday, March 30th, 2015

The Economist has a good piece on income inequality:

Mr Piketty argues that over the long run the rate of return on wealth exceeds economic growth. Over time, this relationship increases inequality as the share of national income going to those who own capital (the rich) rises, while the portion going to labour (everyone else) falls. He also argues that the return on capital in recent history has been remarkably stable, even as economic growth has fallen, and that this trend will continue in the future.

Mr Rognlie has three main criticisms of all this. Several commentators have pointed out that the rate of return from capital should decline in the long run, rather than remaining high as Mr Piketty maintains, owing to the law of diminishing returns. Mr Rognlie expands on this, arguing that Mr Piketty has an inflated idea of the current return. Modern forms of capital, such as software, depreciate faster in value than equipment did in the past: a giant metal press might have a working life of decades whereas a new piece of database-management software will be obsolete in a few years at most. This means that returns from wealth may not necessarily be growing in net terms, since a rising share of the gains that flow to the owners of capital must be reinvested.

Second, Mr Rognlie finds that higher returns to wealth have not been distributed equally across all investments. The return on assets other than housing has been remarkably stable since 1970. In fact, surging house prices are almost entirely responsible for growing returns on capital.

Third, the idea that workers’ share of wealth can continue to decline rests on the assumption that it is easy to substitute capital (ie, robots) for workers. But if lots of the capital in question is tied up in houses, then this switch would be far harder than Mr Piketty suggests.

I don’t find these arguments particularly convincing. With respect to the first point, once capital invested in software depreciates fast enough, it becomes a labour cost in capital clothing: if you need a permanent staff of programmers on hand to keep your business running (whether they are in-house or external), then that’s a labour cost.

The second and third points are interesting, but I suggest that people are spending more on housing because the return on capital is relatively low and relatively volatile – should returns on actual capital increase, then people will stop buying second houses for rental purposes and put their money into the stock market.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 11bp, FixedResets down 31bp and DeemedRetractibles off 19bp. The Performance Highlights table is relatively length and almost all losers, with Enbridge issues again being prominent on the bad side. Volume was on the high side of average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150330
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.26 to be $1.12 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.13 cheap at its bid price of 24.90.

impVol_MFC_150330
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.93 to be $0.56 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.75 to be $0.69 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150330
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 20.60 to be $0.78 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.88 and appears to be $0.78 rich.

impVol_FTS_150330
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.07, looks $1.72 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.13 rich.

pairs_FR_150330
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average over the next five years of about 0.20%. TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F has almost normalized, but remains an outlier at +0.05%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.87%.

Tomorrow we’ll get two more data points for junk: AIM.PR.A / AIM.PR.B and FFH.PR.E / FFH.PR.F.

pairs_FF_150330
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.3085 % 2,332.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.3085 % 4,077.5
Floater 3.25 % 3.25 % 64,608 19.09 3 -1.3085 % 2,479.1
OpRet 4.07 % 1.40 % 108,400 0.22 1 -0.0794 % 2,763.7
SplitShare 4.35 % 4.21 % 33,378 3.46 4 0.1198 % 3,217.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0794 % 2,527.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % -0.80 % 57,957 0.08 25 0.0892 % 2,525.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.95 % 158,734 15.22 9 0.1103 % 2,818.5
FixedReset 4.41 % 3.46 % 250,790 16.54 85 -0.3141 % 2,415.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % 1.25 % 110,100 0.15 37 -0.1874 % 2,657.9
FloatingReset 2.46 % 2.84 % 82,221 6.29 8 0.0688 % 2,358.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.N FixedReset -2.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 20.17
Evaluated at bid price : 20.17
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
ENB.PF.E FixedReset -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 16.07
Evaluated at bid price : 16.07
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 15.45
Evaluated at bid price : 15.45
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.61
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 15.31
Evaluated at bid price : 15.31
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 138,628 Desjardins crossed 126,000 at 20.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.91
Evaluated at bid price : 19.91
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 110,872 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 23.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.58
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 101,360 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.84
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 90,353 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 88,715 Scotia crossed two blocks of 40,000 each, both at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 64,710 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ENB.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 19.80 – 20.30
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3640

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %

ENB.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 21.35 – 21.73
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2516

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 20.60 – 20.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1799

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 24.40 – 24.69
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1720

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.93 – 24.25
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2138

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 15.25 – 15.73
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3827

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-30
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %

And finally, it seems to me that housing prices is related to wealth, whereas income inequality has increased and is measurable.

BNS.PR.Y To Reset At 1.82%

Monday, March 30th, 2015

The Bank of Nova Scotia has announced:

the applicable dividend rates for its Non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series 30 of Scotiabank (the “Preferred Shares Series 30”) and Non-cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares Series 31 of Scotiabank (the “Preferred Shares Series 31”).

With respect to any Preferred Shares Series 30 that remain outstanding after April 26, 2015, commencing as of such date, holders thereof will be entitled to receive non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank and subject to the Bank Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the five-year period commencing on April 26, 2015 and ending on April 25, 2020 will be 1.82%, being equal to the 5-Year Government of Canada bond yield determined as at March 27, 2015 plus 1.00%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares Series 30.

With respect to any Preferred Shares Series 31 that may be issued on April 26, 2015, holders thereof will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank and subject to the Bank Act (Canada), based on a dividend rate equal to the 90-day Canadian Treasury Bill yield plus 1.00%, on an actual/365 day count basis, subject to certain adjustments in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares Series 31. The dividend rate for the period commencing on April 26, 2015 and ending on July 25, 2015 will be equal to 1.528%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares Series 31.

Beneficial owners of Preferred Shares Series 30 who wish to exercise their right of conversion should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee and ensure that they follow their instructions in order to meet the deadline to exercise such right, which is 5:00 p.m. (EDT) on April 13, 2015.

Note that the deadline for notifying the company of a holder’s intent to exchange for the new FloatingReset issue is April 13, but that brokers will have earlier internal deadlines. I intend to recommend whether or not to convert on April 8.

Market Inefficiency: AIM.PR.A vs. AIM.PR.C

Saturday, March 28th, 2015

I was challenged on Financial Wisdom Forum to opine on preferred share market inefficiency:

I do wonder if this market is as inefficient as you suggest. It seems to me when inefficiencies exist (that is to say easy money to be made) in capital markets such inefficiencies don’t last long as smart money rushes in to scoop up the cash and thus eliminating the inefficiency . Perhaps Mr Hymas would care to offer an expert opinion on the preferred share market with respect to its inefficiencies or lack there of.

Fortunately enough, there’s an example of inefficient pricing noted just above:

Take AIM.PR.A (which is one of my holdings and is definitely not investment grade). It was yielding 7.3% (current) when I started buying in February. I knew it was resetting end of March at around 4.5% of the redemption price (for a current yield of 5.1% at my ACB), but thought: ‘It must be safe to buy because the market must have priced in whatever.s going to happen’. Well, in early March they announced the details of the reset and then it sunk like a stone! So a week or so after the announcement, I thought: ‘Now the market must really have priced in everything, so now I can buy some more at a bargain’. Which I did. But it kept sinking and sinking and still is sinking!

Let’s look at the yield of AIM.PR.A using the new and improved yield calculator for FixedResets. Assumptions are always necessary when making yield calculations so assume

  • The bid in thirty years will be the same as the close on Friday, 19.31
  • Constant 5-year Canada yield of Friday’s close of 0.79%

and combine that with what we know about the issue

  • Resets 2020-3-31
  • Reset yield is GOC-5 +375bp
  • Paydates are quarterly from June 30

We calculate the yield as 5.85%.

Now look at AIM.PR.C, which closed on Friday at 24.91, currently pays $1.5625 p.a. and resets at five year intervals commencing 2019-3-31 at GOC-5 + 420bp. Make the same assumption of a constant price. The yield is 5.33%.

This relative valuation makes no sense. AIM.PR.C should yield more than AIM.PR.A, since it has greater call risk.

Some people may tell you that the differential makes sense, because when AIM.PR.C resets in four years it is GUARANTEED!!! to reset at a higher level since GOC-5 will DEFINITELY!!! be higher at that time … to which we may retort that in that case, AIM.PR.A will also reset higher since it will reset again one year later.

In order for AIM.PR.C to achieve the 5.85% yield offered by AIM.PR.A, we must assume a constant GOC-5 yield of 1.49%. If we assume that GOC-5 will reach 1.49% and stay there forever, then AIM.PR.A will then yield 6.45% (n.b. a greater increase since the lower price of AIM.PR.A means it is more levered to the GOC-5 rate). So for the realized yields to be equal, we must assume that GOC-5 will increase to 1.49% by the time AIM.PR.C resets in four years, but return to 0.79% when AIM.PR.A resets a year later (there will be infinite equivalent paths for equality of yield, but they will all look more or less like that) and that this zig-zag will continue forever. This seems like a rather complex path to be betting on.

And the above ignores call risk, i.e., assumes that the Volatility of the Market Reset Spread for AIM is zero and that neither issue will be called with 100% certainty. This is another rather aggressive assumption.

If we turn the question around a little, we can determine that, in order for the yield on AIM.PR.A to be equal to the yield on AIM.PR.C (again, with zero allowance made for call risk), then we may say that the constant price of AIM.PR.A should be $21.20, given a constant GOC-5 yield of 0.79 (for both issues!). Thus, we may conclude to a first approximation that AIM.PR.A is about 9% undervalued relative to AIM.PR.C at current prices.

It is not at all unusual to conclude that cheaper issues are unduly cheap relative to their more expensive siblings. I believe that this is due to some feeling among preferred share investors as a group that:

  • Anything priced at around par will always be priced near par, because, dammit, they’re PREFERRED SHARES
  • Anything priced significantly below par is a speculative piece of shit

Regrettably, this hypothesis would be very difficult to prove. And, as the regrettable timing of MAPF’s move into low-spread FixedResets demonstrates, just because something is probably mostly true most of the time doesn’t mean it’s always true all of the time. But … if the odds are with you on all your decisions and you take care that an unlucky streak won’t wipe you out … you’ll do fine.

March 27, 2015

Saturday, March 28th, 2015

The new issue of LBS / LBS.PR.A was priced today at 19.60, compared to its March 26 NAVPU of 18.74. Nice work if you can get it! I have updated the post announcing the offering.

Brookfield Renewable Power Preferred Equity Inc., proud issuer of BRF.PR.A, BRF.PR.C, BRF.PR.E and BRF.PR.F, was confirmed at Pfd-3(high) by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has confirmed the Issuer Rating and the rating on the Senior Unsecured Debentures and Notes of Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners L.P. (BREP or the Company) at BBB (high), and the Class A Preference Shares at Pfd-3 (high), all with Stable trends. The rating actions reflect DBRS’s expectation that BREP will continue to prudently finance its growth initiatives to maintain its deconsolidated key credit metrics in line with the current rating. BREP’s ratings reflect its geographic and resource diversification, and highly contracted portfolio with investment-grade counterparties, while also factoring in the inherent renewable resource risk.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 5bp, FixedResets down 23bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. The Performance Highlights table was of normal (for the past four months) size and comprised entirely of FixedResets. Volume was average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150327
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.41 to be $1.16 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.17 cheap at its bid price of 24.93.

impVol_MFC_150327
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230 on 2020-3-19, bid at 24.64 to be $0.53 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.87 to be $0.64 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150327
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 20.95 to be $0.62 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.74 and appears to be $0.49 rich.

impVol_FTS_150327
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.30, looks $1.59 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.08 rich.

pairs_FR_150327
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average over the next five years of about 0.20% after a big increase today.TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F remains an outlier at -0.16%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.06%.

pairs_FF_150327
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0644 % 2,363.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0644 % 4,131.5
Floater 3.21 % 3.22 % 64,992 19.19 3 0.0644 % 2,512.0
OpRet 4.07 % 1.01 % 110,149 0.23 1 0.1192 % 2,765.8
SplitShare 4.36 % 4.03 % 32,793 3.48 4 0.2102 % 3,213.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1192 % 2,529.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % 2.61 % 58,333 0.09 25 0.0094 % 2,523.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.99 % 158,961 15.21 9 -0.0465 % 2,815.4
FixedReset 4.40 % 3.39 % 235,021 16.75 85 -0.2263 % 2,423.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.89 % -1.13 % 110,808 0.14 37 0.0629 % 2,662.9
FloatingReset 2.42 % 2.78 % 80,666 6.30 8 0.2229 % 2,356.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.74
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 16.64
Evaluated at bid price : 16.64
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.N FixedReset 93,275 Desjardins crossed 26,800 at 24.64. Scotia crossed 40,000 at the same price and bought 15,100 from RBC at 24.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 76,905 Nesbitt crossed 66,900 at 24.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 63,080 RBC crossed 40,300 at 22.16.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 50,650 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-26
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : -4.35 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 42,220 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 40,392 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 24.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset Quote: 19.35 – 22.00
Spot Rate : 2.6500
Average : 1.4486

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

BAM.PF.E FixedReset Quote: 23.74 – 24.35
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.3693

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.74
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.30 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.6403

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.36 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2607

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %

ENB.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 19.50 – 19.89
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2729

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-27
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %

RY.PR.K FloatingReset Quote: 24.17 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1800

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %

BSD.PR.A Unitholders Approve Term Extension

Friday, March 27th, 2015

Brookfield Soundvest Capital Management Ltd. has announced:

Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust (TSX:BSD.UN)(TSX:BSD.PR.A) (referred to as the “Trust”) is pleased to announce that holders (the “Preferred Securityholders”) of preferred securities (the “Preferred Securities”) of the Trust and holders (the “Unitholders”) of trust units of the Trust (the “Units”) approved the extraordinary resolution relating to the Preferred Securities and the extraordinary resolution relating to the Units at a special meeting (the “Meeting”) of the Preferred Securityholders and the Unitholders held on March 27, 2015.

The extraordinary resolution relating to the Preferred Securities will allow the Trust to implement the following:

  • •extend the term of the Preferred Securities for additional five-year renewal terms following the scheduled maturity date of March 31, 2015;
  • •determine the interest rate on the Preferred Securities for each subsequent extended five-year renewal term of the Preferred Securities, and set the interest rate for the first renewal term at 6.0% per annum; and
  • •provide the Preferred Securityholders with the right to retract and receive repayment of their Preferred Securities on March 31, 2015, and at the end of each subsequent renewal term of the Preferred Securities, if they so choose (the “Preferred Special Repayment Right”).

The extraordinary resolution relating to the Units will allow the Trust to implement the following:

  • •provide the Unitholders with the right to retract, in the aggregate, a number of Units not exceeding the number of Preferred Securities tendered under the Preferred Special Repayment Right on March 31, 2015 and at the end of each subsequent renewal term of the Preferred Securities, if they so choose (the “Unit Special Retraction Right”), and receive redemption proceeds equal to the net asset value per Unit as of such dates, and to the extent that more Units are tendered for retraction under the Unit Special Retraction Right than Preferred Securities tendered for repayment under the Preferred Special Repayment Right, Units so tendered will be redeemed on a pro rata basis; and
  • •in order to maintain the same number of the Units and the Preferred Securities outstanding, in the event that more Preferred Securities are tendered for repayment under the Preferred Special Repayment Right than Units tendered for retraction under the Unit Special Retraction Right, provide the Trust with the ability to consolidate the Units on or about March 31, 2015 and at the end of each subsequent renewal term of the Preferred Securities.

The Trust also announces today that holders of 1,988,024 Units have given notice to the Trust that they wish to exercise the Unit Special Retraction Right up to the number of Units not exceeding the number of Preferred Securities tendered pursuant to the right of Preferred Securityholders to retract and receive repayment of their Preferred Securities pursuant to the Preferred Special Repayment Right. As announced by the Trust on March 16, 2015, holders of 1,779,807 Preferred Securities have given notice to the Trust that they wish to exercise the Preferred Special Retraction Right.

In order to maintain an equal number of Units and Preferred Securities outstanding, 1,779,807 Units will be redeemed on March 31, 2015, on a pro rata basis, from the holdings of those Unitholders who have exercised the Unit Special Retraction Right. This means that 89.53% of the Units surrendered for redemption by Unitholders pursuant to the Unit Special Redemption Right will be retracted. As announced on March 16, 2015, the Trust is reinstituting the annual redemption right available to Unitholders and accordingly Unitholders will be able to redeem Units under the annual redemption right in November, 2015.

The manager, investment advisor and portfolio manager for the Fund is Brookfield Soundvest Capital Management Ltd. (the “Manager”), an established investment advisor, that provides investment management services to trusts, foundations, corporations and high net worth individuals.

So, in line with the manager’s general attitude towards its unitholders, the percentage voting in favour of this ridiculous plan was not disclosed. I had recommended against the proposal; but 44% of preferred shareholders voted with their feet.

So what have the remaining preferred shareholders let themselves in for? I’ve taken a look at the 14H1 Semi-Annual Report and figures of interest are:

MER: Fees and Expenses of $217,000 over six months on total assets of $40.07-million is 1.83% of the whole unit value, annualized. Note that the report states:

Fees and expenses for the six months ending June 30, 2014 totalled $217 thousand, compared to $258 thousand for the same period in 2013, representing an annualized management expense ratio (“MER”) of 2.47% as compared to 2.64% for the six months ending June 30, 2013. The MER is based on the total expenses of the Fund for the stated period (excluding brokerage commissions) and is expressed as an annualized percentage of the daily average net asset value for the period. The MER before interest expense for the six months ending June 30, 2014 and 2013 was 2.47% and 2.31%, respectively. Fees and expenses for the six months ending June 30, 2014 decreased as compared to the same period in 2013 in response to the decrease in net asset value for the six months ending June 30, 2014 relating to the September 2013 redemption of 609,675 units. The net asset value increased by 2.9% while expenses decreased by 15.9% for the six months ending June 30, 2014.

Note that the percentage figure has defined net assets as being the Capital Unitholders’ interest only and does not include preferreds. We may expect the MER to increase in the future, given the 44% cut in assets.

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. Since fees and expenses of $217,000 represented a MER of 2.74% on average net assets, we calculate Average Net Assets to be $7.92-million, but this is only the Capital Units. Add in 32,150,310 for the preferreds, and the total is $40.07-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Distributions received of 400,044 divided by average net assets of 40.07-million is 2.00% annualized.

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income 400,044 gross income less expenses of 216,887 is 183,157 divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 385,804 is 47%.

These figures, together with the prospectus, the website and a guess a Capital Units dividend payout policy, allow us to estimate Split Share Credit Quality using the Split Share Credit Quality Calculator:

Credit Quality of BSD.PR.A
Returns template XIU
Data Collection Period 2002-12-8 to 2010-12-8
Expected Annualized Return 7.00%
Underlying Dividend Yield 2.00%
Initial NAV 12.57
Pfd Redemption Value 10.00
Pfd Coupon 0.60
MER 1.83%
Cap Unit Div (above test) 0.30
Cap Unit Div (below test) 0.00
NAV Test 14.00
Whole Unit Par Value 25.00
Months to Redemption 60
 
Probability of Default 27.55%
Loss Given Default 20.04%
Expected Loss 5.52%
 
Yield to Maturity
9.93 bid on 3/27
6.20%
Expected Redemption Price 9.45
Yield to Expectations 5.23%

Note that the distributions on the preferreds are as interest, not dividends! And also note that while, in the interests of fairness, I have used 7% as the expected annual return on the underlying portfolio, the manager’s track record makes me dubious about their ability to match their benchmark.

BSD.PR.A will continue to be tracked by HIMIPref™. It is assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Link: US Office of Financial Research

Friday, March 27th, 2015

The U.S. Office of Financial Research has announced that it:

launched a new website [February 3, 2015] to provide policy makers and the public better access to the OFR’s high-quality data and independent analysis that helps to promote financial stability.

The new website is at www.financialresearch.gov.

The OFR was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to provide research, data, and analysis for the benefit of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), Council member agencies, Congress, and the public.

“The launch of our new website marks a new chapter for the OFR,” OFR Director Richard Berner said. “This stand-alone site promotes transparency and accountability, and it greatly enhances our ability to provide to the public the results of our efforts to assess and monitor threats to financial stability, to fill in the gaps in financial analysis and data, and to evaluate policy tools.”

The new site contains a “Directors Blog,” biographies of senior managers, and details about OFR initiatives to collect financial data and improve data quality. The site also provides the OFR’s annual reports, working papers, staff discussion papers, and other research and analysis.

Other information on the website includes:
•An inventory of the financial data purchased, collected, and developed by FSOC member agencies;
•Updates on the OFR’s leadership on the Legal Entity Identifier, or LEI, a global data standard like a bar code for identifying parties to financial transactions; and
•Information about the OFR’s Financial Research Advisory Committee, which helps the OFR develop and employ best practices for data management, data standards, and research methodologies.

“The new website helps us create our own, unique identity – which is critical for ensuring the integrity, objectivity, and independence of our work,” Berner said.

I have always admired the quality of research published by various arms of the US government. To be sure, every now and then something is highly politicized – weapons of mass destruction in Iraq come readily to mind – and even on a more mundane level, I have criticized the SEC’s report on the Flash Crash as serving more of a political than analytical purpose. But by and large, you can learn a lot from research sponsored and published by the US government.

I have added a link to the site on the right-hand navigation panel, under the heading “Recommended Official Sites”. Many thanks to Assiduous Reader MP for bringing this to my attention!

March 26, 2015

Thursday, March 26th, 2015

GMP Capital Inc., proud issuer of GMP.PR.B, was confirmed at Pfd-3(low) [Trend Negative] by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed the Pfd-3 (low) rating on the Cumulative Preferred Shares of GMP Capital Inc. (GMP or the Company). The trend remains Negative. The rating reflects the strength of the Company’s business franchise as a provider of investment banking and capital markets products and services to its targeted market of mid-sized, primarily Canadian, companies. However, DBRS remains very cautious about the continuing adverse market environment. While GMP’s results in the early part of 2014 demonstrated the Company’s ability to weather weak market conditions, the continuation of the Negative trend reflects the challenges posed by the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices as indicated by GMP’s losses in Q4 2014. To the extent that GMP can adjust to this changed environment, the trend could return to Stable, but sustained weakness in results that indicated a significant deterioration in GMP’s franchise strength or earnings power would likely increase the negative pressure on the rating.

Canaccord Genuity Group Inc., proud issuer of CF.PR.A and CF.PR.C, was confirmed at Pfd-3(low) by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed its rating of the Cumulative Preferred Shares of Canaccord Genuity Group Inc. (Canaccord Genuity or the Company) at Pfd-3 (low) with a Stable trend. The Company has successfully integrated recent acquisitions, improved geographic diversity, enhanced its wealth management business segment and demonstrated resilience through the extended weak market environment. Nevertheless, the Company continues to face significant challenges.

Weakness in the energy sector, which has had an impact on many of Canaccord Genuity’s traditional Capital Markets clients, resulted in a loss in the last quarter of 2014 that also reflected impairment of goodwill/intangibles. As a result, the Company implemented expense control initiatives and other actions. The Company announced a planned 4% reduction in its overall workforce, primarily affecting the U.K./Europe and U.S. operations. In addition, there were a number of changes to the executive structure, including the appointment of a CEO for the combined North American capital markets and changes to the investment banking executive team.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 8bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles up 15bp. The Performance Highlights table is dominated by losing FixedResets, with a notable presence of Enbridge issues. Volume was above average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150326
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.83 to be $1.40 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.27 cheap at its bid price of 24.91.

impVol_MFC_150326
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.15 to be $0.49 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 25.47 to be $0.72 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150326
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 21.21 to be $0.64 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.25 and appears to be $0.83 rich.

impVol_FTS_150326
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.31, looks $1.62 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.13 rich.

pairs_FR_150326
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average over the next five years of about 0.10% – except for one outlier, TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F, which has a break-even of -0.24%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.31%.

pairs_FF_150326
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3014 % 2,361.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3014 % 4,128.9
Floater 3.21 % 3.21 % 65,192 19.21 3 0.3014 % 2,510.4
OpRet 4.07 % 1.51 % 109,900 0.23 1 -0.2378 % 2,762.6
SplitShare 4.37 % 4.32 % 34,163 3.47 4 -0.2695 % 3,206.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2378 % 2,526.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 1.67 % 56,991 0.08 25 -0.0031 % 2,523.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.99 % 160,970 15.23 9 0.0792 % 2,816.7
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.38 % 245,903 16.77 85 -0.1031 % 2,428.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % -1.18 % 111,362 0.14 37 0.1547 % 2,661.2
FloatingReset 2.42 % 2.76 % 80,504 6.31 8 0.4479 % 2,351.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 19.87
Evaluated at bid price : 19.87
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 20.20
Evaluated at bid price : 20.20
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 20.65
Evaluated at bid price : 20.65
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
BAM.PF.G FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 19.26
Evaluated at bid price : 19.26
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : -5.74 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 230,005 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,000 shares, 50,000 and 25,000, all at 24.90. RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000 at the same price. Desjardins crossed blocks of 35,000 and 15,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 147,515 RBC crossed 125,000 at 19.28.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 19.30
Evaluated at bid price : 19.30
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 104,013 Nesbitt crossed 101,400 at 22.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.58
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 72,900 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 58,569 Desjardins crossed 20,300 at 25.09. RBC crossed 15,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 49,450 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 17.50 – 18.39
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.5730

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.35 – 25.96
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.4652

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 18.75 – 19.12
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %

ENB.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 20.65 – 21.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2467

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 20.65
Evaluated at bid price : 20.65
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

ENB.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 21.46 – 21.78
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2205

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.46
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 24.30 – 24.59
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2088

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-26
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %

Yield Calculator for Resets: New and Improved!

Thursday, March 26th, 2015

Assiduous Reader KB writes in and says:

I often have occasion to use your modified for resets spreadsheet on your site (ytc_resets).

I always have to remember to only use 25 years when I want a “Limit Maturity” of 30 years.

Anyway, it bothered me enough times that I modified it. I also added a couple fields for entering reset spread and GoC 5 year rate instead of having to modify the dividend formula each time.

Might be useful in place of the one you initially modified, or not. You can check it out, modify it, or throw it out. (it’s Excel 2007)

I’ve checked it out and everything is in order; so I have appropriated this development and it is now available for download.

Note that the new version is a .xlsx file and there may still be a few doddering old fogeys out there who haven’t upgraded since the last geological era, so the Old .xls version is still available.

There’s a detailed numerical example for the use of this calculator in the post What is the Yield of HSE.PR.A?. This explanation is based on the old version, but if you can’t figure out the layout difference then you don’t deserve to use nice things anyway.

March 25, 2015

Thursday, March 26th, 2015

Big Pharma is watching you!

As Novartis AG’s chief executive, [Joe] Jimenez is barreling down untested paths at the frontier of biology and digital technology to prepare for a future in which the use of smartphones and other digital devices to monitor health will be the key to getting paid.

Projects and products include pills and inhalers with sensors that tell on patients who miss a dose; clinical tests that rely on Microsoft’s Kinect, the motion-sensing technology used with Xboxes, to measure walking speed and balance in people with multiple sclerosis; and Google contact lenses that focus automatically and can deduce diabetics’ blood-sugar levels from their tears — a gamble that Jimenez says could transform eyesight.

Equities have no direction this month:

Stringing together gains in the American stock market has become next to impossible.

Knocked down 1.5 percent Wednesday, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has now gone 26 days without posting gains in back-to-back sessions, the longest stretch since 1994, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Losses in biotechnology and chip companies dragged U.S. stocks to a third day of declines, interrupting another run at a record for the Nasdaq Composite Index as investors sold the year’s best-performing equities.

The Fed is concerned about the mechanics of a rate hike:

In the past, the Fed increased the cost of overnight bank borrowing by raising the funds rate. The trillions of dollars in excess reserves that exist, compared with a few billion at the start of 2007, have obviated the need for banks to borrow daily and forced U.S. monetary authorities to come up with ways to influence market rates directly.

It has been evident since 2008, when the Fed gained the ability to pay interest on excess reserves, that the new rate wasn’t anchoring borrowing costs as envisioned. Government-sponsored agencies including regional Federal Home Loan Banks, primary providers of cash in the overnight market, aren’t able to receive such interest, which has enabled the funds rate to drift below IOER [Interest On Excess Reserves], now at 0.25 percent.

To make matters worse, widespread negative yields abroad, and heightened regulation on banks and money funds, have sapped the supply of safe short-term assets and buoyed demand. That further casts doubt on whether a tightening of policy will be smooth.

Strategists have expressed concern that, when the Fed starts to tighten policy by raising IOER, other market rates may not follow, leaving monetary conditions too accommodative. While banks receiving interest on surplus reserves have dimmed their desire to dump excess cash into the money markets, the funds rate has still consistently traded below the IOER. The reverse repo program thus far has helped provide a floor for the funds rate.

Problems with the Effective Fed Funds rate became apparent during the Credit Crunch, as discussed at Effective Fed Funds Rate Continues to Confuse, Effective Fed Funds Rate: A Technical Explanation? and Effective Fed Funds and Interest on Excess Reserves.

There will be a secondary offering of Capital Power common:

Capital Power Corporation (TSX: CPX) (“Capital Power”) and EPCOR Utilities Inc. (“EPCOR”) announced today that Capital Power and EPCOR have entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters, co-led by CIBC and TD Securities Inc., as bookrunners, for a secondary offering by EPCOR Power Development Corporation (“EPDC”), a subsidiary of EPCOR, on a bought deal basis, of 9,000,000 common shares of Capital Power at an offering price of $23.85 per common share. Capital Power will not receive any of the proceeds ($215 million, before giving effect to the over-allotment option) from the sale of common shares by EPDC.

The underwriters have also been granted an option to purchase up to an additional 450,000 common shares at the issue price to cover over-allotments, if any. If exercised, EPDC will receive additional gross proceeds of approximately $10.7 million. The over-allotment option is exercisable, in whole or in part, by the underwriters at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the offering. Capital Power will not receive any proceeds from the exercise of the over-allotment option.

Capital Power doesn’t appear to be hard up for cash. They’ve suspended their DRIP:

Effective for the expected June 30, 2015 dividend, Capital Power will be suspending its Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP) for its common shares until further notice. Shareholders participating in the DRIP will begin receiving cash dividends on the expected July 31, 2015 payment date. If the Company elects to reinstate the DRIP in the future, shareholders that were enrolled in the DRIP at suspension and remained enrolled at reinstatement, will automatically resume participation in the DRIP.

Capital Power is the proud issuer of CPX.PR.A, CPX.PR.C and CPX.PR.E, all FixedResets.

Loblaw Companies Limited, proud issuer of L.PR.A, was confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed the Issuer Rating, Medium-Term Notes rating and Debentures rating of Loblaw Companies Limited (Loblaw or the Company) at BBB, its Cumulative Redeemable Second Preferred Shares, Series A rating at Pfd-3 and its Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-2 (middle), all with Stable trends. DBRS also confirmed the Senior Unsecured Debt rating of Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation (Shoppers) at BBB with a Stable trend, based on guarantee by Loblaw. The confirmation primarily reflects Loblaw’s continued deleveraging efforts, which should result in credit metrics considered acceptable for the current rating by the end of 2015, as well as, its solid operating performance in 2014.

DBRS expects that Loblaw’s financial leverage should continue to decline as the Company uses free cash flow to repay debt pursuant to its deleveraging plan following the acquisition of Shoppers. Cash flow from operations should track operating income over the medium term, while capital expenditures (capex) should remain in the current $1.2 billion to $1.4 billion per year with a shifting focus toward retail investments. The cash outlay related to dividends is expected to remain above the $400 million level. DBRS, therefore, continues to believe that Loblaw will generate free cash flow in the $700 million per year range. Loblaw is expected to use free cash flow in the near term primarily for debt repayment. DBRS forecasts that lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR attributable to the retail operations should return below 3.50 times (x) by the end of 2015, a level considered acceptable for the current rating. Over the longer term, DBRS expects that Loblaw will begin using free cash flow to complete share repurchases. Should operating performance remain solid and credit metrics improve further toward the Company’s stated target (i.e., lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR of 3.25x) as a result of growing operating income and/or continuing debt repayment, a positive rating action would likely result.

George Weston Limited, proud issuer of WN.PR.A, WN.PR.C, WN.PR.D and WN.PR.E (all Straight Perpetuals) was confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed the Issuer Rating and Medium-Term Notes and Debentures rating of George Weston Limited (Weston or the Company) at BBB, its Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-2 (high) and its Preferred Shares rating at Pfd-3, all with Stable trends. The confirmations reflect the confirmation of the ratings of Loblaw Companies Limited (Loblaw; see separate press release) as well as Weston’s stable balance-sheet debt levels despite pressure on the Weston Foods bakery business from higher commodity costs.

Weston’s financial profile is expected to remain relatively stable going forward based on the Company’s ownership in Loblaw, its cash-on-hand, and its stable balance-sheet debt levels. Weston announced a strategic plan in 2015, which includes expansionary capex of approximately $300 million in 2015 and approximately $170 million in 2016 to increase capacity (including two new facilities in the United States) and innovation in key growth areas. As a result of the increase in capex, Weston Foods is expected to incur a free cash flow deficit through the end of 2016. DBRS believes the Company will use a portion of its cash-on-hand to fund such investments, while maintaining at least $1 billion of cash-on-hand and short-term investments through the end of Loblaw’s deleveraging plans expected to be completed at the end of 2015. Over the longer-term DBRS expects the Company will continue to use cash-on-hand and free cash-flow generated to invest in growth (organic and/or acquisitions) and/or to increase returns to shareholders. Weston’s ownership interest in Loblaw could return above the 50% level in the medium term as Loblaw is expected to use free cash flow to complete share repurchases once it completes its deleveraging plan. DBRS notes that a positive rating action at Loblaw would not necessarily result in a corresponding rating action at Weston.

It was a modestly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 7bp, FixedResets losing 14bp and DeemedRetractibles off 4bp. The Performance Highlights table is notable for a large contingent of Enbridge FixedReset losers. Volume was high.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.99%, equivalent to 6.49% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 3.6% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 290bp, a widening from the 280bp reported March 18.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150325
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.80 to be $1.29 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.32 cheap at its bid price of 24.95.

impVol_MFC_150325
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.15 to be $0.52 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 25.47 to be $0.67 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150325
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 21.21 to be $0.67 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.14 and appears to be $0.64 rich.

impVol_FTS_150325
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.33, looks $1.49 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.10 rich.

pairs_FR_150325
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average over the next five years of a little under 0.10% – except for one outlier, TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F, which has a break-even of -0.51%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.09%.

pairs_FF_150325
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8864 % 2,354.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8864 % 4,116.5
Floater 3.22 % 3.22 % 61,060 19.18 3 1.8864 % 2,502.8
OpRet 4.06 % 0.48 % 101,768 0.24 1 0.1190 % 2,769.1
SplitShare 4.35 % 4.26 % 34,254 3.48 4 0.1700 % 3,215.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1190 % 2,532.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 1.77 % 57,064 0.08 25 0.0027 % 2,523.5
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.99 % 163,378 15.20 9 -0.0651 % 2,814.5
FixedReset 4.38 % 3.37 % 239,358 16.78 85 -0.1429 % 2,431.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % -0.20 % 112,356 0.17 37 -0.0427 % 2,657.1
FloatingReset 2.43 % 2.82 % 80,805 6.31 8 -0.1118 % 2,341.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 21.32
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 21.48
Evaluated at bid price : 21.48
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 19.86
Evaluated at bid price : 19.86
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 17.13
Evaluated at bid price : 17.13
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.09
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 4.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 15.43
Evaluated at bid price : 15.43
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.M FixedReset 208,600 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 154,275 Scotia crossed 122,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 147,624 RBC crossed 140,000 at 20.47.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 79,595 Scotia crossed 70,000 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : -3.27 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 76,980 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 74,225 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 23.51 – 23.91
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2391

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %

BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.67 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1915

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 1.50 %

TRP.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 24.01 – 24.44
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3202

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.87 – 24.24
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2688

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

ENB.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 19.86 – 20.14
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1934

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-25
Maturity Price : 19.86
Evaluated at bid price : 19.86
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 24.67 – 24.89
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1371

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

LBS.PR.A To Get Bigger

Wednesday, March 25th, 2015

Brompton Group has announced:

Life & Banc Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus with respect to a treasury offering of class A shares and preferred shares. The class A and preferred share offering prices will be set at levels that ensure that existing unitholders are not diluted.

Life & Banc Split Corp. invests in a portfolio of common shares of the six largest Canadian banks (“Banks”) and the four major publicly traded Canadian life insurance companies (“Lifecos”). Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of the following Banks and Lifecos:

The Bank of Nova Scotia Royal Bank of Canada
National Bank of Canada Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc.
The Toronto-Dominion Bank Great-West Lifeco Inc.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Manulife Financial Corporation
Bank of Montreal Sun Life Financial Inc.

The investment objectives for the class A shares are to provide holders with regular monthly cash distributions targeted to be $0.10 per class A share and to provide the opportunity for growth in net asset value per class A share.
The investment objectives for the preferred shares are to provide holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions in the amount of $0.11875 per preferred share ($0.475 per annum), representing a yield on the original issue price of 4.75% per annum, and to return the original issue price to holders of preferred shares on the maturity date of the Company, November 29, 2018.

The syndicate of agents for the offering is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC, Scotiabank, and TD Securities Inc., and includes BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Haywood Securities Inc., Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. and Mackie Research Capital Corporation.

LBS.PR.A last got bigger in November 2013. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2015-3-27: Priced:

Life & Banc Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce that the Company’s treasury offering of class A and preferred shares has been priced at $9.55 per class A share and $10.05 per preferred share. The final class A and preferred share offering prices were determined so as to be non-dilutive to the net asset value per unit of the Company on March 26, 2015, as adjusted for dividends accrued prior to or upon settlement of the offering.

That’s a pretty hefty premium to NAV which was 18.74 on March 26. However, the closing price on March 25 was 9.68 for the Capital Units and 10.17 for the preferreds (both are down today, pricing was made public at 11:27am), so it will probably go pretty well.