Archive for April, 2009

April 30, 2009

Thursday, April 30th, 2009

Bloomberg reports that:

American Express Co.’s preferred stock rating was cut to BB, or non-investment grade, from BBB by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services.

I don’t see anything on the S&P site as yet. Moodys downgraded on April 24:

Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the long-term and short-term ratings of American Express Company (“Amex”). The senior long-term debt rating was lowered to A3 from A2; and the short-term rating was lowered to Prime-2 from Prime-1. The outlook for the Amex long-term ratings is negative.

Moody’s also downgraded the long-term ratings of American Express Travel Related Services (“TRS”) and its rated operating subsidiaries, including American Express Credit Corp. The senior debt and deposit ratings of TRS and subsidiaries were downgraded to A2 from A1. The Bank Financial Strength Ratings of American Express Bank, FSB and American Express Centurion Bank were also lowered to C+ from B-. The Prime-1 short-term ratings for TRS and its rated operating subsidiaries were affirmed. The rating outlook for the TRS debt and deposit ratings is now stable. The outlook on the Banks’ Financial Strength Ratings (“BFSR”) is negative. These rating actions conclude the review initiated on February 25, 2009.

Today’s rating actions reflect the erosion of Amex’s asset quality and weaker revenue trends stemming from the severe U.S. economic recession and the firm’s relatively high credit exposure in the states most heavily affected by home price declines, particularly California and Florida. Moody’s believes that these developments, in combination with structural and regulatory changes in the credit card and consumer lending industry, pose longer term challenges to the company’s franchise.

Chrysler is bust and there could be a fascinating catfight in the works:

The iconic company, third biggest among U.S. automakers, missed a U.S. government deadline to come up with a restructuring plan by today that was rigorous enough to avoid bankruptcy and qualify for more bailout aid. The carmaker tried to negotiate an alliance with Fiat, reduce $6.9 billion in secured loans and cut $10.6 billion owed to a pension fund. Some lenders refused to slash the debt to $2.25 billion.

Bankruptcy can involve uncertainty and delay. Dissident creditors intend to object to the company’s reorganization plan, a person familiar with their thinking said. That might thwart President Barack Obama’s goal of a “surgical” bankruptcy that would put a viable carmaker quickly into the market.

Funny story on credit ratings:

[Retired lawyer Ron] Grassi says the companies’ faulty debt analyses have been at the core of the global financial meltdown and the firms should be held accountable. Exhibit One is his own investment. He and his wife, Sally, held $40,000 in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bonds because all three credit raters gave them at least an A rating — meaning they were a safe investment — right until Sept. 15, the day Lehman filed for bankruptcy.

“They’re supposed to spot time bombs,” Grassi says. “The bombs exploded before the credit companies acted.”

In the brave new world of credit ratings, there won’t be any of this mealy-mouthed “A” and “A(high)” stuff. Only two ratings will be allowed: “Good as Gold” and “Going Bankrupt Next Week”. Any errors will be prima facie evidence of a crime.

The Bank of Canada has released a new working paper, Price Movements in the Canadian Residential Mortgage Market:

The authors empirically analyze the price-setting behaviour of the major Canadian banks in the residential mortgage market over the period 1991–2007. They use weekly posted prices of the major mortgage providers to study the degree of competition in mortgage price setting. Their results suggest that the residential mortgage market is imperfectly competitive. They find distinct price leaders and that, as market concentration increases, so does price dispersion – helped by the increased use of discounting from posted prices. The authors also find that, although banks’ pass-through of input price changes to mortgage prices is complete in the long run under reasonable assumptions regarding discounting, there exists some level of pricing asymmetry in the short run.

And the FDIC has circulated a new batch of ticky-boxes:

A number of insured banks with portfolio holdings in private label mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), or asset-backed securities (ABS) are facing heightened losses as a result of significant investments in these products. Certain structured credit products, particularly private label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs, have experienced deteriorating collateral performance, price declines, and credit rating downgrades. Management due diligence regarding purchases of these products was often lacking. This Financial Institution Letter reiterates and clarifies existing supervisory guidance on the purchase and holding of complex structured credit products. It focuses on the various supervisory concerns related to these securities: pre-purchase analysis, suitability determination, risk limits, credit ratings, valuation, ongoing due diligence, adverse classification, and capital treatment.

Whoosh, what a day! The seminar went well (by which I mean, nobody actually threw rocks at me) and I’ll be arranging the next one shortly. The preferred share market roared ahead on good volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6358 % 970.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6358 % 1,569.7
Floater 4.52 % 4.56 % 71,317 16.29 2 0.6358 % 1,212.6
OpRet 5.09 % 4.38 % 141,660 3.19 15 -0.2930 % 2,137.9
SplitShare 6.55 % 8.13 % 46,232 5.61 3 0.5418 % 1,765.7
Interest-Bearing 6.02 % 7.05 % 28,439 0.65 1 0.4032 % 1,979.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3472 % 1,650.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.63 % 6.80 % 140,745 12.85 71 0.3472 % 1,520.0
FixedReset 5.84 % 5.04 % 593,828 4.54 36 0.4315 % 1,939.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -3.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 8.25 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.06
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.35
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 17.17
Evaluated at bid price : 17.17
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 14.45
Evaluated at bid price : 14.45
Bid-YTW : 8.36 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 16.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.09
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 18.78
Evaluated at bid price : 18.78
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.46
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.31
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 18.58
Evaluated at bid price : 18.58
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 16.33
Evaluated at bid price : 16.33
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 2.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.66 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company. BAM.A closed at 18.28 today, compared to 17.57 on March 31, so we can estimate the current coverage as 1.8-:1. I wonder how high it has to get before the yield becomes single digit.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.51
Bid-YTW : 13.01 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 294,014 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 226,206 Desjardins crossed 200,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
CM.PR.A OpRet 113,349 TD bought 50,000 from Desjardins at 25.85, then another 25,000 at the same price. Desjardins crossed 33,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : -9.75 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 80,521 RBC crossed 11,200 at 17.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 17.84
Evaluated at bid price : 17.84
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 65,854 Scotia crossed 51,000 at 17.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 17.29
Evaluated at bid price : 17.29
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 56,860 Anonymous crossed (? not necessarily the same anonymous) 25,000 at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Thursday April 30 : Seminar on Floating Rate Preferreds

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

I just want to remind all Assiduous Readers about the next seminar in the the series on the theory and practice of preferred share investing.

These seminars are aimed at active and potential preferred share investors who wish to review relative valuation techniques in preferred share analysis.

All seminars will be presented by James Hymas, who has written extensively on the subject of preferred share investment and has been referred to as a "top expert" on the subject.

Questions are encouraged throughout the seminars, as well as in informal discussion at the end of the session.

Each seminar is two hours in length; coffee and tea will be served. The cost of attendance is $100, but a discount of $50 will be given to participants who have an annual subscription to PrefLetter with at least one issue remaining at the time of the seminar.

All seminars will be video-recorded for future distribution.

Thursday, April 30

Floating Rate Issues: Theory & Practice

"Floating Rate Issues" are popular with investors who:

  • wish to obtain tax-advantaged income
  • want protection against future inflation

These issues are characterized by:

  • Issued by Operating companies
    • Extant issues are non-financial
  • Dividends are paid by reference to Canada Prime
  • An exchange option may exist to lock in a rate for five years on a given date
  • Issues are Perpetual

This seminar will review the theory of Floating Rate Preferred evaluation, including:

  • Credit Quality
  • Embedded calls
  • Exchange Options
  • The importance of ex-Dividend dates
  • Investment characteristics relative to
    • money market instruments
    • other perpetual instruments

Examples of relative valuation in current markets will be supplied and discussed. Note that Floating Rate issues include the HIMIPref™ Indices:

  • Ratchet
  • FixedFloater
  • Floater

. "FixedReset" issues will not be discussed as part of this seminar.

Attendence is limited; a reservation will avoid disappointment.

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) Yorkville Room (see map).

Time: April 30, 2009, 6pm-8pm.

Reservations: Please visit the PrefLetter Seminar Page.

Prior Seminars on Video: The video and resource materials for the seminar on PerpetualDiscounts is available via the PrefLetter Video Seminar Page.

EPP.PR.A: Credit Trend Cut to Negative by DBRS

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

DBRS has announced that it:

today changed the trend on the BBB (high) Senior Unsecured Debt and Medium-Term Notes rating of EPCOR Power L.P. (Power LP) to Negative from Stable, as well as the trend on the Pfd-3 (high) Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares, Series 1 rating of EPCOR Power Equity Ltd. DBRS has also downgraded the Power LP stability rating to STA-2 (middle) from STA-2 (high).

The actions follow the release of Power LP’s first-quarter 2009 earnings, which showed a net loss of $33 million that when combined with distributions, led to a $47 million decline in partners’ equity. The net loss was largely the result of a $50 million unrealized loss on the change in the fair value of natural gas supply and foreign exchange contracts. This followed a net loss of $68 million for year-end 2008, the primary driver of which was unrealized fair value losses. These non-cash fair value losses have resulted in a decrease in partners’ equity, which is largely responsible for the increase in Power LP’s debt-to-total-capital ratio from less than 40% in 2007 to the current 55%. The accounting recognition of these fair value changes is not reflective of the underlying economic circumstances, as the natural gas is largely used to produce electricity, which is sold at contracted rates.

DBRS noted on March 6, 2009, that while Power LP had ample room under its maintenance covenants (primarily that debt-to-total capital not exceed 65%), an increase in Power LP’s debt-to-total capital level closer to the maintenance covenant restriction would result in financial flexibility being reduced, which could lead to negative rating implications. With the current increase in debt-to-total capital to 55%, combined with Power LP’s expectation of an additional US$72 million in debt in 2009 to fund capital expenditures, there is a likely scenario that Power LP’s leverage ratio would approach 60%, and potentially exceed that value if there were additional negative fair value impacts. This scenario will constrain financial flexibility for the current debt and preferred rating levels. DBRS will continue to monitor the situation, with a one-notch downgrade of the current debt and preferred ratings likely if Power LP’s financial flexibility continues to diminish and the prospect of a covenant issue becomes more concrete. Alternatively, if leverage ratio pressure were to be alleviated (e.g., through asset sales, unit issuance, a reversal in fair value changes, etc.), DBRS would consider returning the trends to Stable.

The stability rating has been downgraded to reflect (1) that a decrease in distributions would be one of Power LP’s options to shore up its partners’ equity level in the event of a covenant issue and (2) weakness in distributable cash flow, which has resulted in the payout ratio (DBRS adjusted) continuing to exceed 100% – it increased to approximately 120% on a last 12 months basis ending March 31, 2009, compared with 110% at year-end 2008.

EPP.PR.A is a PerpetualDiscount currently quoted at 15.21-64 to yield 8.11% at the bid. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog in the post EPP.PR.A and WN.PR.E: Coupled? Decoupled?. Those keeping track of such things will note that WN.PR.E now yields 7.24% … way, way, way, WAY through the EPP issue.

The issue continues to be split-rated, with S&P gauging it as P-2(low) on the national scale. It may be noted that the Credit Rating of the company itself is BBB+/Negative Trend by S&P, so everybody’s carefully watching!

EPP.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the “Scraps” Index on credit concerns.

April 29, 2009

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

Daniel Bouton is resigning as chairman of SocGen, brought down – at least in part – by the Kerviel scandal which exposed grossly incompetent management.

And Ken Lewis is defending his role in BofA’s Merrill purchase, on the grounds that he is responsible for the global financial system. Perhaps the global financial system should be the one paying him.

Ravi Balakrishnan (IMF), Stephan Danninger (IMF), Selim Elekdag (Central Bank Turkey) and Irina Tytell (IMF) have published an essay on VoxEU, How financial stress spreads – A first comprehensive look at the current crisis, in which they claim:

The twist in the current crisis is that bank-lending linkages appear to be the main driver, rather than the more mobile portfolio investment links that drove the Asian crisis. Since the mid-1990s, Western European banks have dominated bank-lending flows. Emerging Europe stands out as the largest recipient (Figure 2). Using an econometric model for stress transmission, we find that an increase in bank liabilities to Western Europe from 15% to 50% of GDP (roughly the difference between Emerging Europe and other emerging regions) doubles the strength of stress transmission. It is no surprise therefore that Emerging Europe was the first emerging market region to be hit hard by the crisis.

Just another reason to surcharge Risk-Weighted-Assets for bank size and for recent growth. There is also probably good reason to apply a higher risk-weight to holdings due from other banks.

A very good day for the market on increased volume … possibly artificially juiced by portfolio adjustment for the closing of RY.PR.Y. PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.79%, equivalent to 9.51% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield 7.4% (a hair under? Maybe.), so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now 211bp … about average for the Credit Crunch, well down from the highs of November, but still above the pre-Crunch range of 100-150bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3456 % 964.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3456 % 1,559.8
Floater 4.55 % 4.59 % 70,729 16.24 2 -0.3456 % 1,204.9
OpRet 5.07 % 4.28 % 135,290 2.64 15 0.4952 % 2,144.2
SplitShare 6.58 % 8.09 % 46,631 5.61 3 0.5962 % 1,756.1
Interest-Bearing 6.05 % 7.65 % 28,365 0.65 1 -0.3015 % 1,971.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4027 % 1,644.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.65 % 6.79 % 141,829 12.86 71 0.4027 % 1,514.8
FixedReset 5.86 % 5.09 % 601,963 4.54 36 0.4076 % 1,931.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.67
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.66 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.02 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 7.74 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 20.37
Evaluated at bid price : 20.37
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 18.26
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 20.39
Evaluated at bid price : 20.39
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 17.76
Evaluated at bid price : 17.76
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 17.06
Evaluated at bid price : 17.06
Bid-YTW : 7.87 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 23.76
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 16.78
Evaluated at bid price : 16.78
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 24.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 21.92
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 17.64
Evaluated at bid price : 17.64
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 7.72 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 6.90 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 985,152 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 81,085 RBC crossed 20,000 at 26.45. CIBC crossed 38,000 at 26.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 57,675 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
CM.PR.R OpRet 48,900 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 25.70, Nesbitt crossed 12,000 at 25.70, and anonymous bought 15,000 from CIBC at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.60
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 0.08 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 48,170 Holy smokes, a bid with a 27-handle! You young whippersnappers haven’t ever seen anything like it, eh?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 47,452 Scotia crossed 10,000 at 17.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-29
Maturity Price : 17.22
Evaluated at bid price : 17.22
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

RY.PR.Y Soars to Premium on Frantic Trading

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

It was a very good opening day for RY.PR.Y, the Fixed-Reset 6.10%+413 issue announced last week that settled today.

It traded 985,152 shares in a range of 25.30-50 before closing at 25.48-49, 31×22. Vital statistics are:

RY.PR.Y FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %

RY.PR.Y has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset subindex.

Update, 2009-5-1: There are 13-million shares outstanding, implying that the full revised greenshoe of 1-million shares was exercised in full.

April 28, 2009

Tuesday, April 28th, 2009

CalPERS has announced:

it is voting against the re-election of all 18 Bank of America directors, including Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Ken Lewis.

CalPERS contends that Lewis and other directors failed to disclose information to shareowners in connection with Bank of America’s merger with Merrill Lynch. The pension fund also believes that the undisclosed payment of billions of dollars in bonuses to Merrill Lynch executives – before completion of the merger – warrants a vote against all directors.

“The entire board failed in its duties to shareowners and should be removed,” said CalPERS Board President Rob Feckner. He noted the poor condition of the company, the failure by directors to disclose the extent of Merrill Lynch’s losses prior to consummation of the merger, the payment of billions of dollars to Merrill executives in bonuses for failure, and the failure of the board to act in the best interests of shareowners in overseeing management.

Mr. Lewis’ travails, publicized by Andrew Cuomo, were discussed on PrefBlog on April 24.

One wonders whether the CalPERS decision is genuine or another machination of the Obama Administration which – as far as I can tell – is looking to blame US economic problems on Evil Bankers. The response is warranted enough, but the emphasis on bonuses detracts from the credibility of the release.

The bonus issue for investment managers surfaced in Parliament last week, according to the Globe & Mail:

Senior officers of the [Public Sector Pension Investment] board fielded numerous questions from MPs at the Commons finance committee about whether they would receive bonuses – answering only that it will be up to their board of directors to decide.

But MPs warned the board’s managers that taking bonuses for the 2008-09 fiscal year could not be justified.

“Anyone in this country running something called an investment board that lost billions of dollars last year that even thinks of paying themselves a bonus needs their head [examined],” NDP finance critic Tom Mulcair told John Valentini, the investment board’s chief operating officer. “I’d like you to give that message to your board of directors.

“We would find it properly scandalous if in the light of what happened last year, that in addition to your considerable salaries, you decide to vote yourself bonuses.”

Liberal MP John McKay echoed the sentiment, telling the board’s managers that they should be eschewing bonuses when Canadian taxpayers are suffering.

“It would be inappropriate for your organization to be awarding themselves significant bonuses in light of not only your performance … but also the market conditions,” said Mr. McKay, a former parliamentary secretary to the finance minister under the last Liberal government. “Canadians have taken a pretty major haircut in the market in the last while.”

The quoted statements are so ignorant that I do not believe they were honestly made. The implication is that investment managers’ bonuses should be determined by the performance of the market, rather than by performance relative to a benchmark; and that a manager should get a bonus for deliviering +10% returns in a +20% market, but not receive one for a -10% return in a -20% market.

The politicians know this as well as I do. But sleazebag gutter politics gets their names in the paper, which is all that counts, right?

Good volume in the pref market today; PerpetualDiscounts managed to eke out a gain and FixedResets outperformed.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5158 % 967.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5158 % 1,565.2
Floater 4.54 % 4.57 % 74,332 16.28 2 -0.5158 % 1,209.1
OpRet 5.10 % 4.30 % 136,779 2.64 15 0.1474 % 2,133.6
SplitShare 6.62 % 8.50 % 46,752 5.61 3 0.4620 % 1,745.7
Interest-Bearing 6.03 % 7.14 % 27,441 0.65 1 1.0152 % 1,977.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0688 % 1,638.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.67 % 6.80 % 142,181 12.84 71 0.0688 % 1,508.7
FixedReset 5.87 % 5.15 % 623,668 4.54 35 0.1776 % 1,923.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 18.16
Evaluated at bid price : 18.16
Bid-YTW : 7.13 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.38
Evaluated at bid price : 17.38
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 14.21
Evaluated at bid price : 14.21
Bid-YTW : 8.50 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.62
Evaluated at bid price : 17.62
Bid-YTW : 7.20 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.03
Evaluated at bid price : 17.03
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 16.55
Evaluated at bid price : 16.55
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
STW.PR.A Interest-Bearing 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2009-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.95
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 16.83
Evaluated at bid price : 16.83
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 19.58
Evaluated at bid price : 19.58
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 23.64
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.10 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.10
Bid-YTW : 13.47 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.88
Evaluated at bid price : 17.88
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 3.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 3.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 8.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 85,557 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 84,820 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 80,155 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 39,995 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 37,591 RBC crossed 20,000 at 17.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.76
Evaluated at bid price : 17.76
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 34,405 Scotia bought 18,000 from Nesbitt at 27.00. It’s been a long time since I saw a 27-handle (on prices, I mean … seen WAY too many on yields!)
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

April 27, 2009

Monday, April 27th, 2009

Sheila Bair of the FDIC made a speech today indicating willingness to move towards better risk assessment of banks:

So who should pay for an “anybody can fail” doctrine? Certainly not the taxpayer. As a tax-paying citizen, I don’t favor encouraging foolish behavior. Nor should those costs be borne by the Deposit Insurance Fund, which should continue to be used only for the costs of protecting depositors when banks fail.

A new resolution authority could include assessments on larger firms to fund a reserve that would be tapped to absorb losses for a failure. I believe it’s only fair that the industry that benefits should pay … just as banks pay for deposit insurance.

The assessments could be based on the differential in the cost of capital between smaller institutions — which clearly can fail and thus have higher costs — and their larger competitors. Moreover, we should not base this strictly on size, which might not be perfectly aligned with risk. For example, a large mutual fund that invests in the S&P 500 is not systemic. Risk-based surcharges should be imposed on higher risk behavior. This might include certain derivatives, market making or proprietary trading, and rapid growth. We now have such a risk-based system for the insurance premiums we charge for deposit insurance, and it’s working very well.

My problem with the ideas as stated is that they are not integrated with other elements of bank regulation – which, to be fair, she probably does not want to be seen as encroaching upon. I certainly supported graduated risk premia – we have such a thing in Canada, but it’s a joke: just about everybody qualifies for the lowest premium level. And I support the idea that bank capital requirements should include elements such as a surcharge for size – say, for instance, risk-weighted-assets in excess of $250-billion attract a 10% surcharge – and better differentiation between investment banking (which should penalize buy-and-hold behaviour) and regular banking (which should penalize trading).

However, the FDIC still charges premia based on all deposits, not just insured deposits, which is simply craziness – it reduces the incentive for banks to pay premium rates for non-insured deposits and leaves the FDIC with something of an obligation to make good on the uninsured deposits of a failed bank. Premium reform needs to start there.

These are the germs of good ideas, but to some extent are encroaching on the role of the Fed as US banking regulator. If reform efforts are not to degenerate into intra-regulator cat-fights, Ms. Bair will have to be very careful!

Another good solid day for prefs, with FixedResets slightly outperforming PerpetualDiscounts.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5131 % 972.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5131 % 1,573.3
Floater 4.51 % 4.52 % 73,738 16.37 2 -0.5131 % 1,215.4
OpRet 5.11 % 4.27 % 141,345 3.85 15 -0.2940 % 2,130.5
SplitShare 6.65 % 8.48 % 47,172 5.62 3 -0.3750 % 1,737.7
Interest-Bearing 6.09 % 8.68 % 27,074 0.65 1 -0.1014 % 1,957.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2323 % 1,637.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.68 % 6.81 % 141,758 12.83 71 0.2323 % 1,507.7
FixedReset 5.88 % 5.21 % 632,575 4.54 35 0.3303 % 1,919.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -4.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 8.58 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 17.81
Evaluated at bid price : 17.81
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.69 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.83
Bid-YTW : 13.78 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 7.00 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 23.47
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 20.20
Evaluated at bid price : 20.20
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 19.22
Evaluated at bid price : 19.22
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 18.71
Evaluated at bid price : 18.71
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 20.46
Evaluated at bid price : 20.46
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 20.83
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 22.87
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 16.46
Evaluated at bid price : 16.46
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 18.10
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 16.76
Evaluated at bid price : 16.76
Bid-YTW : 8.00 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,174 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 65,575 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 51,241 Scotia crossed 48,300 at 25.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-09-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 40,478 Scotia crossed 11,600 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 40,100 RBC crossed 25,000 at 8.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-27
Maturity Price : 8.78
Evaluated at bid price : 8.78
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 38,015 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Shorting Prefs: Part 2

Saturday, April 25th, 2009

I have recently received an eMail from an Assiduous Reader who, having read the post Shorting Prefs, writes in and says:

I read the “Shorting Prefs” discussion dated February 19th, 2009 under the archive for ‘Reader Initiated Comments’ in your PrefBlog. I find this subject very interesting as it appears to be a very low risk way of profiting from inefficiencies in the pricing of pref shares.

As an example, I recently found two issues of Royal Bank perpetual prefs with almost identical annual dividends, but one yielding 6.5% and the other 6.2%. A study of historic trading revealed the two issues often traded at the same yield in the past year or two. Subsequently, I bought the higher yielding pref and shorted the lower yielding pref. If and when the two prefs trade with the same yield, my maximum profit will be about 4.6% (=0.3/6.5) on one side of the trade on a before tax basis.

I have found shorting pref shares online to be extremely easy with TD Waterhouse. There appears to be no problem in selling any pref short. I have sold five different prefs short to date. The uptick rule does apply, so sometimes you have to wait a while for your order to be executed, but this is a minor problem. Also the short interest positions on pref shares are readily available from Stockwatch.com, which is free for the first 30 days. The short interest positions on most pref shares appear to be very low (less than 1% of the shares outstanding).

My question is on holding a short position through the ex-dividend date. I realize I will have to pay my broker (TD Waterhouse) for any dividends that are paid out on my short position. But, am I liable for the extra dividend tax credit on the short position as well? Don’t short positions create extra dividends over and above what the issuer is paying out? This means extra dividend tax credits will be created. Does the Canadian government get stuck with paying out extra dividend tax credits because of short selling? These are questions for which I cannot find any answers on the internet relating to Canada, although I did find some information relating to the U.S. In the U.S., it appears that the extra dividends paid out by short sellers may be ineligible for tax purposes, according to one website. Brokers could then assign these ineligible dividends to tax neutral accounts. I am sure a tax paying investor would be extremely upset if he found out his dividends were ineligible because his shares were sold short without his knowledge.

I would appreciate any insights you have on the topic of short selling and dividend
tax credits.

The tax question came up in the post BBD.PR.B / BBD.PR.D, where, to my chagrin, I was punished for stepping outside my specialty with respect to the application of tax laws.

All I’m willing to do with respect to the tax laws now is refer to Section 260(6) of the Income Tax Act:

(6) In computing a taxpayer’s income under Part I from a business or property
(a) where the taxpayer is not a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of an amount that, if paid, would be deemed by subsection 260(5) to have been received by another person as a taxable dividend; and

(b) where the taxpayer is a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of more than 2/3 of that amount.

However, with respect to the inefficiencies of the marketplace, I will agree that a long-only account can occasionally pick up a little extra yield by swapping between similar issues. An example of this was given in the post MAPF Performance: August 2008.

April 24, 2009

Saturday, April 25th, 2009

It appears that we will be treated to the spectacle of a regulatory cat-fight in the States. Andrew Cuomo has released a letter to Congress in which he discusses the BofA / Merrill Lynch merger:

Immediately after learning on December 14,2008 of what Lewis described as the “staggering amount of deterioration” at Merrill Lynch, Lewis conferred with counsel to determine if Bank of America had grounds to rescind the merger agreement by using a clause that allowed Bank of America to exit the deal if a material adverse event (“MAC”) occurred. After a series of internal consultations and consultations with counsel, on December 17,2008, Lewis informed then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that Bank of America was seriously considering invoking the MAC clause. Paulson asked Lewis to come to Washington that evening to discuss the matter.

At a meeting that evening Secretary Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Lewis, Bank of America’s CFO, and other officials discussed the issues surrounding invocation of the MAC clause by Bank of America. The Federal officials asked Bank of America not to invoke the MAC until there was further consultation. There were follow-up calls with various Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, including with Treasury Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke. During those meetings, the federal government officials pressured Bank of America not to seek to rescind the merger agreement. We do not yet have a complete picture of the Federal Reserve’s role in these matters because the Federal Reserve has invoked the bank examination privilege.

Bank of America’s attempt to exit the merger came to a halt on December 21, 2008. That day, Lewis informed Secretary Paulson that Bank of America still wanted to exit the merger agreement. According to Lewis, Secretary Paulson then advised Lewis that, if Bank of America invoked the MAC, its management and Board would be replaced.

In an interview with this Office, Secretary Paulson [argely corroborated Lewis’s account. On the issue of terminating management and the Board, Secretary Paulson indicated that he told Lewis that if Bank of America were to back out of the Merrill Lynch deal, the government either could or would remove the Board and management. Secretary Paulson told Lewis a series of concerns, including that Bank of America’s invocation of the MAC would create systemic risk and that Bank of America did not have a legal basis to invoke the MAC (though Secretary Paulson’s basis for the opinion was e,ntirely based on what he was told by Federal Reserve officials).

Notably, during Bank of America’s important communications with federal banking officials in late December 2008, the lone federal agency charged with protecting investor interests, the Securities and Exchange Commission, appears to have been kept in the dark. Indeed, Secretary Paulson informed this Office that he did not keep the SEC Chairman in the loop during the discussions and negotiations with Bank of America in December 2008.

The proper thing for Lewis and the board to do, of course, was to back out and get fired with honour; the claim is made that this would have increased systemic risk and they were craven in the best interests of the global financial system.

Now, Bloomberg reports that:

Bank of America Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth D. Lewis may face scrutiny by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for failing to disclose mounting losses at Merrill Lynch & Co. because of pressure from federal regulators to complete the takeover.

“We have been actively reviewing the disclosure surrounding the merger between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch,” said agency spokesman John Nester. “The issues identified in New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s letter are part of our review.”

Sounds like Ken Lewis will be hung out to dry. While I think he made the wrong decision, he certainly has my sympathy; I know very well that being a mouse in a roomful of angry elephants is not a lot of fun.

One of the Master Asset Vehicle notes has been placed under Review-Negative:

In addition to the potential impact of the interest shortfall, the following factors contributed to DBRS placing the rating of the MAVII A-2 Notes Under Review with Negative Implications:

(1) On March 16, 2009, DBRS was advised that MAVII’s credit default swap transactions with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) were terminated due to the failure of MAVII to post additional collateral to meet a margin call. The termination resulted in losses of $107,742,597 (or approximately 1.1% of the assets of MAVII). As a result, the enhancement available to the MAVII A-2 Notes has been reduced by 1.1%, whereas the enhancement percentage for the MAVI Class A-2 Notes was unaffected.

Sorry that this is being published so late, folks, but I had an engagement Friday night.

The market was up today, FixedResets and PerpetualDiscounts gaining about 15bp each total return, but volume was down sharply to below-average levels, something that might be considered significant by the chartists among us (yes, there are still a few!) but not considered significant by right-thinking people.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1713 % 977.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1713 % 1,581.4
Floater 4.49 % 4.52 % 68,413 16.39 2 0.1713 % 1,221.6
OpRet 5.09 % 4.39 % 142,900 3.70 15 -0.0935 % 2,136.8
SplitShare 6.63 % 8.43 % 47,315 5.63 3 0.3421 % 1,744.2
Interest-Bearing 6.09 % 8.42 % 26,204 0.66 1 0.5097 % 1,959.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1433 % 1,633.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.69 % 6.84 % 141,327 12.78 71 0.1433 % 1,504.2
FixedReset 5.90 % 5.22 % 652,847 4.55 35 0.1546 % 1,913.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.73
Evaluated at bid price : 17.73
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 22.93
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.79
Evaluated at bid price : 17.79
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 16.79
Evaluated at bid price : 16.79
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 25.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.56 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.05
Bid-YTW : 13.51 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 106,745 Nesbitt crossed 98,900 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 39,132 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 34,925 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.56
Evaluated at bid price : 17.56
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 32,576 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 31,132 Nesbitt bought 18,000 from RBC at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 31,029 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

PerpetualDiscounts Video Seminar Accredited for CE Hours

Friday, April 24th, 2009

I am pleased to announce that the Seminar on PerpetualDiscounts has been accredited for four hours of IDA Continuing Education – Professional Development.