Archive for July, 2016

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July, 2016

Sunday, July 31st, 2016

Turnover in July remained elevated by standards of the past few year at about 11%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on July 29 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2016-7-29
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0% N/A N/A
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 10.4% 5.15% 15.16
Fixed-Reset 72.9% 7.53% 10.00
Deemed-Retractible 0% N/A N/A
FloatingReset 7.9% 11.13% 7.28
Scraps (Various) 9.7% 7.06% 12.91
Cash -0.9% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 7.59% 10.70
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 0.65% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.51%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2016-7-29
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 0 (0)
Pfd-2(high) 29.4%
Pfd-2 37.2%
Pfd-2(low) 24.6%
Pfd-3(high) 2.6%
Pfd-3 4.0%
Pfd-3(low) 2.4%
Pfd-4(high) 0%
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0%
Pfd-5(high) 0.7%
Pfd-5 0.0%
Cash -0.9%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5(high) by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.
A position held in BIP.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-2(low)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-2(low).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2016-07-29
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 19.7%
$50,000 – $100,000 38.6%
$100,000 – $200,000 35.0%
$200,000 – $300,000 2.7%
>$300,000 4.9%
Cash -0.9%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

MAPF Performance: June, 2016

Sunday, July 31st, 2016

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close June 30, 2016, was $7.6704 after a distribution of $0.111736

Returns to June 30, 2016
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month -1.49% -0.61% -0.63% N/A
Three Months +4.58% +2.38% +2.85% N/A
One Year -13.79% -9.25% -9.67% -10.16%
Two Years (annualized) -10.21% -8.35% -8.54% N/A
Three Years (annualized) -4.53% -4.59% -4.71% -5.10%
Four Years (annualized) -1.97% -2.74% -2.96% N/A
Five Years (annualized) -1.61% -1.32% -1.61% -2.05%
Six Years (annualized) +1.66% +1.12% +0.46%  
Seven Years (annualized) +4.19% +2.69% +1.73%  
Eight Years (annualized) +8.32% +2.33% +1.53%  
Nine Years (annualized) +6.83% +1.57% +0.63%  
Ten Years (annualized) +6.67% +1.38%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +6.47% +1.38%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +6.75% +1.91%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +7.74% +2.09%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +7.69% +2.50%    
Fifteen Years (annualized) +7.16% +2.33%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.61%, +3.37% and -7.78%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is -2.62%; five year is -0.36%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -1.22%, +2.41% & -11.06%, respectively. It will be noted that AIC Preferred Income Fund was in existence prior to August, 2009, but long term performance figures have been suppressed.
Figures for Horizons Active Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.85%, +2.71% & -7.52%, respectively. Three year performance is -3.12%, five-year is -0.31%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -0.92%, +2.58% and -8.70% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively. Three year performance is -4.83%
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -14.99% for twelve months. Two year performance is -13.81%, three year is -8,97%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are -%, +% and -% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are +% and -% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series F are -8.39% for the past twelve months. The three-year figure is -5.27%; five years is -2.87%
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are +%, +% and -% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three-, four- and five-year figures are -%, -%, -% and -%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
September, 2015 7.8140 6.98% 0.999 6.987% 1.0000 $0.5460
December, 2015 8.1379 6.85% 0.997 6.871% 1.0000 $0.5592
March, 2016 7.4416 7.79% 0.998 7.805% 1.0000 $0.5808
June, 2016 7.6704 7.67% 1.011 7.587% 1.0000 $0.5819
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates. For September 30, 2015, yields of 0.78% and 0.40%, respectively, were assumed; base rates in December, 2015, were 0.71% and 0.46%, respectively. March, 2016: 0.70% and 0.44%; June, 2016: 0.57% and 0.47%.

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on June 30, 2016; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: June, 2016

Sunday, July 31st, 2016

Turnover in June ticked upward to about 13%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on June 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2016-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0% N/A N/A
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 12.2% 5.41% 14.81
Fixed-Reset 69.2% 7.71% 10.35
Deemed-Retractible 0% N/A N/A
FloatingReset 10.4% 9.63% 9.30
Scraps (Various) 9.3% 7.26% 12.72
Cash -1.1% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 7.67% 11.12
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 0.57% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.47%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2016-06-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 0 (0)
Pfd-2(high) 27.0%
Pfd-2 39.0%
Pfd-2(low) 25.8%
Pfd-3(high) 2.6%
Pfd-3 3.7%
Pfd-3(low) 2.3%
Pfd-4(high) 0%
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0%
Pfd-5(high) 0.7%
Pfd-5 0.0%
Cash -1.1%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5(high) by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.
A position held in BIP.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-2(low)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-2(low).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2016-06-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 11.0%
$50,000 – $100,000 50.4%
$100,000 – $200,000 29.4%
$200,000 – $300,000 4.8%
>$300,000 5.6%
Cash -1.1%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

July 29, 2016

Friday, July 29th, 2016
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4262 % 1,686.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4262 % 3,081.2
Floater 4.87 % 4.61 % 88,067 16.12 4 -0.4262 % 1,775.7
OpRet 4.84 % 0.23 % 47,877 0.09 1 -0.2366 % 2,848.1
SplitShare 5.11 % 5.41 % 99,680 4.55 5 0.1206 % 3,369.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1206 % 2,629.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % -2.28 % 80,171 0.09 12 0.0193 % 2,702.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.17 % 5.12 % 105,412 14.79 26 -0.0494 % 2,867.7
FixedReset 4.99 % 4.26 % 148,870 7.09 88 -0.0643 % 2,039.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 4.70 % 119,801 0.24 33 -0.2833 % 2,783.4
FloatingReset 2.94 % 4.43 % 30,771 5.14 11 0.0880 % 2,155.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 11.79
Evaluated at bid price : 11.79
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.73
Bid-YTW : 9.30 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 15.66
Evaluated at bid price : 15.66
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 10.34
Evaluated at bid price : 10.34
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 15.82
Evaluated at bid price : 15.82
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 13.36
Evaluated at bid price : 13.36
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.31
Bid-YTW : 9.70 %
CCS.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.12
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
BAM.PF.H FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 20.67
Evaluated at bid price : 20.67
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 20.17
Evaluated at bid price : 20.17
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.45
Bid-YTW : 9.60 %
BAM.PR.S FloatingReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 14.75
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 163,725 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
BAM.PF.H FixedReset 104,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
HSE.PR.G FixedReset 77,110 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 20.05
Evaluated at bid price : 20.05
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 54,590 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 32,490 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 12.63
Evaluated at bid price : 12.63
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 26,793 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
There were 12 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.81 – 27.40
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3822

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 17.35 – 18.10
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.5751

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-29
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

BNS.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 24.01 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2740

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.91 – 26.34
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2771

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-28
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : -2.28 %

NA.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 24.24 – 24.70
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3212

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.24
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 15.73 – 16.05
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.73
Bid-YTW : 9.30 %

July 28, 2016

Thursday, July 28th, 2016
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5715 % 1,693.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5715 % 3,094.4
Floater 4.85 % 4.54 % 87,855 16.18 4 0.5715 % 1,783.3
OpRet 4.83 % -2.31 % 44,331 0.09 1 0.0394 % 2,854.9
SplitShare 5.12 % 5.56 % 100,707 4.55 5 -0.0322 % 3,365.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0322 % 2,625.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % -3.86 % 81,191 0.09 12 0.5544 % 2,701.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.17 % 5.11 % 104,583 14.80 26 0.4468 % 2,869.2
FixedReset 4.98 % 4.28 % 147,833 7.11 88 0.0875 % 2,040.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 4.88 % 118,698 0.42 33 0.4089 % 2,791.3
FloatingReset 2.94 % 4.49 % 31,224 5.14 11 0.6993 % 2,153.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 12.70
Evaluated at bid price : 12.70
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 12.11
Evaluated at bid price : 12.11
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.24
Bid-YTW : 9.81 %
NA.PR.Q FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
BMO.PR.R FloatingReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.39
Bid-YTW : 9.60 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 10.51
Evaluated at bid price : 10.51
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 9.51 %
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
TD.PR.T FloatingReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.24
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 13.55
Evaluated at bid price : 13.55
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BAM.PR.S FloatingReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 20.49
Evaluated at bid price : 20.49
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 11.13 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-04-15
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 75,245 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 67,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 46,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset 39,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 19.58
Evaluated at bid price : 19.58
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset 25,800 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 24,070 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 11.13 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.52 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3058

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-04-15
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %

BAM.PR.S FloatingReset Quote: 14.50 – 15.10
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.4897

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.07 – 23.29
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1434

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.07
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 12.70 – 13.06
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2878

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-28
Maturity Price : 12.70
Evaluated at bid price : 12.70
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %

NA.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 24.01 – 24.25
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1691

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.00 – 25.17
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1106

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

FTS.PR.E To Be Redeemed

Thursday, July 28th, 2016

Fortis Inc. has announced:

Fortis will redeem all of the issued and outstanding First Preference Shares, Series “E” of the Corporation in accordance with their terms on or about 1 September 2016. The redemption price will be $25.3063 in cash for each share, being equal to $25.00 plus $0.3063, representing the amount of the accrued and unpaid dividends per share for the period from and including 1 June 2016 to but not including 1 September 2016. A notice of redemption providing additional details will be mailed to the registered holders of First Preference Shares, Series E on or about 29 July 2016.

FTS.PR.E commenced trading on 2004-7-16 as a 4.9% 12-year Operating Retractible. It is currently redeemable at par and becomes retractible for common shares September 1, 2016 – but that option has now been superseded by the redemption. FTS.PR.E has been tracked by HIMIPref™ since issued and is currently the sole member of the Operating Retractible subindex.

DBRS Maintains Negative Trend on Bank Debt; Preferreds Stable

Thursday, July 28th, 2016

DBRS has announced that it:

has today maintained the Negative trend on the senior and subordinated debt ratings of the Royal Bank of Canada, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the National Bank of Canada and their subsidiaries. Additionally, the Negative trend has been maintained on related short-term ratings that might be affected by a long-term rating change under DBRS methodologies. The ratings were previously revised to Negative from Stable on May 20, 2015, to reflect the declining likelihood of systemic support. For details on the rating actions on specific banks, please see their separate press releases.

The maintenance of the Negative trend reflects DBRS’s view that ongoing changes in Canadian legislation and regulation still indicate that the potential for timely systemic support for these six banks that DBRS considers systemically important institutions is declining, leading to a likely change in DBRS’s support assessment to SA3 from SA2 for these banks. Currently, the six banks’ final ratings benefit from an uplift of one notch above their intrinsic assessments because of the SA2 support assessment.

The legislation enacting the bank recapitalization, or bail-in, regime is moving forward, but DBRS does not yet have sufficient clarity on the details of the implementation to remove the benefit of systemic support from the affected ratings. Most recently, the Budget Implementation Act (Bill C-15) passed on June 8, 2016, included proposed amendments to existing legislation to enable the appropriate statutory powers for the bail-in regime. According to the Department of Finance Canada, the proposed amendments include permitting the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions to designate the domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) to which the bail-in regime would apply, providing new powers for the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) to carry out a bail-in by converting the eligible debt of a D-SIB that was determined to be non-viable into common shares, enabling CDIC to resolve a failed bank by taking temporary control of a non-viable bank to carry out a bail-in conversion, updating the process for investors to seek redress and revising the amount of minimum regulatory capital and debt subject to the new bail-in conversion power for D-SIBs (Department of Finance Canada, Bill C-15 – Budget Implementation Act 2016, No. 1 – Part 4: Various Measures, http://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/C15/04-eng.asp (May 10, 2016)). This will require amendments to be made to the Bank Act, the CDIC Act, the Financial Administration Act, the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act and the Winding-up and Restructuring Act.

This was reiterated in statements for each of the Big Six Banks … with some commentary regarding the highly topical housing costs issue:

BNS:

DBRS remains concerned over the significant appreciation seen in housing prices, particularly in the greater Vancouver and Toronto areas. Nonetheless, Scotiabank’s Canadian residential mortgage portfolio appears conservatively underwritten or is insured. Indeed, the Bank purchased bulk insurance on an additional portion of this portfolio during Q2 2016. Following this additional purchase, 62% of Scotiabank’s Canadian residential mortgage portfolio is now insured, while the loan-to-value of the uninsured portion is very conservative at 51%. Alberta, the province most exposed to the energy sector, represents 16% of the total residential mortgage portfolio and is primarily insured.

RY:

DBRS remains concerned about the significant appreciation seen in housing prices, particularly in the greater Vancouver and Toronto areas. Nonetheless, RBC’s Canadian residential mortgage portfolio appears conservatively underwritten or is insured. Indeed, 46% of RBC’s Canadian residential mortgage portfolio is now insured, while the loan-to-value ratio of the uninsured portion is conservative at 56%. Alberta, the most exposed province to the energy sector, represents 16% of the total residential mortgage portfolio and is primarily insured.

CM:

The Bank’s overall asset quality remains strong with impaired loans and provisions remaining at very low levels. CIBC’s overall credit quality benefits from the performance of its large and low-risk residential mortgage portfolio, which is 61% insured. However, DBRS remains concerned about the significant appreciation in housing prices, particularly in and around Toronto and Vancouver. Meanwhile, CIBC’s outstanding loan balances to the troubled resource sector are very manageable, with oil and gas comprising approximately 2% of loans and mining comprising less than 1%.

BMO:

DBRS remains concerned over the significant appreciation seen in housing prices, particularly in and around Vancouver and Toronto. Nonetheless, BMO’s residential mortgage portfolio appears conservatively underwritten or is insured. Specifically, 59% of BMO’s Canadian residential mortgage portfolio is insured, while the loan-to-value of the uninsured portion is a very conservative 57%. Meanwhile, loss rates for the past four quarters have been less than one basis point. Alberta, the province most exposed to the energy sector, represents 16% of the total residential mortgage portfolio and is primarily insured. The resource sector also remains challenged, but overall exposures to oil & gas and mining total less than 3% of the total loan portfolio.

NA:

National’s currently strong earnings power benefits from a very good revenue mix, modestly improving expense levels and generally low credit costs. However, National reported two issues in 2016 that have negatively affected earnings, including the $164 million pre-tax write-down of its investment in Maple Financial Group (MFG) and a $250 million pre-tax sectoral provision related to its oil & gas portfolio. Please see the DBRS commentaries on these two events dated May 5, 2016, and February 8, 2016, for more information.

TD:

TD’s risk profile remains strong, as evidenced by its still quite favourable credit quality indicators, though DBRS views current levels as likely unsustainable, given how low they are compared with historical norms. Similar to peers, the Bank’s oil & gas portfolio was pressured in recent periods but remains highly manageable, representing less than 1% of total loans. Moreover, DBRS anticipates seeing some signs of deterioration in other parts of the loan portfolio in the near to intermediate term, given the above-average debt levels of Canadian consumers, rapidly rising housing prices and expected credit quality trend reversion. Importantly, DBRS remains comforted by TD’s track record and disciplined approach to risk management.

July 27, 2016

Wednesday, July 27th, 2016

Japan is considering issuing 50-year bonds:

Japan’s finance ministry is considering issuing 50-year bonds but says it will first concentrate on deepening and broadening the nascent market for existing 30-year bonds, according to a senior ministry official.

Chikahisa Sumi, director of the market division at the Ministry of Finance, told the Financial Times that the MoF might issue a 50-year bond. His department is in charge of Japan’s large debt issuance.

The UK and France have issued 50-year bonds this year, becoming the first European governments to do so for many years. Super-long bonds are viewed as a useful instrument in ageing societies where they can help pension funds match liabilities and assets over a longer period.

Such desperate measures are necessary if they wish to have any bonds at all with positive yields!

Japanese government bond prices rose to lifetime highs on Wednesday [July 6] as negative yields spread to 20-year bonds, with the Brexit vote exacerbating a flight-to-safety bid that has crunched incomes of banks, pension funds and other Japanese investors.

The 20-year yield fell to as low as minus 0.005 percent , having declined more than 0.9 percentage point since the Bank of Japan made a historic shift to negative rates in late January, in addition to its massive bond buying programme.

With 40-year government bonds, the longest tenure on offer, also yielding just above zero percent, Japan is in line to becoming the only country after Switzerland to have all government bonds yield at negative levels.

On Tuesday [July 5], the 50-year Swiss government bond yield fell below zero percent.

The big news of the day was the July FOMC release:

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee currently expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will strengthen. Inflation is expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of earlier declines in energy prices, but to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of past declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. Near-term risks to the economic outlook have diminished. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.

Against this backdrop, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/4 to 1/2 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.

Voting against the action was Esther L. George, who preferred at this meeting to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/2 to 3/4 percent.

Bloomberg comments:

All but two of 94 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg News expected the Fed to leave interest rates unchanged at the meeting. Federal funds futures ahead of Wednesday’s statement suggested that traders see close to a 50-50 chance of a rate hike at or before the FOMC’s final meeting this year, in December.

Yellen will speak at the Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole, Wyoming, symposium on Aug. 26. That will provide her with an opportunity to discuss the committee’s sense of the economy’s progress.

“The market is going to pay a lot of attention to that speech,” [partner at Cornerstone Macro LLC Roberto] Perli said.

The bond market seems to have read it as dovish:

Treasuries rose, the dollar fell versus the euro and U.S. stocks ended mixed as the Federal Reserve reiterated its intention to tighten gradually even as the economy shows signs of improvement. Gold rallied.

The yield on 30-year Treasury notes fell six basis points, while two-year yields slipped three basis points. The greenback erased gains against a basket of 10 of its major peers after officials repeated that “economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate.” The S&P 500 Index slipped as crude’s plunge weighed on energy producers. Apple Inc.’s best rally since April 2014 led the Nasdaq 100 Index higher. Gold futures jumped.

I’m certainly not going to attempt to estimate the timing for a vigorous series of Fed moves – or even whether the next hike will be the first of a long series or just a one-off – but I will bet a nickel that when the Fed does start hiking in earnest, it’s going to make the first half of 1994 look like a hiccup.

Is past performance an indicator of future performance for those who take risky bets? Today we learned of one guy who couldn’t resist trying to snowball his windfall:

In 2015, [Ronnie] Music [Jr.] won $3,000,000 in a Georgia scratch-off lottery game. As part of the case, investigating agents seized over $1 million worth of methamphetamine, a large cache of firearms, thousands of rounds of ammunition, multiple vehicles, and over $600,000 in cash.

United States Attorney Ed Tarver stated, “Defendant Music decided to test his luck by sinking millions of dollars of lottery winnings into the purchase and sale of crystal meth. As a result of his unsound investment strategy, Music now faces decades in a federal prison.”

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.12%, equivalent to 6.66% at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 3.75%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 290bp, a significant narrowing from the 305bp reported July 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5748 % 1,684.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5748 % 3,076.8
Floater 4.88 % 4.59 % 86,991 16.13 4 0.5748 % 1,773.2
OpRet 4.83 % -1.84 % 46,052 0.10 1 -0.0788 % 2,853.8
SplitShare 5.11 % 5.43 % 101,291 4.56 5 0.0241 % 3,366.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0241 % 2,626.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -15.21 % 79,914 0.09 12 0.0591 % 2,687.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.19 % 5.12 % 104,665 14.79 26 0.2617 % 2,856.4
FixedReset 4.99 % 4.27 % 148,899 7.12 88 0.1629 % 2,039.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 4.48 % 121,696 0.42 33 0.0604 % 2,779.9
FloatingReset 2.96 % 4.62 % 31,668 5.14 11 0.0046 % 2,138.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -3.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 17.62
Evaluated at bid price : 17.62
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.32
Bid-YTW : 9.68 %
BAM.PR.S FloatingReset -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 14.30
Evaluated at bid price : 14.30
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 20.58
Evaluated at bid price : 20.58
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BNS.PR.D FloatingReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.92
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 18.78
Evaluated at bid price : 18.78
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 12.25
Evaluated at bid price : 12.25
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 10.45
Evaluated at bid price : 10.45
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 100,105 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
TD.PF.G FixedReset 52,125 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 51,375 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 46,325 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 19.69
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 42,530 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 35,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 0.33 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.21 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.5466

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-26
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : -10.61 %

W.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.82 – 26.32
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3557

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %

CU.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.36 – 26.67
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1946

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

BMO.PR.R FloatingReset Quote: 21.90 – 22.25
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2554

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.76 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2501

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : -23.77 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 17.62 – 18.07
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-27
Maturity Price : 17.62
Evaluated at bid price : 17.62
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %

BMO.PR.Q To Reset At 1.805%

Tuesday, July 26th, 2016

Bank of Montreal has announced (although not yet on their website):

the applicable dividend rates for its Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class B Preferred Shares, Series 25 (the “Preferred Shares Series 25”) and Non-Cumulative Floating Rate Class B Preferred Shares, Series 26 (the “Preferred Shares Series 26”).

With respect to any Preferred Shares Series 25 that remain outstanding after August 25, 2016, commencing as of such date, holders thereof will be entitled to receive fixed rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Bank and subject to the provisions of the Bank Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the five-year period commencing on August 25, 2016, and ending on August 24, 2021, will be 1.805 per cent, being equal to the sum of the five-year Government of Canada bond yield as at July 26, 2016, plus 1.15 per cent, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares Series 25.

With respect to any Preferred Shares Series 26 that may be issued on August 25, 2016, holders thereof will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, calculated on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed in each quarterly floating rate period divided by 365, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Bank and subject to the provisions of the Bank Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the three-month period commencing on August 25, 2016, and ending on November 24, 2016, will be 1.622 per cent, being equal to the sum of the three-month Government of Canada Treasury bill yield as at July 26, 2016, plus 1.15 per cent, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares Series 26.

Beneficial owners of Preferred Shares Series 25 who wish to exercise their right of conversion should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee and ensure that they follow their instructions in order to ensure that they meet the deadline to exercise such right, which is 5:00 p.m. (EDT) on August 10, 2016.

Conversion enquiries should be directed to BMO’s Registrar and Transfer Agent, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, at 1-800-340-5021.

I previously reported that this issue will be extended.

BMO.PR.Q is a FixedReset, 3.90%+115, that commenced trading 2011-3-11 after being announced 2011-3-2.

The new rate therefore represents a 54% cut in dividends. Ouch!

This issue has been tracked by HIMIPref™ and is a member of the FixedResets index. A hardMaturity at par dated 2022-1-31 has been added to the call schedule indicated by the prospectus to reflect an anticipated call due to the issues lack of a NVCC clause and OSFI’s refusal to grandfather such issues – but note that this Deemed Maturity is a matter of analysis, not a formal commitment of the issuer!

As noted, the deadline to notify the company regarding conversion is 5:00 p.m. (EDT) on August 10, 2016; brokers will have internal deadlines a day or two in advance.

I will post a recommendation regarding whether or not to convert closer to the deadline.

July 26, 2016

Tuesday, July 26th, 2016

Low returns are finally catching up to American pension plans:

Twenty-year annualized returns for public pensions in the U.S. are poised to decline to 7.47% once fiscal 2016 results are released in coming weeks, according to an estimate from Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service, which tracks pension investment returns.

That would be the lowest-ever annual mark recorded by Wilshire, which began tracking the statistic 16 years ago. In 2001, near the height of the dot-com boom, pensions’ 20-year median return was 12.3%, according to Wilshire.

Weak annual gains for the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and California State Teachers’ Retirement System dropped their 20-year returns below 7.5% investment targets, to 7.03% and 7.1%, respectively. The two funds, known as Calpers and Calstrs, are the largest public pensions in the U.S. by assets and oversee a combined $484 billion for 2.6 million public workers and retirees.

Ms. Frost’s comments came days before Calpers said that its fiscal 2016 return was 0.6%, the slimmest gain since the 2008-2009 crisis. Calpers has a funding gap of roughly $112 billion, according to the most recent available data. As recently as last year, Calpers Chief Investment Officer Ted Eliopoulos said in an annual letter that the plan was “reassured by our 20-year investment return of 7.76%,” which exceeded the internal target of 7.5%.

Now, “it is a struggle to have a positive return,” Mr. Eliopoulos said in a media call last week.

Good old CalPERS, always good for a laugh.

Meanwhile, a vitriolic attack on Trump by Mary Anastasia O’Grady titled Wharton Grad Trump Fails Economics has some useful information and links:

In the Foreign Affairs magazine essay recently titled “The Truth About Trade,” economist at Dartmouth Douglas Irwin observed that while the technology has “enabled wide productivity and efficiency improvements,” has “also make a lot of blue-collar jobs obsolete. “Mr. Irwin cites a study by the Center for Business and Economic Research at Ball State University, which “found that productivity growth accounted for more than 85 percent of the jobs lost in manufacturing between 2000 and 2010, a period when employment in the sector fell by 5.6 million. “this 85% compares, according to the study, with 13% of job loss associated with trading during the same period. In other words, to bring most jobs back, Mr. Trump should prohibit mechanization. Would Mr. Pence broke the news to farmers Indiana?

In a paper published last summer in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, an economist at MIT David Autor unload automation reason has hit the middle class hard. He observed that to write code for a task, the programmer should be able to “say explicitly ‘rule’ or procedures” required to do so. But the task is understood by man “secretly” is not easy to automate. Mr. Autor call these obstacles “Polanyi Paradox” after the Hungarian-born chemist and economist who observed that “we know more than we know.”

This is the “higher education” and “low-education” work that requires “interpersonal interaction, flexibility, adaptability and problem-solving” -the most difficult to automate records Mr. Autor. Traditional job-secondary education has become the easiest to replace with technology.

The Polanyi Paradox, by the way, was formulated by Michael Polanyi, who was the father of UofT’s John Polanyi. After a lengthy internet search (I hope you’re grateful!), I have found the CBER Ball State study, by Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, titled The Myth and the Reality of Manufacturing in America:

Manufacturing has continued to grow, and the sector itself remains a large, important, and growing sector of the U.S. economy. Employment in manufacturing has stagnated for some time, primarily due to growth in productivity of manufacturing production processes.

Three factors have contributed to changes in manufacturing employment in recent years: Productivity, trade, and domestic demand. Overwhelmingly, the largest impact is productivity. Almost 88 percent of job losses in manufacturing in recent years can be attributable to productivity growth, and the long-term changes to manufacturing employment are mostly linked to the productivity of American factories. Growing demand for manufacturing goods in the U.S. has offset some of those job losses, but the effect is modest, accounting for a 1.2 percent increase in jobs beyond what we would expect if consumer demand for domestically manufactured goods was flat.

Exports lead to higher levels of domestic production and employment, while imports reduce domestic production and employment. The difference between these, or net exports, has been negative since 1980, and has contributed to roughly 13.4 percent of job losses in the U.S. in the last decade. Our estimate is almost exactly that reported by the more respected research centers in the nation.

Manufacturing production remains robust. Productivity growth is the largest contributor to job displacement over the past several decades. This leads to a domestic policy consideration.

The paper by David Autor is titled Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation:

Major newspaper stories offer fresh examples daily of technologies that substitute for human labor in an expanding—although still circumscribed—set of tasks. The offsetting effects of complementarities and rising demand in other areas are, however, far harder to identify as they occur. My own prediction is that employment polarization will not continue indefinitely (as argued in Autor 2013). While some of the tasks in many current middle-skill jobs are susceptible to automation, many middle-skill jobs will continue to demand a mixture of tasks from across the skill spectrum. For example, medical support occupations—radiology technicians, phlebotomists, nurse technicians, and others—are a significant and rapidly growing category of relatively well-remunerated, middle-skill employment. Most of these occupations require mastery of “middle-skill” mathematics, life sciences, and analytical reasoning. They typically require at least two years of postsecondary vocational training, and in some cases a four-year college degree or more. This broad description also fits numerous skilled trade and repair occupations, including plumbers, builders, electricians, heating/ventilating/air-conditioning installers, and automotive technicians. It also fits a number of modern clerical occupations that provide coordination and decision-making functions, rather than simply typing and filing, like a number of jobs in marketing. There are also cases where technology is enabling workers with less esoteric technical mastery to perform additional tasks: for example, the nurse practitioner occupation that increasingly performs diagnosing and prescribing tasks in lieu of physicians.

On another note, there is perennial weeping about affordable housing in the big cities, with “affordable” being a euphemism for “subsidized slum”. Bloomberg’s Patrick Clark has written a piece titled Why It’s So Hard to Build Affordable Housing: It’s Not Affordable:

“If we want to prioritize closing the gap for low-income households, we’re going to need more funding from public subsidy,” said Erika Poethig, director of urban policy initiatives at the Urban Institute, which published an online simulator Tuesday for the purpose of illustrating the challenges to building new affordable housing. Our Denver developer above is fictional, but he’s an illustration of what that simulator churns out: No matter how you slice it, creating the affordable housing needed today probably requires government help.

Playing with the simulator, you quickly learn that there are only a few levers that truly affect a developer’s ability to finance a project. Taking a smaller fee or negotiating a more favorable loan can help at the margins; so can making the project so appealing to residents that no one ever moves out. To really reduce costs or raise revenue, though, there are just these options: Spend less on land, materials, and labor, or bring in more money by raising rents or finding new public financing. But land, materials, and labor can only be cut so much (construction costs are effectively fixed by labor and commodities markets), and raising rents removes the “affordable” from affordable housing.

That leaves subsidies, the biggest of which is the low-income housing tax credit, which Congress funded to the tune of $7 billion last year. Even so, that program is more useful to developers building for higher wage-earners, said Linda McMahon, chief executive of The Real Estate Council, a trade group for Dallas-area real estate companies. “Below 50 percent of area median income, you’re talking about people who can only afford $500 or so in rent, and you really need another layer of subsidy to pay your [commercial] mortgage,” she said.

DBRS has announced publication of a paper titled DBRS: Basel Capital Requirements – What’s Changing?:

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has been active in recent months, finalising the minimum capital requirements for market risk (published in January 2016), while also publishing proposed revisions to the standardised approach (December 2015) and the internal model approach for credit (March 2016) and the standardised approach for operational risk (March 2016). These actions are part of the Committee’s efforts to reform global regulatory standards, and reduce the variability of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions. While DBRS expects that these efforts will improve comparability across the global banking peer group, further transparency would also be valuable in better understanding the risk profile of banks. In particular, DBRS would view positively the standardized disclosure of RWA calculations and components. DBRS also notes that the full implementation of these new requirements is likely to result in a significant amount of operational work for banks, and is expected to lead to a sizeable increase in RWAs.

With full implementation expected to be required from 2019 (the market risk requirements are to be fully implemented from January 2019 and DBRS expects the time period for implementation to be similar for both credit and operational risk requirements once finalised) this will likely add to the already heavy expense burden associated with regulatory compliance, and result in further pressure for those banks that are currently challenged by limited internal capital generation.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5055 % 1,674.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5055 % 3,059.2
Floater 4.90 % 4.69 % 88,107 16.05 4 0.5055 % 1,763.1
OpRet 4.83 % -2.58 % 46,681 0.10 1 0.1975 % 2,856.0
SplitShare 5.12 % 5.31 % 99,842 2.30 5 -0.0482 % 3,365.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0482 % 2,626.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % 0.81 % 81,619 0.27 12 0.0746 % 2,685.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.20 % 5.18 % 101,603 15.07 26 0.4483 % 2,848.9
FixedReset 4.99 % 4.34 % 150,392 7.12 88 0.0893 % 2,035.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 4.17 % 123,530 0.09 33 0.2234 % 2,778.3
FloatingReset 2.96 % 4.53 % 32,176 5.13 11 -0.3188 % 2,138.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.D FloatingReset -3.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 10.25
Evaluated at bid price : 10.25
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.86
Bid-YTW : 8.09 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : -30.73 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.40
Bid-YTW : 9.52 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.65
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.50
Bid-YTW : 11.23 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.53
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.08
Bid-YTW : 7.73 %
BAM.PR.S FloatingReset 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 2.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 13.71
Evaluated at bid price : 13.71
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.J FixedReset 277,914 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 144,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 17.99
Evaluated at bid price : 17.99
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 113,497 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 101,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 12.02
Evaluated at bid price : 12.02
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 100,885 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 15.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
MFC.PR.O FixedReset 84,230 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.80 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2213

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : -30.73 %

BNS.PR.A FloatingReset Quote: 23.01 – 23.45
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3340

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

BNS.PR.D FloatingReset Quote: 18.60 – 18.96
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2554

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %

W.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.70 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1976

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 17.86 – 18.17
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2141

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.86
Bid-YTW : 8.09 %

CM.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 20.35 – 20.74
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2985

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-07-26
Maturity Price : 20.35
Evaluated at bid price : 20.35
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %