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NVCC & Credit Suisse

Monday, March 20th, 2023

OSFI has announced:

OSFI is issuing this statement to reinforce guidance around the design of the regulatory treatment of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.

Canada’s capital regime preserves creditor hierarchy which helps to maintain financial stability.

If a deposit-taking bank reaches the point of non-viability, OSFI’s capital guidelines require Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments to be converted into common shares in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation. This results in significant dilution to existing common shareholders.

Such a conversion ensures that Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 holders are entitled to a more favorable economic outcome than existing common shareholders who would be the first to suffer losses. These capital requirements are administered by OSFI as well as the conversion of the Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.

Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments are and will remain an important component of the capital structure of Canadian deposit-taking banks.

Canadians can be confident that we have a sound and effective regulatory and supervisory foundation that works to protect depositors and creditors.

And the European Central Bank teamed up with other regulators to announce:

ECB Banking Supervision, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority welcome the comprehensive set of actions taken yesterday by the Swiss authorities in order to ensure financial stability.

The European banking sector is resilient, with robust levels of capital and liquidity.

The resolution framework implementing in the European Union the reforms recommended by the Financial Stability Board after the Great Financial Crisis has established, among others, the order according to which shareholders and creditors of a troubled bank should bear losses.

In particular, common equity instruments are the first ones to absorb losses, and only after their full use would Additional Tier 1 be required to be written down. This approach has been consistently applied in past cases and will continue to guide the actions of the SRB and ECB banking supervision in crisis interventions.

Additional Tier 1 is and will remain an important component of the capital structure of European banks.

This announcement appears to be due to the treatment of AT1 instruments in the collapse of Credit Suisse:

Trading in Credit Suisse’s bonds rose sharply at the end of last week as strain in the banking sector mounted, according to official trade data.

There were two types of trades that the investors conducted: one that is set to make money, the other that is set to lose money.
…
The second trade that investors plowed into was in Credit Suisse’s roughly $17 billion of so-called AT1 bonds. This is a special type of debt issued by banks that can be converted to equity capital should they run into trouble. This made that debt inherently riskier to hold, because it carried the chance that bondholders could be wiped out. Investors saw the buying of the bonds for as low as 20 cents on the dollar as a kind of lottery ticket — a long shot, but with a big reward if it had worked out.
…
On Sunday, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, or Finma, approved a deal for UBS to take over its smaller rival. “The transaction and the measures taken will ensure stability for the bank’s customers and for the financial center,” said a statement from Finma.

It said that the AT1 bonds would be wiped out as part of the deal, to add roughly $16 billion of equity to support UBS’s takeover.

That raised eyebrows among some investors because it upended the normal order in which holders of different assets of a company expect to be paid in bankruptcy. Stock investors are at the bottom of that repayment list and usually lose all their money ahead of other investors.

However, in this instance, regulators chose to trigger the conversion of the AT1 bonds to equity capital to help the bank, while still offering Credit Suisse shareholders one UBS share for every 22.48 Credit Suisse shares held.

As further explained:

The eleventh-hour Swiss rescue is backed by a massive government guarantee, helping prevent what would have been one of the largest banking collapses since the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

However, the Swiss regulator decided Credit Suisse’s additional tier-1 (AT1) bonds with a notional value of $17 billion will be valued at zero, angering some holders of the debt who thought they would be better protected than shareholders.

AT1 bonds – a $275 billion sector also known as “contingent convertibles” or “CoCo” bonds – can be converted into equity or written off if a bank’s capital level falls below a certain threshold. The deal will also make UBS Switzerland’s only global bank and the Swiss economy more dependent on a single lender.

“Massive guarantee”? Yes:

The deal includes 100 billion Swiss francs ($108 billion) in liquidity assistance for UBS and Credit Suisse from the Swiss central bank.

To enable UBS to take over Credit Suisse, the federal government is providing a loss guarantee of a maximum of 9 billion Swiss francs for a clearly defined part of the portfolio, the government said.

This will be activated if losses are actually incurred on this portfolio. In that eventuality, UBS would assume the first 5 billion francs, the federal government the next 9 billion francs, and UBS would assume any further losses, the government said.

And UBS boasted:

UBS benefits from CHF 25 billion of downside protection from the transaction to support marks, purchase price adjustments and restructuring costs, and additional 50% downside protection on non-core assets.

This caused an immediate drop in the price of other AT1s:

The write-down to zero at Credit Suisse will produce the largest loss in the $275 billion AT1 market to date, dwarfing the 1.35 billion euros ($1.44 billion) bondholders of Spain’s Banco Popular lost in 2017.

Bid prices on AT1 bonds from banks, including Deutsche Bank , HSBC, UBS and BNP Paribas, were among those under pressure on Monday. They recovered marginally but were still down 6-11 points on the day, sending yields sharply higher, data from Tradeweb showed.

A UBS AT1 bond callable in January 2024 was trading at a yield of 27%, up from 12% on Friday, demonstrating how much more costly this type of debt could become in the wake of the Credit Suisse rescue.
…
Funds that track AT1 debt also fell sharply.

Invesco’s AT1 Capital Bond exchange-traded fund was last down 6%, having been over 10% lower earlier. WisdomTree’s AT1 CoCo bond ETF was indicated 9% lower.

At Credit Suisse, the bank’s AT1 bonds were bid as low as 1 cent on the dollar on Monday as investors braced for the wipeout.

But the lawyers will get rich, as usual:

Lawyers from Switzerland, the United States and UK are talking to a number of Credit Suisse Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bond holders about possible legal action after the state-backed rescue of Credit Suisse by UBS wiped out AT1 bonds, law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan said on Monday.

Quinn Emanuel said it was in discussions with Credit Suisse AT1 bondholders representing a “significant percentage” of the total notional value the instruments. Quinn Emanuel did not name the bondholders.

Under the UBS-Credit Suisse merger deal, holders of Credit Suisse AT1 bonds will get nothing, while shareholders, who usually rank below bondholders in terms of who gets paid when a bank or company collapses, will receive $3.23 billion.

In Switzerland, the bonds’ terms state that in a restructuring, the financial watchdog is under no obligation to adhere to the traditional capital structure hierarchy, which is how Credit Suisse AT1 bondholders lost out.

And so … what it are the implications for Canadian NVCC preferred shares? I have to say: not much, based on the following two factors.

First, it looks like Credit Suisse was in even worse shape than everyone thought last Friday. As reported above, “shareholders, who usually rank below bondholders in terms of who gets paid when a bank or company collapses, will receive $3.23 billion.” This is after wiping out 16- or 17-billion in AT1 capital (reporting differs according to source, presumably due to rounding and difference in exchange rate conversion). So, if we take these figures at face value – i.e., there hasn’t been too much jiggery-pokery in the values received – the Credit Suisse common had a market value of about NEGATIVE 14-billion on Friday, a far cry from the 8-billion valuation at the close on Friday, never mind the values of previous years:

This is before considering the value of the ‘massive guarantee’ that the Swiss central bank has given UBS, which are quite substantial. So it would seem that AT1 holders wouldn’t have gotten much of a recovery anyway.

Secondly, ‘when in doubt, look at the prospectus’, as the adage goes. Here’s the prospectus for RY.PR.H, taken from RBC’s preferred share page:

Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event (as defined below), each outstanding Series BB Preferred Share and each outstanding Series BC Preferred Share will automatically and immediately be converted, on a full and permanent basis, into a number of Common Shares equal to (Multiplier x Share Value) ÷ Conversion Price (rounding down, if necessary, to the nearest whole number of Common Shares) (an “NVCC Automatic Conversion”). For the purposes of the foregoing:

“Conversion Price” means the greater of (i) $5.00, and (ii) the Current Market Price of the Common Shares. The floor price of $5.00 is subject to adjustment in the event of (i) the issuance of Common Shares or securities exchangeable for or convertible into Common Shares to all holders of Common Shares as a stock dividend, (ii) the subdivision, redivision or change of the Common Shares into a greater number of Common Shares, or (iii) the reduction, combination or consolidation of the Common Shares into a lesser number of Common Shares. The adjustment shall be computed to the nearest one-tenth of one cent provided that no adjustment of the Conversion Price shall be required unless such adjustment would require an increase or decrease of at least 1% of the Conversion Price then in effect.

“Current Market Price” of the Common Shares means the volume weighted average trading price of the Common Shares on the TSX, if such shares are then listed on the TSX, for the 10 consecutive trading days ending on the trading day preceding the date of the Trigger Event. If the Common Shares are not then listed on the TSX, for the purpose of the foregoing calculation reference shall be made to the principal securities exchange or market on which the Common Shares are then listed or quoted or, if no such trading prices are available, “Current Market Price” shall be the fair value of the Common Shares as reasonably determined by the board of directors of the Bank.

“Multiplier” means 1.0.

“Share Value” means $25.00 plus declared and unpaid dividends as at the date of the Trigger Event.

So, mainly there’s no ‘writedown to zero’ provision, which is one good thing. And secondly, on a trigger event they’re converted to common at a defined price.

It’s not all rosy! The conversion price for the common is defined as the VWAP for two weeks prior to the Trigger (or $5, it that’s higher, which could very well be the case. I bet nobody saw Credit Suisse being taken out for less than $1/share!), and that could be substantially higher than the price at the end of the period, or the price received in some kind of takeover or recapitalization scenario. As a mitigating factor, the value converted at this conversion price is par, or roughly 50% higher than what RY preferreds are trading at now. But the main thing is that the effects of a trigger are conversion into common, which means that whatever else might be the case, preferred shareholders will get some kind of recovery after a trigger event (as long as the common shareholders get something, which will not necessarily be the case), and not be left out in the cold as the Credit Suisse AT1 holders have been. And, as I have always said, expectations for preferred shareholders (NVCC or otherwise) of an operating company in a bankruptcy scenario are basically zero anyway, so any recovery should be considered a bonus!

Now, make no mistake: I do not like Canada’s implementation of the NVCC rules. I don’t like the ‘low trigger’, which basically guarantees that any loss will take place at a time of maximum confusion (as well as acting entirely to mitigate damage to senior creditors, as opposed to forestalling problems before they get more serious), and I don’t like the arbitrary power granted to OSFI to declare a ‘Trigger Event’, which circumvents the courts and gives civil servants one heckofa lot of power. But, it appears to me, a Credit Suisse scenario is not something to worry about.

Update, 2023-3-22: DBRS has released an analysis titled Credit Suisse’s AT1 Controversy Unlikely Outside Switzerland (at time of writing, no password or log-in was required):

Credit Suisse´s AT1 Write-Down Based on a Specific Swiss Contractual Clause

It is important to note that FINMA has not framed the sale of Credit Suisse AG to UBS as a resolution action (restructuring under Swiss terminology). This is a key consideration, as under a resolution, FINMA could have written-down the AT1s but only after CS´s shareholders equity had been completely written-off and cancelled (see link). We consider that FINMA avoided initiating a resolution, asthat could have had unknown consequences for the Swiss and global financial markets. In addition, CS was still not fully resolvable as explained by FINMA in their last Resolution Report in 2022 (see link). As a result, opening resolution procedures (even just during the weekend) might have had important implications on an operative level (derivatives, deposits, other critical contracts). Nevertheless, in order to close the deal, it seems that UBS required downside protection. The deal was closed after granting this protection by writing-off CHF 15.8 billion of AT1s and adding government protection of CHF 9 billion (which applies only after UBS has absorbed the first CHF 5 billion of losses).

We understand that FINMA’s interpretation was that the AT1 write-down was legally possible under a contractual clause called “viability event”. In particular, according to the AT1 prospectus, an irrevocable commitment of extraordinary support from the public sector would trigger this “viability event” thus allowing the total write-down of AT1s. FINMA interpreted the CHF 9 billion protection as extraordinary support from the public sector. However, some investors are arguing that the public sector support was not given to CS but to UBS. As a result, we anticipate CS AT1 bondholders could initiate legal action against these decisions. Furthermore, we observe that the possibility
to writedown and cancel AT1 bondholder rights based on this specific contractual clause is a feature particular to the Swiss banks’ AT1s. Swiss banks issued some of the first AT1s after the previous financial crisis and they were intended to strengthen a bank, both as going concern as well as a gone concern situation.

Implications for Other Resolution Jurisdictions
We view the sale of CS to UBS as positive for financial stability, reducing potential negative market reaction and contagion from a disorderly resolution or bankruptcy of CS. However, it raises some questions as to how authorities will apply their powers. We note some important takeaways from this case, that are applicable to all regimes, including the EU, UK and Canada. First, the complexity of resolution and quasi resolution situations makes the reality different from theoretical resolution planning. Second, the interpretation of the law made by national authorities could be different from what markets expect in these situations. Third, that bail-in strategies for Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIB) are difficult and the too big to fail issue is still present.

Nevertheless, we also consider that there are some differences between Switzerland and other regions. Specifically, we view that the decision to impose larger losses on the AT1 securities than on shareholders will not set a precedent in the EU, UK or Canada. We consider that the instruments in these regimes have different wording and authorities have been vocal to clarify that AT1 securities are always senior to equity.

Update, 2023-3-23: DBRS has released a commentary on LRCNs that is very similar in tone to their piece on preferred shares.

Posted in Contingent Capital, Regulation | 2 Comments »

T+1 Settlement is Coming!

Wednesday, February 15th, 2023

The SEC has announced:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today adopted rule changes to shorten the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer transactions in securities from two business days after the trade date (T+2) to one (T+1). The final rule is designed to benefit investors and reduce the credit, market, and liquidity risks in securities transactions faced by market participants.

“I support this rulemaking because it will reduce latency, lower risk, and promote efficiency as well as greater liquidity in the markets,” said SEC Chair Gary Gensler. “Today’s adoption addresses one of the four areas the staff recommended the Commission address in response to the meme stock events of 2021. Taken together, these amendments will make our market plumbing more resilient, timely, orderly, and efficient.”

In addition to shortening the standard settlement cycle, the final rules will improve the processing of institutional trades. Specifically, the final rules will require a broker-dealer to either enter into written agreements or establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the completion of allocations, confirmations, and affirmations as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the end of trade date. The final rules also require registered investment advisers to make and keep records of the allocations, confirmations, and affirmations for certain securities transactions.

Further, the final rules add a new requirement to facilitate straight-through processing, which applies to certain types of clearing agencies that provide central matching services. The final rules will require central matching service providers to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce new policies and procedures reasonably designed to facilitate straight-through processing and require them to submit an annual report to the Commission that describes and quantifies progress with respect to straight-through processing.

The adopting release is published on SEC.gov and will be published in the Federal Register. The final rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. The compliance date for the final rules is May 28, 2024.

This is wonderful news, albeit of more interest to institutional investors and their fund managers than to retail. Back in my Canada bond trading days, it was unusual, but not unknown, for clients of the firm to have trades totalling 100-million per side (buy and sell) with a single dealer. Say the market has moved by a buck after trade time but before settlement. Then one side has a loss of 1-million odd, and the other side has a gain of about the same amount. Now say the dealer goes bust before the trade gets settled. The losing side of the trade would settle, but the winning side … maybe. When Confederation Life went bust in the nineties, if you had an outstanding FX trade that you were losing money on, it settled. If you were winning … get in line, buddy! So this is a risk that is reduced by faster settlement.

There are implications for retail, though … everybody remembers the Robin Hood / Meme Stock problem, when Robin Hood suddenly started getting very fussy about what orders they would accept … and although you’ll find lots of vitriol on the web directed at them by newbie retails, you’ll also learn that few of these guys understood the problem: the problem was that clearing corporations demand collateral to mitigate the settlement risk described above:

New York markets had just fired up, and the investing world was tuning in for Thursday’s episode of the continuing drama: Legions of Robinhood Markets investors versus hedge-fund Goliaths.

But within minutes, a shock wave invisible to the outside world rattled the mechanics of Wall Street — sending Robinhood rushing for more than $1 billion of additional cash. The stock market’s central clearing hub had demanded large sums of collateral from brokerages including Robinhood that for weeks had facilitated spectacular jumps in shares such as GameStop Corp.

The Silicon Valley venture with the wildly popular no-fee trading app came to a crossroads. It reined in the risk to itself by banning certain trades and unwinding client bets — igniting an outcry from customers and even U.S. political leaders. By that night, word was emerging that Robinhood had raised more than $1 billion from existing investors and drawn hundreds of millions more from bank credit lines to weather the storm.
…
The question is whether such critics will dig into the industry’s inner workings, where pressure mounted on Robinhood and other firms to limit certain trades. That would put a rare spotlight on arcane parts of the market designed to prevent catastrophe, such as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.

One key consideration for brokers, particularly around high-flying and volatile stocks like GameStop, is in the money they must put up with the DTCC while waiting a few days for stock transactions to settle. Those outlays, which behave like margin in a brokerage account, can create a cash crunch on volatile days, say when GameStop falls from $483 to $112 like it did at one point during Thursday’s session.
…
The trouble on Thursday began around 10 a.m., when after days of turbulence, the DTCC demanded significantly more collateral from member brokers, according to two people familiar with the matter.

A spokesman for the DTCC wouldn’t specify how much it required from specific firms but said that by the end of the day industrywide collateral requirements jumped to $33.5 billion, up from $26 billion.

Brokerage executives rushed to figure out how to come up with the funds. Robinhood’s reaction drew the most public attention, but the firm wasn’t alone in limiting trading of stocks such as GameStop and AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc.

In fact, Charles Schwab Corp.’s TD Ameritrade curbed transactions in both of those companies on Wednesday. Interactive Brokers Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley’s E*Trade took similar action Thursday.

So, faster settlement will alleviate, to a large degree, the amount of settlement risk there is in the system and, hopefully, reduce the chance of serious volatility freezing the markets.

There was a lot of self-congratulation. Chair Gary Gensler stated:

First, the amendments will shorten the standard settlement cycle by half, from two business days (“T+2”) to one business day (“T+1”). The amendments also will halve the settlement cycle for trades relating to initial public offerings, from T+4 to T+2. As they say, time is money. Halving these settlement cycles will reduce the amount of margin that counterparties need to place with the clearinghouse. This lowers risk in the system and frees up liquidity elsewhere in the market.

Now, that’s not to say this change will be new; in fact, this change simply brings us back to the T+1 settlement cycle our markets used up until the 1920s. It also aligns with the T+1 cycle used in the $24 trillion Treasury market.
…
Today’s adoption addresses one of the four areas the staff recommended the Commission address in response to the meme stock events of 2021. Further, the implementation for these amendments will be set to after Memorial Day weekend (May 28, 2024). This implementation comes more than three years after key industry members first proposed shortening the settlement cycle, and a year and a quarter from now, providing sufficient time in my view for the transition. Further easing the transition, the implementation date will occur during a three-day holiday weekend.

Commissioner Jaime Lizárraga stated:

Why does this matter to the investing public? Because buyers and sellers of securities will receive their cash and securities a day earlier under T+1 than they do currently. And because market participants can allocate their capital more quickly and efficiently. Based on the public comments to the proposal, these benefits accrue to retail investors in particular.

Reducing the current settlement time in half will alleviate some of the downsides of the current T+2 cycle, such as counterparty, market, liquidity, credit, and other risks. A longer settlement time also requires risk management tools, such as margin requirements, that carry significant costs. Shortening the settlement cycle not only helps reduce these risks and costs but lowers volatility and makes our markets more fair and efficient.

The risks of longer settlement times are not just theoretical. In January 2021, unprecedented price volatility in so-called “meme stocks” challenged many retail investors’ faith in our in financial markets. Clearing agencies in equities and options experienced record volumes cleared. In the face of high volume and volatility, market utilities had to issue significant margin calls. In reaction to these margin calls, certain brokers restricted trading in some, or all, of the meme stocks. According to media reports, at least one broker’s decisions to halt trading came at the peak of the market and infuriated many retail investors. Investors have filed approximately 50 class action lawsuits claiming substantial harm from this broker’s trading halt.

Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw stated (with lots of valuable footnotes):

Specifically, a shorter settlement cycle should reduce the number of outstanding unsettled trades, reduce clearing agency margin requirements, and allow investors quicker access to their securities and funds. Longer settlement periods, on the other hand, are associated with increased counterparty default risk, market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and overall systemic risk.[7]

Commenters were overwhelmingly in favor of shortening the settlement cycle.[8] We received supportive comments from a broad range of stakeholders, including individual investors, investor advocates, clearing agencies, and broker-dealers.[9] Some commenters raised concerns regarding the proposed changes related to the processing of institutional trades,[10] firm commitment offerings,[11] and security-based swaps,[12] and the final rule reflects certain changes from the proposal in response to those comments. A number of commenters also raised concerns about the implementation timeline, which has been extended by several months from the proposed date to facilitate a smooth transition.[13] The new compliance date would provide market participants more than fifteen months to prepare for the transition.[14]

The proposal also included a request for comment on the possibility of settling trades by the end of the trade date, or what we call “T+0.” Some commenters highlighted challenges relating to multi-lateral netting, securities lending practices, and other issues.[15] However, many others expressed support for an eventual move to T+0.[16] While it is clear that T+0 will entail greater operational and technological challenges than the move to T+1, I agree with commenters that such a move may be both desirable and feasible in the future, and I look forward to working with my colleagues and stakeholders toward that important goal.[17]

Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda was a little bitter (bolding added):

While the net benefits of a shorter settlement cycle are clear, T + 1 can potentially increase some operational risks. There will be less time to address errors within the process and, in some circumstances, less time to deal with trading entities that are suddenly confronting massive and unexpected trading losses within the settlement cycle timeframe. There is also less time for regulators to identify and freeze the potential proceeds from potential frauds, such as, insider trading and market manipulation, before those proceeds exit our jurisdiction. These arguments and considerations, however, do not ultimately weigh against shortening the settlement cycle, but they provide reason for ensuring readiness among market participants. This speaks to the implementation date.

Ensuring a smooth transition will take significant investment and systems changes as well as operational and computational testing among broker-dealers, clearing firms, investment advisers, custodians, payment systems, and so on. Detailed planning is required, as is process adjustment, organizational change, and changes in the relationships among market participants. There is asymmetry in terms of costs and benefits—a smooth transition would provide net benefits for investors and U.S. markets to be accrued over the long-term in the future. On the other hand, the downside of a rough, turbulent transition could be steep, and could induce substantial harm in the short-run. That asymmetry cautions us to provide sufficient time to ensure a smooth transition.

Many comment letters have emphasized the need for more time than the Commission proposed.[5] Many have pointed to the 2024 Labor Day weekend as the implementation date. It would have the added advantage that Canada is also moving forward with T + 1 around the same time. Instead, the Commission appears to be ready to adopt May 28, 2024 as the implementation date.[6] In my view, we are in an imprudent rush away from a sensible transition date and, for that reason, I am unable to support the final rule.

Commissioner Hester M. Peirce also complained about implementation (bolding added):

I support the plan to move to T+1, but do not support the proposed timeline for making this change. Shortening the settlement cycle is a way to remove some risk from our markets. Mandating that the change occur in May 2024, however, could pose risks of its own by forcing the transition before market participants are ready. I propose instead a September 3, 2024 implementation date. Let me explain why:

  • Although preferable to the proposed March 31, 2024 implementation date, the May 28, 2024 date is still too early. Shortening the settlement cycle by one business day is a big change with implications all across the market. We cannot afford a cavalier approach.
  • Many commenters called for a September 3, 2024 date to ensure that the transition would happen with minimal disruption to the markets.
  • Tuesday, September 3, 2024 is the first business day after the 3-day Labor Day weekend, and Canada, the only jurisdiction currently planning on moving with us to T+1, shares this 3-day weekend. The transition from T+3 to T+2 occurred successfully over Labor Day weekend in 2017.
  • This later date would give other foreign market participants the time to work out some of the challenges they will face from our transition to a shorter settlement cycle than they have in their markets.
  • The additional three months will allow more time for firm-specific and coordinated, industry-wide testing, which will make a smoother transition more likely.
  • The transition from T+2 to T+1 is likely to present numerous operational challenges—some of them more difficult than in the last transition—related to, among other things, pre- and post-trade processes, securities lending, foreign exchange transactions, and processing corporate actions.
  • The transition is happening at the same time the market is processing many other regulatory changes.

I do not have any questions for the staff, but do want to make one final plea to Chair Gensler. Why not adopt a September 3, 2024 compliance date? I will vote for the rule if you make this change.

Posted in Regulation | No Comments »

BoC Hikes Overnight 50bp to 1.00%; Prime Follows

Wednesday, April 13th, 2022

The Bank of Canada has announced it has:

increased its target for the overnight rate to 1%, with the Bank Rate at 1¼% and the deposit rate at 1%. The Bank is also ending reinvestment and will begin quantitative tightening (QT), effective April 25. Maturing Government of Canada bonds on the Bank’s balance sheet will no longer be replaced and, as a result, the size of the balance sheet will decline over time.

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is causing unimaginable human suffering and new economic uncertainty. Price spikes in oil, natural gas and other commodities are adding to inflation around the world. Supply disruptions resulting from the war are also exacerbating ongoing supply constraints and weighing on activity. These factors are the primary drivers of a substantial upward revision to the Bank’s outlook for inflation in Canada.

The war in Ukraine is disrupting the global recovery, just as most economies are emerging from the impact of the Omicron variant of COVID-19. European countries are more directly impacted by confidence effects and supply dislocations caused by the war. China’s economy is facing new COVID outbreaks and an ongoing correction in its property market. In the United States, domestic demand remains very strong and the US Federal Reserve has clearly indicated its resolve to use its monetary policy tools to control inflation. As policy stimulus is withdrawn, US growth is expected to moderate to a pace more in line with potential growth. Global financial conditions have tightened and volatility has increased. The Bank now forecasts global growth of about 3½% this year, 2½% in 2023 and 3¼% in 2024.

In Canada, growth is strong and the economy is moving into excess demand. Labour markets are tight, and wage growth is back to its pre-pandemic pace and rising. Businesses increasingly report they are having difficulty meeting demand, and are able to pass on higher input costs by increasing prices. While the COVID-19 virus continues to mutate and circulate, high rates of vaccination have reduced its health and economic impacts. Growth looks to have been stronger in the first quarter than projected in January and is likely to pick up in the second quarter. Consumer spending is strengthening with the lifting of pandemic containment measures. Exports and business investment will continue to recover, supported by strong foreign demand and high commodity prices. Housing market activity, which has been exceptionally high, is expected to moderate.

The Bank forecasts that Canada’s economy will grow by 4¼% this year before slowing to 3¼% in 2023 and 2¼% in 2024. Robust business investment, labour productivity growth and higher immigration will add to the economy’s productive capacity, while higher interest rates should moderate growth in domestic demand.

CPI inflation in Canada is 5.7%, above the Bank’s forecast in its January Monetary Policy Report (MPR). Inflation is being driven by rising energy and food prices and supply disruptions, in combination with strong global and domestic demand. Core measures of inflation have all moved higher as price pressures broaden. CPI inflation is now expected to average almost 6% in the first half of 2022 and remain well above the control range throughout this year. It is then expected to ease to about 2½% in the second half of 2023 and return to the 2% target in 2024. There is an increasing risk that expectations of elevated inflation could become entrenched. The Bank will use its monetary policy tools to return inflation to target and keep inflation expectations well-anchored.

With the economy moving into excess demand and inflation persisting well above target, the Governing Council judges that interest rates will need to rise further. The policy interest rate is the Bank’s primary monetary policy instrument, and quantitative tightening will complement increases in the policy rate. The timing and pace of further increases in the policy rate will be guided by the Bank’s ongoing assessment of the economy and its commitment to achieving the 2% inflation target.

Prime followed:

Well, Rob Carrick and Ryan Siever will be mad:

There’s a case to be made for banks giving borrowers a break when what is expected to be the biggest interest rate hike in 22 years is announced on Wednesday.

A brief flashback to 2015 is required to get the sense of this story. The economy back then was in the opposite shape of what it is now – weak enough to prompt the Bank of Canada to cut its trendsetting overnight rate by 0.25 of a percentage point in January and again in July.

The big banks hijacked part of that rate cut. While the overnight rate fell by a total 0.5 of a point, the banks cut their prime rate by cumulative 0.3 of a point. They held back the rest of the rate cut to build their revenues and profit.

There was a delay in reducing the prime when the Canada Overnight rate dropped 25bp to 0.75% in January 2015 and again when Canada Overnight dropped a further 25bp to 0.50% in July of that year.

Posted in Canada Prime, Regulation | No Comments »

BoC Hikes Overnight to 0.50%; Prime Follows

Wednesday, March 2nd, 2022

The Bank of Canada has announced it has:

increased its target for the overnight rate to ½ %, with the Bank Rate at ¾ % and the deposit rate at ½ %. The Bank is continuing its reinvestment phase, keeping its overall holdings of Government of Canada bonds on its balance sheet roughly constant until such time as it becomes appropriate to allow the size of its balance sheet to decline.

The unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia is a major new source of uncertainty. Prices for oil and other commodities have risen sharply. This will add to inflation around the world, and negative impacts on confidence and new supply disruptions could weigh on global growth. Financial market volatility has increased. The situation remains fluid and we are following events closely.

Global economic data has come in broadly in line with projections in the Bank’s January Monetary Policy Report (MPR). Economies are emerging from the impact of the Omicron variant of COVID-19 more quickly than expected, although the virus continues to circulate and the possibility of new variants remains a concern. Demand is robust, particularly in the United States. Global supply bottlenecks remain challenging, although there are indications that some constraints have eased.

Economic growth in Canada was very strong in the fourth quarter of last year at 6.7%. This is stronger than the Bank’s projection and confirms its view that economic slack has been absorbed. Both exports and imports have picked up, consistent with solid global demand. In January, the recovery in Canada’s labour market suffered a setback due to the Omicron variant, with temporary layoffs in service sectors and elevated employee absenteeism. However, the rebound from Omicron now appears to be well in train: household spending is proving resilient and should strengthen further with the lifting of public health restrictions. Housing market activity is more elevated, adding further pressure to house prices. Overall, first-quarter growth is now looking more solid than previously projected.

CPI inflation is currently at 5.1%, as expected in January, and remains well above the Bank’s target range. Price increases have become more pervasive, and measures of core inflation have all risen. Poor harvests and higher transportation costs have pushed up food prices. The invasion of Ukraine is putting further upward pressure on prices for both energy and food-related commodities. All told, inflation is now expected to be higher in the near term than projected in January. Persistently elevated inflation is increasing the risk that longer-run inflation expectations could drift upwards. The Bank will use its monetary policy tools to return inflation to the 2% target and keep inflation expectations well-anchored.

The policy rate is the Bank’s primary monetary policy instrument. As the economy continues to expand and inflation pressures remain elevated, the Governing Council expects interest rates will need to rise further. The Governing Council will also be considering when to end the reinvestment phase and allow its holdings of Government of Canada bonds to begin to shrink. The resulting quantitative tightening (QT) would complement increases in the policy interest rate. The timing and pace of further increases in the policy rate, and the start of QT, will be guided by the Bank’s ongoing assessment of the economy and its commitment to achieving the 2% inflation target.

Prime followed:

Posted in Canada Prime, Regulation | No Comments »

OSFI Revises Rules for LRCNs; Finally Provides Information for Insurers

Friday, March 19th, 2021

The Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) has announced:

OSFI has published an update to its July 18, 2020 capital ruling on the Limited Recourse Capital Notes (LRCNs). The revised ruling now addresses LRCN issuances from institutions of all sizes and across different industry sectors.

The revisions include a number of clarifications to the ruling’s conditions and limitations, which are part of OSFI’s prudent approach to assessing the quality and quantity of financial instruments used as regulatory capital. This is consistent with our mandate to protect the rights and interests of depositors, policyholders and financial institution creditors, while also allowing financial institutions to compete effectively and take reasonable risks.

The ruling continues to conclude that federally regulated financial institutions may recognize the LRCNs as regulatory capital subject to the capital treatment, conditions and limitations set out in the revised ruling. Should you have any questions, please contact CapitalConfirmations@osfi-bsif.gc.ca.

The new limits are set out in the appendix to the new rules:

LRCN Issuance Limitations by FRFI Sector
Note: For life insurers, the following limitations supplement and are subject to any existing capital composition limits set out in OSFI’s capital guidelines. P&C insurers and mortgage insurers should consult OSFI’s Capital Division in respect of the limitations applicable to any prospective LRCN issuances.

FRFI
Sector		 Regulatory
Capital
Treatment		 LRCN Issuance Cap Floor
Deposit-
Taking
Institutions		 AT1 Greater of $150 million, 0.75%
RWA, or 50% of the
institution’s aggregate net AT1
capital		 Lesser of 0.30% RWA or 20% of
the institution’s aggregate AT1
capital
Life Tier 1 Capital
other than
Common
Shares		 Greater of $150 million or
12.5% of Net Tier 1 capital		 5.0% of Net Tier 1 capital

The “Floor” has the following effect:

The Cap may be removed with the prior approval of OSFI’s Capital Division. In seeking this approval, a FRFI must demonstrate that it has issued institutional preferred shares and/or other Additional Tier 1 capital instruments (other than LRCNs) targeted towards institutional investors that, in aggregate, are no less than the applicable limit, or Floor, set out in the Appendix. If the FRFI’s outstanding institutional preferred shares and/or other Additional Tier 1 capital instruments issued to institutional investors were to subsequently drop below the Floor, the FRFI would not be permitted to issue additional LRCNs in excess of the Cap until it has re-established compliance with the Floor. The Floor will not apply where the LRCNs are issued exclusively to a FRFI’s affiliates.

Posted in Contingent Capital, Regulatory Capital | 1 Comment »

IAIS Says No To DeemedRetractions

Thursday, November 14th, 2019

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors has released a bevy of documents related to the supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.

Of these, the most important for our purposes is the “Technical Note on ICS Version 2.0 for the monitoring period” which states:

Principal Loss Absorbency Mechanism (PLAM): A distinction is made for mutual and non-mutual IAIGs. For non-mutual IAIGs, the 10% limit for Tier 1 Limited financial instruments will be maintained for Tier 1 Limited financial instruments that do not have a PLAM. An additional 5% allowance is granted to those Tier 1 Limited financial instruments that do have a PLAM. The limits are stated as a % of the ICS capital requirement.

For mutual IAIGs: A PLAM is not required as part of Tier 1 Limited capital resources and the limit for Tier 1 Limited capital resources is maintained at 30% of the ICS capital requirement

So that’s an end to the saga that began in February, 2011. As an investor, I’m shocked; as a taxpayer who will end up footing the bill if one of our outsized insurance companies goes down, I’m disappointed.

Update: An end? Or a new beginning? The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions – which has disgraced itself throughout the negotiations for ICS 2.0 – has announced:

While broadly supportive of the goals of the Insurance Capital Standard (ICS), the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) did not support the ICS design proposed for a five-year monitoring period at the Executive Committee Meeting of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

OSFI’s view is that that the Standard in its current form is not fit for purpose for the Canadian market. Specifically, the proposed capital requirements for long-term products are too high to be compatible with OSFI’s mandate of allowing Canadian insurers to compete and take reasonable risks.

During the five-year monitoring period, OSFI will continue its work in trying to achieve an international capital standard for insurance companies that works for all jurisdictions.

Quick Facts

  • Canadian insurers will continue to be subject to the requirements of OSFI’s robust capital frameworks for federally regulated insurance companies.
  • An initiative of the IAIS, the International Capital Standard is a proposed common capital standard for large internationally active insurance groups.

So, maybe a PLAM for Tier 1 Limited capital resources is a bargaining chip …

Update: There hasn’t been much press coverage of this, but here are two articles:

Update, 2019-11-17: States and Feds Split on Major World Insurance Standards Deal

Update, 2019-11-18: OSFI rebuffs global capital rules for insurers.

Posted in Contingent Capital, Regulation, Regulatory Capital | 6 Comments »

FixedReset Prospectuses Are Imprecise!

Friday, September 13th, 2019

As we all know, FixedResets will reset their dividend every five years based on the Government of Canada Five Year yield (“GOC-5 rate” or “GOC-5 yield”) and therefore the prospectus for each issue needs to include information regarding exactly how that yield is determined.

The prospectus for ALA.PR.G (chosen because I can link to it!) contains typical language with respect to this process:

“Bloomberg Screen GCAN5YR Page” means the display designated as page “GCAN5YR” on the Bloomberg Financial L.P. service (or such other page as may replace the GCAN5YR page on that service) for purposes of displaying Government of Canada bond yields.

“Government of Canada Yield” on any date means the yield to maturity on such date (assuming semi-annual compounding) of a Canadian dollar denominated non-callable Government of Canada bond with a term to maturity of five years as quoted as of 10:00 a.m. (Toronto time) on such date and that appears on he Bloomberg Screen GCAN5YR Page on such date; provided that if such rate does not appear on the Bloomberg Screen GCAN5YR Page on such date, then the Government of Canada Yield shall mean the arithmetic average of the yields quoted to AltaGas by two registered Canadian investment dealers selected by AltaGas as being the annual yield to maturity on such date, compounded semi-annually, that a non-callable Government of Canada bond would carry if issued, in Canadian dollars, at 100% of its principal amount on such date with a term to maturity of five years.

I am not aware of any material differences in the definitions between prospectuses.

So this sounds pretty good, right? The GOC-5 yield will be calculated by an independent third party with no ambiguity and complete verifiability, right? Wrong.

As noted in the post Reset Calculation Oddity for 2019-9-30 / 2019-10-1, the following four issues had the GOC-5 rate underlying their dividends recalculated by their issuers on September 3:

Basis Comparison of Resets
Ticker Issue Reset Spread Announced Rate Implied GOC-5 Yield Screenshot
ALA.PR.G 306bp 4.242% 1.182% LINK
EFN.PR.E 472bp 5.903% 1.183% LINK
BAM.PF.F 286bp 4.029% 1.169% LINK
DC.PR.B 410bp 5.284% 1.184% LINK

The AltaGas screenshot shows they made a slight mistake: the time of the screenshot is 10:00:18, so they missed their proper time by 18 seconds, although they could argue that the prospectus only uses four significant figures and therefore their calculation is completely OK. However, each of the other screenshots shows a genuine effort being made to determine just what exactly the GOC-5 rate was at 10:00:00.00000 and each methodology resulted in a different answer.

Four companies, four identically specified calculations, four different answers.

I will be the first to agree that the variance is minor: the spread between the highest and lowest measurement is only 1.5bp and that’s not a lot. On a typical issue size of $250-million, that comes to $37,500 annually or $187,500 over the full five years. On a per-share basis, a 1.5bp yield difference comes to $0.00375 p.a., slightly less than two cents over the full five years.

But that’s not the point. First, the prospectus should specify the yield to be used in a completely precise manner. To quote again from the representative language of the ALA.PR.G prospectus:

“Annual Fixed Dividend Rate” means, for any Subsequent Fixed Rate Period, the annual rate of interest (expressed as a percentage rounded to the nearest one hundred thousandth of one percent (with 0.000005% being rounded up)) equal to the sum of the Government of Canada Yield on the applicable Fixed Rate Calculation Date and 3.06%.

What’s the point of being so horrifyingly precise about the rounding of the Annual Fixed Dividend Rate when the underlying figure is nowhere near that precisely measured?

In addition, once this becomes widely known, what’s to prevent a company from determining the GOC-5 yield in as many ways as their Bloomberg users can invent and choosing the lowest answer?

Clearly, the Bloomberg methodology is not adequate for the task of determining a precise, public, third-party figure and the procedure needs to be changed. The first alternative that leaps to mind is the Bank of Canada’s bond yield reporting:

Selected benchmark bond yields are based on mid-market closing yields of selected Government of Canada bond issues that mature approximately in the indicated terms. The bond issues used are not necessarily the ones with the remaining time to maturity that is the closest to the indicated term and may differ from other sources. The selected 2-, 5-, 10-, or 30-year issues are generally changed when a building benchmark bond is adopted by financial markets as a benchmark, typically after the last auction for that bond.

Yes, it’s not quite the same thing and yes, there might be a perceived problem if the benchmark changes near the time of calculation (typically, new benchmarks will trade to yield less than the ‘off the run’ issues they supersede). I don’t care. I want something precise, public (certainly more public than a subscription to a Bloomberg terminal!) and prepared by an independent third party. If somebody has a better idea, let’s hear it.

Posted in Issue Comments, Regulation | No Comments »

IAIS SecGen Discusses ICS 2.0 Timeline

Monday, May 27th, 2019

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors released its May, 2019, Newsletter today, which was led by a piece from the Secretary-General, Jonathan Dixon:

Our committee meetings next month in Buenos Aires mark an important point in the IAIS’ journey to a global Insurance Capital Standard (ICS). The IAIS embarked on the development of the ICS to create a common language
for supervisory discussions of group solvency of internationally active insurance groups. In June, the focus of our committee discussions will shift from design to implementation issues.

The final round of field testing is now underway, with data due at the end of July. While some ICS design elements remain to be finalised this year, the IAIS remains committed to resolving those elements and beginning the monitoring period in 2020, while recognising that the ICS will continue to evolve during this period. This includes possible refinements and corrections of major flaws or unintended consequences identified during the monitoring period.

In June, we will discuss the overall framework for the monitoring period, including confidentiality safeguards around disclosure of the ICS results and modalities for considering unintended consequences, given that our intention has always been to undertake this work once the ICS is sufficiently developed. We will also further our discussions on the timelines, process and governance for developing comparability criteria and completing the comparability assessment of other solvency regimes relative to the ICS.

As we move towards November and the adoption of ICS Version 2.0 for the monitoring period, we will continue our constructive engagement with stakeholders in order to ensure that there is greater clarity on the process for finalising and implementing the ICS.

This is all consistent with previous schedules provided for ICS 2.0, which include the IAIS deliberations regarding the definition of Insurance company Tier 1 Limited Capital (which includes preferred shares); I take the view that rules comparable, if not identical to the bank NVCC rules will be imposed by OSFI at some point in the future.

Posted in Regulation | No Comments »

IAIS Releases ICS 2.0 Consultation Comments

Friday, April 5th, 2019

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors has released the comments received to its 2018 ICS 2.0 Consultation. Assiduous Readers will remember that the comment period closed at the end of October, 2018 and included the following questions that are critical to the question of Deemed Maturities for Insurance issues:

The consultation document, downloadable from the above page, contains the critical (for our purposes) question:

173. The IAIS is considering whether to set an additional criterion requiring Tier 1 Limited instruments to have a principal loss absorbency mechanism (PLAM). Such mechanisms would provide a means for financial instruments to absorb losses on a going-concern basis through reductions in the principal amount and cancellation of distributions. Without such mechanisms these instruments might only provide going concern loss absorbency through cancellation of distributions.

deemedretractiblequestion_181103
Click for Big

The consultation document, and the files with respondents’ answers to the questions, may be downloaded from the IAIS Insurance Capital Standards page. The ‘critical questions’, ##52-54, are found in Section 6 Reference ICS – Capital resources (public). The IAIS notes that:

The IAIS received 56 submissions in response to the 2018 ICS Consultation Document of which 18 were requested by the respondents to be kept confidential. Therefore, the comments that are posted here publicly are a subset of those that the IAIS will be taking into account as it moves forward with the ICS.

Q52 Section 6 Is a PLAM [Principal Loss Absorbency Mechanism] an appropriate requirement for Tier 1 Limited financial instruments? Please explain any advantages and disadvantages of requiring a PLAM.

There were 17 responses, 8 yes and 9 no.

OSFI answered “No”:

A PLAM is one option considered to assess loss absorbency in a going concern. However, OSFI’s view is that PoNV (point of non viability) loss absorbency could also be considered. Specifically, the IAIS could consider loss absorbency on a going concern basis, as well as on a gone concern basis with contractual or statutory) PoNV triggers. It is possible that an insurer could fail before a PLAM trigger occurs due to the lagging nature of PLAM triggers. Moreover, PLAM triggers could have adverse signalling effects in respect of the financial condition of the issuer, which could precipitate non-viability.

This advocacy of ‘point of non viability loss absorbency’ is consistent with the NVCC rules OSFI has imposed on banks and with its answer to the 2016 consultation. Assiduous readers will remember that I consider the ‘adverse signalling effects’ of a PLAM trigger to be a feature, not a bug; high triggers are good things, and I’m not the only one who says so:

Moreover, high-trigger CoCos would presumably get converted not infrequently which, in terms of reducing myopia in capital markets, would have the merit of reminding holders and issuers about risks in banking.

Broadly speaking, Europeans were in favour of PLAM, although some expressed concerns about complexity: China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC); European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); Insurance Europe; Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin); General Insurance Association of Japan; Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) & Financial Services Commission (FSC); Legal & General; Association of British Insurers. Comments included EIOPA’s remark:

Requiring a PLAM, i.e. write-down or conversion features, provides a means for the principal of a financial instrument to absorb losses on a going-concern basis. Without such mechanisms these instruments only provide going concern loss absorbency through cancellation of distributions.

Naysayers were dominated by American regulators and firms: Dai-ichi Life Holdings, Inc., American Council of Life Insurers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies; Prudential Financial, Inc.; American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCI); MetLife, Inc; Property Casualty Insurers Association of America (PCI); and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The Americans have a high degree of concern regarding the continued eligibility of “surplus notes”, as exemplified by the response of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies:

PLAM is an addition to the discussion that NAMIC strongly opposes. NAMIC does not see any value in a PLAM requirement. It is simply a way to further complicate the ICS 2.0 providing no value. It seems to be designed to reduce the value of allowing surplus notes to qualify as Tier 1 capital resources.

The elephant in the room is AIG and the European bank bail-outs that left Tier 1 noteholders unscathed, at least relatively. How can anybody say with a straight face that loss absorbency via cessation of dividends is sufficient in the face of those memories?

Q53 Section 6 If a PLAM requirement is not introduced, what amount should be included in ICS capital resources for instruments that qualify as Tier 1 Limited, to reflect going concern loss absorbency? Please explain.

OSFI’s answer is a disgrace:

Capital composition limits address the concerns related to loss absorbency of Tier 1 Limited instruments and therefore their full face amount should be included in the ICS capital resources.

In other words, OSFI would have us believe that since Limited Tier 1 Capital is a limited proportion of the insurers’ high quality capital, it doesn’t really matter whether it’s actually high quality or not. Disgusting.

EIOPA and BaFin stepped into the breach:

Without a PLAM requirement, it is difficult to see how the principal of an instrument absorbs losses in a going concern basis.

Interestingly, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America (PCI) stated:

In support, PCI cites the response of OSFI-Canada to a similar question in the prior ICS consultation

and quoted in full the dovish response to the 2016 consultation … including the grudging support for a NVCC solution.

Others stated that cessation of distributions worked just fine, e.g., American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCI):

Tier 1 Limited instruments already provide loss absorbency on a going concern loss basis through cancellation of distributions. Reducing the principal amount of these instruments is only necessary during resolution.

Q54 Section 6 Are there other criteria that could be added to enhance the ability of financial instruments to absorb losses on a going concern and / or on a gone concern basis? Please explain.

OSFI had nothing to say. BaFin and EIOPA had identical answers again:

• In T1, mandatory cancellation of distributions on breach of capital requirement (i.e. a lock-in feature).
• In T2, mandatory deferral of distributions and redemption of principal on breach of capital requirement (i.e. a lock-in feature).
• Requirement for early repurchase (within 5 years from issuance) to be funded out of proceeds of new issuance of
same/higher quality (all tiers).

I don’t quite understand this response. Does “cancellation” mean cancellation forever and ever on T1, as opposed to a temporary “deferral” on T2? How about redemptions? Would such instruments have any rights if the issuer actually did go bankrupt ten years later? And I don’t understand what they mean by an early purchase requirement at all.

So, there you have it. I don’t find anything particularly surprising here; there might be some meaning behind the heavy American participation in this consultation, but an outsider such as myself would be foolish to speculate on just what that meaning might be.

Posted in Contingent Capital, Regulation, Regulatory Capital | 8 Comments »

DBRS: Canadian Banks’ Trends Now Stable on Bail-In Approval

Wednesday, April 25th, 2018

DBRS has announced that it has:

changed the trend to Stable from Negative on the Long-Term Issuer Ratings, Senior Debt Ratings and Deposits ratings of the Bank of Montreal, The Bank of Nova Scotia, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the National Bank of Canada. These actions result from the publication by the Minister of Finance of the final rules related to the Bank Recapitalization Regime (the Bail-in Regime). DBRS notes that the Stable trends on the long-term ratings of The Toronto-Dominion Bank and Royal Bank of Canada were unaffected. For these domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) to which the Bail-in Regime is applicable, DBRS has created a new obligation named Bail-inable Senior Debt. This new obligation rating reflects the senior debt that these banks will begin issuing once the Bail-in Regime goes into effect on September 23, 2018. Lastly, DBRS has downgraded the legacy Subordinated Debt ratings of these D-SIBs by one notch.

The revision of the trend to Stable from Negative for the affected long-term ratings reflects DBRS’s view that a downgrade of existing senior debt for the D-SIBs is now unlikely. It is anticipated that systemic support would still be sufficient to add a notch for such support until the D-SIBs issue adequate amounts of Bail-inable Senior Debt to meet their total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements. Once an adequate level of bail-inable debt has been issued, the likelihood of future systemic support would be much lower. Accordingly, the notch of support would then be withdrawn. However, the new Bail-inable Senior Debt creates an additional buffer that better protects all senior obligations that cannot be bailed in under the regulation. Therefore, DBRS does not expect to downgrade any long-term ratings of existing senior obligations of the D-SIBs.

When issued, DBRS will rate the new Bail-inable Senior Debt at the level of each bank’s Intrinsic Assessment (IA), reflecting the risk of a D-SIB being put into resolution.

The downgrades of the legacy Subordinated Debt ratings reflect the structural subordination to the Bail-inable Senior Debt.

This has been telegraphed for a long, long time:

Posted in Contingent Capital, Issue Comments, Regulatory Capital | No Comments »

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