On May 16, the Globe published a piece titled Property insurers warn proposed federal tax change to preferred shares could hurt the sector that has caused a fair amount of comment on the web and interest from Assiduous Readers. According to the Globe:
Louis Marcotte, Intact’s executive vice-president and chief financial officer, told The Globe and Mail that the company has been a significant investor in Canadian dividend-generating securities for decades, and is encouraging the government to “consult widely” on the proposed change to ensure it is supporting its “local market champions.”
“Most Canadian equity investments held by Canadian insurers like Intact Financial Corporation, are held for the long term with a view of providing a safe return for policy holders and investors,” Mr. Marcotte said in an e-mail. “The loss of the dividend deduction could have a knock-on effect on premiums but also on the availability and diversity of funding sources for Canadian corporations.”
The loss of income from the dividends deduction would effectively raise Intact’s tax rate by almost two percentage points, the company said.
“It also would increase the tax imbalance for us but also all Canadian insurers when facing their foreign counterparts,” Mr. Marcotte added.
Canadian property and casualty (P&C) insurers hold at least 12 per cent of all outstanding preferred shares in Canada – about $6-billion, according to a recent report by SLC Asset Management, Sun Life Financial’s asset-management division.
I discussed the proposed taxation change in the post Dividend Capture by Banks Now Less Profitable, but only in the context of dividend capture trading strategies. The Globe article highlights further-reaching possibilities.
So what are the implications of a potential exodus? I don’t think prices will be immediately affected: right now the market is extremely depressed – there hasn’t been much new issuance in the last three years, and that tells you something right there – and the institutions aren’t going to have a fire-sale of perfectly good assets just because the tax situation has changed unfavourably. What might happen is that any future ascent in prices gets slowed down because the holders sell into market strength, but I don’t think they’ll sell otherwise.
Liquidity will be adversely affected; but much more in the world of block-trades (more than 10,000 shares on a single ticket) and the dealer market (the proprietary traders at the big firms who make a significant portion of their paycheques by arranging these trades for their clients). At the retail level, which dominates the market so much that the average daily trading value for the universe is a mere $100,000, not so much.
A more insidious effect, I think, is that there will be some capital exiting the business. A decline in block trading will be a direct hit to dealer profits and the firms will react by reducing the amount of capital available to their proprietary desks. We saw this writ large during the Credit Crunch, when the prop-traders basically stopped doing business due to lack of capital and as a result there were enormous intra-day price swings, $1.00 gaps between successive trades, up to $2 range on a single day. Those days were glorious for those among us who supply liquidity to the market in our modest way: to some extent I see this happening again.
Another source of liquidity in the market that may be affected is ETF arbitrage. There are a few players who spend a great deal of time exploiting the equation “ETF-1 + ShareBasketA – ShareBasketB = ETF-2” and trading accordingly. A decline in liquidity will disproportionately hurt them and if they can’t make any money with a fully hedged position they’ll have to find some other market to play in.
A decline in liquidity and a shortage of big buyers will also mean that issue sizes will tend to shrink. We’ve seen some massive issues over the past decade – e.g., TRP.PR.K, $500MM, 2016, redeemed in 2022; TD.PF.H, 1,000MM, 2016, redeemed in 2021; TD.PF.G, $700MM, 2016, redeemed in 2021. I don’t think we’ll be seeing that kind of size very often if 12% of the market takes its ball and goes home.
And really, that’s all I got. Our illiquid market will become a little more illiquid, helped along by OSFI’s determination to create an OTC preferred share market (dealt a blow by the proposed tax change?) for institutional investors (see this comment). But there should be no adverse price effects relative to the current subterranean levels; perhaps a slower ascent on the way back up; and probably a greater degree of intra-day volatility.
ytc_resets.xlsx : Slight Modification
Wednesday, September 27th, 2023I have recently been discussing the question of yield and forecast income from Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund with a client, and as part of that referred him to the Yield Calculator for Resets so he could see for himself why the projected income from the fund was so much higher than the current income.
As part of that, I had to explain that HIMIPref™, my analytical software, uses semi-annual compounded yield, which is a higher number than the quarterly compounded yield calculated by the spreadsheet. And my income projections use HIMIPref™ calculations. The more I looked at my explanation, the more it looked like bafflegab and handwaving.
So, in order to reduce the complexity of this explanation in the future, I have added a display field on the spreadsheet showing the yield as the semi-annual compounded value (for comparability with bonds) as well as the quarterly compounded value (applicable only to instruments that pay quarterly).
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