Archive for January, 2009

January 30, 2009

Saturday, January 31st, 2009

I’m very annoyed with DBRS. I had been hoping they would come to some resolution of their mass reviews of Split Corporations (two of them: October and December), but here we are at month-end and … nothing.

So we’ll go through February with, for instance, FBS.PR.B sporting an asset coverage just a hair over 1.0:1 and still rated Pfd-2(low). As a portfolio manager, of course, I couldn’t be happier – such a grossly mis-rated issue in the universe increases my chance to outperform – but as an index calculator, it’s very annoying. It will be in the Split-Share sub-index for at least another month.

The concept of incentive is under continued attack:

NYSE Euronext Chief Executive Officer Duncan Niederauer said today in Davos that “some compensation models need to be completely overhauled.” He added that this would be difficult to legislate and companies will have to take the lead.

“While a number of people clearly do create wealth by brain power, by use of the company’s balance sheet and by other resources, other people have been receiving incentives for basically turning up,” Barclays Plc Chairman Marcus Agius said at the World Economic Forum. “That I don’t think is very smart. An incentive system properly designed and fairly calibrated is absolutely fundamental.”

Interesting charge/countercharge in the Money Market Fund world:

James “Jes” Staley, head of JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s investment unit, said the $4 trillion money-market fund industry is the “greatest systemic risk” to the financial system that hasn’t been adequately addressed.

JPMorgan’s Staley blamed money funds for Lehman’s collapse and the near bankruptcy of Bear Stearns Cos. last year. The funds, which typically hold highly rated, short-term debt instruments, were forced to pull their money from the firms when they saw signs of trouble, he said.

“The people who brought down Lehman and almost Bear Stearns weren’t the banks, they were the money funds,” Staley said.

David Glocke, head of taxable money-market investments at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania-based Vanguard Group defended the industry.

“I’m aware there are those who want to blame the money- market industry for taking away the punch bowl,” he said. “But issuers need to maintain diverse sources of funding.”

The G-30 report on MMFs has been discussed on PrefBlog. The interesting thing about Mr. Glocke’s remark is that – taken at face value – it appears to accept that MMFs are a portfolio management monoculture; it would be highly surprising is the same thing were to be said, for instance, about an equity issue … but, of course, equities only go down due to short selling, so the short-seller can get one of them bonus thingies, right?

PerpetualDiscounts closed the month with a marginal loss, closing to yield 6.85%, equivalent to 9.59% at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor. Long corporates now yield about 7.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now at about 200bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.81 % 7.58 % 21,648 13.63 2 0.3929 % 851.8
FixedFloater 7.47 % 6.96 % 158,550 13.86 8 -0.7003 % 1,384.7
Floater 5.57 % 4.75 % 32,615 15.98 4 -4.1413 % 944.4
OpRet 5.31 % 4.92 % 163,621 4.03 15 0.0279 % 2,023.7
SplitShare 6.23 % 9.05 % 76,364 4.10 15 -0.7373 % 1,789.8
Interest-Bearing 7.06 % 8.21 % 35,974 0.88 2 0.4049 % 2,004.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0185 % 1,559.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.87 % 6.85 % 223,347 12.72 71 -0.0185 % 1,436.7
FixedReset 6.10 % 5.44 % 761,417 14.33 26 0.2212 % 1,789.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -7.91 % Five hundred shares trading in the last 15 minutes took out the bid and the closing quote was 11.06-14.98 (!) 1×1, trading a total of 4,910 shares in a range of 11.06-12.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 11.06
Evaluated at bid price : 11.06
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -5.03 % Closed at 7.36-79, 3×9 after trading 10,221 shares in a range of 7.75-79. YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 7.36
Evaluated at bid price : 7.36
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare -3.72 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.79
Bid-YTW : 7.94 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 7.56
Evaluated at bid price : 7.56
Bid-YTW : 7.05 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -3.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 18.36
Evaluated at bid price : 18.36
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -3.19 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.11
Bid-YTW : 8.04 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -2.75 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.85
Bid-YTW : 8.56 %
BCE.PR.A FixedFloater -2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.48
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.21
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 10.70 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 21.92
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing 1.21 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 19, based on Capital Units NAV of 1.46 as of January 29 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.52
Bid-YTW : 12.53 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 15.58
Evaluated at bid price : 15.58
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.31
Bid-YTW : 9.63 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 16.96
Evaluated at bid price : 16.96
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 3.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 22.17
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 611,420 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 24.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 496,219 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 24.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 214,946 New issue settled yesterday.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 172,668 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 120,800 Scotia crossed 120,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 94,731 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-30
Maturity Price : 24.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BNS.PR.X Closes Below Par on Good Volume

Saturday, January 31st, 2009

Scotia has announced:

that it has completed the domestic offering of 11 million, non-cumulative 5-year rate reset preferred shares Series 28 (the “Preferred Shares Series 28”) at a price of $25.00 per share. The gross proceeds of the offering were $275 million.

The issue is a fixed-reset 6.25%+446, as previously announced. The original size was 10-million shares plus a 2-million greenshoe; bumped to 12+2; and they sold 13. A fine marketting job!

The issue traded 496,219 shares in a range of 24.80-00, closing at 24.90-92. It was one of three issues settling today, the others being TD.PR.G and NA.PR.P.

The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset Sub-Index.

TD.PR.G Closes Below Par on Good Volume

Saturday, January 31st, 2009

The new TD bank fixed-reset 6.25%+438 previously discussed settled today.

The original announcement was for an issue size of 8-million shares with a 3-million greenshoe; TD later announced that the greenshoe had been fully exercised and the issue size bumped, with a total of 15-million shares sold. Now that’s a selling job!

The issue traded 611,420 shares in a range of 24.80-97 before closing at 24.85-90.

The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset Sub-Index.

NA.PR.P Settles Below Par on OK Volume

Saturday, January 31st, 2009

National has announced:

that it has completed the public offering of non-cumulative 5-year rate reset first preferred shares series 26 (the “Series 26 Preferred Shares”), at a price of $25.00 per share. The offering was made through a syndicate of underwriters led by National Bank Financial Inc. Prior to the closing of the offering, the underwriters agreed to purchase 1,800,000 additional Series 26 Preferred Shares through the underwriters’ option, bringing the total issue to 5,800,000 shares and gross proceeds of the offering to $145 million

As previously discussed, this issue is a fixed-reset 6.60%+479. It traded 172,668 shares in a range of 24.85-95 before closing at 24.91-95.

The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset Sub-Index.

CDS Reform Proposals: I Don't Get It

Friday, January 30th, 2009

Bloomberg has reported:

For the first time, the market will have a committee of banks and investors making binding decisions that determine when buyers of the insurance-like derivatives can demand payment and could influence how much they get, industry leaders said yesterday at a conference in New York. Traders also will revamp the way the contracts are traded, including requiring upfront payments to make them more like the bonds they’re linked to.

The plan doesn’t change contracts traded in Europe.

In one of the most noticeable changes for traders, those who buy protection will pay an upfront fee depending on current market prices, and then a fixed $100,000 or $500,000 annual payment for every $10 million of protection purchased. Now, upfront payments are only required for riskier companies, and the annual payment, or coupon, on most contracts is determined by the daily market level.

Dealbreaker, bless its heart, is contemptuous:

We are looking forward to the world where the only finance products permitted go up forever, and where everyone makes above average returns.

I’m mainly confused, and hoping that the Bloomberg reporters simply got it wrong. A standard up-front fee for the buyers of protection? It makes no sense. The buyer’s risk is limited to the sum of the present value of the payments required. A five year contract with a 5% premium limits the buyer’s potential loss to 25% of the notional value. The tail risk of the contract is owned by the seller of the protection, who can lose 100% of notional on the very first day the contract is in existence.

Selling protection has capital implications roughly equivalent to owning the bond. I have no problem with the idea that CDS sellers post margin equivalent to what they would have to were the position an actual bond – but most of them do already. The trouble started when the AIGs and MBIAs of this world sold protection without posting collateral or taking a high enough capital charge for regulatory purposes.

And what’s this with a fixed standard rate of $100,000 or $500,000 per year for the premium (paid by the buyer to the seller) on $10-million notional? That’s 1% and 5%, respectively. I can see that it might be very useful to standardize tick sizes, so that all contracts will trade with, say 10bp ticks … but those premia don’t make any sense.

Note that with 10bp ticks (any size ticks, actually), virtually every contract would have a value at the opening, which would be settled by cash payment between buyer and seller at the time the contract is written. I don’t have any problems with that idea – it would make contracts more fungible, particularly if settled by a clearinghouse.

But we are in the hysteria phase of CDS demonization and the politicians need a pulpit. ISDA has released a mild demur – I can only hope they’re more vociferous behind closed doors.

It was announced yesterday that JPMorgan’s analytics will go open-source; but no details of licensing have yet been released.

January 29, 2009

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

There’s a draft bill in Congress that will kill the CDS market:

House of Representatives Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson of Minnesota circulated an updated draft bill yesterday that would ban credit-default swap trading unless investors owned the underlying bonds. The document, distributed by e-mail by the committee staff in Washington, would also force U.S. trading in the $684 trillion over-the-counter derivatives market to be processed by a clearinghouse.

Presumably, the requirement to own the underlying bonds would apply only to buyers. The industry response notes the obvious:

The standardization necessary to process a contract in a clearinghouse may harm the market and drive the trading overseas, Weber said.

“It’s a big deal because the OTC market has developed almost as an alternative to the exchange market with its clearinghouses,” he said. “It would be advantageous for places like London, Hong Kong or Singapore where OTC trading wouldn’t have that kind of restriction.”

Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser provides an an update on multipliers from a credible source:

Accrued Interest points out that absolute yields on US corporates are nowhere near as interesting as the spreads imply:


Click for big

… although, mind you, that’s a four year issue he’s talking about. He concludes:

So what does the corporate bond market offer? For those who want to just collect income, corporates are a much better choice than either Treasuries or Agency bonds. There are enough solid names to build a diversified portfolio. But this trade is all about the income collection, or the carry. It isn’t about making a great trade.

Or its about making the right credit call at the right time. Picking the beaten up name than can recover. But in that case, it isn’t an easy trade, its a gutsy call that could wind up with a big capital gain or else a large loss in bankruptcy.

I will suggest that fixed income investing in general is all about income collection. Those wishing to make a “great trade” should stick to a more appropriate asset class. I get a lot of calls asking for my ONE GREAT IDEA that will MAKE A FORTUNE!!!! Guys, guys, guys … that’s not what fixed-income is all about.

Treasury will write a global liquidity guarantee on a SIV, a move that has interesting implications. Clearly, there is huge demand for maturity transformation that is traditionally intermediated by banks, but in the glory days saw some intermediation by SIVs, among other vehicles. Clearly, these are unusual times and no conclusions for the future can be drawn; but it will be interesting to see how the eternal struggle between lenders wanting short-term and borrowers seeking long-term plays out over the next few years.

Vancouverites wondering about funding the Olympic Village will be unsurprised to hear that Fortress Investment Group really, really needs more cash. Hat tips: Zero Hedge and Dealbreaker, although I suspect they’re a little over-excited.

Treasuries got whacked today, with the long bond yield up 17bp to 3.59%. Mortgage paper is worse. Long Canadas did relatively well, yield up 8bp to 3.71%. Long Corporates have returned -2.05% month-to-date and now yield 7.6%.

However, PerpetualDiscounts – along with every other sector – was up today and now yield 6.88%, equivalent to 9.63% interest at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor, implying a pre-tax interest-equivalent spread of ~200bp.

Tomorrow will be an interesting day – there are no less than three new issues settling. The BNS 6.25%+446 will trade as BNS.PR.X; the TD 6.25%+438 will trade as TD.PR.G; and the NA 6.60%+479 will trade as NA.PR.P.

And who knows? If they trade nicely, maybe we’ll see some more!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.87 % 7.66 % 22,643 13.53 2 -0.1070 % 848.4
FixedFloater 7.42 % 6.92 % 161,135 13.92 8 0.6635 % 1,394.4
Floater 5.34 % 4.51 % 32,048 16.39 4 0.4851 % 985.3
OpRet 5.31 % 4.91 % 169,475 4.03 15 0.0139 % 2,023.1
SplitShare 6.18 % 9.17 % 75,844 4.11 15 0.1742 % 1,803.1
Interest-Bearing 7.09 % 7.95 % 36,181 0.88 2 0.1158 % 1,996.6
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1204 % 1,560.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.87 % 6.88 % 226,126 12.67 71 0.1204 % 1,436.9
FixedReset 6.08 % 5.35 % 761,830 14.38 23 0.3718 % 1,785.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ALB.PR.A SplitShare -2.16 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 22 according to Scotia.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 16.56 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.90 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31, according to the company. The underlying BAM.A closed today at 19.88 compared to the year-end close of 18.55 and this improvement, together with what may be rather large profits on the retractions of BNA.PR.A and BNA.PR.B, will increase the coverage … at least a little, barring disaster tomorrow!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.35
Bid-YTW : 15.50 %
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -1.61 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of January 22 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.56
Bid-YTW : 12.65 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 17.46
Evaluated at bid price : 17.46
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 16.32
Evaluated at bid price : 16.32
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 19.79
Evaluated at bid price : 19.79
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 22.57
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 21.73
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 44.29
Evaluated at bid price : 45.51
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.35
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 7.28 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare 1.46 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.62
Bid-YTW : 10.96 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.47 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31, according to the company. The underlying BAM.A closed today at 19.88 compared to the year-end close of 18.55 and this improvement, together with what may be rather large profits on the retractions of BNA.PR.A and BNA.PR.B, will increase the coverage … at least a little, barring disaster tomorrow! Oddly, this issue is now trading well over its estimated retraction price of $21.74. Didn’t always used to!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 9.17 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare 2.13 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.10
Bid-YTW : 7.72 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 14.60
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 7.85
Evaluated at bid price : 7.85
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare 2.93 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.13
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 964,597 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 185,200 Scotia crossed 182,900 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 54,782 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 50,475 Desjardins crossed 25,300 at 15.40; Nesbitt crossed 15,000 at 15.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 15.36
Evaluated at bid price : 15.36
Bid-YTW : 7.36 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 47,495 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.01
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 43,462 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.03
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

RY.PR.R Settles Comfortably on High Volume

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

The new Royal Bank Fixed Reset 6.25%+450 announced last week and bumped significantly in size during the marketting period settled today, closing at 24.97-00 after trading 964,597 shares in a range of 24.96-03.

It has been added to the Fixed-Reset Index.

Effective Fed Funds Rate: A Technical Explanation?

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

Assiduous Readers will remember the puzzle of the Effective Fed Funds Rate. Fed Funds were trading at 0.25% at a time when excess balances were earning 1.00% from the Fed, which appears to allow a risk-free arbitrage.

A recent Fed Press Release and its attachment may provide a piece of the answer. First, a little terminology gleaned from the attachment … a small bank does not need to satisfy its reserve requirements directly with the Fed. It can deposit the necessary funds in a (presumably bigger) bank’s Fed account, in which case the small bank is the “respondent” and the big bank with the Fed account is the “pass through correspondent”. Got it? OK:

As noted above, Regulation D currently deems the entire balance in a pass-through correspondent’s account at a Reserve Bank to be the exclusive property of the pass-through correspondent and to represent a liability of that Reserve Bank to the pass-through correspondent exclusively. Therefore, the pass-through correspondent must show the entire balance in its Reserve Bank account on its own balance sheet as an asset, even if the balance consists, in whole or in part, of amounts that are passed through on behalf of a respondent.

Accordingly, when a correspondent’s respondents want to earn interest on excess balances by leaving them with their correspondent (which in turn passes those balances through to the Reserve Bank), the correspondent has a larger balance at the Reserve Bank. As a result, the correspondent has more assets on its balance sheet and a lower leverage ratio for capital adequacy purposes.

In contrast, when the correspondent sells the respondent’s federal funds on the respondent’s behalf, the respondent directs its correspondent to transfer funds to the entity purchasing federal funds. This transaction is effected by a debit to the correspondent’s account at a Reserve Bank and a credit to the purchaser’s account at a Reserve Bank. On the correspondent’s balance sheet, all other things being equal, the correspondent’s assets decline (as does its liability to its respondent) because the correspondent’s account balance at the Reserve Bank is lower and therefore its regulatory leverage ratio would be higher.

Since the implementation of interest on excess balances through the October interim final rule, the actual federal funds rate has generally averaged significantly below the interest rate paid by the Reserve Banks on excess balances, although this spread narrowed significantly after the FOMC established a range for the federal funds rate of 0 to ¼ percent on December 16. When the market rate of interest on federal funds is below the rate paid by the Reserve Banks on excess balances, respondents have an incentive to shift the investment of their surplus funds away from sales of federal funds (through their correspondents acting as agents), and toward holding funds directly as excess balances with the Reserve Banks, potentially disrupting established correspondent-respondent relationships. A correspondent could offer to purchase federal funds directly from its respondents and hold those funds as excess balances at a Reserve Bank; however, such transactions could result in a significant reduction in regulatory leverage ratios for some correspondents. The Board believes that the disparity between the actual federal funds rate and the rate paid by Reserve Banks on excess balances may partly be caused by the leverage incentives imposed on correspondent institutions to sell excess balances into the federal funds market rather than maintaining those balances in an account at a Reserve Bank.

To address this problem, the Fed is proposing to establish a new account type, an “Excess Balance Account”.

These excess balance accounts (“EBAs”) would contain only the excess balances of the eligible institutions participating in such accounts, although the participating eligible institutions (“EBA Participants”) would authorize another institution (“EBA Agent”) to manage the EBA on their behalf. The authorization of EBAs is intended to allow eligible institutions to earn interest on their excess balances at the excess balance rate in an account relationship directly with the Federal Reserve Bank as counterparty without disrupting established business relationships with their correspondents. Continuing strains in financial markets and the configuration of interest rates support the implementation of EBAs; however, the Board will evaluate the continuing need for EBAs when more normal market functioning is restored.

EBA Balances will not gross up the pass-through correspondent’s balance sheet.

Update, 2009-2-2: Economic Policy Journal commented in early December on a December 1 speech by Bernanke in which he noted:

In practice, however, several factors have served to depress the market rate below the target. One such factor is the presence in the market of large suppliers of funds, notably the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are not eligible to receive interest on reserves and are thus willing to lend overnight federal funds at rates below the target.

Banks have an incentive to borrow from the GSEs and then redeposit the funds at the Federal Reserve; as a result, banks earn a sure profit equal to the difference between the rate they pay the GSEs and the rate they receive on excess reserves. However, thus far, this type of arbitrage has not been occurring on a sufficient scale, perhaps because banks have not yet fully adjusted their reserve-management practices to take advantage of this opportunity.

I am happy to see my ‘bureaucracy explanation’ front and centre!

James Hymas quoted by Les Affaires

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

A very nice feature article in this week’s edition of Les Affaires, by Dominique Beauchamp.

Actions privilégiées : à utiliser à petite dose

and

Actions privilégiées : des rendements supérieurs à saisir

CDS Analytics to go Open-Source

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

ISDA has announced:

that J.P. Morgan has transferred to ISDA its CDS Analytical Engine. The CDS analytical engine, originally developed by the Quantitative Research group at J.P. Morgan, is widely used in the industry to price CDS contracts. ISDA will make the analytical engine available as open source code, thereby increasing transparency around CDS pricing.

“J.P. Morgan has invested a lot of intellectual capital in this analytical engine. Its willingness to assign this to ISDA for us to make it available as open source to the entire industry demonstrates our collective commitment to the integrity of the CDS product,” said Robert Pickel, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, ISDA. “ISDA and its members are vigilant to public concerns around transparency. This is yet another measure of increased standardization in CDS.”

This is interesting, particularly given the politics that are swirling around the market. Making the code available to the public could be a first step towards listing some benchmark names on an exchange. As yet, though, the details of the open-source licence are not available.

Hat-tips: Alea via Dealbreaker.