Archive for September, 2007

MAPF Performance, September 2007

Sunday, September 30th, 2007

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for September, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.1489, after a distribution of dividends of $0.116224. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to September, 2007
One Month -0.70%
Three Months -0.50%
One Year +1.17%
Two Years (annualized) +3.54%
Three Years (annualized) +4.71%
Four Years (annualized) +7.31%
Five Years (annualized) +11.83%
Six Years (annualized) +8.86%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

Claymore has published their final monthly numbers and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to September 28
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
June 29 18.97      
July 31 18.95   -0.11% -0.11%
August 31 19.04   +0.47% +0.47%
September 25 18.76 0.2185 -0.32% -1.23%
September 28, 2007 18.59   -0.91%
Quarterly Return -0.87%

It should be explicitly noted that the CPD returns are shown AFTER ALL FEES AND EXPENSES, while the MAPF numbers are shown after expenses, but before fees … so to make the numbers more comparable, take the annual fee from the fund’s web page and divide by the appropriate number to obtain the period’s fee.

So … perhaps not the greatest of all quarters, but considering that MAPF did not get the benefit of the huge rise in BCE preferreds in the quarter, staying even – actually, just a tad better than the ‘CPD Competition – after fees isn’t the worst thing that could happen. The last few days of September didn’t help, in either relative or absolute terms, when the market did very poorly, presumably due to digestive problems with the new issues.

More later.

Update, 2007-10-02

The DPS.UN NAV for September 26 has been published, so we can calculate the September-ish returns for it:

DPS.UN NAV Return, August-ish 2007
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
August 29, 2007 $22.14 $0.00  
September 26 $21.93 $0.30 +0.41%
Time-Weighted, September-ish +0.41%
Adjustment for August stub-period -0.53%
Adjustment for September stub-period -0.80%
Estimated September Return -0.92%
CPD had an NAV of $18.94 on August 29 and $19.04 on August 31. The beginning-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.53%.CPD had a NAV of $18.74 on September 26 and $18.59 on September 28. The end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.80%.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for August and July to derive:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-September-ish, 2007
July-ish +1.38%
August-ish +0.22%
September-ish -0.92%
Three-months-ish +0.66%

I will also note that the “BMO Capital Markets 50” index returned -1.35% for the month and +0.53% for the quarter, but will not analyze the situation further due to the proprietary nature of this index.

This is an unusual quarter. The basic problem is the BCE/Teachers deal, which had the effect of changing the BCE preferreds from junk issues into speculations on a takeover bid at blue-chip prices. This had a marked effect on returns for these issues, which ranged from a low of +9.52% (BCE.PR.H) to +23.52% (BCE.PR.G). The BMOCM-50 is 8.05% BCE issues as of 2007-9-30, but let’s look at the CPD holdings, which are publicly disclosed:

CPD Holdings of BCE
Issue Weight,
2007-10-1
Return,
07Q3
Effect on Fund Return
BCE.PR.F* 1.99% +12%* +0.2388%
BCE.PR.A* 2.83% +12%* +0.3396%
BCE.PR.C 2.83% +10.5% +0.2972%
Total Contribution of BCE Issues +0.8756%
*BCE.PR.F is not tracked by HIMIPref™, BCE.PR.A is tracked, but the change in terms as of September 1 does not allow HIMIPref™ to calculate returns for periods which include that date. Somebody should fire that programmer! For both issues, a generic return of +12% has been presumed for the period.

DPS.UN reported its portfolio in the June 30 Semi-Annual Report:

DPS.UN Holdings of BCE
Issue Weight,
2007-6-30
Return,
07Q3
Effect on Fund Return
BCE.PR.C 1.80% +10.5 +0.1890%
BCE.PR.A* 1.41% +12%* +0.1692%
BCE.PR.I 1.39% +22.2% +0.3086%
BCE.PR.Z 1.36% +11.4% +0.1550%
BCE.PR.R 1.33% +19.3% +0.2567%
BCE.PR.S 1.25% +10.5% +0.1312%
BCE.PR.H 0.85% +9.5% +0.0808%
BCE.PR.F* 0.43% +12%* +0.0516%
BCE.PR.T 0.29% +18.7% +0.0542%
Total Contribution of BCE Issues +1.3963%
*BCE.PR.F is not tracked by HIMIPref™. BCE.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but the change in terms as of September 1 does not allow HIMIPref™ to calculate returns for periods which include that date. Somebody should fire that programmer! A generic return of +12% has been presumed for the period for each of these two issues.

Anyway, my point in performing this minor piece of attribution analysis is simply to show the enormous influence the presence or absence of BCE issues has had this quarter in preferred share fund returns. A conscious decision was made to avoid these issues for the fund; this action was taken due to a feeling that with BCE in play, the instruments had become unanalyzable by quantitative measures (in addition to my general disdain for issued tied to Canada Prime!). This helped MAPF’s relative returns during the second quarter of this year and has hurt in the third. I have no regrets about the decision – but it certainly has made relative returns more volatile than would otherwise be the case.

Update, 2007-10-14: A discussion of portfolio composition as of September 28, 2007, is available here.

Whoosh! Market Adjustment Affects Fair Value of New Issues

Saturday, September 29th, 2007

Readers will remember that when the recent new issues were announced, I liked both of them: the BNS 5.25% was worth $25.93 according to the prior day’s closing prices, although by the time the BMO 5.25% was announced both issues were worth more like $25.33.

Which was still good enough to buy!

Following the debacle of Friday September 28, in which the market just kept on falling, both issues are now fairly valued below their issue price: fair value is about 24.88 to 24.90.

Something like this leads me to suspect that there just isn’t too much opportunistic money on the sidelines; that while the new issues were recognized as attractive, all the money required to buy them has come out of other preferred issues, rather than from other asset classes.

This is a funny market. 5.25% dividends, multiplied by an equivalency factor of 1.4 implies that interest of 7.35% must be received to provide the same after-tax income. There are unique risks in the preferred share market, of course. Investors must be aware of these risks and ensure they’re not overly exposed to any of them (or to any other single risk!) … but 7.35%? From a major bank? We haven’t seen that kind of interest rate lately.

Update, 2007-10-2: As of the close today, fair value for both issues is within a few pennies of $24.85.

Update, 2007-10-4: As of the close today, fair value is $24.72 for the BMO issue, $24.74 for BNS.

After-Tax Yield Equivalency

Saturday, September 29th, 2007

It must be fall! The time when an old man’s fancy lightly turns to thoughts of tax planning! I received my first indication of the change in season today …

My correspondent sent me the following calculation and wondered why the after-tax yield on a dividend that he was investigating was lower than the pre-tax yield … he attached a calculation:

Tax Effect on Dividends
A Preferred Shares Purchase Price $100.00
B Dividend Rate of Return 4.25%
C Yearly Amount of Dividends (A*B) $4.25
D Gross-Up Percentage 45%
E Taxable (i.e. Grossed-Up) Amount of Dividends = (1+D)*C $6.16
F Tax Rate 30%
G Tax on Grossed-up Amount of Dividends (F*E) $1.85
H Tax Credit Percentage 19%
I Tax Credit (H * G) $0.35
J Net Tax (G-I) $1.50
K After Tax Return (C-J) $2.75
L After Tax Rate of Return (K/A) 2.75%

My correspondent’s problem was that he had been told that “L” should be more than “B”.

Well, he was quite right to be suspicious! An after tax rate of return higher than the pre-tax rate implies a negative taxation rate; and while such things may sometimes happen to a very small extent in some corners of the tax world, given very particular (and relatively small!) numbers, it’s just not there for most of us! It will doubtless be a promise in the next Federal election campaign, however.

I suspect that my correspondent was told a garbled version of something that really is a general rule: that dividend income is better than interest income and that a dividend of $1 will always leave more in your pocket than an interest receipt of $1. Always? Well, there might be some exceptions! I will stress that I am not a tax expert and that anything I say about taxes should be checked!

What we need to illustrate this is a few more lines in the calculation:

Additional Lines for Interest Equivalency Factor
M Rate of tax on interest income (from tables) 43.4%
N Percentage of Interest Income kept (1-M) 56.6%
O Interest Required to produce after-tax amount (= K / N) $4.86
P Equivalency Factor (= O / C) 1.14

So what we conclude from this particular equivalency factor is that:

  • a dividend yield of 4.25% will produce the same amount of after-tax income as an interest yield of 4.86%
  • For any given dividend yield, we can multiply by 1.14 to get the interest rate to which it is equivalent
  • For any given interest rate, we can divide by 1.14 to get the dividend yield to which it is equivalent

Note that this 1.14 figure is very low and is probably an error due to the fact that I simply put in a “generic” tax rate for income rather than looking one up that was actually consistent with the other data.

Another problem is that my correspondent’s figure of $1.50 tax on $4.25 dividend is an all-in rate of 35%, which looks pretty high to me. I suspect that the tax factors [(D), (F) and (H)] are incorrect; but more details and sources are required to check this. Most equivalency factors are in the neighborhood of 1.30 – 1.40.

Tax rates for different types of income can be obtained from Ernst & Young’s Tax Calculator. I’ve also written an article in which equivalency factors were vital and calculated for a wide variety of provinces and income levels.

September 28, 2007

Friday, September 28th, 2007

The credit markets have renormalized sufficiently that third-quarter issuance was normal, as a lot of catch-up was done following the Fed easing on September 18. Of particular interest this week was a 10-year Bear Stearns issue: they paid up to get it done, 187.5bp over Treasuries, but USD 2.5-billion that won’t have to be refinanced for a while should do a lot to ease any fears their clients – they do a lot of prime brokerage for hedge funds – may have regarding liquidity.

And it looks like the banks and the vultures are close to agreement on prices:

Investment groups such as Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital, which oversees $47 billion, and BlackRock in New York see a chance to profit because banks are stuck with loans they made before demand for below-investment-grade debt dried up in the past three months.

The mortgage market is still in pretty rough shape according to Mortgage Insurance underwriters:

The number of PrivateMI applications received in August by MICA members was 206,445 or 14.3% more than the 180,561 received in July. The dollar volume of primary insurance written on newly originated 1-to-4 family conventional mortgage loans totaled $27,257.3 million in August, a 2.6% increase from the previous month’s $26,573.1 million. Traditional primary insurance totaled $23,793.9 million and bulk primary insurance totaled $3,463.4 million in August. In that same month, primary insurance in-force totaled $757,333.3 million. MICA members reported 33,811 cures and 58,441 defaults during August.

And in late new … a US Thrift has failed!

NetBank Inc., an online bank with US$2.5 billion in assets, was shut down by the U.S. government on Friday because of an excessive level of mortgage defaults.

The FDIC said Friday that $1.5 billion of NetBank’s insured deposits will be assumed by ING Bank, also a major online bank that is part of Dutch financial giant ING Groep NV. ING will pay $14 million for the deposits and receive 104,000 new customers.

The FDIC insures bank deposits of up to $100,000.

NetBank had $109 million in deposit accounts that exceeded the FDIC limit. Those customers will become creditors in NetBank’s receivership, the FDIC said.

According to their most recent financial statements they had a Tier 1 ratio of 4.83% at Dec 31/06 and a total capital ratio of 9.07%, although these are listed as “estimated”. Shareholders’ equity at that time was $4.32/share after a 2006 loss of $1.86/share. They were attempting to jettison all activities except mortgage servicing but didn’t make it.

And that’s it for me! Sorry to leave you all in the lurch again … but such is life. I will post the daily market action … later. Let’s just say that today was not one of the market’s biggest up days and leave it at that, shall we?

Update, 2007-10-01

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.59% 4.50% 980,120 16.18 1 +2.0408% 1,065.0
Fixed-Floater 4.87% 4.77% 93,849 15.85 8 -0.2080% 1,033.3
Floater 4.49% 4.38% 83,139 11.02 3 -0.1090% 1,044.9
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.07% 77,054 3.23 15 -0.0932% 1,027.2
Split-Share 5.15% 4.87% 96,828 3.83 13 +0.1836% 1,045.6
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.60% 66,193 4.26 3 +0.1735% 1,041.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.58% 5.37% 90,422 8.73 24 -0.2418% 1,019.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.25% 5.29% 240,129 15.02 38 -0.8794% 950.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -2.6518% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 22.76 and a limitMaturity.
 
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.5268% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.24% based on a bid of 22.76 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount -2.2186% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 23.80 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.1739% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.0628% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 21.84 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.0563% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 21.91 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.9873% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 23.18 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.9835% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 23.72 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.8415% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 22.92 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.5794% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 21.81 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.5013% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.62 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.X PerpetualPremium (before rebalancing!) -1.4527% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 49.52 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.4512% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.73 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualPremium (before rebalancing!) -1.3072% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 24.16 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.3043% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.2925% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 21.77 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2895% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.2600% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 23.21 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.1655% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.66 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.1605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 25.55 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.1136% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0518% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 24.46 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualPremium -1.0252% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 25.10 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +1.0144% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 23.90 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.2059% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 21.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
ACO.PR.A OpRet 51,332 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.94% based on a bid of 26.55 and a call 2009-12-31 at 25.50.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 29,335 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.66 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 26,605 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.1671% based on a bid of 21.77 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 19,940 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 21.62 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 17,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 22.76 and a limitMaturity.

There were twelve other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

September 27, 2007

Thursday, September 27th, 2007

Month-end woes have commenced and there will not be much commentary today. I’ll just have to refer loyal readers to my posts about the new BMO 5.25% Perp and the HIMIPref™ Indices for September 2001, as well as Moody’s Senate Committee testimony and S&P’s testimony. And besides, I don’t feel very productive.

But I’ll just take a quick moment to point out that US ABCP Outstanding dropped by another USD 17-billion in the past week – the rate of decrease is declining, but it is quite clear that delevering (or, perhaps, transfer to bank lines) is continuing.

The preferred share market had a lousy day, but productivity here at PrefBlog is so abysmal that you’re going to have to wait – until tomorrow, soonest, maybe later – for firm numbers. I note that the Claymore ETF is down a nickel on the day, or about 27bp.

I’ll do the volume table, but that’s it!

Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 229,050 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.45 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater 120,600 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.30, then an internal cross of 65,000 at the same price.
IGM.PR.A OpRet 66,746 RBC processed an internal cross of 65,000 at 27.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.55% based on a bid of 26.91 and a call 2009-07-30 at 26.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 44,485 RBC crossed two lots of 15,000 each at 24.30.Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 33,107 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 24.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventeen other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update 2007-09-28:

Whoosh! The perpetualDiscount index is now at its lowest level since the trough of mid-June and has re-priced itself so that it is now even-yield with the recent new issues!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.70% 4.66% 1,020,197 15.91 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.76% 94,918 15.87 8 +0.0869% 1,035.5
Floater 4.49% 3.82% 84,157 10.81 3 -0.2856% 1,046.0
Op. Retract 4.85% 3.82% 77,547 3.23 15 +0.0352% 1,028.2
Split-Share 5.16% 4.93% 96,876 3.83 13 -0.3095% 1,043.7
Interest Bearing 6.31% 6.62% 66,262 4.26 3 -0.0345% 1,039.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.56% 5.35% 90,827 8.93 24 -0.2381% 1,022.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.20% 5.24% 241,245 14.69 38 -0.9521% 958.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -3.8602% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -2.8871% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -2.5257% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 22.77 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.4713% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.09% based on a bid of 22.10 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -2.2747% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.11% based on a bid of 22.34 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.1133% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 21.77 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.0455% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.55 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.0443% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.10% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.12% based on a bid of 21.56 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.6173% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.6077% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 24.48 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount -24.34% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 24.34 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.4000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualPremium -1.3355% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 22.38 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium -1.2891% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 25.27 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.1989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount =1.1884% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.45 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount =1.1863% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.49 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.1392% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 19.96 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.0555% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 25.31 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0348% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 21.48 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +2.5534%  

HIMIPref™ Indices : September, 2001

Thursday, September 27th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-09-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,570.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,875.3 13 2.0 5.07% 14.7 186M 5.99%
Floater 1,480.3 4 1.75 4.60% 15.0 44M 5.05%
OpRet 1,495.2 34 1.23 4.57% 1.6 57M 6.08%
SplitShare 1,505.1 11 1.91 5.77% 5.4 53M 6.26%
Interest-Bearing 1,754.3 7 2.00 5.86% 2.6 117M 7.76%
Perpetual-Premium 1,148.4 5 1.39 5.16% 5.6 139M 5.62%
Perpetual-Discount 1,346.4 9 1.55 5.55% 14.5 151M 5.56%

Index Constitution, 2001-09-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-09-28, Post-rebalancing

Senate Hearings : S&P Steps Up

Thursday, September 27th, 2007

In the last statement listed on Banking Committee’s website, Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President of Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services, gave her views on the current controversy. She included a wonderful quotation from Eddy Wymeersch, Chairman of the Committee of European Securities Regulators and also Chairman of Belgium’s Banking and Financial Commission:

“The press and general opinion is saying it’s the fault of the credit rating agencies,” Eddy Wymeersch, chairman of Belgium’s Banking and Financial Commission watchdog told Reuters.

“Sorry, the ratings are just about the probability of default, nothing more. Now we have a liquidity crisis and not a solvency crisis,”

She then states that S&P has been rating Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) for thirty years, with the following results:

Initial Rating % of Default
AAA 0.04
AA 0.24
A 0.33
BBB 1.09
BB 2.11
B 3.34

She then reiterates Moody’s testimony regarding the role of the Credit Rating Agency in it’s relationship with the Originators:

While evaluating the credit characteristics of the underlying mortgage pool is part of our RMBS ratings process, S&P does not rate the underlying mortgage loans made to homeowners or evaluate whether making those loans was a good idea in the first place. Originators make loans and verify information provided by borrowers. They also appraise homes and make underwriting decisions. In turn, issuers and arrangers of mortgage-backed securities bundle those loans and perform due diligence. They similarly set transaction structures, identify potential buyers for the securities, and underwrite those securities. For the system to function properly, S&P relies, as it must, on these participants to fulfill their roles and obligations to verify and validate information before they pass it on to others, including S&P. Our role in the process is reaching an opinion as to how much cash we believe the underlying loans are likely to generate towards paying off the securities eventually issued by the pool. That is the relevant issue for assessing the creditworthiness of those securities.

There’s a lot in the presentation that repeats Moody’s testimony, or simply describes the S&P version of the same procedure, so I’ll skip over a lot of verbiage. Her major headings are:

  • The “Issuer Pays” Model Doesn Not Compromise the Independence and Objectivity of Our Ratings … this section includes a reference to a Fed Reserve paper Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate.
  • S&P Does Not “Structure” Transactions … they talk, yes. This encourages transparency and predictability.
  • Credit Enhancement – How Securities Backed By Subprime Mortgages Can Recieve, and Merit, Investment Grade Ratings … I’m getting tired of this topic, but I suppose she had to ensure it was addressed
  • S&P Has Been Warning the Market, and Taking Action, in Response to Deterioration in the Subprime Market Since Early 2006 … listing quite a few publications.
  • Impact of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 … blah blah blah

So … she covered pretty much the same ground as Moody’s did.

Senate Hearings : The Empire Strikes Back

Thursday, September 27th, 2007

See? Accrued Interest isn’t the only blog in the world that can use Star Wars titles.

Following the last testimony reported here, that of Dr. Lawrence J. White, Moody’s stepped up to the plate. The testimony has been published by the Senate committee.

They first reviewed the process, including one very critical element:

It is important to note that, in the course of rating a transaction, we do not see individual loan files or information identifying borrowers or specific properties. Rather, we receive only the aforementioned credit characteristics provided by the originator or the investment bank. The originators of the loans and underwriters of the securities also make representations and warranties to the trust for the benefit of investors in every transaction. While these representations and warranties will vary somewhat from transaction to transaction, they typically stipulate that, prior to the closing date, all requirements of federal, state or local laws regarding the origination of the loans have been satisfied, including those requirements relating to: usury, truth in lending, real estate settlement procedures, predatory and abusive lending, consumer credit protection, equal credit opportunity, and fair housing or disclosure. It should be noted that the accuracy of information disclosed by originators and underwriters in connection with each transaction is subject to federal securities laws and regulations requiring accurate disclosure. Underwriters, as well as legal advisers and accountants who participate in that disclosure, may be subject to civil and criminal penalties in the event of misrepresentations. Consequently, Moody’s has historically relied on these representations and warranties and we would not rate a security unless the originator or the investment bank had made representations and warranties such as those discussed above.

They also make the point that the 2002-2005 vintages of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS; “vintage” refers to the date the mortgage was given) are performing at or above expectations; it’s the 2006 vintage that is creating headaches. The following data is extracted from their figure 2:

Downgrade / Upgrade Percentage By Vintage (By Rated Original Balance)
  Subprime
Vintage Downgrade Upgrade
2002 2.3% 2.0%
2003 1.1% 2.7%
2004 0.3% 0.2%
2005 0.5% 0.3%
2006 5.4% 0%
2002-2006 2.2% 0.6%

Moody’s categorized their response to an observed deterioration in sub-prime portfolios as follows:

  • We began warning the market starting in 2003
  • We tightened our ratings criteria
  • We took rating actions as soon as the data warranted it:As illustrated by Figure 3, the earliest loan delinquency data for the 2006 mortgage loan vintage was largely in line with the performance observed during 2000 and 2001, at the time of the last U.S. real estate recession. Thus, the loan delinquency data we had in January 2007 was generally consistent with the higher loss expectations that we had already anticipated. As soon as the more significant collateral deterioration in the 2006 vintage became evident in May and June 2007, we took prompt and deliberate action on those transactions with significantly heightened risk.

Note that the first two points are also elucidated; I’m just highlighting their third point.

Their Figure 5 provides some detail that I’ve been trying to find for a while. Readers will remember the decomposition of the Bear Stearns ABS 2005-1 in this blog, and know that the highest rated tranche is the biggest, while the smaller tranches are relatively small. The tranches On Review or Downgraded (First & Second Lien Transactions combined) comprise 15.9% of the total by number, but only 5.4% by dollar value.

And, finally, they get to their actions to address the problems and their recommendations for others. Moody’s initiatives are:

  • Enhancements to analytical methodologies
  • Continued investments in analytical capabilities
  • Changes to credit policy function (this means increased separation of the reporting channels between the sales and ratings departments)
  • Additional market education
  • Development of new tools beyond credit ratings

I am sure they mean well by their last two points, but they won’t work. The market does not want to be educated and the market does not want any more detail – the reaction to their change in bank rating methodology proves that.

What does the market want? The market wants a very simple methodology so it can claim to have done a due-diligence without wasting more than five minutes on investment crap and someone to blame when something goes wrong, that’s what the market wants.

Moody’s recommendations for policies outside its control are:

  • Licensing or other oversight of mortgage brokers
  • Greater disclosure of additional information by borrowers and lenders
  • Tightening due diligence standards for underwriters
  • Stronger representations and warranties
  • Increased disclosure from issuers and servicers on the individual loans in a pool
  • Increasing transparency (in structured products)

Not very much, perhaps, but not very much change is needed.

New Issue : BMO 5.25% Perpetual

Thursday, September 27th, 2007

Hot on the heels of the BNS 5.25% Perp New Issue comes a very similar offering from BMO!

Bank of Montreal (TSX, NYSE: BMO) today announced a domestic public offering of $250 million of Non-Cumulative Perpetual Class B Preferred Shares Series 14 (the “Preferred Shares”).

With an anticipated closing date of October 9, this too will get the Tier 1 Capital onto BMO’s balance sheet prior to their year-end.

Size: 10-million shares = $250-million. Greenshoe option for 2-million shares = $50-million.

Dividends: 5.25% of par = $1.3125 p.a. Fat first dividend of $0.49983 payable February 25, 2008 based on October 9 closing.

Redemption: Redeemable at $26 commencing November 25, 2012; redemption price declines by $0.25 annually until November 25, 2016; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Priority: Parri Passu with all other preferred shares; Senior to common; Junior to everything else.

Ratings: S&P: P-1(low); DBRS Pfd-1; Moody’s: Aa3 (I can’t remember seeing a Moody’s rating for a Canadian Pref before … is BMO doing a little ratings-shopping after their downgrade by S&P?)

HIMIPref™ Valuation: The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with a preIssue securityCode of P25008. Estimated fair price with some comparables is:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/26
BMO.PR.H 25.35 25.60-66
BMO.PR.J 22.90 22.72-75
BMO.PR.? 25.32 Not Yet Trading
BNS.PR.? 25.33 Not Yet Trading

September 26, 2007

Wednesday, September 26th, 2007

Manor & Mendelson, co-founders of Portus Alternative Asset Management Inc., are being charged:

with 12 counts of fraud, money laundering, and possession of property obtained by crime on Wednesday, the result of a lengthy international investigation.

It has been quite some time since I saw Boaz – I look forward to seeing him in the dock. Regardless of guilt or innocence of these particular charges, he ran away from 26,000 customers, 100 employees, and me. That’s not cricket.

Inquiries into the Credit Rating Agencies has begun:

The SEC wants to know whether issuers pushed credit raters to “diverge from their stated methodologies and procedures,” Cox said in testimony prepared for the Senate Banking Committee today. In particular, the commission is “examining” whether firms were “unduly influenced by issuers and underwriters,” he said.

I have posted further detail of the hearings and will continue to plough through the testimony. Alex Cukierman has written an essay on VoxEU regarding central bank independence, which may possibly be a move in the Trichet / Sarkozy game. And this game is just simply a part of the markets / politicians tournament, just like the credit ratings agency investigations. I am attempting to form a troupe of attractive Swedish cheerleaders to encourage the Markets faction … if you qualify, drop me a line!

In somewhat related news, Larry Summers has (quite correctly) warned against giving the Feds too many hats to wear.

“I think it’s clear that when you vest regulation for consumer protection with agencies like the Federal Reserve whose primary mandate is the health of the financial system or the health of the lenders, you are going to get insufficient vigilance with respect to consumer protection,” he said during a panel discussion for the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project.

The next US jobs number, due a week Friday, will be closely watched – especially as there are some concerns that the last one might have been distorted:

Many economists suspect the drop in August payrolls was exaggerated by a fluky fall in local government payrolls, and new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics supports that.

On Tuesday the BLS released state payroll data for August. If you sum up the changes across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the total rose 159,000, compared to the decline of 4,000 in the national data.

With all the worries in the High-Yield market and concerns over the stability of the banking system,  yesterday’s news release regarding large loans syndicated in the US was a good sign.

The volume of Shared National Credits (SNC) rose by 21% in 2006, the fastest pace since 1998, reflecting, in part, significant merger and acquisition lending, according to the SNC2 review results released today by federal bank and thrift regulators.

Criticized commitments rose to $114 billion, but still remain less than half of their peak dollar level in 2002. Criticized credits represent a modest 5.0 percent of total commitments, about the same rate experienced over the past three SNC reviews.

Which is not to say, of course, that everything is unfolding as one might have thought six months ago. It looks like the Sallie Mae takeover will not proceed as originally planned, if at all:

SLM Corp. said a group led by J.C. Flowers & Co. won’t complete the $25.3 billion purchase of the largest U.S. student loan company. The group said it’s open to negotiation.

The group doesn’t expect to complete the $60-a-share acquisition, Reston, Virginia-based SLM, known as Sallie Mae, said today in a statement. Under an agreement announced in April, SLM was to be sold for $60 a share to an entity 50.2 percent- owned by Flowers, with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. each holding 24.9 percent.

Shake-ups in the Very Big Brokerage segment are coming! The Chinese brokerage, Citic, is now number eight globally, although that’s with rankings by market capitalization and:

The S&P 500’s measure of seven U.S. securities firms is valued at 8.8 times estimated profit, about a quarter of the 38 times for their four listed Chinese peers. Citic trades at 34 times estimated earnings, compared with 10 times profit for Bear Stearns, 7.9 times for Morgan Stanley, and Lehman’s 8 times. Haitong Securities trades at 52 times estimated profit, Hong Yuan is at 39 times, while Northeast Securities is at 28 times profit.

Still, it’s not too long since no such qualification would have been necessary. And it looks like Warren Buffet, saviour of Salomon, is sniffing around Bear Stearns:

Bank of America Corp., Wachovia Corp., and two Chinese companies, Citic Group and China Construction Bank Corp., also are among the potential bidders, the New York Times reported, citing unidentified sources.

I can just imagine the consternation if a Chinese firm takes over an iconic trader like the Bear – particularly given concern about the Chinese government’s commitment to the free flow of information. But then, the big brokerages have had a few problems recently:

Merrill Lynch & Co., the third biggest U.S. securities firm, may record losses of as much as $4 billion on fixed-income assets, resulting in the lowest quarterly earnings in almost six years, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analyst William Tanona said.

And, in late news, it was announced that Canada’s getting into the act:

Australian investment bank Macquarie Bank Ltd will buy Canadian investment and brokerage firm Orion Financial Ltd for about C$147 million ($146 million) in cash and stock.

Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser notes that the latest dust-up in American politics is over a relatively picayune $5-billion for children’s health; suggesting there are other exposures that have been recklessly undertaken in the past five years. It is clear that some hard measures will need to be taken if the dollar is to retain value, a matter that Accrued Interest notes is of increasing concern. I’m just happy that the GAO is now referring to the decline of the Roman Empire as opposed to the fall of the Roman Republic as a metaphor. If we’re going to decline and fall all over the place, let’s at least get the metaphors right!

US Equities had a good day, with financials leading the way – attributed to the idea that Warren Buffett might possibly like the sector.

If it turns out that the sector does poorly, will there be a Senate Inquiry?

Tech stocks led Canadian equities up a bit.

Treasuries did almost nothing, but did it while attracting lots of bids to the quarterly refunding (it was the two-year today). One has to feel sorry for a reporter so abjectly desperate to make things sound interesting that she writes:

The benchmark 10-year note’s yield rose almost 1 basis point to 4.63

The only thing worse is having to quote such a report! Canadas were weak, but nothing out of the ordinary.

The preferred share market normalized a bit after yesterday’s repricing, but the PerpetualDiscount sector continued to fall. Volume returned to the light-but-still-reasonable levels that have been in effect all month.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.72% 4.68% 1,062,629 15.88 1 -0.0816% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.76% 95,952 15.87 8 +0.3998% 1,034.6
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 81,047 10.76 3 +0.0410% 1,049.0
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.05% 77,146 3.24 15 -0.0869% 1,027.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.77% 96,837 3.84 13 +0.0674% 1,046.9
Interest Bearing 6.31% 6.61% 65,532 4.26 3 +0.1386% 1,040.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.29% 91,082 7.06 24 -0.0300% 1,024.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.15% 5.19% 240,616 14.78 38 -0.4355% 967.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.8295% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.6196% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.5306% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 23.16 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.2860% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.1112% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.A OpRet 495,700 Went ex-Dividend today for $0.33125. Global crossed 247,700 for cash at $26.21, then 247,700 for regular settlement at 25.87. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.32% based on a bid of 25.76 and a call 2007-11-30 at 25.75.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 106,032 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 23.53 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 66,100 Desjardins crossed 60,000 at 22.28. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualPremium 35,725 RBC bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 25.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 25.38 and a call 2013-03-02 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 26,700 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.83. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.76% based on a bid of 25.65 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.

There were eight other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.