Archive for September, 2007

SBN.PR.A Officially Rated by DBRS : Tough Standards!

Tuesday, September 18th, 2007

DBRS released its official rating of Pfd-2(low) for this issue today:

The Company will aim to provide the Class A Shareholders with regular monthly cash distributions in an amount targeted to be 6.00% per annum on the net asset value (NAV) of the Class A Shares. No distributions will be paid to the Class A Shares if the asset coverage available to the Preferred Shares drops below 1.65. Furthermore, no special distributions will be paid to the Class A Shares if the payment would drop the Company NAV to less than $25 per unit; however, special distributions may be made to mitigate any potential tax liabilities to the Company.

The Pfd-2 (low) rating of the Preferred Shares is based on the downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders, the credit quality and consistency of the BNS Shares dividend distributions, the dividend coverage for the Preferred Shares and the asset coverage test.

The main constraints to the rating are the following:

(1) The downside protection available to holders of the Preferred Shares depends totally on the value of the BNS Shares.

(2) The concentration of the entire portfolio in the BNS Shares.

(3) Changes in price and dividend policies of Bank of Nova Scotia may result in significantly less downside protection being available to the Preferred Shareholders.

Now, I don’t want to get into an endless game of ‘outguess the rating agency’, but the Pfd-2(low) rating looks a little low to me, compared with the other constituents of the SplitShare index. Or, perhaps, some of the Pfd-2 issues are due for a one-notch downgrade …

SBN.PR.A and some Competitors
Ticker Rating Asset
Coverage
Underlying
MUH.PR.A Pfd-2  1.49:1 Diversified 
FFN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.56:1 15 Financials
FBS.PR.B Pfd-2  2.88:1 Big 5 Banks
FTN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.75:1 15 Financials 
DFN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.82:1 15 Blue Chips
LBS.PR.A Pfd-2  2.45:1 4 Lifecos, 6 Banks
WFS.PR.A Pfd-2  2.05:1  30 Financials 
PIC.PR.A Pfd-2  1.73:1 Big 5 Banks
SBN.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.36:1  BNS Shares 
BNA.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  3.83:1 BAM.A Shares
LFE.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.72:1 4 LifeCo’s
ALB.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.01:1 Big 5 Banks
BNA.PR.C Pfd-2(low)  3.83:1 BAM.A Shares

Update: The Asset Coverage ratio in the chart has been corrected for ALB.PR.A – the ratio originally shown was incorrect. Thanks to cowboylutrell in the comments who pointed out this outbreak of boneheadism on my part.

September 17, 2007

Monday, September 17th, 2007

Panic, thy name is retail:

Despite the credit-market uproar, redemptions from money market funds were described as lower than expected at $915.5 million. Bond funds had $368.1 million in net redemptions excluding reinvested distributions, and Canadian equity funds had net redemptions of $578.4 million.

The only positive major category was balanced funds, offering conservative managed combination of stocks and fixed-income holdings. Canadian balanced funds endured $271.5 million in net redemptions, but the global balanced segment showed net sales of $670.5 million.

I’m sure that somebody, somewhere, has studied mutual fund cash flows vs. 12-month future returns. If anybody knows where I can find such a thing, let me know and I’ll post the link.

The Northern Rock crisis continues in Britain, with the stock dropping, customers crowding the withdrawal window and the Bank of England’s actions being questioned. The part I don’t understand is:

Northern Rock credit-default swaps increased 15 basis points to 170 basis points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. The cost of the credit-default swaps, which traded as high as 210 basis points on Sept. 14, rises as creditworthiness deteriorates.

Only 170bp? You don’t have to look very hard to find higher prices than that in the North American markets … Countrywide & CIT Group are quoted in the mid-200s, for instance, and with all their problems they’re not actually suffering a run and getting publicly announced support from the Fed. Bear Stearns & Lehman are in the low-100s. Still – I haven’t actually looked at NR’s financials, so I’ll just pass on the tidbit without further comment.

But! After the UK markets closed, the following announcement was made:

The British government is to guarantee all existing deposits at troubled bank Northern Rock, Treasury Chief Alistair Darling said Monday.

People can continue to take their money out of the Northern Rock, but if they choose to leave their money in the bank it will be guaranteed safe and secure,” Darling said at a Downing Street press conference.

Now, that is a bail-out. I don’t know what to make of it … but my gut reaction is unfavourable.

Meanwhile, in LBO news … Blackstone might be getting a black eye:

PHH Corp., the mortgage lender and vehicle-fleet manager that agreed to be bought by General Electric Co. and Blackstone Group LP, said the sale may unravel after Blackstone failed to get $750 million in loans.

And Credit Suisse is taking a hit on First Data:

Credit Suisse, the lead arranger of financing for First Data Corp.’s LBO, last week agreed to lower the amount of loans that banks initially will sell to $5 billion from $14 billion, and cut the price to 96 cents on the dollar, said three people with knowledge of the talks. The discount alone could cost about $200 million.

Deutsche Bank AG, Germany’s biggest bank, and JPMorgan, the No. 3 U.S. bank, found buyers last week for the highest-yielding loans financing KKR’s purchase of U.K. pharmacist Alliance Boots. The banks had abandoned selling 6 billion pounds ($12 billion) of mostly senior loans in August because buyers weren’t interested.

Investors agreed to buy the loans at 95 cents on the dollar, according to bankers.

That concession followed the sale of loans to back the purchase of Allison Transmission, the Indianapolis-based auto- parts supplier, by Carlyle Group and Onex Corp. Banks led by Citigroup, the biggest U.S. bank, sold $1 billion of loans for the Allison purchase for 96 cents on the dollar.

The fact that these loans are moving at all, albeit at a hefty discount, will be welcome news for holders of BCE Prefs. BCE common was down a tad today, but well within the boundaries of random jiggle-jaggles.

Oil prices set a new record today, which might have long term implications for the Gulf states:

It should go without saying that the strong oil/ weak dollar mix creates real problems for all the Gulf countries that insist (still) on pegging to the dollar.   They are effectively importing a weak currency and low nominal interest rates when there economies are booming.   The result: massive inflation and very negative real rates that are adding to the boom now, but risk creating problems later.

Three income trusts have celebrated oil’s rise by cutting their distributions:

Income-trust distribution malaise spread through the oilpatch Monday as Enterra Energy Trust (TSX: ENT-UN.TO) suspended its payout while Wellco Energy Services Trust (TSX: WLL-UN.TO) cut its distribution in half.

Those moves followed a 10 per cent distribution reduction Friday by Pengrowth Energy Trust (TSX: PGF-UN.TO) and extended a wave of payout disappointments for investors, particularly in energy services trusts.

NovaStar, mentioned here on September 4 is in the news again:

NovaStar Financial Inc., the subprime home lender trying to survive by conserving cash, scrapped plans to pay a dividend on 2006 profit and will forfeit its real estate investment trust tax status as a result.

The mortgage company, one of more than 110 that have halted lending or left the business since the start of 2006, said in a statement that the loss of REIT status will have a “significant adverse impact” on third-quarter results. Kansas City, Missouri- based NovaStar is reviewing its listing requirements with the New York Stock Exchange.

“Clearly, we did not anticipate the drop in market value or the level of demands on liquidity caused by the market turmoil this summer,” said Chief Executive Officer Scott Hartman in the statement. “Canceling the previously planned dividend is the only reasonable and prudent course of action.”

James Hamilton of Econbrowser thinks enormous pressure for increased regulation is inevitable – and, at least to some degree, desirable. Econbrowser’s other principal, Menzie Chinn, notes:

As social scientists, we should try to explain why the current Administration behaves in this manner. One approach is the capture and ideology perspective of Kalt and Zupan (1984). Although not directly applicable (since their study was of legislative actions), the framework is of interest. If policy is captured by economic interests, then analysis is irrelevant. If ideology is paramount, then again analysis is irrelevant.

Oh, it’s a glorious world, where evidence, argument and analysis are irrelevant!

US Equities were off a bit, having run aground on the Northern Rock (and a sudden realization that maybe the Fed doesn’t actually have to cut by 50bp tomorrow if they don’t feel like it); Canadian equities followed.

Short-term Treasuries also fell, flattening the curve; Canadian ten-years rose, flattening the curve.

Preferreds didn’t do much on low volume, although the SplitShare and InterestBearing sectors drifted up a bit.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.85% 4.81% 1,411,410 15.67 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 99,562 15.82 8 +0.0257% 1,031.8
Floater 4.48% 2.98% 86,466 10.80 3 -0.0254% 1,048.4
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.91% 75,506 3.13 15 +0.0137% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.13% 4.79% 95,847 3.87 13 +0.2558% 1,048.1
Interest Bearing 6.25% 6.74% 64,535 4.54 3 +0.1718% 1,038.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.04% 88,998 5.24 24 -0.0918% 1,032.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 249,244 15.06 38 +0.0064% 985.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.2622% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 24.25 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.4634% Closed at 20.80-87, 7×6. The virtually identical BAM.PR.N closed at 20.11-21, 2×1. There are things in life that I don’t understand. BAM.PR.M now has a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 66,700 Asset coverage of about 2.5:1 as of August 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.08 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-01 at 10.00.
ACO.PR.A OpRet 23,725 Scotia crossed 18,400 at 26.65. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.33% based on a bid of 26.30 and a call 2009-12-31 at 25.50.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 21,700 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.13 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.R OpRet 15,120 Scotia dominated the action, buying 14,820 of the shares and selling 14,800. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.29% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2009-5-30 at 25.60.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 37,915 Asset coverage of just under 2.1:1 as of September 6 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.80% based on a bid of 10.15 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.

There were four other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : January, 2001

Monday, September 17th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-01-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,599.8 1 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,983.1 10 1.89 5.74% 4.0 251M 5.50%
Floater 1,506.5 4 1.75 5.87% 12.3 68M 6.48%
OpRet 1,428.8 32 1.19 4.79% 2.2 90M 6.14%
SplitShare 1,477.4 7 1.86 5.54% 5.4 65M 5.97%
Interest-Bearing 1,629.7 7 2.00 7.35% 3.2 158M 7.95%
Perpetual-Premium 1,196.1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,224.9 11 1.63 5.79% 14.1 145M 5.80%

Index Constitution, 2001-01-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-01-31, Post-rebalancing

PrefLetter for September, 2007, Released!

Sunday, September 16th, 2007

The September edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the September, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the October, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close October 12 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on October 15.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

September 14, 2007

Friday, September 14th, 2007

Retail Sales in the US were unexpectedly weak in August, adding to the rationale for a Fed Rate cut (although the numbers are considered highly adjustable by some). Tom Graff uses a Taylor Rule (parameterized as a trading indicator, not as a policy gauge) to estimate the future Fed Funds Rate as 3.75% down 150bp from current, while emphasizing that he considers it a qualitative measure of direction, rather than an actual prediction. Fed Funds Futures are now predicting a value of about 4.5% at year-end. The use of the Taylor rule to determine neutrality – and the effects of getting it wrong – was discussed at the recent Jackson Hole conference. Economic chatter leans to a 25bp cut.

It will be most interesting to see the reaction of USD LIBOR and USD CP rates to whatever the Fed ends up doing. There are definite indications that USD ABCP investors are anticipating a rate cut – perhaps the next weekly Federal Reserve report on ABCP will not show such a huge decline. That will annoy the banks! Cushioning fear-driven liquidity shocks is their bread and butter:

This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank “specialness” is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP spreads increase, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines, without running down their holdings of liquid assets. Using bank-level data, we provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains the funding flows.

From the same paper, incidentally:

Banks’ functioning as liquidity insurance providers originated early in the development of the commercial paper market. In 1970, Penn Central Transportation Company filed for bankruptcy with more than $80 million in commercial paper outstanding. As a result of their default, investors lost confidence in other large commercial paper issuers, making it difficult for some of these firms to refinance their paper as it matured. The Federal Reserve responded to the Penn Central crisis by lending aggressively to banks through the discount window and encouraging them, in turn, to provide liquidity to their large borrowers (Kane, 1974). In response to this difficulty, commercial paper issuers thereafter began purchasing backup lines of credit from banks to insure against future funding disruptions (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).

David Dodge is quoted in The Economist as saying:

He acknowledged that the Bank of Canada may itself have played a role in stoking the excesses by not raising interest rates enough. “One can see in retrospect that we should have been driving those rates harder than we did, because in reality credit conditions were being eased by increased securitisation and movement of stuff off balance [sheet],” he says.

Presumably, therefore, decreased securitization and movement of stuff onto balance sheet is a de facto tightening.

Meanwhile, China is hiking rates due to inflation concerns. There is evidence that the effect of high levels of imports from China is shifting to inflationary from deflationary. And Brad Setser is puzzled about the current account deficit and how it relates to the investment income balance:

Since the US has a borrowed a lot more – about $ 5 trillion more — than it has lent out, mathematically, a constant deficit on the interest balance implies that either that the interest rate on US lending has to be rising faster than the interest rate on US borrowing or that the interest rate on US borrowing has to be falling faster than the interest rate on US lending.

If I did all the calculations correctly, it turns out that the implied interest rate on US lending has been constant (at around 4.7%) while the implied interest rate on US borrowing is actually falling, from a bit under 4.4% in 2006 to 4.25% in the first half 2007.

The Credit Rating Agencies are beginning to take a little more action to polish their public profile. Moody’s has published some reflections on liquidity and flight to quality, and promise more. They note:

The need for a liquid and transparent secondary market for structured product may delay a recovery in primary issuance as investors will avoid purchasing an asset in the primary market if a similar asset can be purchased in the secondary market at a lower price. Therefore, greater transparency will be required of the secondary market as well as lower prices (or better protection) in the primary market. The liquidity risk premium is going to be higher and investors will be reluctant to buy these products unless there is some degree of standardization and secondary market liquidity. Marked to market actors may be reluctant to buy customized product, and higher risk premia could temporarily reduce the economic attractiveness of securitization for certain classes.

Illiquidity was highlighted as one of six “key vulnerabilities” of the UK financial system in the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report of April 2007:

Unusually low premia for bearing risk, especially in credit markets. Benign current economic conditions, the greater dispersal of credit risk and confidence that market liquidity will remain high may have weakened risk assessment standards. If risk perceptions were to adjust, unexpectedly large shifts in market liquidity might lead to sharper asset price changes than anticipated by market participants, with knock-on effects on counterparty credit risk.

The moral of the story is: liquidity is a risk! Investors may intend to buy and hold but the consequences of having to sell (or wishing to sell due to credit concerns) into an illiquid market can be severe. The best defense is, as always, a broadly diversified portfolio with the individual elements bearing a wide variety of risk/reward profiles. Just look at HSBC: what they’re losing on sub-prime, they’re making up on insurance.

Thomson, issuer of the TOC.PR.B floaters, has been downgraded by Moody’s from A3 to Baa1. Moody’s did not specifically address preferred shares; I believe they have a mandate only for Thomson’s USD debt.

BCE holders will be interested in the latest news from junk-land. Prices on TXU and First Data common have gotten closer to the deal price on hopes that financing will not kill the deal. Several others have also narrowed, but poor old Sallie Mae is a wallflower, now that Dad’s cutting her allowance. The First Data bond deal is getting done, albeit at a spread almost 100bp more than originally intended, with more restrictive covenants. Investment grade issuers are issuing lots of paper, swallowing the high spreads; presumably they are calculating their spread to some kind of ‘non-panic’ government yield rather than actual market levels.

US Equities finished a great weak on a quiet note; as did stocks in Canada. Both Treasuries and Canadas were boring.

Volume in preferred shares was extremely light, which is leading to some strange pricing moves. The market looks quite sloppy, although now that the BCE issues are acting a little bit more like Pfd-2(lows) again, my curve-fitting is showing reasonable goodness-of-fit. It’s one of them conundrum thingies!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.87% 4.83% 1,470,158 15.64 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 100,732 15.82 8 +0.0005% 1,031.5
Floater 4.48% 1.33% 87,071 10.77 3 +0.1645% 1,048.7
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.83% 75,358 3.07 15 -0.0200% 1,028.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.91% 95,378 3.88 13 -0.2947% 1,045.5
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.76% 64,304 4.54 3 +0.0752% 1,036.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.01% 89,370 5.26 24 +0.0853% 1,033.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 251,510 15.07 38 +0.0100% 985.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.1038% On volume of – count ’em – 55 shares. Somebody moved the bid up and the fish still wouldn’t bite! Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 7 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.54% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.16 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FAL.PR.H Scraps (Would be PerpetualPremium, but there are credit concerns) 150,800 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.10, then Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 25.10 and a call 2008-4-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 17,075 It seems to me that retail is nibbling away at these things since the price collapse. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.02-10, 6×45; the almost identical BAM.PR.M closed at 20.50-59, 1×1, on volume of 8,500. Which is one of my conundrums! Why pay fifty cents when you can pay ten?
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 16,820 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 12,655 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 25.40 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 11,040 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.86% based on a bid of 23.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were NO other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : December, 2000

Friday, September 14th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-12-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,528.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,973.2 11 1.90 5.91% 4.0 247M 5.54%
Floater 1,439.3 4 1.75 6.50% 11.6 73M 6.99%
OpRet 1,424.8 32 1.19 4.62% 2.2 97M 6.12%
SplitShare 1,471.9 6 1.83 5.44% 5.5 86M 6.01%
Interest-Bearing 1,609.0 7 2.00 7.57% 3.5 172M 8.05%
Perpetual-Premium 1,161.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,189.8 12 1.58 5.77% 14.1 128M 5.93%

Index Constitution, 2000-12-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-12-29, Post-rebalancing

September PrefLetter is Being Prepared!

Friday, September 14th, 2007

The markets have closed and the September edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The September issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

September 13, 2007

Thursday, September 13th, 2007

Goldman’s Global Alpha fund lost 22% in August:

The fund, managed by Mark Carhart and Raymond Iwanowski, has dropped by a third in 2007 and 44 percent from its peak in March 2006. Investors notified New York-based Goldman last month that they plan to withdraw $1.6 billion from the fund, or almost a fifth of the assets as of July 31.

Global Alpha’s biggest loss in the month stemmed from the managers’ decision to sell Japanese yen and buy Australian dollars. The so-called carry trade unraveled when the Australian dollar fell 6 percent against the yen in August. Equities holdings, including stocks in the U.S., Norway and Finland, declined 4.7 percent.

Red Kite, a $1-billion metals fund, lost about 20%.

In the junk world, financing is being arranged for KKR Boots, while negotiations continue on the $26-billion First Data deal (there is a late report that talks have been suspended for a week). Tom Graff has some historical commentary, focussing on the perils of market timing.

American ABCP outstanding continued to decline according to the regular Federal Reserve release. Yield spreads to government paper are still extremely high, however.

The news is good; it looks like things are starting to get moving again – creakily – but we’re by no means out of the woods yet. There will be lots of firms hanging on by their fingernails (Xceed Mortgage Corp., for instance, has just eliminated its dividend) and confidence is always slow to recover. However, it is nice to see that the hedgies have fulfilled their function by losing a lot of money and helping to stabilize things.

After the markets closed there were reports that Northern Rock, a UK mortgage lender, has received emergency funding from the BoE. This news had an immediate effect on New Zealand and Australian currencies.

Menzie Chinn has criticized Bernanke’s Savings Glut hypothesis:

To sum up, the Bernanke explanation for the US current account deficit relies upon a particularly small effect of budget deficits on current account deficits, and treats the US housing boom and associated mortage equity withdrawal as largely exogenous, or primarily a function of foreign excess saving. If you believe these points, then the saving glut story is the story for you.

And Brad Setser poked holes in the argument that China is forced to finance the US current account deficit:

The standard argument that China would shoot itself in the foot, financially speaking, if it stopped lending to the US is wrong.   China would certainly shoot its export sector in the foot if it stopped lending to the US.   And it is true that if China stopped lending to the US, the value of the RMB would rise relative to the dollar would increase and the value of China’s existing US assets would fall.  But China would still be better off, in the purely financial sense, if it took its lumps now.

That’s enough to make you feel good, isn’t it? The US economy is a Ponzi scheme. Maybe they should cut taxes, or something.

US Equities were euphoric over some indications that the credit crunch is less crunchy, while Canadian equities experienced similar dizziness over the prospect of oil at $80+. An ill wind will always blow some good somewhere!

Treasuries fell in a slight reversal of the flight to quality, as did Canadas.

It was a quiet day for prefs with not much volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.89% 4.85% 1,531,356 15.62 1 +0.0816% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 103,961 15.82 8 -0.2076% 1,031.5
Floater 4.49% 1.33% 88,782 10.75 4 -0.0369% 1,046.9
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.81% 76,000 3.02 15 -0.0995% 1,029.0
Split-Share 5.12% 4.77% 97,490 3.68 15 -0.0054% 1,048.6
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.77% 65,769 4.54 3 +0.4170% 1,035.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.00% 90,249 4.92 24 -0.0074% 1,032.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 256,227 15.35 38 -0.0706% 985.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0135% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.86% based on a bid of 23.44 and a limitMaturity.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing +1.2146% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.52% (as interest) based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.3372% Went wild today, trading as high as 10.84. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.31% based on a bid of 10.61 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 55,260 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
TOC.PR.B Floater 42,024  
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 29,051 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.91 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 22,307 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 15,132 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.

There were five other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : November, 2000

Thursday, September 13th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,524.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,935.3 12 1.91 6.07% 4.2 218M 5.57%
Floater 1,435.3 4 1.75 6.42% 11.1 55M 6.99%
OpRet 1,399.2 33 1.24 5.10% 3.7 88M 6.15%
SplitShare 1,434.7 6 1.83 5.96% 5.5 111M 6.12%
Interest-Bearing 1,576.7 7 2.00 7.96% 10.9 162M 8.07%
Perpetual-Premium 1,112.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,139.5 12 1.58 6.03% 13.8 132M 6.13%

Index Constitution, 2000-11-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-11-30, Post-rebalancing

Note: The “PerpetualPremium” Index contained the issue NA.PR.J from date of issue, 2000-7-13 until 2000-11-29. This is an error; this issue is a FixedFloater. Since this was the sole issue in the “PerpetualPremium” index, the results for this index should have been reported as having a performance equal to the “PerpetualDiscount” index.
In the period 2000-7-12 to 2000-11-29, performance of relevant indices was:   

     

  • FixedFloater: +2.50%
  • PerpetualPremium: +3.30%
  • PerpetualDiscount: +3.42%

Indices will not be recalculated – for now! I regret the error.

Stress Testing of Australian Banks: Housing Implosion

Thursday, September 13th, 2007

With all the news that Bernanke is a quant, I had a look at a paper presented in 2005 with data from 2003 titled Stress Testing Housing Loan Portfolios: A Regulatory Case Study:

Against the backdrop of sharply rising house prices and Central Bank warnings that housing credit growth was not sustainable, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) conducted a “stress test” to gauge the resilience of 120 Australian banks, building societies and credit unions to a substantial correction in the housing market. The stress test scenario mapped a 30 per cent fall in house prices to a substantial increase in default and loss rates. The results showed that all 120 institutions would remain solvent under the imposed conditions, however 11 institutions’ capital ratios fell below their regulatory minima. This paper details the stress testing methodology and traces through the various stages of the project, from background research, to stress test design, implementation, supervisory follow-up, public dissemination of the results and resulting policy changes.

The regulators are no more perfect than the credit rating agencies; models can always be improved; averages don’t mean much if you’re investing at the margins; and the world is always changing. But it is through such constant study and disaster simulation that the world is a much less exciting place than the newspapers would have us believe.

Update, 2007-10-23: It is interesting to note reports that:

Standard & Poor’s may cut the credit ratings of 207 Australian and New Zealand residential mortgage- backed securities while it examines the creditworthiness of the insurer of the underlying home loans.

S&P said Oct. 19 it may lower the credit rating of PMI Group Inc., and its Australian unit PMI Mortgage Insurance Ltd., after the second-largest U.S. mortgage insurer posted a $350 million third-quarter loss because of rising defaults on U.S. home loans.

… in light of section 7.2 of the report:

Given the heavy reliance of some ADIs on mortgage insurance, a logical extension of the project was to examine the resilience of the mortgage insurance industry to a similar stress scenario. The result of applying the stress test on LMIs revealed that LMIs would not fare as well as ADIs should the modelled stress event occur, and secondly that APRA’s minimum capital requirement for LMIs was inadequate. After more than two years of work to refine the LMI capital framework, a revised model was issued in February 2005 and is planned to come into effect on October 1 2005. Following the findings of the stress test and subsequent research and industry consultation, the proposed capital framework resulted in roughly a doubling of the minimum capital requirement and a far more risk sensitive model (with the key risk drivers being LVR, loan seasoning and loan type).

We shall see how it all works out!


Update, 2008-5-23: This exercise was discussed at a Bank of Canada conference reported in the Spring, 2008, Review. Interestingly, the author observed:

Conversely, having banks undertake the exercise themselves provided a number of valuable insights, particularly into the way banks run their businesses and how they think about the risks they manage.

For those institutions where stress testing is an integral part of their risk management framework, the stress test scenario formed the basis for a discussion of the effect of the event on individual business units and the linkages across businesses. Some banks, for example, reacted to the weaker domestic growth and large depreciation in the exchange rate by assuming a shift of resources from business units which focussed primarily on domestically oriented industries, such as service industries, and the household sector, to those that were more export oriented. For these banks, the stress test was a useful means of communicating senior management’s risk appetite across the various levels of the firm (with the results being signed off by the Board of one bank). These banks were more likely to use a mix of quantitative and judgemental assessments.

This echoes the main observation of the International Report on Risk Management Supervision … the firms that have done best (least badly?) during the Credit Crunch are the ones in which communication between departments is most efficient.