Archive for November, 2009

November 11, 2009

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

To my embarassment, I must correct the November 9 mention of the G-20 and the proposed Tobin tax. A Reuters story quotes a somewhat irritated Gordon Brown on the controversy:

“I think if you read my speech on Saturday, what I was talking about was the social responsibility of financial institutions,” Brown said at his regular news conference.

The actual speech:

But what we need to consider is whether in fact we need to go further in recognising the social and economic responsibility of the financial system not least in mitigating the risks to the rest of society.

So I believe we should discuss whether we need a better economic and social contract to reflect the global responsibilities of financial institutions to society.

There have been proposals for an insurance fee to reflect systemic risk or a resolution fund or contingent capital arrangements or a global financial transactions levy.

Any measures we consider would have to be set against four core principles.

First, they would have to be global: to reflect the existence of the world’s first truly global sector and thereby create a level playing field for its operation.

Second, they would have to be non-distortionary to avoid damaging reductions in liquidity, inefficient allocation of capital and the temptation of avoidance.

Third, any measures should complement – and reinforce – the action we are already taking to enhance the stability of the international financial system and the global economy.

Fourth the contribution we ask the global financial services sector to make must be fair, measured and enable financial services to make their necessary contribution to future economic growth.

*sigh* That’s what I get for trusting a reporter instead of going straight to source documents.

The Dodd banking bill, briefly mentioned yesterday in the context of regulatory / monetary policy separation (I don’t believe arguments for either separation or combination are compelling, although I lean towards separation on the grounds that no institution should have too much power), also undermines Fed independence:

The financial-regulation overhaul proposed yesterday by Senator Christopher Dodd would strip the Fed of its role as a bank supervisor and give Congress a greater voice in naming the officials who set interest rates. The measure opens the door to interference from politicians who might disagree with any move by the Fed to raise rates from record lows, former central bank officials said.

Under the proposal, commercial banks would lose their power to appoint directors of the 12 regional Fed banks. Instead, directors would be chosen by the Fed’s Senate-confirmed governors, and each board chairman would be subject to Senate approval. Currently, two-thirds of directors are chosen by private-sector banks and one-third by the Washington-based governors.

Robert Benmosche of AIG, last mentioned on PrefBlog on August 31, is just about the only super-CEO who’s coming through the post-crisis recriminations with a good reputation. That reputation was burnished today:

American International Group Inc. Chief Executive Officer Robert Benmosche told the insurer’s board of directors that he may quit because of government limits on what the company can pay employees, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Benmosche made the comments at a board meeting last week, about three months after joining the company, said the person, who declined to be identified because the meeting was private. The CEO’s remarks were an expression of frustration, and Benmosche, 65, hasn’t acted on his declaration, the person said.

Can you imagine that? A CEO who actually stands up for his guys! Incredible, isn’t it?

Mark Pengelly of Risk Magazine has some interesting technical notes on the CIT CDS Recovery auction in CIT auction not likely to be heavily bid.

BIS has released its Regular OTC Derivatives Statistics:

Key developments:

  • •notional amounts of all types of OTC contracts rebounded somewhat to stand at $605 trillion at the end of June 2009, 10% above the level six months before,
  • •gross market values decreased by 21% to $25 trillion,
  • •gross credit exposures fell by 18% from an end-2008 peak of $4.5 trillion to $3.7 trillion,
  • •notional amounts of CDS contracts continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the second half of 2008 and
  • •CDS gross market values shrank by 42%, following an increase of 60% during the previous six-month period.

More gains for Canadian preferreds today, as PerpetualDiscounts were up 13bp while FixedResets advanced 2bp, on thin volume. There were no losers in the Performance Highlights table.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield an average 5.95%, equivalent to 8.33% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates continue to yield about 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also referred to as the Seniority Spread) is about 235bp, slightly tighter than the 240bp reported on November 4.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4451 % 1,489.2
FixedFloater 6.21 % 4.31 % 45,434 18.42 1 0.0571 % 2,508.6
Floater 2.62 % 3.10 % 93,865 19.43 3 0.4451 % 1,860.5
OpRet 4.80 % -5.92 % 117,476 0.09 14 -0.0027 % 2,308.3
SplitShare 6.32 % 3.40 % 370,141 0.08 2 0.2840 % 2,093.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0027 % 2,110.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.88 % 5.54 % 70,447 1.16 4 0.0595 % 1,862.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.90 % 5.95 % 185,887 13.93 70 0.1342 % 1,756.9
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.09 % 398,087 3.96 41 0.0154 % 2,125.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.46
Evaluated at bid price : 19.46
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 48,450 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 30,682 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 19.52
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 27,375 RBC crossed 25,000 at 17.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 17.62
Evaluated at bid price : 17.62
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet 26,569 RBC crossed 11,700 at 25.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-11
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : -3.67 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 24,144 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 21,200 RBC crossed 20,000 at 24.67.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-11
Maturity Price : 24.40
Evaluated at bid price : 24.72
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Merrill Keeps Lloyds ECNs out of UK Bond Indices

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

at least until the wind changes:

Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAC.N) reversed its position for a second time on Wednesday to decide its bond indexes would not include new contingent capital securities, devised for UK bank Lloyds (LLOY.L).
On Tuesday the U.S. bank said it would include these new bonds in its benchmark indexes, but many investors objected.

“The preponderance of feedback that we have received from investors who are measured against our indices indicates that most do not view the new contingent capital securities as part of their investment universe,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch said in a research note.

The Association of British Insurers (ABI) said on Tuesday its members were against including these new securities in bond indexes.

BofA Merrill Lynch had originally planned not to include the new bonds in its indexes, but then changed its mind on Tuesday.

“We have decided to evaluate the new securities on their own merits and will revert to our original decision to exclude them from the indexes,” Merrill’s research note said.

The note also said the bank would review all bank Tier 1 debt – the lowest ranking bank bond that has equity-like features – currently in the index to determine if there are, in fact, other securities that should be removed from the index.

No decision has been made yet for the iBoxx indexes, a leading benchmark in the investment grade arena, said Markit, which runs the indexes.

Markit’s oversight committee, made up of asset managers, regulators and consultants, is expected to meet next Tuesday to discuss a recommendation on this issue, Markit said.

Barclays Capital has already decided that contigent capital securities that are convertible to equity will not be eligible for broad-based investment-grade Barclays Capital bond indexes such as the Global Aggregate, Sterling Aggregate and US Aggregate indexes.

The new securities would also not be eligible for the bank’s high-yield benchmark indexes, but might be eligible for Barclays Capital Convertible Bond indexes, provided they meet inclusion rules, Barclays said.

I reported last week that UK authorities were promoting inclusion with the presumed purpose of widening the investor pool.

Two amusing things about this article are, firstly: “We have decided to evaluate the new securities on their own merits” which the smiley-boys at Merrill consider to be worthy of note, and secondly, that the stated reasons for exclusion have nothing whatsoever to do with whether these notes are bonds are not.

Can the issuer avoid bankruptcy while being a day late or a dollar short in their payments? No? Then it isn’t a bond.

Update: For all that, the issue is popular:

Lloyds Banking Group said yesterday that it may increase its capital-raising by £1.5 billion to £22.5 billion because of a clamour by investors to take up its offer to swap debt into equity.

Shares in the beleaguered banking group rose 5 per cent to 89¼p on the latest positive signal from the bank.

Investors are flocking to take up Lloyds’ offer to convert their tier 1 and tier 2 debt into new “contingent capital” because it will guarantee them an income of possibly 10 per cent or more in an annual coupon.

ASC.PR.A: DBRS Discontinues Rating

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

DBRS has announced that it:

has today discontinued its rating of the Preferred Shares issued by AIC Global Financial Split Corp. at the request of AIC Limited (the Promoter).

The NAV was 11.16 as of November 6 according to Manulife Financial.

ASC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-5 by DBRS. ASC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

November 10, 2009

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

The question of whether central banking and bank regulation functions should be separated or not is heating up again in the States:

Senator Christopher Dodd will propose creating a single U.S. regulator that would strip the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. of bank- supervision authority, said a person familiar with the matter.

Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, would eliminate the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision and fold the Treasury Department units into the new bank regulator, according to the person, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the plan isn’t public. The Connecticut Democrat is scheduled to release a draft of his financial-regulation overhaul plan today in Washington.

Deutsche Bank sees a big increase in hedge fund assets coming:

Hedge fund assets may top the previous $2 trillion high by the end of next year as double-digit average returns lure investors, said Barry Bausano, Deutsche Bank AG’s global co-head of prime finance.

Hedge fund assets parked with Deutsche Bank have risen recently and global investors plan to allocate new capital next year, New York-based Bausano said during a visit to Hong Kong on Nov. 6. His division provides services and products ranging from securities lending to financing and derivatives to the industry.

As the banks retreat – and are forced away, like Citigroup / Philbro – from proprietary trading, I think it entirely reasonable to suppose that hedge funds will take their place. Naturally, there are all kinds of hedge funds, just as there are all kinds of investment manager: most of the principals will just be jumped-up stockbrokers, but some of them will know what they’re doing.

I am pleased to see Dealbreaker taking a stand against lousy programming practices, but I can’t help feeling that it’s more complex than they state. Surely writing wrappers around external APIs, formats and codes is standard?

Integrity. Character. Forthrightness. These are the regulatory buzzwords today. And Senator Dodd (STASI, Connecticut) will lead the way to Nirvana:

Securities and Exchange Commission employees would get $50,000 awards for snitching on each other, under Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd’s proposed legislation to overhaul financial regulation.

Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, whose hedge fund at Bear Stearns collapsed and presaged the onset of the credit crunch, are not guilty:

A jury of eight women and four men deliberated less than a day before reaching a verdict this afternoon. Cioffi, 53, the portfolio manager for the hedge funds, and Tannin, 48, their chief operating officer, went on trial Oct. 13 in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, on charges of conspiracy, securities and wire fraud. Each faced as many as 20 years in prison if convicted. When the verdicts were read, the two men didn’t visibly react. Their wives burst into tears.

Juror Aram Hong said e-mails sent by Cioffi and Tannin showed that the men were working “24-7” to save the funds in the months before they collapsed.

“Just because you’re the captain of a ship and it gets hit doesn’t mean you should be blamed,” Hong said.

I have had no opinion on their guilt or innocence. There have been, and will be, convictions by the barrel related to the crisis; there’s always crime. But I also know that the US justice system is extraordinarily vindictive, that bursting into tears is ex-post de rigeur when things go wrong, that prosecutors are desperate for scalps to brandish during their next electoral campaign, and that the (shielded) regulators are desperate to divert attention from their own incompetence (who’s gone to jail for missing Madoff? Not criticized, not demoted, not fired … I want to know who has been charged with a criminal offense. Nobody? Golly, what a surprise). So I’m pleased by the verdict.

Another good strong day for preferreds, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 19bp and FixedResets picking up 18bp. Volume recovered to good levels (GWO issues were a highlight), but I suspect that to get things really moving again we need more issuance.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3106 % 1,482.6
FixedFloater 6.21 % 4.31 % 46,936 18.41 1 1.4493 % 2,507.1
Floater 2.63 % 3.10 % 94,948 19.44 3 -0.3106 % 1,852.2
OpRet 4.80 % -7.88 % 119,068 0.09 14 0.1337 % 2,308.4
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.40 % 383,562 3.90 2 0.0875 % 2,087.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1337 % 2,110.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.82 % 73,297 1.16 4 -0.1287 % 1,861.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.95 % 188,414 13.93 70 0.1894 % 1,754.6
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.06 % 400,266 3.96 41 0.1849 % 2,125.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-10
Maturity Price : 18.62
Evaluated at bid price : 18.62
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-10
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-07-19
Maturity Price : 26.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-10
Maturity Price : 19.26
Evaluated at bid price : 19.26
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 355,000 TD crossed blocks of 135,000 and 100,000 shares at 27.10; RBC crossed 100,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet 238,659 TD crossed 25.80 at 206,200; then sold 19,500 to Nesbitt at 25.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : -4.28 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 162,274 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 25,000 and 120,000 shares, both at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-09-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 141,609 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 27.85, then 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 115,100 RBC crossed three blocks, two of 25,000 and one of 15,000 shares, all at 27.25; Scotia crossed 11,300 at 27.25 then bought 22,900 from National at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 103,110 RBC crossed 100,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.47
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SBN.PR.A: Capital Unitholders' Warrants' Prospectus Filed

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

S Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of Class A Shares of the Fund. Each Class A shareholder of record on November 19, 2009 will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held. One Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share (together, a “Unit”) upon payment of the subscription price of $18.75. The Toronto Stock Exchange has conditionally approved the listing of the Warrants under the symbol SBN.WT and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof. It is expected that the Warrants will commence trading on November 17, 2009 and will remain trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date of March 31, 2010.

The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Units had a NAV of 20.14 on November 5. SBN closed today at 8.01-29, 3×11 and SBN.PR.A closed at 10.00-34, 22×1.

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the intent to issue warrants was announced. SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

WFS.PR.A: Prospectus for Capital Unitholders' Warrants Filed

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

World Financial Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of Class A Shares of the Fund. Each Class A shareholder of record on November 19, 2009 will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held. One Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share (together, a “Unit”) upon payment of the subscription price of $13.14. The Toronto Stock Exchange has conditionally approved the listing of the Warrants under the symbol WFS.WT and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof. It is expected that the Warrants will commence trading on November 17, 2009 and will remain trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date of March 31, 2010.

The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The NAV of the units was 13.23 on November 5. WFS closed today at 3.25-34, 11×10, and WFS.PR.A closed at 9.40-45, 25×7.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the intent to issue warrants was announced. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Update, 2009-12-4: The company has renewed its issuer bid. This news is not worthy of its own post (despite the commentary in Split-Share Buy-Backs? WFS.PR.A & FIG.PR.A Examined) because, as the 2008 Annual Report states:

Under the terms of the normal course issuer bid that was renewed in November 2008, the Fund proposes to purchase, if considered advisable, up to a maximum of 1,275,271 Class A shares (2007 – 1,414,293) and up to a maximum of 1,275,271 Preferred shares (2007 – 1,414,293), 10 percent of its public float as determined in accordance with the rules of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The purchases would be made in the open market through facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The normal course issuer bid will remain in effect until the earlier of November 12, 2009 or until the Fund has purchased the maximum number of units permitted under the bid. As at December 31, 2008, nil shares (2007 – nil) have been purchased by the Fund.

S&P Comments on Contingent Capital

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

Standard and Poor’s has noted Contingent Capital Is Not A Panacea For Banks, Says Report:

There are certain practical difficulties, however.

The first is whether contingent capital securities will convert into capital early enough to help the bank. For contingent capital securities to prove effective as a buffer for senior bondholders, the conversion triggers need to be set at appropriate levels. However, this is difficult to determine
before a crisis hits.

The second is that contingent capital securities may not be sufficiently attractive to investors at a price that is also attractive to the issuing banks. The level of investor demand for contingent capital securities is unclear, given the difficulty that investors may face in pricing the potential conversion risks. Therefore, it is too early to gauge how this market will develop.

One big question for the development of the contingent capital market will be how the conversion trigger levels are set. Given that bank capital ratios are typically not strictly comparable, we expect that any specific ratio (such as a 5% Core Tier 1, for example) could mean different things to different issuers. In our capital analysis, we take account of how likely the conversion would be to happen in a time of stress, and this depends on what type of financial stress scenario the trigger ratio would represent. Published capital ratios can be lagging indicators of financial strength, and also can be calculated more conservatively by one bank than another. It may take some time for the contingent capital market to develop norms for trigger levels, and it may be complicated to compare these across banks.

For these instruments to be effective in a time of stress, the conversion will also need to happen quickly. This raises several questions:

  • •How frequently will the trigger ratio will monitored?
  • •Will the status of this ratio always be publicly disclosed?
  • •Is there an appropriate process in place to enforce the conversion quickly?

I continue to suggest that the three closing questions are answered readily by ignoring the manipulable and variable capital ratios, and instead making the conversion trigger the breaching of a floor price by the common, with the the conversion price equal to that floor price.

Possibly the most bizarre form of contingent capital I’ve yet seen is the Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital Trust V Trust Preferred Securities, which begin their lives as Upper Tier 2 Sub-debt with a cumulative coupon, but convert to Tier 1 Innovative Capital with a non-cumulative coupon at the whim of the issuer – with no step up, no penalty, no conditions.

Update: More commentary from Tracy Alloway at FTAlphaville.

GWO Issuing 30-Year Debs at 5.998%

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

They’re busy little beavers over at the Great-West Lifeco treasury! Hard on the heels of the GWO.PR.X redemption call, they have unveiled two financing announcements today. The first is the announcement of a 30-year debenture issue:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. (Lifeco) announced earlier today that it had entered into an agreement with a syndicate of agents co-led by RBC Capital Markets and BMO Capital Markets for the sale on an agency basis of $200 million aggregate principal amount of debentures maturing November 16, 2039 (the “Debentures”).

The Debentures will be dated November 16, 2009, will be issued at par and will mature on November 16, 2039. Interest on the Debentures at the rate of 5.998% per annum will be payable semi-annually in arrears on May 16 and November 16 in each year, commencing May 16, 2010, until November 16, 2039. The Debentures are redeemable in whole or in part at the greater of the Canada Yield Price and par, together in each case with accrued and unpaid interest. The Debenture offering is expected to close on or about November 16, 2009. The net proceeds will be used by the Company for general corporate purposes and to augment the Company’s current liquidity position.

The syndicate of agents will include RBC Capital Markets, BMO Capital Markets, CIBC World Markets Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., TD Securities Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Casgrain & Company Limited, and Desjardins Securities Inc.

They have also announced another issue of long debs – at least, I think it’s a different issue, the press release is not entirely clear – in an exchange offer for Innovative Tier 1 Capital:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. (Lifeco) announced today that it is making an offer to acquire (the “Offer”) up to 170,000 of the outstanding Great-West Life Trust Securities – Series A (“GREATs”) of Great-West Life Capital Trust and up to 180,000 of the outstanding Canada Life Capital Securities – Series A (“CLiCS”) of Canada Life Capital Trust. If more than 170,000 GREATs or 180,000 CLiCS are tendered to the Offer, the tenders will be subject to pro ration.

Lifeco also announced today that it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of agents co-led by RBC Capital Markets and BMO Capital Markets for the sale of $200 million aggregate principal amount of debentures on an agency basis (the “Debentures”).

Pursuant to the Offer, holders of GREATs and CLiCS will have the opportunity to tender all or a portion of their GREATs and/or CLiCS, as applicable, for the applicable GREATs or CLiCS purchase price payable, at the election of the depositing securityholder, either in (a) cash, or (b) debentures with a term to maturity of approximately 30 years plus cash equal to the amount, if any, by which the GREATs purchase price (described below) or CLiCS purchase price (described below), as the case may be, exceeds the debenture price (described below).

The purchase price for the GREATs will provide a yield on each GREATs to December 31, 2012 equal to the yield of the 2% Government of Canada bond due September 1, 2012, as determined one business day prior to the expiration of the Offer, plus a spread of 1.20%. The purchase price for the CLiCS will provide a yield on each CLiCS to June 30, 2012 equal to the yield of the 3.75% Government of Canada bond due June 1, 2012, as determined one business day prior to the expiration of the Offer, plus a spread of 1.05%. In addition, the debentures to be issued under the Offer will provide a yield to maturity equal to the yield to maturity of a 5% Government of Canada due June 1, 2037 plus an equivalent credit spread to the Debentures to be determined and included in the Offer to Purchase and Circular to be mailed to all holders of the GREATs and CLiCS shortly.

The Company will publicly announce the determination of the purchase prices for the GREATs and the CLiCS as well as other details regarding the debentures offered as consideration payable for the GREATs and CLiCS by way of a news release and will post such release on the Company’s website not later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on the business day immediately prior to the expiration date of the Offer (such date currently expected to be December 15, 2009).

According to the 2008 Annual Report (which is copy-protected because it’s SECRET), there were $350-million GREATs outstanding, which are Tier 1 Capital of GWL. There was a total of $450-million CLiCS outstanding, $300-million of which were Series A. They disclose that subsidiaries of GWO held $167-million of the total, but do not provide a breakdown of his holding into Series A & B. CLiCS are Tier 1 Capital of Canada Life.

CLiCS were issued in February 2002 with a 6.679% coupon and the Series A were due to mature 2012-6-30 according to the prospectus on SEDAR.

The GREATs were issued in December 2002 and have a pretend-maturity of 2012-12-31 according to SEDAR.

GWO seems to be rejigging its capital structure somewhat! We will see if this is a normal term-extension type of refinancing (the GWO debs will be worse credits than the CLiCs & GREATs), or whether there’s something else cooking….

November 9, 2009

Monday, November 9th, 2009

The G-20 discussed a Tobin tax:

Group of 20 governments split on whether to tax financial trading as part of a broader strategy to ensure the global economy’s expansion is less crisis-prone.

U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown told a meeting of finance chiefs in St. Andrews, Scotland today that such a levy could prevent excessive risk taking and fund future bank rescues, adding momentum to a debate begun by France. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said a “day-by-day” tax on speculation is “not something we’re prepared to support.”

Clearly a lunatic view. Or populist. Or … perhaps even pre-emptive, to spike the guns of the French! Because after all, even the speaker states:

Brown, who didn’t say whether he’d ultimately endorse such a levy, said any policy would need to be implemented by all financial centers including those in the Middle East, Asia and Switzerland.

There’s nothing wrong in principal with taxing the financial sector in order to pay for bail-outs – but a Tobin tax will kill liquidity and encourage buy-and-hold carry trades – which are precisely the trades that killed the brokerages and banks in the first place. Much better is a beefed-up deposit insurance scheme – which has been proposed by Treasury in connection with the multi-nationals.

Mind you, in Canada we can’t even fund the deposit insurance we have properly. There’s a capital tax on banks, but the government blows it on useless garbage.

BIS has published the Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors: Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, which is the missing reference in Julie Dickson’s recent speech.

The Financial Post ran an article regarding Canadian Alternative Trading Systems, Men of Shadows.

The Canadian preferred share market edged up today, with PerpetualDiscounts ahead by 3bp on the day while FixedResets were up 8bp. Volume dropped off again, with FixedResets dominating what little action there was.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.2354 % 1,487.3
FixedFloater 6.30 % 4.39 % 46,962 18.31 1 6.2847 % 2,471.3
Floater 2.62 % 3.10 % 93,245 19.46 3 1.2354 % 1,858.0
OpRet 4.80 % -10.25 % 118,584 0.09 14 0.1804 % 2,305.3
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.40 % 396,198 3.90 2 -0.1964 % 2,085.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1804 % 2,108.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.88 % 5.76 % 73,800 1.16 4 0.2183 % 1,863.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 189,333 13.92 70 0.0251 % 1,751.2
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.09 % 399,234 3.97 41 0.0753 % 2,121.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 12.75
Evaluated at bid price : 12.75
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 12.81
Evaluated at bid price : 12.81
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 6.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 212,425 TD crossed 200,000 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,000 RBC crossed 30,900 at 27.30 and 36,800 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 45,845 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 37,945 RBC crossed 34,700 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
PWF.PR.D OpRet 34,425 TD bought 25,000 from Nesbitt at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-09
Maturity Price : 25.60
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : -24.61 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 30,927 Nesbitt bought 17,200 from RBC at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

November 6, 2009

Friday, November 6th, 2009

Another good day for preferreds, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 17bp and FixedResets picking up 24bp. Volume remained subdued.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.9566 % 1,469.1
FixedFloater 6.70 % 4.73 % 46,608 17.87 1 0.0617 % 2,325.2
Floater 2.65 % 3.15 % 94,539 19.34 3 -0.9566 % 1,835.3
OpRet 4.81 % -10.68 % 118,237 0.09 14 -0.0410 % 2,301.2
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.40 % 411,654 3.91 2 0.1530 % 2,089.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0410 % 2,104.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.75 % 72,650 1.17 4 -0.1387 % 1,859.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 190,998 13.93 70 0.1722 % 1,750.8
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.09 % 403,947 3.98 41 0.2437 % 2,119.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 12.57
Evaluated at bid price : 12.57
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 12.60
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 24.45
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 21.62
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.58
Evaluated at bid price : 19.58
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 154,900 RBC crossed 143,900 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 71,785 TD crossed 55,000 at 19.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.84
Evaluated at bid price : 19.84
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 68,215 Desjardins bought 22,100 from RBC at 27.41 and two blocks of 13,800 and 14,500 from National, both at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 53,785 Nesbitt crossed two blocks at 18.55: 28,700 and 20,450 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 18.68
Evaluated at bid price : 18.68
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 50,980 Nesbitt bought 19,400 from Macquarie at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium 43,003 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.