Archive for August, 2012

August 7, 2012

Tuesday, August 7th, 2012

The Bloomberg editorial board wants more paperwork:

The Securities and Exchange Commission last month took a half-step by requiring markets to build a $4.1 billion system that can generate audit trails of all transactions. The trouble with this system is that trading data won’t be generated until the next day, a feature the industry insisted on. Day-old data might not help regulators much when they are called upon the instant a market blows up. (It took five months to confirm the cause of the flash crash.) Nor is it clear that the system will be able to pinpoint the identity of every party in a transaction.

The SEC and stock exchanges should also require major trading firms to demonstrate that their software programs are reliable before letting them go live. Now, firms are simply urged to adhere to an industry-recommended set of best practices. Unleashing a flawed program, as Knight seems to have done, is unacceptable.

Market apologists have said Knight’s errant trades caused no harm to anyone other than Knight and its shareholders, who saw the value of their investment shrink by about $600 million in a few hours. Yet who can be so certain the next bug-infested program won’t inflict much more damage? And what might have happened if Knight, which handled about 11 percent of all U.S. stock trading before the errors, had shut down?

Plus, the argument that Knight only hurt itself is bogus: Investors withdrew $127 billion from stock mutual funds in the 12 months ended in June. Repeated computer-trading misfires — not to mention the financial crisis of 2008 — erode confidence in U.S. markets. At some point, regulators and Wall Street have to decide whether the quest for speed is worth the chaos that can result.

$4.1-billion for a trade tracking system. You can put a Mars buggy on Mars for less than that. Has anybody, anywhere, ever seen a cost-benefit analysis for increased regulation? As far as I can tell, the attitude is – this might be worth something, so we should build it no matter what the cost.

As are most calls for increased regulation, Bloomberg’s argument depends upon dizzying leaps of logic and extremely vague fear-mongering:

  • Yet who can be so certain the next bug-infested program won’t inflict much more damage?: Just, what, exactly, are you afraid of?
  • And what might have happened if Knight, which handled about 11 percent of all U.S. stock trading before the errors, had shut down?: Golly, I don’t know. The end of the universe, maybe?
  • Investors withdrew $127 billion from stock mutual funds in the 12 months ended in June. Repeated computer-trading misfires — not to mention the financial crisis of 2008 — erode confidence in U.S. markets.: Just what, if any, connection is there between these two sentences? How is confidence in US markets eroded? What is the effect of this loss of confidence?

Assiduous Reader beluga alleges:

I placed a limit order for YLO.PR.C at 43 cents today at 10am. Got two partial fills with a 100 shares left at the end of the day. I then noticed YLO.PR.C closed at 40 cents and there were trades at 0.425 and 0.40 just before 3pm.

Called to find out what happened. My order was routed to Alpha and after the partial fills didn’t go back to TSX.

This is contrary to my understanding of the National Best-Bid-and-Offer rules. Does anybody have any other ideas?

Interesting staffing kerfuffle at AGF:

AGF Management Ltd. is suing a former star manager and a U.S. investment firm, alleging they engineered the departure of most of AGF’s emerging markets team and cost the Canadian firm millions in lost business.

Patricia Perez-Coutts, who oversaw the top-performing AGF Emerging Markets mutual fund and related institutional accounts, left AGF with four members of her team in May to run money for Dallas-based Westwood Holdings Inc.

Two lessons there:

  • That’s why you’ve got to give your star managers a piece of the action
  • That’s why fundcos don’t promote star managers any more

I liked the Michael Osborne’s op-ed on TMX / Maple:

The approval of the Maple deal bears all the hallmarks of the creation of a “Canadian champion.” Proponents argue that we should accept reduced competition at home, in order to create Canadian champions that have the resources to take on the world. The problem is that monopolies become bloated and inefficient, and unable to compete in world markets. Instead of a Canadian champion, we get an uncompetitive Canadian backwater ripe for foreign takeover.

Ripe for foreign takeover indeed, unless the feds decide it is in the national interest for one group of Canadians to stick it to another group of Canadians. As they have done.

It was a mildly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 5bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles down 2bp. Volatility was mild. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4843 % 2,300.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4843 % 3,441.7
Floater 3.16 % 3.20 % 65,234 19.21 3 0.4843 % 2,484.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.30 % 32,697 0.87 5 0.2456 % 2,536.7
SplitShare 5.49 % 5.00 % 67,493 4.64 3 -0.0533 % 2,757.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2456 % 2,319.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 4.04 % 104,784 1.15 28 -0.0549 % 2,271.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.97 % 99,656 15.49 3 -0.2232 % 2,510.3
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.09 % 181,174 3.79 71 -0.0288 % 2,421.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.54 % 139,111 1.19 46 -0.0170 % 2,351.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 16.85
Evaluated at bid price : 16.85
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 202,317 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 147,200 and 50,000, both at 26.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 62,996 TD crossed 29,800 and 26,900, both at 26.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.79
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 58,745 National crossed 50,000 at 25.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 56,230 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.97
Bid-YTW : -4.51 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 52,972 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 52,088 Scotia crossed 33,700 at 23.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 26.43 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 1.00 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.31 – 26.63
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2024

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.73 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1529

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.41 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2877

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -9.71 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.80 – 27.06
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1664

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.86 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1582

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

YLO Court Battle Looming?

Monday, August 6th, 2012

Tim Kiladze of the Globe and Mail reports:

But there have been rumblings of anger from some creditor groups about the way the spoils are being divided, and the company’s bankers and convertible debenture holders – who own bonds that can be converted into common shares – escalated frustrations last week by separately hiring lawyers and going public with their grievances.

On Monday, the banking group, which is made up of the Big Six banks and Caisse Centrale Desjardins, and which is owed $369-million by Yellow Media, will appear in Quebec court to voice its arguments.

Banks and convertible debenture holders both argue they were treated unfairly by Yellow Media because they were not consulted before the restructuring plans were made public. The banks accuse the company of using “a divide and conquer strategy” by negotiating only with a small group of bondholders, and they want the process to start over.

At the moment, it is unclear how receptive the court will be to both groups’ complaints because their legal rights are murky. The debt restructuring has already been deemed to be fair by financial advisers BMO Nesbitt Burns and Canaccord Genuity.

But that hasn’t stopped the groups from putting forth their arguments. In a motion filed in Quebec court, the banking group, represented by McMillan LLP, states that “creditors are the parties with the primary economic interest in an insolvent entity, and they are, and must be, involved in shaping the terms of a plan that will govern any compromise or arrangement of their debt.”

The convertible debenture holders are also upset at “having been excluded completely from the consultative process” said lawyer Avram Fishman at Fishman Flanz Meland Paquin LLP, and they can’t understand why “they were not asked whether they agreed with [the proposed arrangement] or what provisions could be changed to induce them to accept it.”

The proposed reorganization has been reported on PrefBlog. I suspect that I might recommend a negative vote by preferred shareholders – who may well be able to vote separately as a class – on the grounds that the plan assumes forced conversion by preferreds into old common, which is then converted on harsh terms into new common.

In other words, the plan appears (appears! Pending my review of final documentation!) to be a worst-case scenario alread for the preferred shareholders … and why should they vote “Yes” if they’re not being paid to vote “Yes”?

YLO has four series of preferred shares outstanding: YLO.PR.A & YLO.PR.B, which are subject to forcible conversion into old common, and YLO.PR.C & YLO.PR.D, which are not.

MAPF Performance: July 2012

Saturday, August 4th, 2012

The fund strongly outperformed in June July, due largely to stellar performance by insurer-issued DeemedRetractibles and BNA.PR.C. Another major factor was the relative performance of FixedResets, which underperformed DeemedRetractibles by 58bp over the month – relative to the index, the fund is underweight in FixedResets.

All the above factors were also critical elements of last month’s underperformance – but each bounced back with room to spare.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 31, 2012, was 10.4713.

Returns to July, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +2.51% +0.75% +1.06% +0.91%
Three Months +1.60% +0.65% +1.26% +1.06%
One Year +2.84% +4.47% +4.26% +3.76%
Two Years (annualized) +9.13% +8.70% +7.32% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +11.19% +9.09% +7.53% +6.79%
Four Years (annualized) +21.13% +8.44% +7.11% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +14.87% +5.03% +3.84% +3.21%
Six Years (annualized) +13.27% +4.29%    
Seven Years (annualized) +11.98% +4.12%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.39% +4.24%    
Nine Years (annualized) +12.23% +4.43%    
Ten Years (annualized) +12.35% +4.62%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.25% +4.56%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.76%, +0.76% and +3.95%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +7.69%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.54%, +0.36% and +2.12% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +4.97%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.98%, +0.97% & +3.79%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.52%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.70%, +1.05% & +5.26%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons, but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise unavailable (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF).

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
July, 2012 10.4713 5.03%
Note
1.00 5.030% 1.0000 $0.5267
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. Commencing February, 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on July 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only three such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.5267 per unit in July should be looked at as a simple consequence of the funds holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

REI.PR.A, REI.PR.C: Distributions 62% Return of Capital in 2011

Saturday, August 4th, 2012

This post is motivated by a query from Assiduous Reader adrian2, who writes in and says:

Is there any other Canadian security calling itself preferred and distributing ROC?

As it turns out, there is: REI.PR.A and REI.PR.C are reported by RioCan to have the following breakdown of their distribution in 2011:

  • Capital Gain: 1.72%
  • Foreign Non-Business Income 4.57%
  • Other Income 31.24%
  • Return of Capital 62.47%

Various implications of this kind of tax treatment were discussed by Tom Kiladze in the Globe:

In RioCan’s case, distributions will be taxed as income, not as dividends. That matters, because income is taxed at a higher rate. But the preferred units will be treated just like RioCan’s regular trust units, so a portion of the distributions will be treated as a return of capital. REITs often distribute more than their net incomes because depreciation skews their bottom lines (property values usually go up, not down), and the amount overpaid allows investors to get a better tax treatment.

BMO analyst Karine MacIndoe ran the numbers and found that RioCan has a historical five-year tax-deferral average of about 50 per cent. Applying that figure over a five-year horizon in the future, the pref units’ 5.25 per cent yield equates to a 4.82 per cent dividend yield on an after-tax return basis.

What the numbers will look like in the future is left as an exercise for the student.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 2012

Saturday, August 4th, 2012

Turnover declined in July, to a very low 2%. There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relative homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to disappear for most practical purposes.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on July 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-7-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.9% (+0.1) 5.66% 5.50
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 18.6% (+0.3) 2.59% 1.81
Deemed-Retractible 62.6% (+1.1) 5.46% 7.46
Scraps (Various) 8.9% (-0.3) 6.24% (see note) 11.02 (see note)
Cash 0.00 (-1.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.03% 6.49
Yields for the YLO preferreds have been set at 0% for calculation purposes, and their durations at 0.00, due to the the company’s decision to suspend preferred dividends and proposed reorganization.
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-7-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 51.9% (+0.6)
Pfd-2(high) 28.9% (+0.8)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.3% (+0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 1.1% (-0.4)
Pfd-3 2.3% (+0.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0.6% (0)
Pfd-4 3.2% (0)
Pfd-4(low) 1.4% (-0.1)
Pfd-5(low) 0.3% (+0.1)
Cash 0 (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-7-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 15.5% (+4.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 1.1% (-16.3)
$100,000 – $200,000 55.9% (+18.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 18.9% (-4.9)
>$300,000 8.6% (0)
Cash 0 (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

August 3, 2012

Friday, August 3rd, 2012

Good news! The CEO of RBS says LIBOR rigging isn’t his fault:

Royal Bank of Scotland confirmed for the first time on Friday it had dismissed staff over an interest rate rigging scandal but the bank gave no indication whether it might settle soon with investigators.

Reporting a drop in first-half operating profit, RBS said it was co-operating with governments and regulators which are investigating the role of a number of banks in the setting of Libor and other inter-bank lending rates.

“I think that the regulators must decide how they want to deal with the situation. We will stand up and take any punishment that comes our way,” Chief Executive Stephen Hester said. He said he believed the Libor issue had been a result of “wrongdoing by individuals” rather than a “systemic problem” within the industry.

“The Libor situation is a stark reminder of the damage that individual wrongdoing and inadequate systems and controls can have in terms of financial and reputational impact.”

The inadequate systems and controls aren’t his fault, either. Me, I blame society.

There’s an interesting piece in the Globe about corporate cash in Canada:

“Corporate businesses are flush with cash, which they still seem hesitant to deploy, presumably due to the uncertain economic outlook,” said David Madani, Canadian economist for the London-based research firm [Capital Economics]. “This obviously leaves scope for firms to increase dividends, which could boost personal income and consumption significantly.”

In a recent research note, Mr. Madani said Canada’s non-financial-sector corporate cash balances stood at $526-billion at the beginning of 2012 – up 42 per cent since the recession ended in mid-2009. Since the Canadian economy is roughly one-tenth the size of our U.S. neighbour, this Canadian cash pile, in relative terms, dwarfs the roughly $1.3-trillion (U.S.) in cash held by U.S. corporations.

The US had a better than expected jobs number, albeit not “good”:

The payrolls increase of 163,000 followed a revised 64,000 gain in June, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median estimate of 89 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for a gain of 100,000. The jobless rate, based on a separate survey of households, climbed to a five-month high of 8.3 percent

I don’t understand all this anger management stuff:

A survey published in American Journal of Nursing in 2002, reported that 90 percent of hospital workers, including doctors and nurses, reported “yelling,” “abusive language” as well as “condescension” and “berating colleagues.” A quarter of the 1,200 people surveyed said they witnessed such behavior weekly.

“There isn’t a doctor alive who hasn’t seen it,” says William Norcross, executive director of a program at the University of California at San Diego that uses anger management to treat irascible physicians.

Medical professionals present [anger management guru George] Anderson with unique challenges. Their hours are brutal, the stakes are high, and the threat of malpractice suits is ever-present. The life-or-death nature of the work wears at steely nerves even on the best days, Anderson says.

If things have got to the point where you have to yell at your staff, the sensible thing to do is fire them instead. If you don’t have the authority to fire them … well, then you don’t have the authority to yell at them either, do you?

This sort of prima-donna behaviour was one of the things that took down RT Capital Management back in about 2000 – big-shot portfolio managers yelling at the back-office. Why is there “a program at the University of California at San Diego that uses anger management to treat irascible physicians”?

I’ve got a better idea: you yell at my staff, you’re fired. No matter how good you are at your tiny little specialty, you’re no good at all without good support staff … right down to the janitor who keeps the washroom clean, and if the support staff hates their jobs, they’re not going to do them very well. Sorry, buddy, but your hospital privileges are withdrawn. These guys indulge in their temper tantrums for the same reason bratty five-year-olds do: because there are no repercussions.

So, I finally got everything working again, with the proviso that I’m back to where I started and the conversion of the HIMIPref™ Web Services from Visual C++ 2002 to Visual C++ 2010 has been delayed. What a total nightmare. Everything worked just fine under VC 2002 … but VC 2002 won’t run under Windows 7.

Like everybody else, I have a love-hate relationship with Microsoft … some of their design decisions drive me nuts, but whenever I compare one of their products to its competitor, they almost always come out on top. Spreadsheets … C++ compilers … operating systems … the only exception I can remember is Rapid Application Development software, in which I consider Visual Basic to be pretty horrible – and that’s almost certainly because they insist that it be usuable throughout their entire suite of software.

So their tools are first class, but they’ve got a problem: there is, as far as I can tell, an institutional culture that supposes that because they do development in teams numbering in the hundreds – and because they guys they talk to also have huge development teams – that’s the way it works everywhere. It doesn’t. Lots of programming gets done in small shops (like mine!). I don’t need ultra-finicky version control! I can do all my version control on the back of an envelope! I don’t have a full time staff member in charge of compiling, who has daily meetings with the guy who does version control! But they think I do, so there are all kinds of finicky adjustments to be made to compiler settings and version control that all have to agree with each other or the damn thing blows up. And there’s no “Turn Off Version Control” setting on the damn compiler.

Such is life.

It was a slightly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 4bp, and both FixedResets and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was ridiculously low – there’s usually more volume on Christmas Eve!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1410 % 2,289.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1410 % 3,425.1
Floater 3.18 % 3.20 % 63,371 19.20 3 -0.1410 % 2,472.2
OpRet 4.77 % 2.41 % 32,762 0.88 5 -0.2145 % 2,530.5
SplitShare 5.48 % 4.98 % 67,331 4.65 3 -0.2793 % 2,759.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2145 % 2,313.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.93 % 104,247 1.16 28 -0.0417 % 2,272.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.95 % 103,011 15.54 3 0.0558 % 2,515.9
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.07 % 180,934 3.95 71 -0.0223 % 2,422.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.36 % 141,628 1.20 46 -0.0238 % 2,352.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 75,605 Scotia crossed 27,300 at 25.05; RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 51,345 National Bank crossed 46,500 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 37,153 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 34,000 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 25,337 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 21,484 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
There were 8 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.76 – 27.07
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1955

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %

NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.56 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1924

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-02
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.01 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2239

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 16.65 – 16.89
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1697

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1842

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.41 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1342

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %

BAF placed on Review-Negative by DBRS

Friday, August 3rd, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

placed the ratings of Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership (Bell Aliant or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS is reassessing the risks associated with the Company’s transformational strategy (including the magnitude and pace of capital requirements) while returns from this investment remain difficult to forecast and pressure on operating income/cash flow from traditional business lines persists.

Bell Aliant is currently in the process of transforming its business by supplanting its traditional voice with broadband and IPTV services. Although DBRS recognizes the merits of such a strategy, it acknowledges that the transition will not be without risk. The Company expects to have invested approximately $500 million in Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) by the end of 2012. As of June 30, 2012, Bell Aliant has achieved 582,000 homes passed and penetration of approximately 75,000 FibreOP Internet customers and 65,000 FibreOP TV subscribers. In the meantime, revenues from local and long distance continue to decline at a steady pace (down 5.0% and 10.8% year-over-year, respectively, for H1/2012). As a result, Bell Aliant’s total EBITDA declined by 1.1% to $655 million for the first half of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, a moderation of a negative trend that began in 2010. The decline was softened due to incremental revenues and operating income from the Company’s FibreOp services.

Bell Aliant maintains significant capital investment requirements in the near-to-medium term in order to achieve its stated objective of reaching one million homes passed. DBRS believes there are strategic merits to accelerating the Company’s capex program in order to advance their position in an increasingly competitive environment. That said, an acceleration of investment would increase external funding requirements as DBRS expects the Company to generate negative free cash flow after dividends over the period of accelerated capital investment.

In its review, DBRS will focus on Bell Aliant’s prospects for penetration growth in the new business lines, size/pace of capital program and overall financing requirements in light of Management’s commitment to its dividend. DBRS will also reassess the competitive environment, including pricing strategies and the threat of product innovation. DBRS will aim to complete its assessment and resolve the Under Review status within the next month.

In terms of short-term debt, Bell Aliant’s Commercial Paper rating of R-1(low) reflected the Company’s superior liquidity strength as entities with a long-term rating of BBB (high) are typically coupled with a short-term rating of R-2 (high). As part of our assessment of the future capital program and financing requirements, DBRS will also review the appropriateness of having a Commercial Paper rating on Bell Aliant that exceeds the standard mapping.

The text of press release doesn’t mention their preferred share issuing arm, Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc., specifically, but its preferred shares are specifically placed under Review-Negative in the appended table.

Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. has two issues outstanding: BAF.PR.A and BAF.PR.C. Both are FixedResets, both are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Issue: AX.PR.A FixedReset 5.25%+406

Friday, August 3rd, 2012

Artis REIT announced on July 24:

a marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of approximately $50 million Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A (the “Series A Units”) at a price of $25 per Series A Unit. The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase additional Series A Units, up to an amount equal to 15% of the number of Series A Units sold pursuant to the Financing. The Financing will be priced in the context of the market with the final terms of the Financing to be determined at the time of pricing.

The Series A Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five-year period ending September 30, 2017. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on September 30, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on September 30, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing. The Series A Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.
Holders of Series A Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series A Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series B (the “Series B Units”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series B Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

Artis continues to enjoy a strong deal flow pipeline, with a continued focus on the accretive acquisition of quality commercial properties, in select markets in Canada and the U.S.

The issue was priced the following day:

announced today that is has priced its previously announced marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A (the “Series A Units”). Artis will issue 3 million Series A Units at a price of $25 per Series A Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of $75,000,000.

The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase up to an additional 450,000 Series A Units.

The Series A Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions of $1.3125 per unit per annum, yielding 5.25% per annum, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five-year period ending September 30, 2017. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on September 30, 2012 and shall be $0.2122 per unit, based on the anticipated closing of the offering of Series A Units of August 2, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on September 30, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and 4.06%. The Series A Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series A Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series A Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series B (the “Series B Units”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series B Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus a spread of 4.06%.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators. The Financing is expected to close on or about August 2, 2012 and is subject to regulatory approval.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to fund future acquisitions, repay indebtedness, and for general trust purposes.

Artis continues to enjoy a strong deal flow pipeline, with a continued focus on the accretive acquisition of quality commercial properties, in select markets in Canada and the U.S.

And they announced on August 2:

it has closed its previously announced marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A, (“the Series A Units”), through a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Pursuant to the Financing, Artis issued 3.0 million Series A Units at a price of $25 per Series A Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of $75,000,000.

Artis has granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase up to an additional 450,000 Series A Units.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

According to the prospectus supplement (available at SEDAR dated July 25, 2012; I am not permitted to link to it directly due to the cosy little contract the soon-to-be-bank-owned CDS has signed with regulators), “The Series A Units and the Series B Units are not rated by any rating agency.” Accordingly, the issue will not be tracked by HIMIPref™. As I have stated so often that people are getting sick of the repetition, this policy is not because I don’t think I can analyze the credit quality myself, and not because I worship the rating agencies … but because a public credit rating serves as a useful public flash-point during times of stress. It’s always useful to give the directors something to talk about over lunch!

Taxation is complicated: “Artis’ income and net taxable gains for the purposes of the Tax Act will be allocated to the holders of Units and Preferred Units in the same proportion as the distributions received by such holders.” In 2011, Unitholder distributions were 100% return of capital and this was also the case in 2010.

August 2, 2012

Friday, August 3rd, 2012

There’s some jostling over the YLO reorg:

Law firm McMillan, counsel for the company’s lenders, said Wednesday the lenders, who weren’t specified, are owed a principal amount of $369-million by Yellow Media as of Sept. 28, 2011.

“The company put forward the proposed CBCA plan without notice to or prior consultation with the lenders or most of its other stakeholders,” McMillan said in a news release.

“The lenders have invited the company to withdraw the proposed CBCA plan forthwith and to engage in a more open and transparent consultation process with its stakeholders to see if an acceptable plan can be achieved.”

The lenders intend to bring a motion on Aug. 6 to protect their legal rights in the reorganization proceeding initiated by Yellow Media under the CBCA.

Goldman Sachs has developed a new kind of investment:

Under the Goldman Sachs-funded initiative, inmates aged 16 to 18 will receive education, training and counseling intended to reduce the likelihood of them reoffending after their release.

City officials said Goldman would provide a $9.6-million loan to pay for the program at the Rikers Island jail complex. If recidivism drops by 10 per cent, the firm will get back the $9.6-million. If it drops even more, Goldman could make as much as $2.1-million in profit. If recidivism doesn’t drop by at least 10 percent, Goldman will lose as much as $2.4-million.

Nearly half of the adolescents who leave city jails currently return within one year.

Social impact bonds, also called pay-for-success bonds, were first used in Britain and are being explored in Australia and in the U.S.

Massachusetts is negotiating with two nonprofit groups to finance juvenile justice and homelessness programs with the promise of repayment only if the programs work.

I don’t know why it’s called a “bond” rather than “an investment in a micro-cap that has a government contract”, but I suppose it helps sell the things.

As of September 28, 2011? That was the date the banks tightened the screws and DBRS slashed the rating. But why it’s being used as a reference date for the challengers’ holdings is something I don’t know.

Testing software is boring:

Knight Capital Group Inc. (KCG) said losses from yesterday’s trading breakdown are $440 million, almost quadruple its 2011 net income and more than some analysts had estimated, and the firm is exploring strategic and financial alternatives. Its stock has lost 66 percent in two days.

Knight said it will continue its trading and market-making today as it considers its options. Yesterday’s issue was related to the installation of trading software and resulted in the company sending “numerous erroneous orders,” the Jersey City, New Jersey-based firm said today. The stock tumbled 50 percent to $3.46 at 9:36 a.m. New York time today.

The errors were caused by a malfunction in a trading algorithm, according to a person at Knight who asked to remain anonymous because the matter hasn’t been publicized.

Apparently there’s some regulatory concern over the problem:

Yesterday’s problem shows regulation is “broken” and a study group should be convened to review technology and market structure, Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, said in an interview. Regulators would have been able to stop incidents such as yesterday’s breakdown if they didn’t face a lack of resources, he said.

“The ability of regulators to do their job has never been weaker than it is today because of the failure of the oversight process,” Levitt, 81, said today in an interview. “Congress has a greater responsibility for what we’re seeing today than any regulator or any particular part of the industry. They’ve allowed this to happen.”

Kevin Callahan, a spokesman with the SEC, said in an e-mail that regulators are “closely monitoring the situation and in continuous contact with the NYSE and other market participants.”

I don’t understand this. A poorly-run company gave a $440-million gift to investors. Why is this a problem?

In related news, a bug was discovered at Hymas Investment Management today:


Click for big

Company officials were quoted as saying “Now stop screwing around and do some damn work.”

ING Bank Canada is for sale:

The sale process for ING Bank Canada has already kicked into high gear, and rival Canadian banks are heavily interested in scooping up their online-focused competitor.

I understand that central banks are using Google searches as indicators:

The Federal Reserve and the central banks of England, Italy, Spain and Chile have followed up with their own studies to see if search volumes track trends in the economies they oversee.

It all started with a hunch in Mountain View, California. On the heels of developing a new website reporting how often users searched for certain keywords, Hal Varian, Google Inc.’s chief economist, said he wondered whether this data could foreshadow what traditional economic reports would show later. So he ran the numbers.

“The ‘aha moment’ was, gee, this actually works,” Varian said in an interview.

The result was a 23-page paper he co-wrote in April 2009, demonstrating how data reported on the Google Trends service improved forecasts of auto and home sales and retail spending in the U.S.

If they’re paying attention to my Google searches, banknotes will soon feature “scarlett johansson nude” in place of dead politicians. But other pornography is good too!

***********************
Sorry, folks, the daily report will be delayed.

I have been in Microsoft Version Hell for about ten-and-a-half hours now … and ain’t nuthin’ workin’.

Update, 2012-8-3: Finally!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1408 % 2,292.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1408 % 3,430.0
Floater 3.17 % 3.20 % 65,611 19.21 3 -0.1408 % 2,475.7
OpRet 4.76 % 2.40 % 34,108 0.89 5 -0.0306 % 2,535.9
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.87 % 65,593 4.66 3 0.0799 % 2,767.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0306 % 2,318.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.92 % 103,946 1.16 28 0.0821 % 2,273.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.93 % 103,855 15.56 3 0.2239 % 2,514.5
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.05 % 181,877 3.95 71 -0.0656 % 2,422.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 2.96 % 142,532 0.80 46 0.0486 % 2,352.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 121,160 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 105,926 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 89,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 57,027 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.73
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 55,401 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 54,432 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.78
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.12 – 23.85
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.5176

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.12
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.78 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1878

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.78
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.20 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1929

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3447

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.10 – 25.51
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3092

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.76 – 26.19
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3381

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : -0.60 %

Soon!

New Issue: TA FixedReset 5.00%+365

Thursday, August 2nd, 2012

TransAlta Corporation has announced:

that it has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank for distribution to the public 6,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series E (the “Series E Shares”). The Series E Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series E Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million. Holders of the Series E Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 5% annually for the initial period ending September 30, 2017. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.65%.

Holders of Series E Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series F (the “Series F Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series F Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.65%.

TransAlta Corporation has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 3,000,000 Series E Shares at the same offering price. The Series E Shares will be offered by way of prospectus supplement under the short form base shelf prospectus of TransAlta Corporation dated November 15, 2011. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

The net proceeds of the Offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, for other general corporate purposes and to reduce short term indebtedness of the Corporation and its affiliates. The offering is expected to close on or about August 10, 2012.

TransAlta was recently downgraded to P-3 by S&P and the shelf registered preferreds were downgraded to (P)Ba2 by Moody’s. DBRS has them at Pfd-3, Review-Developing.

Update, 2012-8-3: Provisionally rated Pfd-3 by DBRS.