Category: Press Clippings

Press Clippings

Heinzl: Why preferreds are falling but corporate bonds aren't

John Heinzl was kind enough to quote me in today’s Globe and Mail in his Investor Clinic:

I’m a retired and experienced investor. Some months ago I invested a sizable amount of money in preferred shares of major banks, the rationale being that it would be a safe haven for the cash and produce a steady stream of dividends. They have fallen sharply over the last few weeks. Why?

The facile explanation is that interest rates are rising, so straight preferred shares – which trade much like long-term bonds – are falling. But preferred share expert James Hymas of PrefLetter.com says the tumble in preferreds has more to do with emotion than interest rates.

Short-term rates are indeed rising – the Bank of Canada all but confirmed yesterday that it will hike its benchmark rate on June 1. But long-term corporate bond yields – which are far more important to the preferred share market – are not.

“Long corporate yields have been fairly steady. They have been bouncing around at basically 6 per cent to a little under for the all this year. So whatever concerns there might be about rising interest rates, they’re not being shared by the corporate bond market,” Mr. Hymas says.

So why are preferred shares falling while long corporate bonds are not?

The corporate bond market is large and dominated by institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies that take a long-term view. The preferred market, on the other hand, has a bigger retail presence and many issues are comparatively illiquid. This makes preferred prices more volatile, particularly when retail investors start getting nervous – like now.

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Carrick: Rising inflation set to shake up sleepy preferreds

Rob Carrick was kind enough to quote me in his Portfolio Strategy column of February 20:

A different take on the appeal of perpetual and fixed reset preferreds is offered by James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management. He doesn’t believe perpetuals will fall in price as much as some people expect and, regardless, he still sees some benefits in them for investors who want income.

His argument begins with the point that there are two issues to consider when choosing income-producing investments – the safety level of the investment itself and the reliability of the income it produces.

Fixed resets do a good job of protecting investors when inflation’s on the rise and pushing up interest rates, Mr. Hymas [pontificated]. But they fall behind perpetuals when it comes to preserving a reliable flow of income. Let’s say you bought some fixed reset preferreds back in early 2009, when they were being issued with yields of 6 per cent or more. Those shares could be very well be redeemed in a few years, leaving you in the tough position of trying to replace a 6-per-cent yield.

With perpetuals, your income flow lasts indefinitely, if not in perpetuity, and it’s comparatively safe.

“If you’ve got something from one of the big banks paying $1 a year, you can be as sure as you can be of anything in the investing world that you’re going to get that $1 a year until the shares are called,” Mr. Hymas said.

Mr. Carrick had to deal with the journalist’s constant bugbear: how to address a complex question for a wide swath of the investing public in 1,000 words or less. One question I must always ask when responding to queries on “interest rates” is: “Which interest rates?”. Short term rates are different from long term rates; government rates are different from corporate rates. And that’s just where we start!

The article has eight comments so far – a good one that addresses the issue is:

The premise of the article is that inflation is rising. Without that assumption all of it become irrelevant.

But there is no argument presented to support that premise. Just because very-short-term-government-set rates are rising does NOT mean that inflation is rising.

And just because the current month’s CPI was closing on 2% does not mean the rate is rising either. That rise is just a reversal of last year’s deflation – both short term events.

And, of course, even if we grant that FixedResets are good at protecting principal (which is only true up to a point – they are subject to exactly the same long-term credit risk as Straights) there is the eternal Fixed Income tug-of-war to consider between Protection of Principal and Protection of Income. You can’t have both; money market instruments emphasize protection of principal; straight perpetuals emphasize protection of income. FixedResets are in between – but not so close to the Money Market side of the struggle as many people like to think.

Update: A few more comments: the first, a retail view of the case for FixedResets (subsequent editing note applied to quote)

Rate-reset preferreds eliminate the risk of rising interest rates while perpeptuals expose you to full risk. If you bought bank reset perpetuals preferreds, when first issued in 2009, you now have a 10% capital gain (on paper )but most importantly a guaranteed 6% dividend over the next five years. If economic growth is slow then rates will not rise much over that time and the dividend is gold. The rate reset will then kick in to protect you going forward.

If rates do rise substantially, the banks will redeem the shares and you can re-invest in a high interest savings account until another investment opportunity presents itself. In this way your capital is preserved.

On the other hand, if you bought perpetuals and rates rise substantially, the shares will be deeply discounted and you will have a substantial capital loss. If you choose not to sell you will be locked in and have inferior returns going forward.

On a risk-return basis the rate-reset perpetuals preferreds are the winners IMHO.

The commenter got it right first time: rate-reset (or FixedReset, in my nomenclature) are indeed perpetuals, a thing that is very often forgetten in good times. The credit risk is forever. While the FixedReset structure does indeed provide protection against inflation (to the extent that this is reflected in 5-Year Government bonds, which is a pretty large extent!), but provides no protection whatsoever against credit risk. If a particular issuer gets into trouble between now and the next reset and is not able to refinance at a lower rate, it will probably not call the issue – and the price of the issue will, almost (but not quite) by definition be lower than par.

Additionally, one should always remember that in this wicked world, nice things cost money. Inflation protection is nice. And it costs money, as I have discussed in my essays on break-even rate shock. Naturally, having calculated the cost, one can quite legitimately take the view that it’s cheap at the price – but I suspect many purchasers do not attempt to quantify the cost in any way whatsoever. Especially when the same protection is available for free with Government real return bonds (RRBs)! I’m willing to bet that there are a few investors out there who have nominal Canadas and FixedReset preferreds, when it be more logical to own RRBs and Straight Perpetuals.

But the crux of the argument is If rates do rise substantially, the banks will redeem the shares and you can re-invest in a high interest savings account until another investment opportunity presents itself. In this way your capital is preserved..

Well, in the first place the banks’ decision whether or not to redeem the shares will have little, if anythng, to do with the rate on 5-Year Canadas. If those rates are high, then to a first approximation we may assume that all other rates will be high as well; and (also to a first approximation) the decision will be made dependent upon the cost of refinancing options. It is the Reset Spread that is critical to the refinancing decision, not the five year rate.

And in the second place, even a high interest savings account (paying what? 1%?) will not replace the lost income on call. You may have your principal but – as is too often the case with investors being far more concerned than they should be with Preservation of Capital at the expense of the other objective of Preservation of Income – income will suffer.

I rather liked one of the other comments:

James Hymas Rocks!

… even with the “thumbs down” comment rating!

Press Clippings

James Hymas Interviewed by Globe & Mail

A very nice piece by John Heinzl in today’s Globe: An Investor with a Preference for Preferreds.

Update: Finally got a heckler in the Globe’s comments section! An individual who was too ashamed to sign his name wrote:

There is a problem with the authors comment about firs loss protection. Pref Shares are equity from a balance sheet stand point, and the financial regulators treat them as such.

Pref Shares are equity investments with stated yield that must be paid before the common share dividend. THIS IS THE ONLY protection. It is not a bond, meaning the issuer does not have to make good on it to stay in business, nor do pref shareholders have any stake in the event of an insolvent company.

For reference, Please read p. 58 of Benjamin Graham’s book The Outstanding Investor. Or have a read at this study of preferred shares. http://www.pallas-athena.ca/Income_Investing_Preferred_Shares.html

Firstly, I don’t understand the author’s problem with my statement regarding first-loss protection. I was not referring to the balance sheet treatment specified by accountants or the regulatory treatment specified by Basel II – I was referring to the investment characteristic of first-loss protection.

  • 1 – How much money did CIBC lose in 2008-2009?
  • 2 – How much of this loss was borne by common shareholders?
  • 3 – How much of this loss was borne by preferred shareholders?
  • 4 – What conclusions may be drawn regarding first loss protection?

I am not aware of any book authored by Benjamin Graham titled The Outstanding Investor and neither is Wikipedia. The commentator may possibly be referring to The Intelligent Investor; I commented on an extract from this book dealing with preferred shares in my early 2009 post, Benjamin Graham et al. on Preferred Stocks. Briefly, Mr. Graham was writing in another time, under a very different tax regime; I agree that under the conditions described, it would be highly unusual for an individual investor to find an attractively priced preferred share – but those conditions no longer apply.

The essay published on the Pallas Athena Investment Counsel website, titled Preferred Shares: A Tutorial again references page 58 of the mysterious book The Outstanding Investor and quotes an extract from it that appears to be a verbatim copy of part of the passage from The Intelligent Investor discussed briefly above.

To be brutally frank, I do not consider the Pallas Athena analysis to be worthy of much detailed comment. Their first example assumes:

the dividend increases by only 27% over the next 4 years to $2.54.

Therefore, $2.54 / 4% = $63.50. This is the price that the common shares should be worth at a 4% yield if the Royal Bank dividend on common shares will be $2.54 in 2013. A 27% dividend increase over the next four years is a very likely scenario; especially when we look at the past.

Given these assumptions, why would one ever invest in anything but Royal Bank common?

PA’s second example differs only in the starting price for the common.

This assumption is repeated in the third example. The preferred share used in the example is RY.PR.W at its lowest price, but the authors display their lack of familiarity with the preferred share market with the statement:

We will assume that we the shares are held until the end 2013, a few months prior to the scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014. For this reason, we’ll assume that the value of the Series W shares will be $25.00 at the end of 2013.

There is no “scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014”. That is when the shares become callable at par, which implies only a ceiling to the potential price, not a floor. This is, of course, favourable to the preferred share, but is inexcusable anyway. Naturally, the authors make the same assumptions about the future common as they do in the other examples (only the purchase price is different), leaving one to wonder yet again: why would anybody ever invest in anything but RY common if these assumptions are to be regarded as solid?

The authors conclude, in part:

The reality is that preferred shares are a tool for companies to increase their profits which is to the benefit of common shareholders or it is a tool for companies to solidify their balance sheet which is to the benefit of the lenders and bond holders.

Certainly, that’s as good a one-sentence explanation of the existence of preferred shares as any, but the authors neglect to inqure as to what price the company is prepared to pay for these benefits.

Preferred shares form a region on the continuum between debt and equity that will be attractive to many. That’s about the only general statement I can make!

I was not able to find composite performance numbers for Pallas-Athena Investment Counsel; if anybody has more luck, please let me know!

Press Clippings

IIROC Publishes Proposed Retail Bond Rules

The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada has announced:

a proposed rule and guidance note to address fair pricing of over-the-counter (OTC) traded securities including fixed income securities such as bonds. The proposal would amend existing trade confirmation requirements by mandating yield disclosure for fixed income securities. It will require firms to disclose on confirmations sent to retail clients for OTC transactions if the dealer’s remuneration has been added to the price in the case of a purchase or deducted in the case of a sale. The general purpose of these proposed amendments is to enhance the fairness of pricing and transparency of OTC market transactions.

The text of the proposed rule states that, generally speaking:

the proposed amendments will:
• Require Dealer Members to fairly and reasonably price securities traded in OTC markets;
• Require Dealer Members to disclose yield to maturity on trade confirmations for fixed-income securities and notations for callable and variable rate securities; and
• Require Dealer Members to include on trade confirmations sent to retail clients in respect of OTC transactions a statement indicating that they have earned remuneration on those transactions unless the amount of any mark-up or mark-down, commissions and other service charges is disclosed on the confirmation.

These are rules only a regulator could love. They note, for instance, that:

the pricing mechanisms used for fixed income securities are less understood by retail clients. Specifically, retail clients may not understand the inverse relationship between price and yield or the various factors that can affect yield calculations and the relative risk of a particular fixed income security. All these factors contribute to the difficulty retail investors are faced with when determining whether a particular fixed income security is fairly priced (and therefore offers an appropriate yield) and of appropriate risk. IIROC therefore wishes to underscore the responsibility of Dealer Member firms to use their professional judgment and market expertise to diligently ascertain and provide fair prices to clients in all circumstances, particularly in situations where the Dealer Member must determine inferred market price because the most recent market price does not accurately reflect market value of that security.

If a client does not understand the inverse relationship between price and yield, THE CLIENT SHOULD NOT BE BUYING BONDS. Full stop.

The underlying purpose of the rules may be deduced from:

Market regulators’ surveillance of fixed income market activity will provide the tools to monitor for patterns and trends in prices and will allow regulators to more effectively identify price outliers. IIROC is currently considering how best to implement such a system to monitor our Dealer Members’ OTC security (both fixed income and equity) trading, which would allow IIROC to identify circumstances where trade prices do not correspond with the prevailing market at that time.

In other words, somebody at IIROC wants to expand his empire. Or, maybe, has looked at his career prospects and decided that a good future job title would be “Compliance Manager, Retail Bond Desk, Very Big Brokerage Inc.”

Rules 2 (Yield disclosure) and 3 (Compensation disclosure) are derisory; the latter simply requires a statement that the dealer is making money (or hoping to, anyway), something that most people are able to deduce from the fact that the confirmations already state that it’s a principal transaction.

Rule 1, however, is more complex. IIROC has drafted a Guidance Note:

When executing an OTC trade as agent for a customer, a Dealer Member will have to use diligence to ascertain a fair price. For example, in the context of an illiquid security this “reasonable efforts” requirement may require the Dealer Member to canvass various parties to source the availability and the price of the specific security. Passive acceptance of the first price quoted to a Dealer Member executing an agency transaction will not be sufficient.

This will kill the market, such as it is. Why would they bother, when they can just say “No offer” or “No bid”? If they do bother, and they do go through this canvassing process, and they do charge a fair price for their efforts, is the price still going to be halfway reasonable? I doubt it.

Most insidiously:

It is important to note that the fair pricing responsibility of Dealer Members requires attention both to the market value of the security as well as to the reasonableness of compensation. Excessive commissions, mark-ups or mark-downs obviously may cause a violation of the fair pricing standards described above. However, it is also possible for a Dealer Member to restrict its profit on transactions to reasonable levels and still violate the Rule because of inattention to market value. For example, a Dealer Member may fail to assess the market value of a security when acquiring it from another dealer or customer and in consequence may pay a price well above market value. It would be a violation of fair pricing responsibilities for the Dealer Member to pass on this misjudgment to another customer, as either principal or agent, even if the Dealer Member makes little or no profit on the trade.

So, in other words, you could make a good faith misjudgement of a market price – such as, for instance, a bond market professional makes all the time – and be subject to regulatory action. Not to mention being liable (forever) for the difference between the price at which you offset the client transaction and the price some regulator decides is fair.

Just in case there are some people out their with the belief that these rules might actually result in a net improvement to the retail bond market:

IIROC expects Dealer Members to maintain adequate documentation to support the pricing of OTC securities transactions. In most instances, existing transactions records, including audio recordings, will allow Dealer Members to reconstruct the basis on which an OTC transaction price was determined to be fair, and will therefore suffice for purposes of supporting the fairness of a transaction. IIROC anticipates that hard-to-value transactions, are likely to require additional supporting documentation. Proper documentation of such transactions may be the subject of IIROC trading reviews, and the failure to maintain documentation to support the fairness of pricing of hard-to-value transactions will be a consideration in any potential enforcement actions.

It is rather sweet that IIROC believes we can reach a Nirvana through imposition of more rules, but all this stuff simply betrays total lack of comprehension of how the bond market – retail or institutional – works. These rules are the product of people who have never in their lives got on the ‘phone in a cold sweat and said “Done”; it is the product of people who believe they know everything on the basis of their two-year Ryerson certificate in Boxtickingology.

My brief remarks when the gist of the rules was leaked on April 14 attracted comments, both on the post and in my eMail. One Assiduous Reader writes in and says:

I have a similar observation over the few years for bond with short maturity (1 – 5 years). Could you explain some of the factors why retail brokerages seem to be offering a better deal on GIC? Is the difference between a retail bond offering and a GIC the cost of “liquidity” (ability to sell before maturity) and the markup by the brokerage?

GICs are completely easy for the brokerages to offer. They get a feed from the issuer showing the rates, they can offer all they like at those rates in any wierd quantity desired, they get a commission, click, bang, done. A little bit of profit, no market exposure at any time for the brokerage, and the so-called trader can be any eighteen year old teller with the requisite CSI course.

Best of all, when the issuer runs into difficulties and gets its name in the headlines, they don’t have to deal with thousands of desperate, angry, confused clients who don’t understand why the brokerage doesn’t want to buy back every single piece of paper they’ve ever sold at the original price.

There has also been some discussion on Financial WebRing:

On the other hand, we require all sorts of disclosures for mutual fund investors, presumably targeted at unsophisticated investors. If that holds for mutual funds, why not for bonds?

Because mutual funds are sold on the basis that you are hiring somebody – and paying them – to exercise their best efforts. Bonds are sold on the basis that you don’t want to pay exhorbitant management fees on something so simple as bonds, and are therefore buying them yourself as principal and saving all kinds of money, yay!

Definitely agree that bonds should be on more of a transparent exchange than presently. If more complicated forms of debt such as pref shares and debentures can be exchange-traded, why not plain and simple bonds?

Because there are thousands and thousands and thousands of bonds, all but a few of which trade by appointment only. I don’t want to pay listing fees for something that’s going to trade three times a year; you can if you like.

Update: I was quoted by Bloomberg:

“The net effect of these proposed rules will be to decrease the choice of retail offerings even further,” said James Hymas, a fixed-income and preferred-share specialist at Hymas Investment Management Inc. in Toronto. “There’s a lot of overhead for the brokers. They may simply choose to limit the number of offerings they make.”

Press Clippings

The Preferred Approach

I was quoted in the Globe and Mail by Rob Carrick, who wrote a piece about fixed-resets and preferreds in general with the title “The Preferred Approach“:

Preferred share specialist James Hymas agrees that rising rates would be negative for perpetual preferreds, while rate reset shares would have some protection. Still, he prefers perpetuals. One reason is that perpetuals yield roughly a full percentage point more than the new reset preferred shares.

An example is Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce series 30 preferred shares, which were issued in 2005 at the usual $25 price and have fallen to about $16, thereby pushing the yield up to 7.4 per cent (price and yield move in opposite directions).

“I would recommend straight perpetuals at this point because you are getting paid more than enough extra income to compensate for the added risk of a fixed rate,” said Mr Hymas, who is president of Hymas Investment Management.

Perpetual preferred offer not only a higher yield than the rate reset version, but also a chance for capital gains as financial market conditions “normalize,” in Mr. Hymas’s words.

He figures that perpetuals issued by banks could rise back to the $23 range under normal conditions, which suggests potential gains of 25 to almost 45 per cent, depending on the individual share issue.

Mr. Hymas said perpetuals also solve the problem of reinvestment risk, where you have money in a high-yield investment that matures and has to be rolled into something paying much less. If the bank rate reset shares being issued today are redeemed in five years, as many expect they will be, then investors will be unlikely to find such high yields again. Meantime, perpetuals bought today can be expected to roll along.

As for rising interest rates, Mr. Hymas said yields on corporate bonds and preferred shares – they have many similarities – typically fall as the economy emerges from recession, while government bond rates rise.

Meantime, there’s the risk that business conditions will deteriorate and force banks to not only break the taboo against common share dividend cuts, but also slash preferred share dividends.

Mr. Hymas plays down this threat. “Such an event is currently so remote that I don’t think the probability is measurable.”

Press Clippings

James Hymas Quoted in Financial Post

The February 5 Financial Post had an article titled Investors Prefer Preferreds, a short piece about the popularity of Fixed Resets. I was able to offer one reason why they are popular with investors:

“Fear levels have ratcheted up,” said James Hymas, president and portfolio manager at Hymas Investment Management. “They are flocking to this because the new structure is giving them some degree of comfort.”

… and one reason why the banks like them …

“One reason the banks like this new structure is because they have a call at par in five years,” Mr. Hymas said.

Well, I can tell you one thing – it’s getting to be a very strange market! There are issues trading at a discount for which the YTW scenario is a call at par as soon as possible – because the reset makes the perpetual yield higher. And other issues which have a “five year yield” (‘yield to next call’ would be a more precise way of expressing the scenario) so high that investors are either (a) trading them as perpetuals, or (b) stupid.

It makes it very difficult to fit the data into a unified theory!

Press Clippings

James Hymas to Appear on BNN Today

I will be appearing on the “Market Wrap” segment of the show today, October 14, at 3:45pm.

Update, 2008-10-17: The clip is on the BNN website, but neither I nor anybody else can find the bit with me! I have made inquiries; BNN will be getting back to me with an explanation.

Many of those who have contacted me about this have asked which issues I recommended. They were:

  • WFS.PR.A
  • CU.PR.A
  • … er … the other one. Sorry, folks! I’m not trying to be cute here, I honestly can’t remember. It was taken from the October PrefLetter

Note that the market has been rather volatile lately; there is no guarantee that what I recommended as of last Friday’s close and then recycled on short notice for the following trading day is the same thing as what I would recommend today. As previously announced, there will be an update to PrefLetter prepared as of the close today, October 17.

Press Clippings

Ellen Roseman of the Toronto Star on Preferred Shares

Ellen Roseman, who writes the “Money 911” column for the Toronto Star, devoted a piece to preferred shares today: Preferred Shares are Ideal for the Risk-Averse

It’s a good introduction – considering she only had 600-words! I was interviewed and mentioned in the article:

So, why invest in preferred shares? I asked James Hymas of Hymas Investment Management Inc. in Toronto, who runs a fund for high-net-worth investors, publishes a newsletter about preferred shares and has a website, www.prefblog.com.

“The common share investor is taking the first loss,” he says. “Common shares provide a higher expected long-term return, but it could be a bumpier flight.”

He points to U.S. banks, hit hard by the credit crunch. News reports indicate that up to half of them may be cutting their dividends this year.

Preferred shares have a somewhat more secure dividend than common shares. Moreover, they trade in a tight price range, generally with no big gains or losses.

Suppose you have $10,000 or more to invest in preferred shares. Hymas recommends buying at least three issues with a top-quality credit rating, such as Pfd-1 from Dominion Bond Rating Service.

“If you can afford five to six issues, you can get a Pfd-2. And with 10 different issues, I wouldn’t mind too much if one was Pfd-3.”

You don’t have much choice when it comes to sectors. A large proportion of preferred shares are from banks and insurance companies.

“With Canadian preferred shares, you have to resign yourself to a high exposure to financials,” he says. “You can make allowances for that in the rest of your portfolio.”

I discussed US Banks cutting their common dividends in FDIC Releases 1Q08 Report on US Banks.

The column quotes me as saying “If you can afford five to six issues, you can get a Pfd-2” … I shouldn’t have said “a”, I should have said “some”. I have published an article on Portfolio Construction which fleshes out my thoughts on this matter.

It was very kind of Ms. Roseman to mention my product offerings! The fund mentioned is Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund and the newsletter is PrefLetter.

Update: The column has attracted some comment on Financial Webring Forum, where in response to a question about the ‘irritant of issuer calls’ I posted the following:

There’s some data in my article A Call, too, Harms – but note that data for that article reflect a period when, after a long period of declining long term rates, most perpetuals were trading above par … something that is not currently the case.

Many investors – some of them professional – buy preferreds on the basis of current yield, ignoring potential calls. This is not a strategy I recommend to my friends. I’ve summarized data on potential calls at prefInfo.com.

In times where call-dates become important, they cannot be escaped by buying a passive fund, as I point out in my article Closed End Preferred Funds: Effects of Calls

Press Clippings

PrefBlog, inter alia, mentioned in Financial Post

Hugh Anderson has a column in today’s Financial Post, Clear Thinking for Smart Investing :

Above all, you need to understand clearly who has the upper hand in the never-ending tussle between issuer and buyer. The answer revolves around the ability of the issuer to terminate the investment at its option. Naturally, this almost always occurs at the best time for the issuer. That’s why James Hymas terms the yield to call the “yield to worst.”

Hymas owns Hymas Investment Management … one of the few easily available sources of comment and key data on the Canadian preferred market. He writes a monthly subscription newsletter, makes available detailed data on a selection of preferred issues at www.prefinfo.com and writes a blog (www.prefblog.com) about what’s going on in the preferred market.

Hymas’s writing is refreshingly candid, Buffett-style. He describes as “monumental bad timing” and “the greatest mistake of my professional life” his brief employment at Portus Alternative Asset Management three months before “the roof fell in.” Portus collapsed because of regulatory problems “over which he had no control”.

The website reported for Hymas Investment Management in the article is incorrect and I’ve removed it with ellipsis in the quotation. The correct website is www.himivest.com.

I should clarify that Yield-to-Worst is a technical, not a pejoritive, term. There is more than one yield to call … a perpetual has an infinite number of potential calls, although the difference between a call at $25 on November 27, 2185, and a call at $25 on November 28, 2185, might be considered negligible!

The Yield-to-Worst is the lowest yield that can result from the issuer exercising its privileges while honouring its responsibilities, and one of the choices is the possibility that the issue is not called at all. It is a much better predictor of performance than current yield, as further explained in my article A Call, too, Harms.

It’s nice to see my writing described as “refreshingly candid, Buffet-style” … but geez, there’s good old Portus being mentioned again. That, unfortunately, will be a millstone around my neck for the rest of my life – even though I have never even been accused of wrong-doing.