January 8, 2013

January 8th, 2013

Interesting take on chaotic theories of markets:

Dr Tobias Galla from The University of Manchester and Professor Doyne Farmer from Oxford University and the Santa Fe Institute, ran thousands of simulations of two-player games to see how human behaviour affects their decision-making.

In simple games with a small number of moves, such as Noughts and Crosses the optimal strategy is easy to guess, and the game quickly becomes uninteresting.

However, when games became more complex and when there are a lot of moves, such as in chess, the board game Go or complex card games, the academics argue that players’ actions become less rational and that it is hard to find optimal strategies.

This research could also have implications for the financial markets. Many economists base financial predictions of the stock market on equilibrium theory – assuming that traders are infinitely intelligent and rational.

This, the academics argue, is rarely the case and could lead to predictions of how markets react being wildly inaccurate.

I wouldn’t call the subjects of the following story “quants”. I’d call them technical analysts. A technical analyst with a computer is simply a technical analyst, and is still going to lose money:

Hedge funds that use computers to follow trends lost money for a second straight year in 2012 as political debates over the U.S. fiscal cliff and Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis roiled markets.

The Newedge CTA Trend Sub-Index, which tracks the performance of the largest computer-driven, or quant funds, fell 3.4 percent last year after a 7.9 percent decline in 2011. David Harding’s $10 billion Winton Futures Fund Ltd. slid 3.5 percent in 2012, its second annual decline since opening in 1997, investors in the pool said. Man Group Plc (EMG)’s $17 billion AHL Diversified fund fell 2.1 percent, while BlueCrest Capital Management’s $14 billion trend-following fund gained 0.02 percent, said the investors, who asked not to be identified because the figures are private.

The performance of the funds belies their popularity with investors, who’ve poured $108.2 billion into the pools since the end of 2008, according to Fairfield, Iowa-based BarclayHedge Ltd.

Trend-followers try to profit by tracking momentum in prices, whether rising or falling. They often use technical indicators, such as moving averages or Bollinger bands, to predict movements for stocks, bonds and commodities. Quants use mathematical algorithms to decide when to buy or sell and rely on computers to respond to price signals in fractions of seconds.

Not only that, but quants do not necessarily engage in High Frequency Trading, either.

OSFI’s Mark Zelmer gave a speech at the 2013 RBC Capital Markets Canadian Bank CEO Conference:

An important New Year’s resolution for OSFI will be to assess which banks in Canada should be designated as domestically systemically-important (D-SIBs). We expect to announce our decision within a few months. Any bank receiving a D-SIB designation can also expect some additional prudential requirements, including having to carry more common equity. The extra capital requirements will take effect in January 2016; the start date for those that will be imposed internationally on globally systemically-important banks. This provides plenty of time for the designated banks to plan accordingly.

Another important resolution for us this year is contingent capital. As of January 1, Canadian deposit-taking institutions are no longer able to include new issues of preferred shares and subordinated debt in their Tier 1 and Total Capital ratios unless those instruments carry Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC) conversion triggers. Existing instruments are being phased out of regulatory capital at a rate of ten per cent per year. Like living wills and other resolution measures, these new instruments are an important ingredient in making sure that all deposit-taking institutions can be resolved in an orderly fashion in times of stress without taxpayers being the first port of call for new capital. OSFI is looking forward to the emergence of a market in Canada for NVCC preferred shares and subordinated debt instruments in 2013.

It was another mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 7bp, FixedResets off 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 5bp. Volatility was negligible. Volume was a little below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1461 % 2,491.1
FixedFloater 4.28 % 3.64 % 28,356 17.96 1 0.2256 % 3,761.9
Floater 2.79 % 3.00 % 55,156 19.75 4 -0.1461 % 2,689.7
OpRet 4.63 % -5.81 % 51,457 0.40 4 -0.1810 % 2,596.3
SplitShare 4.60 % 4.61 % 46,263 4.34 2 0.4626 % 2,892.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1810 % 2,374.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % -0.06 % 76,907 0.75 30 0.0669 % 2,341.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.82 % 4.82 % 135,583 15.80 4 0.1111 % 2,663.5
FixedReset 4.92 % 2.95 % 203,544 4.07 78 -0.0109 % 2,472.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.88 % 0.86 % 108,753 0.35 46 -0.0504 % 2,432.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 84,715 National crossed 75,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 61,993 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.84
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 58,459 Scotia crossed 55,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 2.73 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium 46,460 National bought 16,300 from RBC at 25.79, then crossed 19,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 44,800 RBC crossed 36,900 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 41,495 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.50 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.2997

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.09 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.51 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.4900
Average : 1.3056

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-08
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.92 – 26.34
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2602

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 2.73 %

BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.11 – 27.40
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.11
Bid-YTW : 1.68 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.20 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1560

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.98 – 26.21
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.98
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

January 7, 2013

January 8th, 2013

We have more welfare payments to dinosaurs:

The federal government announced a five-year extension of its $250-million Automotive Innovation Fund Friday that was immediately deemed by some industry observers as the ongoing cost of Canada’s continued participating in the North American auto industry.

Why do we subsidize them? Because they’re good jobs. Why are they good jobs? Because they’re subsidized.

The Basel III liquidity rules have been modified:

Global central bank chiefs agreed to water down and delay a planned bank liquidity rule to counter warnings that the proposal would strangle lending and stifle the economic recovery.

Lenders will be allowed to use an expanded range of assets including some equities and securitized mortgage debt to meet the so-called liquidity coverage ratio, or LCR, following a deal struck by regulatory chiefs meeting today in Basel, Switzerland. Banks will also have an extra four years to fully comply with the measure.

A sample of 209 banks assessed by the Basel committee had a collective shortfall of 1.8 trillion euros ($2.3 trillion) at the end of 2011 in the assets needed to meet the 2010 version of the LCR, according to figures published by the Basel group.

Banks had warned that the initial LCR proposal would force them to buy additional sovereign debt, more closely tying their fate to governments’ solvency. The 2010 rule was drafted before the EU was fully confronted by a sovereign debt crisis that challenged traditional assumptions about the credit worthiness of government bonds.

Forcing banks to buy government debt is a form of financial repression.

Bloomberg’s editors are upset about this:

Not for the first time, the panel has retreated from its initial demands, and the final liquidity rule is far less rigorous than the committee had said it wanted and financial markets had been expecting.

The committee issued its draft liquidity rules in 2010. The idea was to lay down the quantity and quality of liquid assets (in theory, assets that can be sold quickly without driving down prices) that banks must hold to cover a run on deposits or some other interruption in short-term funding. Under pressure from banks, especially those in the U.S., most aspects of the draft proposal have been weakened in the final document.

For instance, the new rule says liquidity must be enough to cover a 30-day run on insured retail deposits of 3 percent, instead of 5 percent as proposed. It also expands the range of corporate debt securities that qualify as liquid to BBB- (the lower boundary of “investment grade”); previously, the committee said nothing less than AA- should be eligible. High-quality mortgage-backed securities will also count.

This broadening of qualifying assets means that almost all banks already satisfy the rule — a point that was acknowledged by Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, the chairman of the rule-setting committee.

As guttings go, this is pretty thorough. It confirms the committee’s reputation for delay, backsliding and willingness to accommodate the preferences of banks — the industry it’s supposed to be supervising. If the panel had been mindful of its credibility, it would have issued a draft it was willing to defend in the face of expected pressure from the industry.

William Cohan on Bloomberg has a nice piece on the realities of regulation:

Instead of taking a job at a big Wall Street investment bank, he [“Dock2” Treece] returned home to Toledo, Ohio, and joined, as a partner, his father’s tiny investment-advisory firm, Treece Investment Advisory Corp., and the family broker-dealer, Treece Financial Services Corp. The two companies have five employees: Dock2 Treece, his father, his younger brother and two administrators.

The Treeces’ 2010 Finra exam, however, went on for eight months, as the regulators kept asking for more and more documents to try to discover a minor technical point about what kind of mutual funds the firm sold to its customers.

Treece said Finra kept telling him to sell a kind of mutual fund that he knew he wasn’t supposed to sell, but the examiners seemed to not understand the rules. To fulfill one Finra request required 4,000 pages of documents to be copied and sent off.

“It had taken my staff two weeks to get together, literally, just standing in front of a copy machine for 12 hours a day, pull a file out, take the documents out that they wanted, copy them, put them in a box, put the originals back in the file, and put the file back,” Treece said. “I mean, talk about useless.”

He said he spent more than $30,000 in legal fees — chicken feed on Wall Street but a big deal at a tiny firm — trying to convince the examiners of something they should have known about all along.

Here’s an idea for Toronto – Subway Savings Bonds!

Malaysia, Southeast Asia’s biggest local-currency bond market, will let retail investors fund Kuala Lumpur’s new subway when it starts marketing its first exchange- traded notes to individuals.

DanaInfra will offer 300 million ringgit ($99 million) of government-guaranteed Islamic securities to individuals, Ashraf Radzi, associate director of Prokhas Sdn., a financial adviser to the company, said in Jan. 3 interview. He declined to give specific details such as yields or maturity.

The bonds, which pay returns on assets to comply with the Koran’s ban on interest, will be sold in increments of 100 ringgit, or the equivalent of $33, with a minimum order value of 1,000 ringgit, Bursa Malaysia’s Tajuddin said.

Rob Carrick of the Globe has weighed in on trailers:

What regulators should do is order the replacement of trailing commissions with a fee that is set by the adviser as a percentage of the client’s assets, to be withdrawn quarterly from cash holdings in the client’s account. The investment industry should introduce the phrase “advice fee” and create standards under which this fee would cover not only investment management, but financial planning.

He means, fees should be charged in the way an actual portfolio manager charges fees, forgetting that there’s one problem with this model: a huge segment of the investing public doesn’t want it. ‘There was no trading!’ says Joe Blow. ‘Why should I pay if there was no trading?’.

I also see that Mr. Carrick wants to force me to offer financial planning, despite the fact that I do not want to offer financial planning. It’s a ludicrous idea … any single person can be good at only so many things; I have chosen to be good at quantitative investment strategies, fixed income in general and preferred shares in particular. Now I’m going to be forced to offer financial planning? What’s next, I have to offer golf games and hockey tickets to big clients and hire a pretty receptionist?

Still another hurdle is you, the investor. You can be half to two-thirds excused for your fee ignorance because of the way you’ve been manipulated by the investing industry.

Totally wrong. There is full disclosure all over the place. Anybody who doesn’t know about fees hasn’t done any work at all. Is that another job Mr. Carrick wants to give me? Reading aloud the prospectus to prospective clients?

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 8bp, FixedResets down 3bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was average. Volume recovered, to average levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2796 % 2,494.7
FixedFloater 4.29 % 3.65 % 28,488 17.94 1 -0.6278 % 3,753.4
Floater 2.79 % 3.00 % 54,335 19.75 4 0.2796 % 2,693.6
OpRet 4.62 % -5.77 % 49,672 0.40 4 -0.0476 % 2,601.0
SplitShare 4.63 % 4.68 % 47,851 4.34 2 0.0000 % 2,879.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0476 % 2,378.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.24 % 0.14 % 73,092 0.76 30 0.0826 % 2,340.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.82 % 4.82 % 134,770 15.79 4 0.5382 % 2,660.6
FixedReset 4.92 % 2.91 % 203,750 4.01 78 -0.0252 % 2,472.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 0.44 % 108,687 0.35 46 -0.0218 % 2,433.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-07
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 67,500 National crossed 47,200 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-06
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -16.86 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 61,776 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 60,397 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 40,890 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 39,600 RBC crossed 38,300 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 36,980 RBC crossed 30.700 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.50 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.5000
Average : 1.1035

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-07
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.47 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2602

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : -3.96 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.39 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2870

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %

BMO.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 25.10 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1807

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

MFC.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 26.50 – 26.79
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1784

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %

MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.41
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1529

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %

ABK.PR.B To Be Refunded On Reorganization

January 7th, 2013

Scotia Managed Companies has announced:

Allbanc Split Corp. (the “Company”) announced today that the final condition required to extend the term of the Company for an additional five years to March 9, 2018 has been met as holders of 85.6% of Class A Capital Shares have elected to extend. Holders of Class A Capital Shares on December 13, 2012 approved the extension of the term of the Company subject to the condition that a minimum of 361,000 Class A Capital Shares remain outstanding after giving effect to the special retraction right (the “Special Retraction Right”).

Under the Special Retraction Right, 104,212 Class A Capital Shares were tendered to the Company for retraction on March 8, 2013. The holders of the remaining 617,252 Class A Capital Shares will continue to enjoy the benefits of a leveraged participation in the capital appreciation of the Company’s portfolio of publicly listed common shares of Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank while potentially deferring any capital gains tax liability which would otherwise be realized on the redemption of their Class A Capital Shares.

The Company’s Class B preferred shares will be redeemed by the Company on March 8, 2013 in accordance with the redemption provisions as detailed in the Company’s March 3, 2008 prospectus. Pursuant to these provisions, the Class B preferred shares will be redeemed at a price per share equal to the lesser of $26.75 and the Unit Value. In order to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company, the Company intends to create and issue a new series of Class C preferred shares, which are expected to be issued following this redemption. In addition, the Company may also undertake a concurrent public offering of additional Class A Capital Shares at the same time the Class C preferred shares are offered.

Capital Shares and Class B preferred shares of Allbanc Split Corp. are listed for trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols “ABK.A” and “ABK.PR.B”, respectively.

ABK.PR.B is a fairly small issue, with less than half a million shares outstanding with a par value of $26.75 each.

ABK.PR.B was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they proposed this transaction. ABK.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Updated, 2013-1-28: New issue provisionally rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS.

MAPF Performance, December 2012

January 6th, 2013

The fund outperformed in December, boosted by good performance by the MFC and SLF DeemedRetractibles. DeemedRetractibles as a group outperformed FixedResets, +96bp vs. +76bp respectively.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close December 31, 2012, was 10.8307 after a dividend distribution of 0.129831. There was no capital gains distribution.

2012 was a fine year for the fund, as it returned +12.76% (after expenses, before fees) against +5.50% for its benchmark … leaving me once again to ponder the question: ‘Why am I not running every dollar there is?’

Returns to December 31, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +1.05% +0.92% +0.95% +0.95%
Three Months +2.72% +1.58% +1.39% +1.19%
One Year +12.76% +5.50% +5.51% +4.90%
Two Years (annualized) +7.13% +6.64% +5.64% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +10.10% +7.79% +6.33% +5.58%
Four Years (annualized) +22.06% +12.83% +11.15% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +16.37% +6.25% +4.88% +4.22%
Six Years (annualized) +13.16% +4.07%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.24% +4.10%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.43% +4.07%    
Nine Years (annualized) +11.65% +4.28%    
Ten Years (annualized) +13.67% +4.58%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.47% +4.57%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.64%, +1.20% and +5.33%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +6.60%; five year is +5.20%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.57%, -0.35% and +1.02% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +3.47%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.72%, +0.1.29% & +4.75%, respectively. Three Year performance is +4.88%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.77%, +1.33% & +6.37%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are +0.66% for one month.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +0.89% for one-month. [calculation by JH]

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons, but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated insurance issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF) – despite the fact that the PWF issues are much more subject to unfavourable calls in the near term and should, logically, be deprecated on those grounds alone without any fancy-pants arguments about imposition of the NVCC rule!

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on December 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.4643 per unit in December should be looked at as a simple consequence of the fund’s holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: December, 2012

January 6th, 2013

Turnover increased in December, to 10%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to disappear for most practical purposes.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on December 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-12-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.6% (-0.2) 4.94% 5.24
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 22.0% (+0.1) 2.20% 1.67
Deemed-Retractible 59.4% (+0.4) 4.73% 7.35
Scraps (Various) 7.8% (-0.9) 6.07% 10.71
Cash 1.1% (+0.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.24% 6.08
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-12-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 52.9% (+1.9)
Pfd-2(high) 28.6% (+0.6)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 9.6% (-2.0)
Pfd-3(high) 1.4% (-0.2)
Pfd-3 2.6% (-0.5)
Pfd-3(low) 0.3% (+0.3)
Pfd-4(high) 0.4% (0)
Pfd-4 1.8% (-0.4)
Pfd-4(low) 1.3% (0)
Cash 1.1% (+0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-12-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 9.3% (-3.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 14.0% (+2.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 37.5% (-3.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 21.6% (+0.9)
>$300,000 16.6% (+2.4)
Cash 1.1% (+0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

January 4, 2013

January 5th, 2013

There was a decent, but by no means stellar, US jobs number:

Employers added workers in December at about the same pace as the prior month, and the unemployment rate matched a four-year low, showing sustained gains in the U.S. labor market even as lawmakers were struggling to reach a budget deal.

Payrolls rose by 155,000 workers last month following a revised 161,000 advance in November that was more than initially estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median estimate of 82 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for a increase of 152,000. The unemployment rate held at 7.8 percent after the November figure was revised up from a previously reported 7.7 percent.

The S&P 500 reached a milestone of sorts:U.S. stocks rose, sending the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index above the highest closing level since December 2007, after data showed employers added workers in December at about the same pace as the prior month.

Mark Whitehouse of Bloomberg writes an interesting review of an IMF paper by two IMF officials, chief economist Olivier Blanchard and economist Daniel Leigh, titled Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers:

This paper investigates the relation between growth forecast errors and planned fiscalconsolidation during the crisis. We find that, in advanced economies, stronger planned fiscal consolidation has been associated with lower growth than expected, with the relation being particularly strong, both statistically and economically, early in the crisis. A natural interpretation is that fiscal multipliers were substantially higher than implicitly assumed by forecasters. The weaker relation in more recent years may reflect in part learning by forecasters and in part smaller multipliers than in the early years of the crisis.

First, because of the binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, central banks could not cut interest rates to offset the negative short-term effects of a fiscal consolidation on economic activity. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) have shown, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, that under such conditions, fiscal multipliers can exceed 3. Since episodes characterized by a binding zero lower bound (also referred to as “liquidity trap” episodes) have been rare, only a few empirical studies investigate fiscal multipliers under such conditions. Based on data for 27 economies during the 1930s—a period during which interest rates were at or near the zero lower bound—Almunia and others (2010) have concluded that fiscal multipliers were about 1.6.

Second, lower output and lower income, together with a poorly functioning financial system, imply that consumption may have depended more on current than on future income, and that investment may have depended more on current than on future profits, with both effects leading to larger multipliers (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012).

Third, and consistent with some of the above mechanisms, a number of empirical studies have found that fiscal multipliers are likely to be larger when there is a great deal of slack in the economy. Based on U.S. data, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) have found that fiscal multipliers associated with government spending can fluctuate from being near zero in normal times to about 2.5 during recessions.5 If fiscal multipliers were larger than normal and growth projections implicitly assumed multipliers more consistent with normal times, then growth forecast errors should be systematically correlated with fiscal consolidation forecasts.

Perhaps Keynesian economics will make a comeback! I’ve often remarked that I don’t mind large deficits in hard times … as long as there is a credible plan, with accompanying legislation, for paying off the new debt within 20-30 years.

America is a country in which rights are paramount. Unless you’re a bank:

“This dispute does not go to the merits of the matter but it does raise an important issue of principle: Whether we and other banks, large and small alike, have the fundamental right long recognized in this country to communicate freely with and seek confidential guidance from their lawyers,” Zuccarelli said in an interview.

Bryan Hubbard, an OCC spokesman, declined to comment on the agency’s inquiry.

In the letter sent to JPMorgan general counsel Stephen Cutler, the inspector general — the Treasury’s internal watchdog — dismissed JPMorgan’s arguments on attorney-client privilege, saying the OCC “could not do its work” if banks were allowed to withhold information on that basis. The OCC, an independent bureau of Treasury, asked the IG office to review the situation, Thorson said in the letter.

Failure to produce the records “will have to be seen as a continuing purposeful impediment to the authority of the OCC,” Thorson said in the letter, and would require “further action by our office.”

Coming up next: hand over your Facebook password or be charged with obstructing justice.

DBRS has a new methodology for rating life insurers, but there were no major changes and it did not result in any ratings actions. They did not opine on the result of OSFI’s consideration of the definition of capital.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 11bp, FixedResets winning 13bp and DeemedRetractibles up 12bp. Volatility was average, but all on the upside. Volume continued to be very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0266 % 2,487.8
FixedFloater 4.26 % 3.62 % 29,442 18.00 1 0.8137 % 3,777.1
Floater 2.80 % 3.00 % 54,178 19.75 4 0.0266 % 2,686.1
OpRet 4.62 % -5.60 % 50,346 0.41 4 0.0381 % 2,602.2
SplitShare 4.63 % 4.67 % 48,412 4.35 2 0.2015 % 2,879.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0381 % 2,379.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.25 % -0.06 % 71,717 0.77 30 0.1098 % 2,338.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.88 % 132,763 15.70 4 0.1628 % 2,646.3
FixedReset 4.92 % 2.90 % 202,436 4.01 78 0.1302 % 2,472.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % -0.08 % 109,907 0.36 46 0.1202 % 2,434.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.73
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.49
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.64
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 37,591 TD crossed 19,100 at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 24,090 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 21,669 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 18,000 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 17,743 TD crossed 10,500 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 15,283 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
There were 13 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 22.59 – 24.10
Spot Rate : 1.5100
Average : 0.8370

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 22.32
Evaluated at bid price : 22.59
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.30 – 24.80
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.4222

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.08 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1056

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.08 – 26.27
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1266

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.67
Evaluated at bid price : 26.08
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.75 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.70 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1886

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-03
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -8.99 %

January 3, 2013

January 3rd, 2013

Suncor has a corporate policy of ineffective supervision:

Last June, Suncor told its workers it would introduce a sweeping random drug-and-alcohol testing policy for all employees in “safety-sensitive” roles, meaning they could be tested at any time.

Workers in safety-sensitive jobs aren’t supervised? What kind of company is this?

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets down 5bp and DeemedRetractibles up 14bp. Volatility was low. Volume picked up, and is now merely very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3341 % 2,487.1
FixedFloater 4.29 % 3.66 % 29,819 17.94 1 1.1431 % 3,746.6
Floater 2.80 % 3.01 % 54,857 19.74 4 0.3341 % 2,685.4
OpRet 4.62 % -3.44 % 51,130 0.41 4 0.1622 % 2,601.2
SplitShare 4.64 % 4.67 % 50,261 4.35 2 -0.2613 % 2,873.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1622 % 2,378.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.25 % 0.31 % 69,152 0.77 30 0.0594 % 2,335.5
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.85 % 133,209 15.76 4 0.0203 % 2,642.0
FixedReset 4.92 % 2.97 % 203,611 4.03 78 -0.0451 % 2,469.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 0.11 % 110,894 0.36 46 0.1354 % 2,431.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-03
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 101,384 Desjardins crossed 96,000 at 25.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 1.30 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 84,870 National bought 39,100 from CIBC, then crossed 40,000, both at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : -1.00 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 55,783 TD crossed 42,600 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.94
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 41,362 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 28,112 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from anonymous at 17.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-03
Maturity Price : 17.54
Evaluated at bid price : 17.54
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 23,687 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.48 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.5200
Average : 1.3691

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-03
Maturity Price : 17.48
Evaluated at bid price : 17.48
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.45 – 24.88
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2852

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.16 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2249

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.55 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1525

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-03
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.77 – 25.09
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2242

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.12 – 22.83
Spot Rate : 0.7100
Average : 0.6189

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-03
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

86,509 Spam Comments Deleted from PrefBlog

January 3rd, 2013

It took me five-years-odd to reach 100,100 spam comments marked for deletion … another 86,509 have been removed for this New Year’s Cleaning!

Isn’t the Internet wonderful?

January 2, 2013

January 3rd, 2013

Good news on pensions – but not for the sponsors:

The solvency of Canadian defined benefit pension plans improved in 2012, a new Mercer study says.

The consultant said Wednesday that its Pension Health Index stood at 82 per cent on Dec. 31, up two percentage points for the fourth quarter and up six percentage points for the year.

However, the global pension, health and investment consultancy said economic factors were largely a non-factor.

Most of the improvement was due to increased employer contributions to fund deficits.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 10bp, FixedResets up 23bp and DeemedRetractibles off 7bp – seemingly unaffected by excitement in the equity market. Volatility was higher than average, comprised of losing DeemedRetractibles and winning FixedResets. However, volume continued its recent stretch of extremely low number, so all this could just be a puff of smoke.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.88%, equivalent to 6.34% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.25%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 210bp, unchanged from the figure reported December 27.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0134 % 2,478.8
FixedFloater 4.34 % 3.71 % 30,015 17.85 1 0.0915 % 3,704.3
Floater 2.81 % 3.01 % 53,128 19.74 4 0.0134 % 2,676.5
OpRet 4.63 % 1.99 % 53,231 0.46 4 -0.0763 % 2,597.0
SplitShare 4.62 % 4.64 % 50,717 4.36 2 0.2014 % 2,881.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0763 % 2,374.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % 0.31 % 70,018 0.16 30 0.1002 % 2,334.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.88 % 130,914 15.70 4 0.0611 % 2,641.5
FixedReset 4.91 % 2.94 % 205,918 4.09 78 0.2344 % 2,470.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.88 % 0.81 % 109,506 0.36 46 -0.0731 % 2,427.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.53
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 28,650 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-02
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 21,325 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-02
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 16,834 National crossed 11,300 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 1.89 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 15,149 National crossed 12,100 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 14,287 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-02
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 13,548 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.53
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
There were 3 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.44 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.5600
Average : 1.2036

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-02
Maturity Price : 17.44
Evaluated at bid price : 17.44
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.32 – 26.84
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3643

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.87 – 22.54
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.5190

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-01-02
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.20 – 52.60
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.20
Bid-YTW : 1.41 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.91 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2610

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %

RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.02 – 26.34
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2159

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : -2.24 %

December 31, 2012

December 31st, 2012

Fiscal madness continues in the US, with proposals to embed milkfare:

Under President Harry S. Truman’s farm policy, the government bought supplies of a product until its price reached “parity” with the cost immediately before World War I. Adjusted for a century of inflation, the Agriculture Department’s milk-support price today would be $39.08 per hundred pounds, more than double the dairy futures price of $18.60 at 8:34 a.m. in New York today.

Under the revised dairy plan, written by [Minnesota Rep. Collin] Peterson [D], the government would manage the milk supply by setting milk- production limits for farmers who enroll in a market- stabilization program. The proposal eliminates programs that pay farmers when prices fall below a certain level, replacing them with initiatives designed to protect profit margins through insurance programs and by limiting output, which would raise prices.

The year ended on a positive note, with PerpetualPremiums and DeemedRetractibles both up 2bp and FixedResets winning 12bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was near non-existent.

And that’s a wrap for 2012! The fund’s done rather well over the year … I’ve earned an extra half spoonful of cinnamon in my coffee tonight!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1601 % 2,478.5
FixedFloater 4.35 % 3.71 % 30,473 17.85 1 0.2294 % 3,700.9
Floater 2.81 % 3.00 % 54,001 19.72 4 -0.1601 % 2,676.1
OpRet 4.62 % 1.63 % 53,688 0.46 4 0.1241 % 2,599.0
SplitShare 4.63 % 4.68 % 52,488 4.36 2 0.0000 % 2,875.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1241 % 2,376.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % 1.03 % 67,640 0.78 30 0.0194 % 2,331.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.89 % 129,708 15.69 4 -0.0305 % 2,639.9
FixedReset 4.92 % 2.89 % 212,650 4.25 77 0.1249 % 2,465.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.88 % 0.09 % 110,626 0.16 46 0.0193 % 2,429.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.23
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 24,165 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 18,397 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 15,467 RBC bought 13,300 from CIBC at 25.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 10,362 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 10,100 National crossed 10,000 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : -0.41 %
There were 0 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.47 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.5300
Average : 0.8128

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-12-31
Maturity Price : 17.47
Evaluated at bid price : 17.47
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.82 – 26.28
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2675

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 0.74 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.23 – 24.70
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.2905

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.23
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.56 – 52.42
Spot Rate : 0.8600
Average : 0.7270

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.56
Bid-YTW : 1.03 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.26 – 26.55
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1778

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 0.74 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 23.15 – 23.46
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2078

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %