Altamira Preferred Equity Fund Launches Quietly

December 4th, 2012

Many will remember that when Omega Preferred Equity Fund was closed to new investors, it was also announced that National Bank would be starting a new fund with in-house management.

It’s here, but it seems to be operating very quietly!

The portfolio management firm is Fiera Sceptre Inc., which has a “strategic alliance” with and is partly owned by National Bank, as announced in February. The portfolio manager is Catherine Payne:

Catherine Payne is a member of the Active Fixed Income team and is responsible for managing certain corporate bond, high yield bond, preferred share and convertible bond portfolios.

Ms. Payne has 19 years of industry experience and has been with the firm and a predecessor since 2003. Prior experiences include positions as Portfolio Manager, Senior Credit Analyst, and Assistant Vice President at major Canadian investment management, credit rating and brokerage firms.

Ms. Payne graduated from the University of Toronto with a Bachelor of Commerce (BComm). She later received the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation.

As is usually the case, there is lots of chatter about experience and not a line about performance.

There are four classes to the fund, three of them with an estimated MER of 1.50%, the F-Class with an estimate of 50bp. I am fascinated to see that NBC510, the Deferred Sales Charge option, pays the salesman a 5% commission on the sale with a trailer to follow. I’m in the wrong business!

According to the Globe and Mail Fund Quote the fund was 64% in cash on October 31, which I presume had more to do with start-up frictions than long-term asset allocation goals.

I’ll keep an eye on the fund and report its performance together with those of my other competitors.

December 3, 2012

December 3rd, 2012

Fitch Ratings (my favourite CRA) didn’t win an account recently – so they decided to win some political brownie points instead:

The recently closed CSMC Trust Mortgage Corp 2012-CIM3 (‘CIM3’) transaction has insufficient credit enhancement to achieve a ‘AAA’ rating, according to Fitch Ratings.
While asked to provide feedback, Fitch was ultimately not selected to rate the transaction, the ninth new issue prime RMBS transaction completed in 2012. Fitch believes it has a more conservative credit stance regarding this transaction. In fact, at 5.85%, the credit enhancement available to the ‘AAA’ rated A-2 class is more than 15% lower than any Fitch rated prime RMBS transaction issued since 2008. Fitch’s estimated credit enhancement (‘CE’) for the senior class A-1 and A-2 notes was 8%.

The collateral attributes of the CIM3 pool are consistent with those Fitch would consider representative of a high credit quality prime portfolio. That said, the 5.85% CE available to the A-2 class is not sufficient in Fitch’s view to fully address the risks associated with the pool, including concentrations in geographies whose property prices remain well above what Fitch believes are sustainable values.

A key component of Fitch’s analysis is to reduce home prices to their sustainable value prior to applying its market value decline (MVD) stresses. Six of the top ten MSA’s represented in the transaction were applied base MVD’s over 20% including Washington-Arlington-Alexandria that accounts for 17.3% of the pool.

They didn’t say who won the deal but Bloomberg did:

The AAA ratings assigned by Standard & Poor’s in a mortgage-bond deal by Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) are too high, Fitch Ratings said for the second time this year.

Rating companies have stepped up their public criticism of competitors’ grades on securitized debt after investors and lawmakers accused them of lowering standards to win business as issuers practiced so-called ratings shopping during the credit boom. A report by a Senate panel last year described the industry as engaging in “a race to the bottom,” before the bubble began to burst in 2007 and sparked a global financial crisis.

I am perplexed to learn that the SEC is studying decimalization:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that its staff will host a roundtable early next year to discuss the impact of decimal-based stock trading on small and mid-sized companies, market professionals, investors, and U.S. securities markets.

The roundtable will be held on Feb. 5 at the SEC’s Washington, D.C., headquarters, and will be open to the public and webcast live on the SEC’s website. Information on the agenda and participants will be issued shortly.

This has been given some focus by the SEC Report to Congress on Decimalization:

One of the IPO Task Force’s conclusions is that changes in the market structure of U.S. capital markets toward a low-cost, frictionless environment characterized by electronic trading has favored highly liquid, very large capitalization stocks at the expense of smaller capitalization stocks. According to the IPO Task Force Report, the impact of decimalization has been twofold. First, market structure changes associated with decimalization favor short-term trading strategies over long-term fundamental strategies. For smaller public company stocks with lower liquidity, the lack of fundamental strategies results in trading volume that is too low “to make money for the investment bank’s trading desk.” The IPO Task Force Report argues that this lack of profitability undermines the incentive for underwriters to take smaller companies public.

Second, the IPO Task Force Report states that “decimalization . . . put the economic sustainability of sell-side research departments under stress by reducing the spreads and trading commissions that formerly helped to fund research analyst coverage.” The IPO Task Force Report also argues that analyst coverage has significantly shifted away from smaller capitalization stocks towards highly liquid, larger capitalization stocks, reflecting the change in financial institution focus.9 In particular, the IPO Task Force Report suggests that analyst coverage of smaller public companies has become unprofitable both because of the Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2003, which prohibited the direct compensation of research analysts through investment banking revenue, and the advent of decimalization, which reduced spreads that formerly helped fund analyst coverage. Thus, the IPO Task Force Report concludes, less analyst coverage of smaller capitalization companies means that less information on these stocks is generated, which, in turn, reduces market interest in these stocks.

In many ways this echoes my criticism of the concept of exchange trading for bonds: transparency sounds wonderful, but it leads to a shallower and more brittle market than OTC. However, my perception is that the big problem for smaller companies is the immense cost of prospectus preparation and compliance with regulation for public companies; I think the SEC would be better advised to fix that first, prior to fiddling with market mechanics.

The Nobel Foundation is reaching for yield:

The Nobel Foundation, which this year lopped 20 percent off its cash prizes, is planning to invest more money through hedge funds to boost its returns and restore the award to its previous size.

“When we look at the analysis we see that we can get more return with less risks by doing that,” Executive Director Lars Heikensten said in an interview at the Nobel Foundation’s Stockholm headquarters yesterday. “If we can choose hedge funds that we trust, then we can get better returns for given risks.” The fund “probably shouldn’t” be fully invested in debt securities, he said.

Audit fees and expenses are going up:

Accounting firm Ernst & Young LLP has been accused by regulators of failing to properly scrutinize the books of failed forestry company Sino-Forest Corp., marking a rare case of auditors facing allegations of wrongdoing by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The case was announced Monday just as lawyers for Sino-Forest’s shareholders were also revealing they had reached a record $117-million settlement with E&Y late last week. The settlement is the largest class-action lawsuit payment by an audit firm in Canadian history.

Both developments are expected to have a broad impact on the work of auditors, especially those working for companies like Sino-Forest who trade on Canadian stock exchanges but have all their operations based in another country.

The Canadian preferred share market drifted very slightly upward today, with PerpetualPremiums and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp while FixedResets gained 4bp. There was a surprising amount of volatility, heavily skewed to the upside. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0799 % 2,472.7
FixedFloater 4.16 % 3.51 % 26,315 18.27 1 0.4399 % 3,866.9
Floater 2.79 % 3.00 % 57,798 19.66 4 0.0799 % 2,669.8
OpRet 4.59 % 0.27 % 37,728 0.56 4 0.3326 % 2,600.0
SplitShare 4.68 % 4.81 % 68,941 4.43 2 -0.3854 % 2,844.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3326 % 2,377.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.25 % 1.86 % 72,080 0.23 30 0.0233 % 2,319.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.89 % 125,425 15.59 4 0.0305 % 2,619.6
FixedReset 4.96 % 2.98 % 212,356 4.32 75 0.0446 % 2,447.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.63 % 118,517 0.88 46 0.0195 % 2,406.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-04-15
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.16
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 0.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 72,795 RBC sold 10,000 to Scotia at 26.63, then crossed blocks of 22,500 and 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 1.98 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 52,449 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-12-03
Maturity Price : 24.23
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 33,023 RBC crossed 24,800 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 32,890 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 30,850 RBC crossed 20,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : -29.40 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 29,405 RBC bought 16,300 from anonymous at 26.87.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 1.98 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 24.05 – 24.30
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1592

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.68 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1711

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %

BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.62 – 26.86
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1835

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 0.77 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.69 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.2118

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : -11.12 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.95 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1527

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : -35.89 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.45 – 25.65
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-02
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %

MAPF Performance: November 2012

December 2nd, 2012

The fund outperformed in November, due largely to stellar performance by the insurance-sector DeemedRetractibles with an assist from BNA.PR.C. DeemedRetractibles as a group outperformed FixedResets, +68bp vs. +5bp respectively.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close November 30, 2012, was 10.8469.

Returns to November 30, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +0.83% +0.27% +0.18% +0.09%
Three Months +2.70% +1.04% +0.86% +0.67%
One Year +12.55% +6.09% +5.94% +5.31%
Two Years (annualized) +6.39% +6.14% +5.14% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +10.29% +8.16% +6.71% +5.93%
Four Years (annualized) +26.63% +14.33% +12.86% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +17.16% +6.20% +4.94% +4.26%
Six Years (annualized) +13.14% +3.96%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.18% +4.02%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.44% +4.11%    
Nine Years (annualized) +11.82% +4.33%    
Ten Years (annualized) +13.57% +4.66%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.10% +4.47%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.09%, +1.10% and +5.84%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +6.91%; five year is +5.14%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.02%, +0.48% and +2.65% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +4.02%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.17%, +0.83% & +5.27%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.14%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.56%, +1.86% & +7.67%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are not yet available.
Figures for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF are not yet available.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons, but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated insurance issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF) – despite the fact that the PWF issues are much more subject to unfavourable calls in the near term and should, logically, be deprecated on those grounds alone without any fancy-pants arguments about imposition of the NVCC rule!

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
November, 2012 10.8469 4.40% 0.994 4.426% 1.0000 $0.4801
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on November 30; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.4801 per unit in October should be looked at as a simple consequence of the fund’s holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: November 2012

December 1st, 2012

Turnover increased slightly in November, to a still very low 6%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to disappear for most practical purposes.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on November 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-11-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.8% (-0.2) 4.91% 5.32
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 21.9% (+2.7) 2.46% 2.23
Deemed-Retractible 59.0% (-2.5) 4.87% 7.42
Scraps (Various) 8.7% (+0.1) 5.88% 10.79
Cash 0.6% (-0.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.40% 6.33
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from October month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-11-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 51.0% (-2.2)
Pfd-2(high) 28.0% (+0.5)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 11.6% (+1.6)
Pfd-3(high) 1.6% (+0.7)
Pfd-3 3.1% (+0.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0.4% (-0.2)
Pfd-4 2.2% (-0.4)
Pfd-4(low) 1.3% (-0.1)
Cash 0.6% (-0.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from October month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-11-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 12.6% (-1.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 11.1% (+0.3)
$100,000 – $200,000 40.6% (-5.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 20.7% (+1.1)
>$300,000 14.2% (+5.8)
Cash 0.6% (-0.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from October month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

November 30, 2012

November 30th, 2012

I have long been amused that monetary loosening intended to provoke investment in productivity enhancing endeavors has instead had the result of inflating housing bubbles; and now Citibank says there’s another problem:

Worldwide quantitative easing may be making investors richer rather than encouraging business investment, according to Citigroup Inc. (C)

Fulfilling the goals of central bankers such as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, ultra-low interest rates and bond purchases are encouraging investors to buy stocks. Policy makers’ intent was that asset prices and wealth would rise, encouraging consumers and businesses to spend more.

The sticking point is the particular equities investors are favoring, Robert Buckland, Citigroup’s London-based chief global equity strategist, said in a Nov. 21 report. His research suggests they tend to choose companies that issue dividends and buy back shares rather than those that invest in the economy.

It was a modest day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 4bp while FixedResets and DeemedRetractibles both gained 2bp. Volatility was low but entirely comprised of losers. Volume was high.

And that’s it for another month!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1600 % 2,470.7
FixedFloater 4.18 % 3.53 % 27,289 18.24 1 0.3532 % 3,849.9
Floater 2.80 % 3.00 % 58,323 19.66 4 0.1600 % 2,667.7
OpRet 4.61 % 2.67 % 49,529 0.54 4 -0.2937 % 2,591.4
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.85 % 66,461 4.44 3 0.0000 % 2,855.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2937 % 2,369.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.25 % 1.71 % 72,608 0.23 30 0.0362 % 2,319.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.89 % 125,232 15.58 4 0.2651 % 2,618.8
FixedReset 5.00 % 2.98 % 210,799 4.17 75 0.0176 % 2,446.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.39 % 116,928 0.48 46 0.0178 % 2,406.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.G FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium 186,070 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 185,604 National crossed blocks of 40,000 shares, 49,800 and 80,000, all at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 144,246 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 26.90; RBC crossed 100,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.05 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 128,253 RBC crossed 100,000 at 24.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.72
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 127,800 Scotia crossed 75,000 at 26.50, then bought blocks of 14,200 shares, 10,800 and 12,400 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : -2.16 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 106,760 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-30
Maturity Price : 24.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.58
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.51 – 26.01
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3118

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.40 – 25.78
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2113

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

MFC.PR.A OpRet Quote: 25.63 – 26.22
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4486

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 2.74 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.53 – 26.77
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1457

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %

POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.86 – 27.19
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2468

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %

SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.94 – 24.14
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1332

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.94
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %

PIC.PR.A To Be Valued Daily Until Rights Expiry

November 30th, 2012

Strathbridge Asset Management has announced (although not yet on their website):

Premium Income Corporation (the “Fund”)(TSX: PIC.A)(TSX:PIC.PR.A)(TSX:PIC.RT) is pleased to announce that beginning Monday December 3, 2012 through Tuesday December 11, 2012 the Fund will be calculating and publishing on its website, a daily Net Asset Value per share with respect to its Class A Shares and Preferred Shares. This is being done to assist shareholders in making a fully informed investment decision regarding the exercise of Rights recently issued and which expire on December 11, 2012.

Under the Rights offering two Rights entitle the holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price of $20.88 prior to the expiry date of December 11, 2012. Any Rights not exercised by December 11, 2012 will expire and be of no value. To exercise Rights holders should contact their advisors or dealers. Please note that some dealers may have an earlier deadline in order to process the exercise request.

After the expiry of the Rights on December 11, 2012 the Fund will revert to calculate its Net Asset Value on a weekly basis.

For further information, please contact Investor Relations at 416.681.3966, toll free at 1.800.725.7172 or visit www.strathbridge.com.

The rights issue was reported on PrefBlog.

PIC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

November 29, 2012

November 30th, 2012

Nothing happened today.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 7bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0534 % 2,466.8
FixedFloater 4.19 % 3.54 % 26,924 18.21 1 -0.2203 % 3,836.4
Floater 2.80 % 3.00 % 56,100 19.66 4 0.0534 % 2,663.4
OpRet 4.60 % 0.34 % 38,854 0.57 4 -0.1986 % 2,599.0
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.77 % 62,738 4.45 3 -0.1587 % 2,855.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1986 % 2,376.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % 1.80 % 72,833 0.17 30 0.0744 % 2,318.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.87 % 4.90 % 125,889 15.57 4 -0.1324 % 2,611.8
FixedReset 5.00 % 3.01 % 203,072 4.17 75 -0.0215 % 2,446.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.86 % 120,738 0.48 46 0.0591 % 2,406.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 437,597 RBC crossed blocks of 235,000 shares, 175,000 and 18,700, all at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 2.46 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 88,070 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-29
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 74,098 Scotia bought 10,000 from CIBC at 25.07; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-29
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 71,122 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.73
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 70,770 National crossed 54,200 at 26.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 1.57 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 46,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 27.02 – 28.02
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5619

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.02
Bid-YTW : -4.84 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.56 – 24.98
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2607

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.63 – 26.97
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2171

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.26 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2251

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.86 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2807

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.22 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2314

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %

November 28, 2012

November 28th, 2012

Evan Soltas writes an interesting piece on Bloomberg titled Misconceptions 101: Why College Costs [in the US] Aren’t Soaring:

What has happened is a shift toward price discrimination — offering multiple prices for the same product. Universities have offset the increase in sticker price for most families through an expansion of grant-based financial aid and scholarships. That has caused the BLS measure to rise without increasing the net cost.

Wealthier families now pay more than ever to send their children to college. But for much of the middle class, the real net cost of college has not changed significantly; for much of the poor, the expansion of aid has increased the accessibility and affordability of a college education.

Data from the College Board show effectively no change in real net tuition and fees for dependent students at four-year public or private universities whose families are in the lower-two income quartiles. There also have been some increases in the real cost of room and board, but for families with below-average income, the rise has been on the order of 20 percent over 20 years.

At four-year public universities, the average sticker price for tuition and fees has risen 127 percent in real terms, from $3,810 in 1992 to $8,660 in this academic year. But only $990 of this $4,850 increase in sticker price, or 20 percent, is due to increases in net cost. The remaining 80 percent is price discrimination.

At four-year private universities, the story is the same. From 1992 to 2012, their average sticker price rose $12,020, or 70 percent, after inflation. Only 28 percent of this increase, or $3,370, has come from net cost; 72 percent of the increase is in the sticker price only.

In other words, the universities are now part of the tax system. Is this supposed to be good? I’m all in favour of merit-based scholarships and grants – but that’s not what is being defended. I also note that the increase in real net cost is about 25% over the past twenty years; it is not clear how this increase is justified.

Co-operators General Insurance Company was confirmed by DBRS at Pfd-3(high):

The Company is the cornerstone of The Co-operators Group Limited, a co-operative financial services organization with complementary interests in life insurance and investment management. As part of a larger financial services group, the Company enjoys a strong franchise in the co-operative space, which ranks it among the top five providers of general insurance products in Canada. The Company is positioned to benefit from recent management initiatives to reduce costs, contain underwriting risk and cultivate deeper customer relationships. The Company is demonstrating the discipline to pull back from unprofitable business even at the cost of lost revenue. More customer segmentation and differential pricing create a more favourable platform for improved future profitability.

In line with the improvement in underwriting profitability, return on equity has recovered to low double digits, which is in line with the Company’s targets. Investment income remains pressured by lower interest rates, although realized gains in market values of securities have supported investment results in recent periods. Financial leverage remains modest, with the preferred shares representing just 17.4% of capitalization. The corresponding fixed-charge coverage ratio has averaged between seven and eight times, which is strong for the rating category. The Company’s consolidated regulatory minimum (MCT) capital ratio is 269%, which is well in excess of the Company’s minimum target of 180% ($437 million of excess capital). Strong regulatory capital ratios at its major operating subsidiaries permit the regular flow of dividends up to the Company which, in addition to its own operating earnings, are available to meet its preferred share obligations. Liquidity is generally not a concern in the general insurance industry as premiums are written and invested in relatively liquid assets.

There’s an interesting article on Bloomberg about accountability of anti-piracy troops.

It was a day of very little movement for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums and DeemedRetractibles both gaining 1bp and FixedResets up 2bp. Volatility was low. Volume was a little above average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.89%, equivalent to 6.36% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.2%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 215bp, a small (and perhaps spurious) increase from the 210bp reported November 21.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1738 % 2,465.4
FixedFloater 4.19 % 3.53 % 28,019 18.23 1 0.4425 % 3,844.9
Floater 2.80 % 3.02 % 55,731 19.62 4 0.1738 % 2,662.0
OpRet 4.59 % -0.60 % 36,383 0.58 4 0.1231 % 2,604.2
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.78 % 62,326 4.45 3 0.2120 % 2,859.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1231 % 2,381.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % 1.92 % 71,656 0.18 30 0.0052 % 2,316.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.89 % 127,022 15.58 4 -0.1221 % 2,615.3
FixedReset 5.00 % 3.01 % 205,909 4.17 75 0.0206 % 2,446.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % 3.00 % 117,598 0.72 46 0.0068 % 2,404.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.G FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 222,371 Nesbitt crossed three blocks: 50,000 shares, 40,000 and 125,000, all at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.38 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 179,109 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-28
Maturity Price : 24.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 81,635 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-28
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 75,601 Desjardins crossed 67,900 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : -25.18 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 75,055 Scotia crossed 60,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
NA.PR.Q FixedReset 58,230 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-11-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.84 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1718

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.84
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.44 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2145

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.21 – 24.49
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1978

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.34 – 26.63
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2286

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.34
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.43 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1098

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %

TD.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.45 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1425

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : 2.41 %

November 27, 2012

November 27th, 2012

There is some chatter about London’s decline as a financial centre:

Investment bankers and traders at European banks should expect at least a 15 percent cut in pay this year, while U.S. lenders may leave compensation unchanged, three consultants surveyed by Bloomberg said. That’s because bonus pools at European banks may be reduced by as much as half, while those at U.S. firms, which can cushion the impact of falling fees in the region with earnings from home, may fall 20 percent, they said.

“The real split is coming, and we will see the quantum divide this year,” said Tom Gosling, a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in London, referring to the difference in pay between the two financial centers. “U.S. regulators don’t have the same obsession with pay structures that European regulators have.”

While lower pay for all bankers reflects what may be a temporary drop in business, cuts at European lenders probably will be structural rather than cyclical, cementing a two-tier system, said John Purcell, chief executive officer of Purcell & Co., a London search firm. They also could spur some employees to relocate, according to recruitment company Astbury Marsden.

It’s not clear yet, but the latest Greek bail-out might work:

European finance ministers eased the terms on emergency aid for Greece, declaring after three years of false starts that Europe has found the formula for nursing the debt-stricken country back to health.

In the latest bid to keep the 17-nation euro intact, the ministers cut the rates on bailout loans, suspended interest payments for a decade, gave Greece more time to repay and engineered a Greek bond buyback. The country was also cleared to receive a 34.4 billion-euro ($44.7 billion) loan installment in December. Greek bonds rose.

“This has been a very difficult deal,” Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker told reporters in Brussels after chairing a 13-hour meeting that ended early today. “All initiatives decided upon today will bring Greece’s public debt clearly back on a sustainable path.”

After 240 billion euros in loan pledges and the biggest writedown of privately held debt failed to turn Greece around, the creditor governments led by Germany proclaimed the latest fix just as they grappled with swelling financing needs in Cyprus and a potential aid request by Spain, the fourth-largest euro economy.

To compensate for this little bit of progress, the Europeans have gone completely nuts on Credit Rating Agencies:

Credit ratings companies face curbs on when they can assess government debt and restrictions on their ownership under draft plans agreed on by European Union officials and legislators.

Lawmakers from the European Parliament and Cyprus, which holds the rotating presidency of the EU, also agreed today to allow investors to sue ratings companies if they lose money because of malpractice or gross negligence.

[ EU financial services chief Michel] Barnier proposed the tougher ratings rules after warnings from nations including France and Germany that downgrades of sovereign debt had deepened the bloc’s fiscal crisis. Barnier said last year that ratings companies were guilty of “serious mistakes” and shouldn’t be allowed to “increase market volatility” through ill-timed or unjustified downgrades.

On sovereign debt ratings, lawmakers and officials agreed that each credit rating firm must pick three days a year when they would be allowed to give so-called unsolicited assessments of governments’ creditworthiness, according to Jean-Paul Gauzes, a lawmaker involved in the talks. Ratings firms may get a chance to issue unsolicited ratings outside those dates if they could justify it to regulators.

The EU also plans to block any investor from owning stakes of more than 5 percent in more than one rating company, Gauzes said in an interview after the meeting.

The commission said that it will weigh further steps to regulate the credit ratings market, including the creation of a “European credit rating agency.” Officials will report on the possible step by 2016, it said.

All this sounds like a really good reason for CRAs to set up shop well outside the EU.

I wonder if they will declare the OECD to be illegal?

The OECD slashed its global growth forecasts on Tuesday, warning that the debt crisis in the recession-hit euro zone is the greatest threat to the world economy.

In light of the dire economic outlook, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development urged central banks to prepare for more exceptional monetary easing if politicians fail to come up with credible answers to the debt crisis.

Cutting its estimates, the OECD forecast that the euro zone economy would contract 0.4 per cent this year and another 0.1 per cent next year, only returning to growth in 2014 with a rate of 1.3 per cent.

Maybe that’s related to the bad press for long sovereigns:

Given the overheated market, it’s understandable why Michael Sabia, chief executive of the Caisse, told the Financial Times on Tuesday that he is planning to lower his institution’s $58.8-billion allocation to fixed-income investments by at least $7-billion next year. And why [Boston-based fund manager] GMO, a highly regarded money manager, told the FT it has “given up” on long-dated sovereign debt.

But if big institutions are starting to pull out of fixed income investments, ordinary Canadians are continuing to pile in. As of the end of October, retail investors had poured a net $16.3-billion into bond funds so far in 2012 – almost three times as much as in the same period in 2011 – while redeeming a net $11.5-billion from equity funds, according to the Investment Funds Institute of Canada.

The Caisse hasn’t always been the best proxy for smart money, but GMO has. Headed by the famed investor Jeremy Grantham, it shifted its portfolios to a high cash position in late 2007, just before the credit crisis mushroomed, and also managed to avoid being sucked in by the Internet bubble in the late 1990s.

Now, GMO is holding 40 per cent of its assets in cash, according to the FT. Canadians thinking it’s high time they added more bonds to their portfolios should think twice; there may be safer places to keep that money.

Why is it so expensive to go to school in the US?:

At universities nationwide, employment of administrators jumped 60 percent from 1993 to 2009, 10 times the growth rate for tenured faculty. “Administrative bloat is clearly contributing to the overall cost of higher education,” says Jay Greene, an education professor at the University of Arkansas. In a 2010 study, Greene found that from 1993 to 2007, spending on administration rose almost twice as fast as funding for research and teaching at 198 leading U.S. universities.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 5bp, FixedResets losing 18bp and DeemedRetractibles off 3bp. Volatility was average, but all negative. Volume was well above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0534 % 2,461.2
FixedFloater 4.20 % 3.55 % 29,155 18.20 1 -0.0442 % 3,827.9
Floater 2.81 % 3.03 % 54,771 19.60 4 -0.0534 % 2,657.4
OpRet 4.59 % -0.40 % 36,707 0.58 4 0.1043 % 2,601.0
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.77 % 61,069 4.45 3 -0.1191 % 2,853.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1043 % 2,378.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.26 % 2.29 % 72,619 0.18 30 -0.0504 % 2,316.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.90 % 126,520 15.61 4 -0.6369 % 2,618.5
FixedReset 5.00 % 2.99 % 205,080 4.18 75 -0.1813 % 2,446.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % 3.19 % 118,721 0.90 46 -0.0304 % 2,404.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 384,725 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-27
Maturity Price : 24.32
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 127,457 Scotia sold 17,800 to Nesbitt at 26.10, then crossed 88,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
NA.PR.Q FixedReset 102,115 RBC crossed 29,000 at 25.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-11-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 68,568 National crossed 50,000 at 24.94.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 64,252 Nesbitt bought 14,000 from TD at 25.25, then crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-27
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 61,241 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.55 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3901

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %

TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.56 – 26.88
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1955

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.56
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %

MFC.PR.A OpRet Quote: 25.56 – 25.88
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2041

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.64 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.42 – 26.66
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1614

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %

CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.75 – 25.96
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1320

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -23.69 %

BAM.PF.C Falls on Good Volume

November 27th, 2012

Brookfield Asset Management has announced:

the completion of its previously announced 4.85% perpetual Class A Preference Shares, Series 36 (“Preferred Shares”) issue in the amount of CDN$200,000,000. Brookfield issued 8,000,000 Preferred Shares at a price of CDN$25.00 per share, for total gross proceeds of CDN$200,000,000. The Preferred Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange this morning under the ticker symbol BAM.PF.C.

BAM.PF.C is a Straight Perpetual, 4.85%, announced November 20. The issue size of $200-million indicates that the greenshoe option was exercised in full.

The issue traded 384,725 shares today in a range of 24.64-95 before closing at 24.70-73, 7×40.

BAM.PF.C will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and initially assigned to the PerpetualDiscount index. Vital statistics are:

BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-11-27
Maturity Price : 24.32
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %