TDS.PR.C Upgraded to Pfd-2

October 19th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today upgraded the rating of the Class C Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the Class C Preferred Shares) issued by TD Split Inc. (the Company) to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low).

On November 21, 2011, DBRS confirmed the ratings on the Class C Preferred Shares at Pfd-2 (low) mainly based on the stable downside protection levels available to holders of the Class C Preferred Shares over the prior year. Since the rating confirmation, the net asset value (NAV) of the Company has been increasing fairly steadily, rising from $25.93 on December 1, 2011, to $29.41 as of October 11, 2012. Downside protection available to the holders of the Class C Preferred Shares increased to approximately 66.0% as of October 11, 2012, from 61.4% on December 1, 2011. In addition, TD raised its dividends on August 30, 2012, increasing quarterly distributions by five cents to 77 cents per share. This dividend boost increases the Class C Preferred Share distribution coverage ratio to 2.0 times. The Class C Preferred Shares are being upgraded mainly due to the increased downside protection available and the improved distribution coverage ratio.

The main constraints to the rating are the following:

(1) The downside protection provided to holders of the Class C Preferred Shares is dependent on the value of the shares in the Portfolio.

(2) Volatility of price and changes in the dividend policies of TD may result in significant reductions in downside protection or dividend coverage from time to time.

(3) The concentration of the entire Portfolio is in the common shares of TD.

TDS.PR.C is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a partial call for redemption last November.

October 18, 2012

October 19th, 2012

The latest news in Big Brother Regulation is LIBOR reform:

The Treasury said in London today that it will enshrine in law the way Libor is set, create a criminal offense for those who misreport it and give regulators the power to oversee the setting of the rate and other financial-industry benchmarks.

The FSA will encourage more banks to submit quotes as part of the revamp, Wheatley, an FSA managing director, said last month, and could force uncooperative banks to submit quotes with its new powers.

Sounds great, eh? Criminalize mistakes – and, presumably, make the survival of the bank dependent upon every single employee being completely pure at all times – and then, because only a lunatic would get involved in business on such terms, make it mandatory. Oh, it will take a lot of well paid regulators to enforce this one!

The government is egged on by eggheads:

First, by forcing banks to commit to their quotes—actually trade at them when given the opportunity—banks need only make an honest market determination. They only need their army of lawyers when, for some reason on a given day, they decide they want to make a trade outside of the range they’ve quoted. This is a parsimonious method for ensuring accurate and reliable quotes.

Clearly, the authors have never actually traded anything. Quotes for bonds, to take just one example, can change dramatically in the course of a single telephone call. If such a rule is put in place, spreads will be as wide as allowed by law.

DBRS confirmed BPO Properties (proud issuer of BPP.PR.G, BPP.PR.J and BPP.PR.M):

DBRS has today confirmed the Issuer Rating of Brookfield Canada Office Properties (BCOP) at BBB with a Stable trend and has also confirmed the Issuer Rating and Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares rating of BPO Properties Ltd. (BPO Properties) at BBB and Pfd-3, respectively, with Stable trends.

The confirmations follow the change in Brookfield Office Properties Inc.’s (BOP) trends to Negative from Stable. Although BCOP and BPO Properties benefit from their close association with BOP, particularly from property and asset management agreements, the ratings are not directly linked at this level. DBRS believes that the current ratings of BCOP and BPO Properties continue to reflect the solid operating performance of the Canadian office portfolio and steady financial credit metrics. That said, DBRS would become concerned if BOP’s credit risk profile continued to deteriorate beyond the ratings of BCOP and BPO Properties.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 5bp, FixedResets down 5bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was very low. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0378 % 2,460.2
FixedFloater 4.24 % 3.56 % 33,174 18.24 1 0.0892 % 3,799.1
Floater 2.98 % 3.01 % 66,592 19.71 3 -0.0378 % 2,656.4
OpRet 4.62 % 3.11 % 61,484 0.66 4 -0.0095 % 2,568.8
SplitShare 5.39 % 4.78 % 71,820 4.50 3 0.2364 % 2,847.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0095 % 2,348.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 1.95 % 85,620 0.35 27 0.0468 % 2,304.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.01 % 4.90 % 45,793 15.47 4 0.0410 % 2,581.9
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.00 % 184,863 3.83 73 -0.0519 % 2,440.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.58 % 129,196 1.16 47 -0.0033 % 2,380.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.96
Bid-YTW : -1.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 425,994 Added to TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-18
Maturity Price : 23.61
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 126,215 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 106,641 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.84
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 103,750 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet 85,600 National crossed 75,000 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.96
Bid-YTW : -1.76 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 76,500 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : -0.20 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet Quote: 25.72 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1707

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %

RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.90 – 26.13
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1494

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1613

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.77 – 26.94
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1034

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %

MFC.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1640

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.45 – 23.61
Spot Rate : 0.1600
Average : 0.1043

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %

LB.PR.F Reaches Premium On Excellent Volume

October 19th, 2012

LB.PR.F is a FixedReset, 4.00%+260, announced October 11. This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to Scraps on credit concerns.

The prospectus supplement (SEDAR, October 11, 2012) contains some interesting wrinkles on the Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC) theme:

Under the new Basel III rules, effective January 1, 2013, all non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments issued by a bank must have, either in their contractual terms and conditions or by way of statute in the issuer’s home country, a clause requiring a full and permanent conversion into common shares of such bank upon certain trigger events at the point where such bank is determined to be no longer viable. The Preferred Shares Series 11 as a result will not qualify as non-common Tier 1 capital under the new capital rules as no such conversion mechanism exists. As a result, the Bank may, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, redeem the Preferred Shares Series 11 in accordance with their terms. See “Risk Factors”.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has announced new international bank capital adequacy rules (commonly called Basel III) which will amend the existing Basel II capital management framework. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada (“OSFI”) has announced that it plans to adopt the new Basel III rules for purposes of Canadian bank capital guidelines. Under the new Basel III rules, effective January 1, 2013, all non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments issued by a bank must have, either in their contractual terms and conditions or by way of statute in the issuer’s home country, a clause requiring a full and permanent conversion into common shares of such bank upon certain trigger events at the point where such bank is determined to be no longer viable. The Preferred Shares Series 11 and, if and when issued, the Preferred Shares Series 12 as a result will not qualify as non-common Tier 1 capital under the new capital rules as no such conversion mechanism exists. For purposes of being included in the Bank’s regulatory capital under the new capital rules, the Preferred Shares Series 11 and the Preferred Shares Series 12 would be phased out beginning January 31, 2013 (their recognition will be capped at 90% of total Tier 1 capital from January 1, 2013, with the cap reducing by 10% in each subsequent year). As a result, the Bank may, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, redeem the Preferred Shares Series 11 and the Preferred Shares Series 12, if any, in accordance with their respective terms. If prevailing rates are lower at the time of redemption, a purchaser would not be able to reinvest the redemption proceeds in a comparable security at an effective yield as high as the yields on the Preferred Shares Series 11 or the Preferred Shares Series 12 being redeemed. The Bank’s redemption right may also adversely impact a purchaser’s ability to sell Preferred Shares Series 11 and Preferred Shares Series 12 as the optional redemption date or period approaches.

The 2011 Annual Report (complete with slogan “Our team – It’s (sic) Capital” on the front cover) states:

The BCBS published further details in January 2011 with regard to qualifying criteria for capital under the guidelines. OSFI subsequently provided additional guidance regarding the treatment of non-qualifying capital instruments in February 2011. As a result, certain capital instruments will no longer qualify fully as capital beginning January 1, 2013. The Bank’s
non-common capital instruments will be considered non-qualifying capital instruments under Basel III and will therefore be subject to a 10% phase-out per year beginning in 2013. These non-common capital instruments include both Series 9 and 10 preferred shares and Series 2010-1 subordinated Medium Term Notes. The Bank has not issued any hybrids or innovative Tier 1 instruments and none of its capital instruments are subject to a regulatory event redemption clause. Therefore, no regulatory event redemption is expected.

What are the Series 2010-1 sub MTNs? I’m glad you asked that:

On November 2, 2010, the Bank issued $250.0 million Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes (Subordinated Indebtedness), for net proceeds of $248.4 million. The contractual maturity of the Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes is November 2, 2020. Holders of the Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes are entitled to receive semi-annually fixed interest payments for the initial five-year period ending November 2, 2015 at a rate of 3.70% per annum. The interest rate on the Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes will reset on November 2, 2015 at the three-month bankers’ acceptance rate plus 1.76% per annum. The Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes will not be redeemable prior to November 2, 2015. Subject to the provisions of the Bank Act, to the prior consent of OSFI and to the provisions described in the pricing supplement dated October 25, 2010, at any time on or after November 2, 2015, the Bank may redeem all or any part of the then outstanding Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes, at the Bank’s option, by the payment of an amount in cash equal to the par value together with unpaid accrued interest. The $250.0 million Series 2010-1 Medium Term Notes are presented net of unamortized issue costs of $1.6 million on the consolidated balance sheet and include a net fair value adjustment of $5.9 million to reflect the change in the carrying value previously covered by a fair value hedge.

The Series 9 preferreds, LB.PR.D, pay 6% while Series 10, LB.PR.E, pay 5.25%. Both are Straight Perpetuals.

All this leaves me feeling a bit confused as to why this issue has been left without an NVCC clause. My first thought was that they had some capital instruments outstanding with such an absurdly low coupon that the company wanted to keep them outstanding for as long as possible; issuing these shares to be outstanding when the base for the sliding scale of Tier 1 eligibility is set could have helped such an effort. But this is not the case! Their non-common Tier 1 is actually a little bit expensive; if anything, I would have thought they’d issue NVCC shares to fund the redemption of LB.PR.D.

I just don’t get it. Any suggestions will be welcome. I stand ready to be corrected once the day comes, but I don’t think that a bank NVCC preferred will cost much more than a non-NVCC preferred; we Canadian know that not one of our banks will fail, because the government won’t let it happen.

Anyway, given the absence of an NVCC clause, I have put a DeemedMaturity entry into the call schedule, at 25.00 for 2022-1-31.

The issue traded 438,529 shares today in an unusually wide range of 25.18-65 before closing at 25.30-32, 5×28. Vital statistics are:

LB.PR.F FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %

SBC.PR.A To Get Bigger

October 18th, 2012

Brompton Split Banc Corp. has announced:

it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus with respect to a treasury offering of Preferred shares and Class A shares.

Brompton Split Banc Corp. invests in the common shares of the six largest Canadian banks with selective covered call writing in order to generate additional distributable income. Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of:
Bank of Montreal
Royal Bank of Canada
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
The Bank of Nova Scotia
National Bank of Canada
The Toronto-Dominion Bank

The closing price of the Preferred shares on the TSX on October 17, 2012 was $10.22. The investment objectives for the Preferred shares are to provide holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions in the amount of $0.45 per annum paid in equal quarterly amounts, and to return the original issue price to holders of Preferred shares on the current maturity date of November 29, 2017.

The closing price of the Class A shares on the TSX on October 17, 2012 was $11.34. The investment objectives for the Class A shares are to provide holders with regular monthly cash distributions targeted to be $0.10 and to provide the opportunity for growth in net asset value per Class A share.

The final Class A and Preferred share offering prices will be announced in the final prospectus, and will be set at levels that ensure that existing unitholders are not diluted.

The syndicate of agents for the offering is being co-led by RBC Capital Markets and CIBC and includes BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., Scotiabank, TD Securities Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Macquarie Private Wealth Inc., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., and Mackie Research Capital Corporation.

SBC.PR.A recently announced the details of their term extension.

SBC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

October 17, 2012

October 18th, 2012

Nothing happened today.

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 10bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles down 7bp. Volatility was muted. Volume more than made up in strength what it lacked in breadth – probably related to the TXPR index changes.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.93%, equivalent to 6.41% interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 200bp, a sharp narrowing from the 225bp reported October 10.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1705 % 2,461.2
FixedFloater 4.24 % 3.57 % 32,671 18.24 1 0.0446 % 3,795.7
Floater 2.98 % 3.00 % 67,526 19.74 3 0.1705 % 2,657.4
OpRet 4.62 % 2.80 % 62,253 0.66 4 -0.1998 % 2,569.0
SplitShare 5.40 % 4.84 % 71,603 4.50 3 0.3824 % 2,840.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1998 % 2,349.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 2.04 % 87,007 0.35 27 -0.1056 % 2,302.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.01 % 4.93 % 45,950 15.48 4 0.2158 % 2,580.8
FixedReset 4.97 % 2.97 % 187,040 3.83 73 -0.0265 % 2,442.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.49 % 124,057 1.01 47 -0.0715 % 2,380.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 459,866 Added to TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 454,663 Added to TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-17
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 335,412 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-17
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 316,447 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 0.04 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 252,552 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.11 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 236,716 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 214,224 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 204,934 Added to TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-17
Maturity Price : 23.64
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 179,517 Added to TXPR
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-17
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 169,700 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : -0.88 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 155,705 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 126,992 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 116,051 Deleted from TXPR.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : -0.20 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.60 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1918

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.72 – 18.00
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1892

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-17
Maturity Price : 17.72
Evaluated at bid price : 17.72
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 27.04 – 27.50
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3751

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.04
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.17 – 25.38
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1321

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.68 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : -0.05 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.73 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1984

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

CCS Outlook Positive: S&P

October 18th, 2012

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • •The combined operating performance of CFSL’s operating entities, CGIC and CLIC, has improved.
  • •We view the capital adequacy for the consolidated Co-operators group as
    very strong.

  • •We are affirming the financial strength and issuer credit ratings on CGIC and CLIC and the counterparty credit rating on CFSL.
  • •We revised the outlook on all these ratings to positive from stable.

… that it affirmed its ‘BBB+’ long-term financial strength and issuer credit ratings on the operating companies of the Co-operators Group, Co-operators General Insurance Co. (CGIC) and Co-operators Life Insurance Co. (CLIC). We also affirmed our ‘BBB-‘ long-term counterparty credit rating on their immediate holding company Co-operators Financial Services Ltd. (CFSL). We revised the outlooks on all ratings to positive from stable.

“The positive outlooks reflect our view that the continued and improved capital strength at the consolidated Co-operators group is very strong,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Jieqiu Fan. The significantly improved operating performance at CGIC in the past two years partially benefited from the Ontario Auto Reform that capped escalating accident benefit claims, and was offset somewhat by the weakening operating performance at CLIC. CGIC had underwriting losses in 2008-2010 driven by many claims from the Ontario auto sector. In 2011 CGIC generated underwriting profits, and continued to do so in the first six months of 2012.

The ratings are also based on the company’s strong competitive position as the fifth-largest property/casualty insurance company in Canada and its well-established multichannel distribution. Offsetting these strengths are its concentration in the highly regulated Ontario auto sector and expense ratios higher than peers’.

We expect CLIC’s operating performance to be marginal in 2012, but improve in 2013 to an after-tax return on equity of 4%-5%. We expect CFSL’s debt plus preferred-to-total capital ratio to remain less than 35% and its EBIT fixed-charge coverage to be near or more than 3.5x. In the next 12 months, if the company meets these expectations and we believe this performance level is sustainable, we could raise the ratings by one notch.
Alternatively, we could lower the ratings if the company significantly underperforms (five or more combined ratio points) the Canadian personal lines industry or experiences significant deterioration in its capital strength, reflecting a low ‘A’ level of consolidated capital adequacy.

Co-operators General Insurance Co. (referred to as CGIC in the press release) is the proud issuer of CCS.PR.C and CCS.PR.D. Both are tracked by HIMIPref™; both are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

S&P rates the preferreds at P-2(low). The company was upgraded to Pfd-3(high) by DBRS in July.

Research: It's All About Sequence

October 17th, 2012

I wrote an article about SplitShares for the Advisor’s Edge Report, which has been published on-line.

Look for the research link!

October 16, 2012

October 16th, 2012

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Democratic Commissioner Bart Chilton’s recent speech contained some ominous points:

Here’s the thing: our futures markets were never established to be gaming at gambling houses. Leave that to Amarillo Slim and Poison Ivey Phil (that’s still not his name, but I like it). Leave the gaming to the poker players and the gamblers—thank you very much. How smooth was that transition? See, I did have a point. But there’s more: A new car! No, not that. These markets were established to discover prices to benefit consumers and manage risk. We can’t overlook that. Once we forget that, we have lost our way.

As I never tire of pointing out, risk cannot be eliminated, only transformed or shifted. Any time you have a capital asset – perhaps your own house – that has benefits to be realized in the future, there is risk. You can transfer the risk of fire to the insurance company. You can transfer the risk of price declines to the bank, with a low deposit, non-recourse mortgage. But the risk is constant.

I agree that futures markets were established to manage risk (I’m not so sure about the “benefit consumers” part!). A commodities market will benefit ultimate buyers and ultimate sellers by allowing them to fix a price. But these terminal users won’t conveniently arrive at the market at the same time, or share the same views on what price is appropriate when they do … so these ultimate transactions are mediated by speculators, aka gamblers.

I confess I got sidetracked by this part of the speech:

At one point, it sort of brought to mind the Sabre Dance. Remember that one (written by Armenian composer Aram Khachaturian in 1942)? It’s that plate-spinning song where an act spins a large number of plates on teeny tiny poles (the world record in 108 plates). Can’t ya just hear it?

Huh? So I found Sabre Dance on YouTube. Ah! I know that song – how can you possibly not know that song? Wikipedia informs me that it is from the ballet Gayane, which I will have to make a point of seeing some day. But plate spinning? Aha! Mr. Chilton is showing his age!

Brenn was a master at the art of plate spinning, a classic circus act that relies on the gyroscopic effect. Brenn’s routine consisted of spinning five glass bowls on four foot-long sticks all the while spinning eight plates on the tables holding the spinning glass bowls. Seem like too much? Intermittently, he also managed to balance a tray carrying glasses and eggs and in one swoop would remove one of the trays causing an egg to fall into each glass.

Aiming to keep the audience at the edge of their seats, he would also carry a separate tray lined with glasses and spoons in front of them. With a simple flip, every spoon would magically fall into a glass.

His act was almost always performed to Khachaturian’s “Sabre Dance,” a piece of music that is now identified by many people with the skill of multi-tasking.

Sadly, I could not find a video of Brenn’s act with the Sabre Dance music. I wonder how much household crockery got broken after each of his appearances? Maybe his show was sponsored by a large crockery company.

Boy, this “Internet” thingy is a real time sink. Back to our regularly scheduled snarky comments on regulators’ speeches – Mr. Chilton wants the ability to approve or forbid market prices based on whether or not he can rationalize them:

Since 2008, I’ve been working to get these limits in place because, and this is supported with many studies, excessive speculation can push prices around. Nobody can rationalize nearly $150 a barrel oil in 2008 based solely upon supply and demand. It cannot be done. Well, Dodd-Frank required that we implement limits to curtail excessive speculation that can lead to unfair prices.

Sadly, he did not share the results of his interviews with buyers of oil at near $150/bbl in 2008, nor did he provide any hints of responses obtained when he asked people who were long but did not sell. However, this is mere idle curiosity. He’s a regulator, you know, part of the team of adult supervisors, and if he doesn’t know the rational price of a market instrument, who does?

He wants lots and lots of regulation:

There are some things, however, that we should do and promptly. Cheetahs—HFTs—were not even mentioned in Dodd-Frank. There was not one word about them. The new law was passed and signed just shortly after the Flash Crash in May of 2010. By then it was too late to put any techno-language in the law. Heck, we didn’t even yet know all of the ramifications of the Flash Crash.

Nevertheless, we need some market protections and a balanced approach to seeking safer markets while not going all in. Here’s my list:

1. Cheetah Registration: They need to be registered. That’s sort of a pedestrian first step. Can you believe they aren’t even mandated to be registered with us? If they are not registered, we can’t command their books and trading records. They gotta be registered.

2. Testing: They should be required to test their programs before they are unleashed in a live production trading environment. Most of the big cheetahs do this already.

3. Kill Switches: It should be compulsory to have kill switches in the event that cheetah programs go feral. I am pleased that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), some exchanges and my Agency are working on that.

4. Wash Blocker Technology: Cheetahs should also be required to create pre-trade risk controls with available wash blocker technology to prevent wash—or cross—trading (that’s trading with themselves). After all, those trades are illegal in the United States. But, as it stands now, things are moving so fast in this gizmo-gadget trading world that some cheetahs claim they don’t even know when wash trades occurs—if their dancing with their self. That’s not a fantastical answer when regulators start asking questions.

5. Compliance Reports: I’ve also recommended that there be periodic compliance reports from the cheetahs and that the senior executives sign their names and are held accountable for any false or misleading information. The days of “he said, she said” responsibility in financial markets needs to end.

6. Penalties: Finally, and this goes to accountability, also. If there is another flash crash where people are damaged (they lose money) due to a rogue cheetah, I think there need to be steep consequences. And when I say consequences, I’m talking not just for the firm, but for individuals at the firm. If the cheetahs want to be involved in the high-flying, incomprehensible gambling world, okay, but if you cause harm to markets and consumers, we shouldn’t stand for it.

The only “consumers” hurt during the Flash Crash were those idiots who implemented their own little algorithm – a stop loss order. Why is Chilton so bent on protecting the the users of idiotic trading algorithms?

The sternest measure Chilton et al. have taken recently is to protect public utilities from themselves since, naturally, mere public utilities can’t be expected to have a clue about what they’re doing. This protection is forseen to have the usual consequence:

Among the toughest rules that are scheduled to kick in next week is one that requires traders to begin counting their swaps transactions to see if they reach an $8 billion threshold, which tags them as a “swap dealer.” Such firms face the toughest rules, like capital requirements to back trades.

But firms that have only $25 million in total swaps trading with public utilities also get tagged. The aim of this lower threshold was to protect public utilities, by toughening up oversight of banks that deal with them.

But the lawmakers raised concerns voiced by utilities that the threshold will deter banks from trading with them at all, limiting their ability hedge risk and forcing them to pass higher costs on to consumers.

“These new rules will harm America’s economic engine by impairing many of the companies that provide vital financing to consumers and American businesses,” they wrote.

Sources familiar with the matter say the CFTC is reviewing this and other issues posed by the Oct. 12 deadline.

If you want to eliminate public markets, insist on making them safe. It’s a bit like demanding cool sunlight and dry rain. If there are egregiously punitive fines for naughtiness in the course of certain business … that business will not be done at all, for the bosses know that man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward.

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 15bp, FixedResets winning 22bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 12bp. Volatility was average, which is surprising given the size of the move. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0379 % 2,457.0
FixedFloater 4.24 % 3.57 % 33,923 18.23 1 1.7257 % 3,794.0
Floater 2.98 % 3.01 % 66,024 19.72 3 0.0379 % 2,652.9
OpRet 4.62 % -1.32 % 63,217 0.62 4 0.7671 % 2,574.2
SplitShare 5.42 % 4.99 % 72,240 4.51 3 0.3573 % 2,829.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7671 % 2,353.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % -1.06 % 87,544 0.25 27 0.1583 % 2,305.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 4.92 % 46,218 15.48 4 0.0514 % 2,575.3
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.00 % 183,088 3.84 73 0.2211 % 2,442.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.93 % 3.50 % 118,569 1.01 47 0.1206 % 2,382.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.89
Bid-YTW : -1.32 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-16
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 52,803 TD crossed 49,700 at 25.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 48,540 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 44,517 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 42,113 TD bought 11,100 from Nesbitt at 26.60, then crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 2.13 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 30,986 TD crossed 20,600 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 27,048 TD crossed 20,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : 1.98 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.00 – 27.89
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.4876

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 2.25 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 27.06 – 27.40
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2181

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 2.22 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.09 – 26.35
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1574

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : -1.06 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.48 – 26.67
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1261

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : 2.14 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 25.83 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2117

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.81 – 23.94
Spot Rate : 0.1300
Average : 0.0797

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %

October 15, 2012

October 16th, 2012

Statistics Canada has revised estimated productivity growth substantially downwards:

The latest revisions mean the Canada-U.S. gap is now wider – 0.8 percentage points per year from 1981 to 2012, up from 0.7 per cent.

Fortunately, this is not expected to affect milkfare, subsidies of pulp mills, Ontario’s solar energy programme or regulation.

In a startling development, common shareholders are still allowed to vote on corporate business:

In Telus’s case, the company is up against Mason Capital, which owns almost one-fifth of the company’s voting stock. Mason has also sold short millions of [non-voting] shares, leaving it a very slim net long interest. Mason is using the votes on the shares it owns to fight Telus’s plan to consolidate the two classes of stock into a single class on a one-for-one basis. Mason wants a ratio that favours the voting stock.

Telus argues that Mason has no real interest in the overall health of the company, making Mason an empty voter. Mason, of course, disagrees. It has on its side one of the people who coined the term, who points to the fact that Mason has an economic interest in the share collapse’s success or failure.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia ruled Friday that “there is no indication that it [Mason] is violating any laws, nor is there any statutory provision that would allow the court to intervene on broad equitable grounds. To the extent that cases of ‘empty voting’ are subverting the goals of shareholder democracy, the remedy must lie in legislative and regulatory change.”

I can’t understand why any common shareholder would vote in favour of this, diluting their vote with no compensation and I quite agree that Mason cannot logically be described as an empty voter in this instance.

To my mind, a much more serious problem is owners of common who also have a long position in the non-voting shares. In the bond world, this is known as debt decoupling, where as bondholder you vote for a bad deal so that your Credit Default Swaps will pay more.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 8bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles down 7bp. Volatility picked up, with Floaters jumping up and insurance-related issues getting hit …. but it was not the world’s biggest deal. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.8795 % 2,456.0
FixedFloater 4.31 % 3.64 % 35,092 18.10 1 0.0454 % 3,729.7
Floater 2.99 % 3.00 % 65,581 19.74 3 0.8795 % 2,651.9
OpRet 4.65 % 2.96 % 63,732 0.66 4 -0.3916 % 2,554.6
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.99 % 72,800 4.51 3 -0.1190 % 2,819.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3916 % 2,335.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 1.90 % 88,194 0.36 27 -0.0849 % 2,301.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 4.93 % 46,740 15.48 4 -0.1335 % 2,574.0
FixedReset 4.98 % 3.02 % 182,365 3.79 73 -0.0191 % 2,437.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.54 % 119,415 0.83 47 -0.0740 % 2,379.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 0.43 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-15
Maturity Price : 17.59
Evaluated at bid price : 17.59
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-15
Maturity Price : 17.59
Evaluated at bid price : 17.59
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.M FixedReset 148,840 Scotia crossed 51,000 at 26.70; RBC crossed blocks of 63,700 and 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 77,340 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-15
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 64,860 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 53,100 RBC crossed 51,200 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 2.45 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 43,977 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-15
Maturity Price : 17.58
Evaluated at bid price : 17.58
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 43,378 TD crossed two blocks of 20,000 each, both at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-14
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -6.75 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 26.47 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3319

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-14
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.47
Bid-YTW : -6.02 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.04 – 24.44
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2251

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.60 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2238

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 0.43 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.67 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2289

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.76 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1117

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 27.00 – 27.49
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.4269

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

Correction: Yield of SBC.PR.A

October 16th, 2012

The October edition of Prefletter contains an error on page 9 regarding the yield of SBC.PR.A

On October 12, at a bid price of 10.24, the yield of SBC.PR.A to its maturity 2017-11-29 is 3.99% (expressed with semi-annual compounding). This incorporates all the information in the Brompton press release describing the terms of the extension (reported on PrefBlog), including the new maturity date, the change of dividend to 0.45 p.a., and the non-standard dividend to be paid in January.

I regret the error. The two Assiduous Readers who brought this to my attention, SM & AC, have had their subscriptions extended by one issue.