MAPF Semi-Annual Financials Published

August 9th, 2012

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has published its:

All materials are accessable via the fund’s main web-page.

BCE.PR.A To Reset To 3.45%

August 9th, 2012

BCE Inc. has announced:

BCE Inc. will, on September 1, 2012, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AA outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on August 22, 2012, BCE Inc. determines that at least 2.5 million Series AA Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of September 1, 2012, the Series AA Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 3.45%.

BCE.PR.A is interconvertible with BCE.PR.B on September 1, and notice of conversion is required to be with BCE by August 22, 2012. Note that brokerages and other custodians will have deadlines slightly in advance of this – so if contemplating conversion, find out your deadline immediately! The Notice of Conversion was discussed on PrefBlog.

I recommend that holders of BCE.PR.A convert to BCE.PR.B. The total dividends paid over the next five years will greater for the latter issue if the average prime rate exceeds 3.45% (provided that this issue continues to pay 100% of prime, which it will do unless the current price of $21 increases to over $25). This condition will be met if prime increases steadily to 4% at the end of five years. This is a reasonably good bet, even with the Fed announcing continued financial repression through the end of 2014. Additionally, I judge the chance of an overshoot of this figure to be much greater than the chance of an extreme undershoot; in other words, I judge the chances of average prime being 5% to be much greater than the chance of average prime being 2%.

August 8, 2012

August 8th, 2012

Fisher says that central banks are pushing on a string:

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said adequate economic stimulus is in place and that global central banks may not have the capacity to undertake additional measures.

“We’re at the risk of overburdening the central banks,” Fisher said in an interview today on “Bloomberg Surveillance” with Tom Keene and Sara Eisen. “We keep applying what I call monetary Ritalin to the system. We all know there’s a risk of over-prescribing.”

Fisher said the largest banks have $1.5 trillion in excess reserves that they would like to put to work and that the private sector now must take the next steps to boost growth. Lawmakers also must act to eliminate uncertainty about government spending and tax rates, Fisher said.

“We have done our job,” Fisher said of the Fed. “We have done enough. Just doing more doesn’t solve the problem. The problem is engaging the transmission. We provided the gas, the gas tank is full.”

Today’s report will be late. Today’s nightmare is a router upgrade at the server farm that hosts HIMIPref™ (and all my websites) – I get an intermittent and randomly timed error caused by the host programme’s being “Unable to connect to the remote server” when performing one of the myriad Web Service accesses in the course of its run.

I am working to make the programme more robust by repeating attempts to contact the server when this error is reported and confidently expect to complete the process at about the same time as the server farm management fixes the routing problem.

Update:

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 2,308.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 3,453.5
Floater 3.15 % 3.19 % 67,059 19.22 3 0.3414 % 2,492.7
OpRet 4.75 % 2.31 % 32,420 0.87 5 0.0842 % 2,538.8
SplitShare 5.48 % 5.06 % 67,940 4.64 3 0.1868 % 2,763.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0842 % 2,321.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.96 % 108,453 1.14 28 0.0440 % 2,272.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.97 % 99,196 15.48 3 -0.0420 % 2,509.3
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.10 % 179,265 3.93 71 -0.0430 % 2,420.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.54 % 138,585 1.33 46 0.0213 % 2,352.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.I FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.77
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 101,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-07
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : -5.27 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 90,282 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-07
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : -21.57 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 51,821 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.41 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 51,245 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 47,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : -37.26 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 42,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.90 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.3948

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.44 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3721

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.44
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.42 – 26.82
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2849

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-08
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.51 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2518

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %

BMO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.49 – 26.70
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1262

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.49
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.12 – 24.49
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2982

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-08
Maturity Price : 23.83
Evaluated at bid price : 24.12
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %

New Issue: BIR FixedReset 8.00%+683

August 8th, 2012

On July 17, Birchcliff Energy announced:

it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters, which have agreed to purchase, on a bought deal basis, 1.6 million preferred units (“Preferred Units”) at a price of $25.00 per Preferred Unit, for total gross proceeds of $40 million (the “Offering”).

Each Preferred Unit will consist of one Cumulative 5-Year Rate-Reset Preferred Share, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”) and 3 common share purchase warrants issued by Birchcliff (the “Warrants”), with each Warrant providing the right to purchase one (1) common share in the capital of Birchcliff (“Common Shares”) at an exercise price of $8.30 per Common Share for a period of two years. The syndicate of underwriters is co-led by GMP Securities L.P., Cormark Securities Inc. and National Bank Financial Inc., and includes HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Raymond James Ltd., Macquarie Group Ltd. and Peters & Co. Limited.

The Series A Preferred Shares will pay cumulative dividends of $2.00 per share per annum, payable quarterly if, as and when declared by Birchcliff’s board of directors (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on September 30, 2012 (or the next business day)), for the initial five year period ending September 30, 2017. The dividend rate will be reset on September 30, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 6.83 per cent. The Series A Preferred Shares will be redeemable by the issuer on or after September 30, 2017, in accordance with their terms.

Holders of the Series A Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series B (the “Series B Preferred Shares”) subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series B Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 6.83 per cent, if, as and when declared by Birchcliff’s board of directors.

The Preferred Units will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces of Canada other than Quebec pursuant to a short form prospectus to be filed with Canadian securities regulatory authorities in such provinces. The Offering is scheduled to close on or about August 8, 2012, subject to certain conditions, including obtaining all necessary regulatory approvals.

The deal was quickly upsized:

Birchcliff Energy Ltd. (“Birchcliff” or the “Corporation”) (TSX: BIR) is pleased to announce that Birchcliff has increased the size of its previously announced bought deal preferred unit offering to $50 million, from $40 million. Birchcliff will issue a total of two (2) million preferred units (“Preferred Units”) at a price of $25.00 per Preferred Unit, for total gross proceeds of $50 million (the “Offering”).

The deal closed today:

Birchcliff Energy Ltd. (“Birchcliff” or the “Corporation”) (TSX: BIR) is pleased to announce that it has closed its previously announced bought deal preferred unit financing of two million preferred units of Birchcliff (“Preferred Units”) at a price of $25.00 per Preferred Unit, for gross proceeds of $50 million (the “Offering”). Each Preferred Unit is comprised of one cumulative redeemable 5-year rate reset preferred share, series A (a “Series A Preferred Share”) of Birchcliff, to yield initially 8.00% per annum; and three common share purchase warrants (each a “Warrant”) of Birchcliff. Each Warrant provides the right to purchase one common share (a “Common Share”) of the Corporation for a period of two years from the closing date of August 8, 2012, at a price of $8.30 per Common Share. Birchcliff now has two million Series A Preferred Shares, six million Warrants and 141,475,311 Common Shares outstanding.

The prospectus is available on SEDAR, dated July 30, 2012. I am not permitted to link to this public document due to soon-to-be-bank-owned CDS’ abusive exploitation of its cosy little contract with the regulators.

The prospectus states:

The Series A Preferred Shares, the Series B Preferred Shares, the Warrants and the Common Shares are not rated by any credit rating agency.

This means the issue will not be tracked by HIMIPref™. The presence of a credit rating serves as a public flashpoint, downgrades in which will often persuade an otherwise complacent Board and management to take decisive action to fix it. If Hymas Investment Management downgrades an issue – so what? If S&P downgrades an issue and it gets into the papers – that’s a little more serious.

BIR.PR.A had good volume but lousy results on its first day of trading, with 102,370 shares changing hands in a range of 22.25-23.25. The closing quote was 23.00-50, 14×1. The warrants did quite well, trading 349,150 in a range of 1.00-25, closing at 1.12-20, 8×1, so purchasers of the $25 units of one preferred and three warrants have done quite well so far!

August 7, 2012

August 7th, 2012

The Bloomberg editorial board wants more paperwork:

The Securities and Exchange Commission last month took a half-step by requiring markets to build a $4.1 billion system that can generate audit trails of all transactions. The trouble with this system is that trading data won’t be generated until the next day, a feature the industry insisted on. Day-old data might not help regulators much when they are called upon the instant a market blows up. (It took five months to confirm the cause of the flash crash.) Nor is it clear that the system will be able to pinpoint the identity of every party in a transaction.

The SEC and stock exchanges should also require major trading firms to demonstrate that their software programs are reliable before letting them go live. Now, firms are simply urged to adhere to an industry-recommended set of best practices. Unleashing a flawed program, as Knight seems to have done, is unacceptable.

Market apologists have said Knight’s errant trades caused no harm to anyone other than Knight and its shareholders, who saw the value of their investment shrink by about $600 million in a few hours. Yet who can be so certain the next bug-infested program won’t inflict much more damage? And what might have happened if Knight, which handled about 11 percent of all U.S. stock trading before the errors, had shut down?

Plus, the argument that Knight only hurt itself is bogus: Investors withdrew $127 billion from stock mutual funds in the 12 months ended in June. Repeated computer-trading misfires — not to mention the financial crisis of 2008 — erode confidence in U.S. markets. At some point, regulators and Wall Street have to decide whether the quest for speed is worth the chaos that can result.

$4.1-billion for a trade tracking system. You can put a Mars buggy on Mars for less than that. Has anybody, anywhere, ever seen a cost-benefit analysis for increased regulation? As far as I can tell, the attitude is – this might be worth something, so we should build it no matter what the cost.

As are most calls for increased regulation, Bloomberg’s argument depends upon dizzying leaps of logic and extremely vague fear-mongering:

  • Yet who can be so certain the next bug-infested program won’t inflict much more damage?: Just, what, exactly, are you afraid of?
  • And what might have happened if Knight, which handled about 11 percent of all U.S. stock trading before the errors, had shut down?: Golly, I don’t know. The end of the universe, maybe?
  • Investors withdrew $127 billion from stock mutual funds in the 12 months ended in June. Repeated computer-trading misfires — not to mention the financial crisis of 2008 — erode confidence in U.S. markets.: Just what, if any, connection is there between these two sentences? How is confidence in US markets eroded? What is the effect of this loss of confidence?

Assiduous Reader beluga alleges:

I placed a limit order for YLO.PR.C at 43 cents today at 10am. Got two partial fills with a 100 shares left at the end of the day. I then noticed YLO.PR.C closed at 40 cents and there were trades at 0.425 and 0.40 just before 3pm.

Called to find out what happened. My order was routed to Alpha and after the partial fills didn’t go back to TSX.

This is contrary to my understanding of the National Best-Bid-and-Offer rules. Does anybody have any other ideas?

Interesting staffing kerfuffle at AGF:

AGF Management Ltd. is suing a former star manager and a U.S. investment firm, alleging they engineered the departure of most of AGF’s emerging markets team and cost the Canadian firm millions in lost business.

Patricia Perez-Coutts, who oversaw the top-performing AGF Emerging Markets mutual fund and related institutional accounts, left AGF with four members of her team in May to run money for Dallas-based Westwood Holdings Inc.

Two lessons there:

  • That’s why you’ve got to give your star managers a piece of the action
  • That’s why fundcos don’t promote star managers any more

I liked the Michael Osborne’s op-ed on TMX / Maple:

The approval of the Maple deal bears all the hallmarks of the creation of a “Canadian champion.” Proponents argue that we should accept reduced competition at home, in order to create Canadian champions that have the resources to take on the world. The problem is that monopolies become bloated and inefficient, and unable to compete in world markets. Instead of a Canadian champion, we get an uncompetitive Canadian backwater ripe for foreign takeover.

Ripe for foreign takeover indeed, unless the feds decide it is in the national interest for one group of Canadians to stick it to another group of Canadians. As they have done.

It was a mildly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 5bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles down 2bp. Volatility was mild. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4843 % 2,300.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4843 % 3,441.7
Floater 3.16 % 3.20 % 65,234 19.21 3 0.4843 % 2,484.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.30 % 32,697 0.87 5 0.2456 % 2,536.7
SplitShare 5.49 % 5.00 % 67,493 4.64 3 -0.0533 % 2,757.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2456 % 2,319.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 4.04 % 104,784 1.15 28 -0.0549 % 2,271.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.97 % 99,656 15.49 3 -0.2232 % 2,510.3
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.09 % 181,174 3.79 71 -0.0288 % 2,421.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.54 % 139,111 1.19 46 -0.0170 % 2,351.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 16.85
Evaluated at bid price : 16.85
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 202,317 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 147,200 and 50,000, both at 26.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 62,996 TD crossed 29,800 and 26,900, both at 26.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.79
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 58,745 National crossed 50,000 at 25.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 56,230 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.97
Bid-YTW : -4.51 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 52,972 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 52,088 Scotia crossed 33,700 at 23.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 26.43 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 1.00 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.31 – 26.63
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2024

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.73 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1529

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.41 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2877

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -9.71 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.80 – 27.06
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1664

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.86 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1582

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

YLO Court Battle Looming?

August 6th, 2012

Tim Kiladze of the Globe and Mail reports:

But there have been rumblings of anger from some creditor groups about the way the spoils are being divided, and the company’s bankers and convertible debenture holders – who own bonds that can be converted into common shares – escalated frustrations last week by separately hiring lawyers and going public with their grievances.

On Monday, the banking group, which is made up of the Big Six banks and Caisse Centrale Desjardins, and which is owed $369-million by Yellow Media, will appear in Quebec court to voice its arguments.

Banks and convertible debenture holders both argue they were treated unfairly by Yellow Media because they were not consulted before the restructuring plans were made public. The banks accuse the company of using “a divide and conquer strategy” by negotiating only with a small group of bondholders, and they want the process to start over.

At the moment, it is unclear how receptive the court will be to both groups’ complaints because their legal rights are murky. The debt restructuring has already been deemed to be fair by financial advisers BMO Nesbitt Burns and Canaccord Genuity.

But that hasn’t stopped the groups from putting forth their arguments. In a motion filed in Quebec court, the banking group, represented by McMillan LLP, states that “creditors are the parties with the primary economic interest in an insolvent entity, and they are, and must be, involved in shaping the terms of a plan that will govern any compromise or arrangement of their debt.”

The convertible debenture holders are also upset at “having been excluded completely from the consultative process” said lawyer Avram Fishman at Fishman Flanz Meland Paquin LLP, and they can’t understand why “they were not asked whether they agreed with [the proposed arrangement] or what provisions could be changed to induce them to accept it.”

The proposed reorganization has been reported on PrefBlog. I suspect that I might recommend a negative vote by preferred shareholders – who may well be able to vote separately as a class – on the grounds that the plan assumes forced conversion by preferreds into old common, which is then converted on harsh terms into new common.

In other words, the plan appears (appears! Pending my review of final documentation!) to be a worst-case scenario alread for the preferred shareholders … and why should they vote “Yes” if they’re not being paid to vote “Yes”?

YLO has four series of preferred shares outstanding: YLO.PR.A & YLO.PR.B, which are subject to forcible conversion into old common, and YLO.PR.C & YLO.PR.D, which are not.

MAPF Performance: July 2012

August 4th, 2012

The fund strongly outperformed in June July, due largely to stellar performance by insurer-issued DeemedRetractibles and BNA.PR.C. Another major factor was the relative performance of FixedResets, which underperformed DeemedRetractibles by 58bp over the month – relative to the index, the fund is underweight in FixedResets.

All the above factors were also critical elements of last month’s underperformance – but each bounced back with room to spare.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 31, 2012, was 10.4713.

Returns to July, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +2.51% +0.75% +1.06% +0.91%
Three Months +1.60% +0.65% +1.26% +1.06%
One Year +2.84% +4.47% +4.26% +3.76%
Two Years (annualized) +9.13% +8.70% +7.32% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +11.19% +9.09% +7.53% +6.79%
Four Years (annualized) +21.13% +8.44% +7.11% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +14.87% +5.03% +3.84% +3.21%
Six Years (annualized) +13.27% +4.29%    
Seven Years (annualized) +11.98% +4.12%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.39% +4.24%    
Nine Years (annualized) +12.23% +4.43%    
Ten Years (annualized) +12.35% +4.62%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.25% +4.56%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.76%, +0.76% and +3.95%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +7.69%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.54%, +0.36% and +2.12% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +4.97%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.98%, +0.97% & +3.79%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.52%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.70%, +1.05% & +5.26%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons, but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise unavailable (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF).

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
July, 2012 10.4713 5.03%
Note
1.00 5.030% 1.0000 $0.5267
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. Commencing February, 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on July 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only three such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.5267 per unit in July should be looked at as a simple consequence of the funds holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

REI.PR.A, REI.PR.C: Distributions 62% Return of Capital in 2011

August 4th, 2012

This post is motivated by a query from Assiduous Reader adrian2, who writes in and says:

Is there any other Canadian security calling itself preferred and distributing ROC?

As it turns out, there is: REI.PR.A and REI.PR.C are reported by RioCan to have the following breakdown of their distribution in 2011:

  • Capital Gain: 1.72%
  • Foreign Non-Business Income 4.57%
  • Other Income 31.24%
  • Return of Capital 62.47%

Various implications of this kind of tax treatment were discussed by Tom Kiladze in the Globe:

In RioCan’s case, distributions will be taxed as income, not as dividends. That matters, because income is taxed at a higher rate. But the preferred units will be treated just like RioCan’s regular trust units, so a portion of the distributions will be treated as a return of capital. REITs often distribute more than their net incomes because depreciation skews their bottom lines (property values usually go up, not down), and the amount overpaid allows investors to get a better tax treatment.

BMO analyst Karine MacIndoe ran the numbers and found that RioCan has a historical five-year tax-deferral average of about 50 per cent. Applying that figure over a five-year horizon in the future, the pref units’ 5.25 per cent yield equates to a 4.82 per cent dividend yield on an after-tax return basis.

What the numbers will look like in the future is left as an exercise for the student.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 2012

August 4th, 2012

Turnover declined in July, to a very low 2%. There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relative homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to disappear for most practical purposes.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on July 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-7-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.9% (+0.1) 5.66% 5.50
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 18.6% (+0.3) 2.59% 1.81
Deemed-Retractible 62.6% (+1.1) 5.46% 7.46
Scraps (Various) 8.9% (-0.3) 6.24% (see note) 11.02 (see note)
Cash 0.00 (-1.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.03% 6.49
Yields for the YLO preferreds have been set at 0% for calculation purposes, and their durations at 0.00, due to the the company’s decision to suspend preferred dividends and proposed reorganization.
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-7-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 51.9% (+0.6)
Pfd-2(high) 28.9% (+0.8)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.3% (+0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 1.1% (-0.4)
Pfd-3 2.3% (+0.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0.6% (0)
Pfd-4 3.2% (0)
Pfd-4(low) 1.4% (-0.1)
Pfd-5(low) 0.3% (+0.1)
Cash 0 (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-7-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 15.5% (+4.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 1.1% (-16.3)
$100,000 – $200,000 55.9% (+18.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 18.9% (-4.9)
>$300,000 8.6% (0)
Cash 0 (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

August 3, 2012

August 3rd, 2012

Good news! The CEO of RBS says LIBOR rigging isn’t his fault:

Royal Bank of Scotland confirmed for the first time on Friday it had dismissed staff over an interest rate rigging scandal but the bank gave no indication whether it might settle soon with investigators.

Reporting a drop in first-half operating profit, RBS said it was co-operating with governments and regulators which are investigating the role of a number of banks in the setting of Libor and other inter-bank lending rates.

“I think that the regulators must decide how they want to deal with the situation. We will stand up and take any punishment that comes our way,” Chief Executive Stephen Hester said. He said he believed the Libor issue had been a result of “wrongdoing by individuals” rather than a “systemic problem” within the industry.

“The Libor situation is a stark reminder of the damage that individual wrongdoing and inadequate systems and controls can have in terms of financial and reputational impact.”

The inadequate systems and controls aren’t his fault, either. Me, I blame society.

There’s an interesting piece in the Globe about corporate cash in Canada:

“Corporate businesses are flush with cash, which they still seem hesitant to deploy, presumably due to the uncertain economic outlook,” said David Madani, Canadian economist for the London-based research firm [Capital Economics]. “This obviously leaves scope for firms to increase dividends, which could boost personal income and consumption significantly.”

In a recent research note, Mr. Madani said Canada’s non-financial-sector corporate cash balances stood at $526-billion at the beginning of 2012 – up 42 per cent since the recession ended in mid-2009. Since the Canadian economy is roughly one-tenth the size of our U.S. neighbour, this Canadian cash pile, in relative terms, dwarfs the roughly $1.3-trillion (U.S.) in cash held by U.S. corporations.

The US had a better than expected jobs number, albeit not “good”:

The payrolls increase of 163,000 followed a revised 64,000 gain in June, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median estimate of 89 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for a gain of 100,000. The jobless rate, based on a separate survey of households, climbed to a five-month high of 8.3 percent

I don’t understand all this anger management stuff:

A survey published in American Journal of Nursing in 2002, reported that 90 percent of hospital workers, including doctors and nurses, reported “yelling,” “abusive language” as well as “condescension” and “berating colleagues.” A quarter of the 1,200 people surveyed said they witnessed such behavior weekly.

“There isn’t a doctor alive who hasn’t seen it,” says William Norcross, executive director of a program at the University of California at San Diego that uses anger management to treat irascible physicians.

Medical professionals present [anger management guru George] Anderson with unique challenges. Their hours are brutal, the stakes are high, and the threat of malpractice suits is ever-present. The life-or-death nature of the work wears at steely nerves even on the best days, Anderson says.

If things have got to the point where you have to yell at your staff, the sensible thing to do is fire them instead. If you don’t have the authority to fire them … well, then you don’t have the authority to yell at them either, do you?

This sort of prima-donna behaviour was one of the things that took down RT Capital Management back in about 2000 – big-shot portfolio managers yelling at the back-office. Why is there “a program at the University of California at San Diego that uses anger management to treat irascible physicians”?

I’ve got a better idea: you yell at my staff, you’re fired. No matter how good you are at your tiny little specialty, you’re no good at all without good support staff … right down to the janitor who keeps the washroom clean, and if the support staff hates their jobs, they’re not going to do them very well. Sorry, buddy, but your hospital privileges are withdrawn. These guys indulge in their temper tantrums for the same reason bratty five-year-olds do: because there are no repercussions.

So, I finally got everything working again, with the proviso that I’m back to where I started and the conversion of the HIMIPref™ Web Services from Visual C++ 2002 to Visual C++ 2010 has been delayed. What a total nightmare. Everything worked just fine under VC 2002 … but VC 2002 won’t run under Windows 7.

Like everybody else, I have a love-hate relationship with Microsoft … some of their design decisions drive me nuts, but whenever I compare one of their products to its competitor, they almost always come out on top. Spreadsheets … C++ compilers … operating systems … the only exception I can remember is Rapid Application Development software, in which I consider Visual Basic to be pretty horrible – and that’s almost certainly because they insist that it be usuable throughout their entire suite of software.

So their tools are first class, but they’ve got a problem: there is, as far as I can tell, an institutional culture that supposes that because they do development in teams numbering in the hundreds – and because they guys they talk to also have huge development teams – that’s the way it works everywhere. It doesn’t. Lots of programming gets done in small shops (like mine!). I don’t need ultra-finicky version control! I can do all my version control on the back of an envelope! I don’t have a full time staff member in charge of compiling, who has daily meetings with the guy who does version control! But they think I do, so there are all kinds of finicky adjustments to be made to compiler settings and version control that all have to agree with each other or the damn thing blows up. And there’s no “Turn Off Version Control” setting on the damn compiler.

Such is life.

It was a slightly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 4bp, and both FixedResets and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was ridiculously low – there’s usually more volume on Christmas Eve!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1410 % 2,289.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1410 % 3,425.1
Floater 3.18 % 3.20 % 63,371 19.20 3 -0.1410 % 2,472.2
OpRet 4.77 % 2.41 % 32,762 0.88 5 -0.2145 % 2,530.5
SplitShare 5.48 % 4.98 % 67,331 4.65 3 -0.2793 % 2,759.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2145 % 2,313.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.93 % 104,247 1.16 28 -0.0417 % 2,272.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.95 % 103,011 15.54 3 0.0558 % 2,515.9
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.07 % 180,934 3.95 71 -0.0223 % 2,422.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.36 % 141,628 1.20 46 -0.0238 % 2,352.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 75,605 Scotia crossed 27,300 at 25.05; RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 51,345 National Bank crossed 46,500 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 37,153 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 34,000 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 25,337 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 21,484 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
There were 8 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.76 – 27.07
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1955

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %

NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.56 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1924

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-02
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.01 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2239

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 16.65 – 16.89
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1697

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-03
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1842

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.41 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1342

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %