BAF placed on Review-Negative by DBRS

August 3rd, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

placed the ratings of Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership (Bell Aliant or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS is reassessing the risks associated with the Company’s transformational strategy (including the magnitude and pace of capital requirements) while returns from this investment remain difficult to forecast and pressure on operating income/cash flow from traditional business lines persists.

Bell Aliant is currently in the process of transforming its business by supplanting its traditional voice with broadband and IPTV services. Although DBRS recognizes the merits of such a strategy, it acknowledges that the transition will not be without risk. The Company expects to have invested approximately $500 million in Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) by the end of 2012. As of June 30, 2012, Bell Aliant has achieved 582,000 homes passed and penetration of approximately 75,000 FibreOP Internet customers and 65,000 FibreOP TV subscribers. In the meantime, revenues from local and long distance continue to decline at a steady pace (down 5.0% and 10.8% year-over-year, respectively, for H1/2012). As a result, Bell Aliant’s total EBITDA declined by 1.1% to $655 million for the first half of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, a moderation of a negative trend that began in 2010. The decline was softened due to incremental revenues and operating income from the Company’s FibreOp services.

Bell Aliant maintains significant capital investment requirements in the near-to-medium term in order to achieve its stated objective of reaching one million homes passed. DBRS believes there are strategic merits to accelerating the Company’s capex program in order to advance their position in an increasingly competitive environment. That said, an acceleration of investment would increase external funding requirements as DBRS expects the Company to generate negative free cash flow after dividends over the period of accelerated capital investment.

In its review, DBRS will focus on Bell Aliant’s prospects for penetration growth in the new business lines, size/pace of capital program and overall financing requirements in light of Management’s commitment to its dividend. DBRS will also reassess the competitive environment, including pricing strategies and the threat of product innovation. DBRS will aim to complete its assessment and resolve the Under Review status within the next month.

In terms of short-term debt, Bell Aliant’s Commercial Paper rating of R-1(low) reflected the Company’s superior liquidity strength as entities with a long-term rating of BBB (high) are typically coupled with a short-term rating of R-2 (high). As part of our assessment of the future capital program and financing requirements, DBRS will also review the appropriateness of having a Commercial Paper rating on Bell Aliant that exceeds the standard mapping.

The text of press release doesn’t mention their preferred share issuing arm, Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc., specifically, but its preferred shares are specifically placed under Review-Negative in the appended table.

Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. has two issues outstanding: BAF.PR.A and BAF.PR.C. Both are FixedResets, both are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Issue: AX.PR.A FixedReset 5.25%+406

August 3rd, 2012

Artis REIT announced on July 24:

a marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of approximately $50 million Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A (the “Series A Units”) at a price of $25 per Series A Unit. The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase additional Series A Units, up to an amount equal to 15% of the number of Series A Units sold pursuant to the Financing. The Financing will be priced in the context of the market with the final terms of the Financing to be determined at the time of pricing.

The Series A Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five-year period ending September 30, 2017. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on September 30, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on September 30, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing. The Series A Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.
Holders of Series A Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series A Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series B (the “Series B Units”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series B Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

Artis continues to enjoy a strong deal flow pipeline, with a continued focus on the accretive acquisition of quality commercial properties, in select markets in Canada and the U.S.

The issue was priced the following day:

announced today that is has priced its previously announced marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A (the “Series A Units”). Artis will issue 3 million Series A Units at a price of $25 per Series A Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of $75,000,000.

The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase up to an additional 450,000 Series A Units.

The Series A Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions of $1.3125 per unit per annum, yielding 5.25% per annum, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five-year period ending September 30, 2017. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on September 30, 2012 and shall be $0.2122 per unit, based on the anticipated closing of the offering of Series A Units of August 2, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on September 30, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and 4.06%. The Series A Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series A Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series A Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series B (the “Series B Units”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series B Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus a spread of 4.06%.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators. The Financing is expected to close on or about August 2, 2012 and is subject to regulatory approval.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to fund future acquisitions, repay indebtedness, and for general trust purposes.

Artis continues to enjoy a strong deal flow pipeline, with a continued focus on the accretive acquisition of quality commercial properties, in select markets in Canada and the U.S.

And they announced on August 2:

it has closed its previously announced marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series A, (“the Series A Units”), through a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Pursuant to the Financing, Artis issued 3.0 million Series A Units at a price of $25 per Series A Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of $75,000,000.

Artis has granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase up to an additional 450,000 Series A Units.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

According to the prospectus supplement (available at SEDAR dated July 25, 2012; I am not permitted to link to it directly due to the cosy little contract the soon-to-be-bank-owned CDS has signed with regulators), “The Series A Units and the Series B Units are not rated by any rating agency.” Accordingly, the issue will not be tracked by HIMIPref™. As I have stated so often that people are getting sick of the repetition, this policy is not because I don’t think I can analyze the credit quality myself, and not because I worship the rating agencies … but because a public credit rating serves as a useful public flash-point during times of stress. It’s always useful to give the directors something to talk about over lunch!

Taxation is complicated: “Artis’ income and net taxable gains for the purposes of the Tax Act will be allocated to the holders of Units and Preferred Units in the same proportion as the distributions received by such holders.” In 2011, Unitholder distributions were 100% return of capital and this was also the case in 2010.

August 2, 2012

August 3rd, 2012

There’s some jostling over the YLO reorg:

Law firm McMillan, counsel for the company’s lenders, said Wednesday the lenders, who weren’t specified, are owed a principal amount of $369-million by Yellow Media as of Sept. 28, 2011.

“The company put forward the proposed CBCA plan without notice to or prior consultation with the lenders or most of its other stakeholders,” McMillan said in a news release.

“The lenders have invited the company to withdraw the proposed CBCA plan forthwith and to engage in a more open and transparent consultation process with its stakeholders to see if an acceptable plan can be achieved.”

The lenders intend to bring a motion on Aug. 6 to protect their legal rights in the reorganization proceeding initiated by Yellow Media under the CBCA.

Goldman Sachs has developed a new kind of investment:

Under the Goldman Sachs-funded initiative, inmates aged 16 to 18 will receive education, training and counseling intended to reduce the likelihood of them reoffending after their release.

City officials said Goldman would provide a $9.6-million loan to pay for the program at the Rikers Island jail complex. If recidivism drops by 10 per cent, the firm will get back the $9.6-million. If it drops even more, Goldman could make as much as $2.1-million in profit. If recidivism doesn’t drop by at least 10 percent, Goldman will lose as much as $2.4-million.

Nearly half of the adolescents who leave city jails currently return within one year.

Social impact bonds, also called pay-for-success bonds, were first used in Britain and are being explored in Australia and in the U.S.

Massachusetts is negotiating with two nonprofit groups to finance juvenile justice and homelessness programs with the promise of repayment only if the programs work.

I don’t know why it’s called a “bond” rather than “an investment in a micro-cap that has a government contract”, but I suppose it helps sell the things.

As of September 28, 2011? That was the date the banks tightened the screws and DBRS slashed the rating. But why it’s being used as a reference date for the challengers’ holdings is something I don’t know.

Testing software is boring:

Knight Capital Group Inc. (KCG) said losses from yesterday’s trading breakdown are $440 million, almost quadruple its 2011 net income and more than some analysts had estimated, and the firm is exploring strategic and financial alternatives. Its stock has lost 66 percent in two days.

Knight said it will continue its trading and market-making today as it considers its options. Yesterday’s issue was related to the installation of trading software and resulted in the company sending “numerous erroneous orders,” the Jersey City, New Jersey-based firm said today. The stock tumbled 50 percent to $3.46 at 9:36 a.m. New York time today.

The errors were caused by a malfunction in a trading algorithm, according to a person at Knight who asked to remain anonymous because the matter hasn’t been publicized.

Apparently there’s some regulatory concern over the problem:

Yesterday’s problem shows regulation is “broken” and a study group should be convened to review technology and market structure, Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, said in an interview. Regulators would have been able to stop incidents such as yesterday’s breakdown if they didn’t face a lack of resources, he said.

“The ability of regulators to do their job has never been weaker than it is today because of the failure of the oversight process,” Levitt, 81, said today in an interview. “Congress has a greater responsibility for what we’re seeing today than any regulator or any particular part of the industry. They’ve allowed this to happen.”

Kevin Callahan, a spokesman with the SEC, said in an e-mail that regulators are “closely monitoring the situation and in continuous contact with the NYSE and other market participants.”

I don’t understand this. A poorly-run company gave a $440-million gift to investors. Why is this a problem?

In related news, a bug was discovered at Hymas Investment Management today:


Click for big

Company officials were quoted as saying “Now stop screwing around and do some damn work.”

ING Bank Canada is for sale:

The sale process for ING Bank Canada has already kicked into high gear, and rival Canadian banks are heavily interested in scooping up their online-focused competitor.

I understand that central banks are using Google searches as indicators:

The Federal Reserve and the central banks of England, Italy, Spain and Chile have followed up with their own studies to see if search volumes track trends in the economies they oversee.

It all started with a hunch in Mountain View, California. On the heels of developing a new website reporting how often users searched for certain keywords, Hal Varian, Google Inc.’s chief economist, said he wondered whether this data could foreshadow what traditional economic reports would show later. So he ran the numbers.

“The ‘aha moment’ was, gee, this actually works,” Varian said in an interview.

The result was a 23-page paper he co-wrote in April 2009, demonstrating how data reported on the Google Trends service improved forecasts of auto and home sales and retail spending in the U.S.

If they’re paying attention to my Google searches, banknotes will soon feature “scarlett johansson nude” in place of dead politicians. But other pornography is good too!

***********************
Sorry, folks, the daily report will be delayed.

I have been in Microsoft Version Hell for about ten-and-a-half hours now … and ain’t nuthin’ workin’.

Update, 2012-8-3: Finally!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1408 % 2,292.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1408 % 3,430.0
Floater 3.17 % 3.20 % 65,611 19.21 3 -0.1408 % 2,475.7
OpRet 4.76 % 2.40 % 34,108 0.89 5 -0.0306 % 2,535.9
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.87 % 65,593 4.66 3 0.0799 % 2,767.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0306 % 2,318.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.92 % 103,946 1.16 28 0.0821 % 2,273.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.93 % 103,855 15.56 3 0.2239 % 2,514.5
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.05 % 181,877 3.95 71 -0.0656 % 2,422.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 2.96 % 142,532 0.80 46 0.0486 % 2,352.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 121,160 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 105,926 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 89,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 57,027 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.73
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 55,401 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 54,432 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.78
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.12 – 23.85
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.5176

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.12
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.78 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1878

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.78
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.20 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1929

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3447

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.10 – 25.51
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3092

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.76 – 26.19
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3381

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : -0.60 %

Soon!

New Issue: TA FixedReset 5.00%+365

August 2nd, 2012

TransAlta Corporation has announced:

that it has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank for distribution to the public 6,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series E (the “Series E Shares”). The Series E Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series E Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million. Holders of the Series E Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 5% annually for the initial period ending September 30, 2017. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.65%.

Holders of Series E Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series F (the “Series F Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series F Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.65%.

TransAlta Corporation has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 3,000,000 Series E Shares at the same offering price. The Series E Shares will be offered by way of prospectus supplement under the short form base shelf prospectus of TransAlta Corporation dated November 15, 2011. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

The net proceeds of the Offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, for other general corporate purposes and to reduce short term indebtedness of the Corporation and its affiliates. The offering is expected to close on or about August 10, 2012.

TransAlta was recently downgraded to P-3 by S&P and the shelf registered preferreds were downgraded to (P)Ba2 by Moody’s. DBRS has them at Pfd-3, Review-Developing.

Update, 2012-8-3: Provisionally rated Pfd-3 by DBRS.

August 1, 2012

August 1st, 2012

It was a black day for Canadian capital markets:

Maple Group Acquisition Corp. has won control of TMX Group Inc., with 91 per cent of shares tendered to its takeover offer worth about $3.8 billion.

A new Maple board of directors has already been appointed.

And along similar lines … when is a bank not a bank? When it’s a money-market mutual fund:

The 10 biggest money-fund managers and the Investment Company Institute trade group reported combined lobbying spending of $16 million in the first half of 2012 and $31.6 million last year in disclosures that reference money-market mutual funds, according to a review of documents by Bloomberg News. That compares with $16.7 million in all of 2010.

The companies are seeking to block new rules championed by Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro that are headed for a vote before a divided commission as soon as this month. The proposal would force funds to abandon their fixed $1 share price or introduce withdrawal limits and capital buffers. Schapiro can count on only one supporting vote from the other four commissioners, even as Federal Reserve officials have said that failure to enact tougher rules will leave the $2.5 trillion industry vulnerable to investor runs and threaten global credit markets.

The FOMC statement was gloomy:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June suggests that economic activity decelerated somewhat over the first half of this year. Growth in employment has been slow in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. Business fixed investment has continued to advance. Household spending has been rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some further signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has declined since earlier this year, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee anticipates that inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.

This libel suit amuses me:

Daniels repeatedly questioned Molo about statements from the book that are alleged to be libelous, including Lewis’s comments that Chau had worked for “sleepy” insurance companies for much of his career before managing CDOs and that CDO managers didn’t work hard.

“Most of your argument is based on the implications of certain statements, not on the actual statements,” the judge told Molo. “There’s no proof you can offer to a jury whether an insurance company is ‘sleepy.’ That is hyperbole. That is opinion.”

Chau’s firm managed about $20 billion worth of CDOs in 2007, making it the fourth largest in that category, according to court papers. Investors in Harding’s CDOs included UBS AG and Deutsche Bank AG, according court filings. CDO sales collapsed in 2007 along with the subprime-mortgage market.

There are certainly very many portfolio managers out there who are totally unqualified. Usually they just underperform. Sometimes they get hired by enormous companies with equally incompetent advisors.

It was another good, solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 12bp, FixedResets up 5bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 9bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was pathetically low.

The PerpetualDiscount sub-index got cut in half with the July month-end rebalancing, losing CIU.PR.A to Scraps on volume concerns, while ELF.PR.F and PWF.PR.K migrated to the PerpetualPremium index. The remaining constituents are BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N and ELF.PR.G.

PerpetualDiscounts, all three of them, now yield 4.96%, equivalent to 6.45% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.25% (maybe a little more) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 220bp, unchanged from July 25.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0403 % 2,296.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0403 % 3,434.8
Floater 3.17 % 3.20 % 68,362 19.21 3 0.0403 % 2,479.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.39 % 35,292 0.89 5 0.0690 % 2,536.7
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.91 % 66,307 4.66 3 0.0933 % 2,764.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0690 % 2,319.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.98 % 104,899 1.16 28 0.1177 % 2,271.3
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.96 % 105,097 15.53 3 0.0140 % 2,508.9
FixedReset 4.98 % 3.00 % 181,807 4.00 71 0.0499 % 2,424.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.19 % 143,423 0.80 46 0.0861 % 2,351.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : -11.80 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-01
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 101,637 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 73,840 RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 at 26.12 and 45,100 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 67,849 RBC crossed blocks of 32,500 and 28,000, both at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 53,167 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 38,381 RBC crossed 19,500 at 26.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.89
Bid-YTW : 2.00 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 33,895 CIBC sold 12,100 to anonymous at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.60 – 24.11
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3097

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

RY.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.24 – 26.75
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3657

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.32 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.26 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2288

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.24 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : -6.12 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2827

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

TA Downgraded to P-3 by S&P

August 1st, 2012

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

  • We are lowering our long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on TransAlta Corp. to ‘BBB-‘ from ‘BBB’.
  • We are also lowering our global scale preferred stock rating on the company to ‘BB’ from ‘BB+’, and our Canada scale rating to ‘P-3’ from ‘P-3(High)’.
  • The cash flow related to a recently announced contract at TransAlta’s Centralia facility largely falls outside of our rating horizon; as a result, the positive impacts of an improved business risk profile and associated cash flows have a small impact on our analysis.
  • As we said in our research update from July 23, 2012, the recent arbitration decision on Sundance Units 1 and 2 increased the probability of a downgrade because it increases the business risk related to an additional 2.5 gigawatts of capacity sold under similar power purchase agreements and it led to additional deterioration in the company’s financial risk profile.
  • The stable outlook reflects our view that adjusted funds from
    operations-to-debt will remain in the 15%-20% range, below the 20% threshold we associated with the previous ratings.

The ratings on TransAlta reflect Standard & Poor’s opinion of the company’s strong business risk profile and significant financial risk profile. In our view, the business risk profile reflects a predominance of long-term power purchase arrangements (PPAs) and a relatively diversified electricity generation portfolio. We believe that offsetting these credit strengths are high leverage; the potential for year-to-year volatility in cash flow due to revenue exposure to volume and price risk; asset concentration at Centralia, TransAlta’s largest merchant asset; and the company’s involvement in high-risk energy trading activities. An underlying level of profitability and cash flow stability comes from long-term power contracts (with a minimum of five years to maturity).

The stable outlook reflects our expectation of AFFO-to-debt remaining in the 15%-20% range and a relatively stable business risk profile. We could raise the ratings if TransAlta improves its business risk profile or if we expect the company to achieve and maintain AFFO-to-debt of more than 20%. Conversely, while we don’t expect it, a material debt-financed acquisition or capital building program, costly regulatory or environmental initiatives, or a sustained deterioration in plant operating performance leading to AFFO-to-debt falling below 15% could result in a downgrade.

TransAlta currently has two preferred share issues outstanding, TA.PR.D and TA.PR.F, both FixedResets.

DBRS recently put TA on Review-Developing:

DBRS has today placed the BBB Unsecured Debt/Medium-Term Notes and Pfd-3 Preferred Shares ratings of TransAlta Corporation (TAC or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications. This rating action follows the announcement of the final outcome of the arbitration case regarding the force majeure and economic claim of Sundance 1 and 2 coal-fired generation units. The arbitrator concluded that, although the closure was a result of a force majeure, Sundance 1 and 2 can still be economically restored to service. As a result of this outcome, TAC will be responsible for approximately $190 million in estimated repair costs to restart Sundance 1 and 2, as well as for $150 million in accrued penalties to TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TCPL; rated “A” by DBRS), a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada Corporation. However, TAC will still be receiving capacity payments totaling approximately $100 million from the Balancing Pool (established by the Government of Alberta) from today to when the units are restored to service, which is expected to be in the fall of 2013. Therefore, the net cash cost for TAC is estimated to be approximately $240 million.

DBRS expects TAC to ultimately fund the majority of the aforementioned costs primarily with equity (including preferred shares and dividend re-investment proceeds) in a timely manner to maintain its current leverage level. Any further increase in leverage could cause TAC’s credit risk profile to deteriorate to a level that is no longer commensurate with the current BBB rating.

July 31, 2012

July 31st, 2012

Pragma Trading provides an interesting perspective on high frequency trading:

Market making is an important function in the smooth operation of markets. In theory, there should be a natural equilibrium: market makers will compete only to the point that they can no longer profit by quoting more aggressively. This means they will trade at times or prices that directional traders will not, narrowing spreads and improving market quality.

However, the existence of ultra-long queues suggests that this equilibrium is out of whack. Market makers compete en masse where there is already deep liquidity and no opportunity for price improvement because of the tick size. From a market structure perspective, the concern is that there is no practical way to opt out of interacting with these superfluous market makers, and because of the take fees charged by exchanges, directional traders are effectively forced to subsidize HFTs even though there are other directional traders they could interact with directly. This effect is most pronounced where the spread size is very large despite fundamental liquidity, i.e. for low-priced, high-volume stocks. As demonstrated by the preponderance of ultra-long queues in lower-priced stocks and the total absence of ultra-long queues in stocks priced below $1, it appears that the penny tick size and the liquidity rebates paid by exchanges in the maker/taker model effectively subsidize HFTs in a way that is essential to much of their profitability, and are the root causes of this market distortion.

Bloomberg’s Matthew Philips did some more digging:

The question is whether the benefits speed traders bring to the market outweigh these added costs and trade-offs. Even if slightly longer wait times are costing long-term investors billions a year, having a more liquid market with tighter spreads has saved them that much, if not more, says Rick Cooper, a professor of finance at the Illinois Institute of Technology’s Stuart School of Business. Cooper used to work for long-term investors, building early algorithms and quant models for State Street Global Advisors. He doubts they want to go back to the old days where they were beholden to a small, clubby group of broker dealers serving as market makers. “Back in the day, when demand spiked, they would widen out the spread on you,” says Cooper. “It used to take us days to execute some of our big trades so we wouldn’t move the price.”

These days, any time a market-maker tries to widen out the spread, an electronic market maker usually jumps in and tightens it up again.

There’s some colour on the Facebook fiasco:

UBS’s admission that it lost nearly $356-million on the botched Facebook IPO puts pressure on Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. and raises questions about how quickly the exchange can put this problem behind it.

UBS handles most of the order flow from Charles Schwab Corp., one of the biggest U.S. brokerages, with about $1.8-trillion in client assets. It also takes orders from other retail brokerages, including TD Ameritrade and Fidelity.

But that alone may not account for the massive loss. UBS also said that, as a result of “multiple operational failures by NASDAQ, UBS’s pre-market orders were not confirmed for several hours” rather than in the usual milliseconds. That triggered its internal systems to re-enter orders multiple times, it said.

When the confirmations finally came through, UBS and other market makers were left owning large amounts of unwanted Facebook stock, which led to losses as the stock plunged.

“As a result of system protocols that we had designed to ensure our clients’ orders were filled consistent with regulatory guidelines and our own standards, orders were entered multiple times before the necessary confirmations from Nasdaq were received and our systems were able to process them,” UBS said. “Nasdaq ultimately filled all of these orders, exposing UBS to far more shares than our clients had ordered.”

No failsafes on the order-reentry algorithms, eh? Well, it’s nice that they saved a few thousand on programming.

The Canadian preferred share market closed the month on a happy note, with PerpetualPremiums up 3bp, FixedResets gaining 4bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 7bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0201 % 2,295.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0201 % 3,433.4
Floater 3.17 % 3.20 % 68,807 19.23 3 0.0201 % 2,478.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.39 % 35,313 0.89 5 0.1074 % 2,534.9
SplitShare 5.48 % 4.90 % 66,028 4.66 3 -0.0133 % 2,762.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1074 % 2,318.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.32 % 0.17 % 102,065 0.46 27 0.0303 % 2,268.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.96 % 4.96 % 40,040 15.27 6 0.2188 % 2,508.6
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.04 % 183,329 3.96 71 0.0445 % 2,423.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.48 % 146,360 1.21 46 0.0657 % 2,349.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.96
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.A FixedReset 125,743 Scotia crossed blocks of 21,600 shares, 30,000 and 40,000, all at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 107,715 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 89,050 Scotia crossed blocks of 30,000 shares, 28,000 and 25,000, all at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 52,575 National crossed 50,000 at 25.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 50,503 National crossed 46,100 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 39,442 RBC crossed 12,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.30 – 26.89
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3522

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.83 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3051

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-31
Maturity Price : 23.54
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.53 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2296

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.22 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3482

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 16.40 – 16.84
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3615

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-31
Maturity Price : 16.40
Evaluated at bid price : 16.40
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.56 – 25.77
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1409

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.49 %

LSC.PR.C Redeemed on Schedule

July 31st, 2012

Scotia Managed Companies has announced:

The Board of Directors of Lifeco Split Corporation Inc. (“Lifeco”) has announced today that the redemption prices for all outstanding Capital Shares and Preferred Shares to be paid on July 31, 2012 are as follows:
Redemption Price per Preferred Share: $36.84
Redemption Price per Capital Share: $4.4466

Holders of 27,010 Capital Shares requested delivery of and will receive their pro rata share of portfolio shares in payment for their Capital Shares.

Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of Lifeco are listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols LSC and LSC.PR.C respectively. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be de-listed from The Toronto Stock Exchange as at the close of trading on July 31, 2012.

The maturity was previously discussed on PrefBlog. LSC.PR.C was not tracked by HIMIPref™.

July 30, 2012

July 30th, 2012

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 12bp, FixedResets up 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. Volatility was average. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,294.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 3,432.7
Floater 3.17 % 3.19 % 68,842 19.24 3 0.0000 % 2,477.7
OpRet 4.77 % 2.82 % 35,904 0.89 5 0.1460 % 2,532.2
SplitShare 5.48 % 4.90 % 65,743 4.66 3 -0.0932 % 2,762.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1460 % 2,315.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.32 % 0.77 % 99,418 0.46 27 0.1206 % 2,267.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.96 % 40,036 15.20 6 -0.2455 % 2,503.1
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.03 % 181,728 4.01 71 0.0294 % 2,422.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.53 % 144,836 1.81 46 0.0199 % 2,347.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 1.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 70,900 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.55; Desjardins crossed 28,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 47,873 TD crossed 40,000 at 25.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 39,505 TD crossed 29,000 at 25.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-28
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 26,770 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 25,633 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 24,770 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 16.40 – 16.85
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2753

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 16.40
Evaluated at bid price : 16.40
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.00 – 24.32
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2004

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.15 – 23.47
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-07-30
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.09 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2069

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.14 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2306

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.99 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1777

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-29
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : -6.64 %

Marginal Tax Rates: Alberta 2012

July 29th, 2012

E&Y have analyzed Alberta tax rates as of 2012-1-15 and we may draw some conclusions from these data:

Investors Taxable Income Marginal Rate on Interest Marginal Rate on Dividends Equivalency Factor
Widows & Orphans $30,000 25.00% 0.00% 1.33
Professionals $75,000 32.00% 9.63% 1.33
Plutocrats $150,000 39.00% 19.29% 1.32

Equivalency factors for Professionals and Plutocrats have declined marginally since my 2011 post on this topic.

Two nuances should be noted. Firstly, E&Y appears to have put a floor of 0.00% on the published marginal tax rate for dividends; in fact, the tax on dividends can be negative if the taxpayer has other income available to soak up the excess dividend tax credit. This will increase the equivalency factor for “Widows & Orphans”.

Secondly, if the taxpayer is subject to OAS clawback, the equivalency factor will decline by about 0.1. It should be noted that this figure is an extremely rough estimate and is based solely on the direct income tax effect – there may be other net-income-tested benefits to the taxpayer, such as drug plans, which will exacerbate the decline.