Market Action

August 13, 2012

Here’s some corporate activism that doesn’t induce nausea:

Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) Chief Executive Officer Doug Oberhelman said he will campaign later this year for a cut in U.S. government debt because the issue affects customers of the largest maker of construction and mining machinery.

“It’s starting to hold us back,” Oberhelman said in an interview yesterday with Bloomberg Television’s “Street Smart” at the company’s demonstration and learning center in Edwards, Illinois. “For the contractor base and customers in this country, it’s worrisome. It has a chill in the air.”

Customers of Caterpillar are “scared to death” that tax rates will rise as public expenditure stalls, he said. Higher taxes and cuts in spending on government programs amounting to $607 billion as measured by the Congressional Budget Office will take effect at year-end without congressional action.

In a continuation of the insane stampede towards central counterparties and single-point failure BIS has proposed:

Where a bank acts as a clearing member of a CCP for its own purposes, a risk weight of 2% must be applied to the bank’s trade exposure to the CCP in respect of OTC derivatives, exchange traded derivative transactions and SFTs. Where the clearing member offers clearing services to clients, the 2% risk weight also applies to the clearing member’s trade exposure to the CCP that arises when the clearing member is obligated to reimburse the client for any losses suffered due to changes in the value of its transactions in the event that the CCP defaults

Capital is charged harshly … but subject to a cap!

Clearing member banks may apply a risk-weight of 1250% to its default fund exposures to the CCP, subject to an overall cap on the risk-weighted assets from all its exposures to the CCP (ie including trade exposures) equal to 20% times the trade exposures to the CCP. More specifically, under this approach, the Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) for both bank i’s trade and default fund exposures to each CCP are equal to:16
Min {(2% * TEi + 1250% * DFi); (20% * TEi)}
where
• TEi is bank i’s trade exposure to the CCP, as measured by the bank according to paragraphs 110 to 112 of this Annex; and
• DFi is bank i’s pre-funded contribution to the CCP’s default fund.

When calculating the required capital of the CCP, its exposures are risk-weighted at 20%, a figure which is far too low. Interconnectedness of banks should be discouraged through the capital rules, not encouraged! Note that under Canadian rules:

  • the risk weight of bank exposure is dependent upon the credit quality of the sovereign (i.e., an implicit assumption of cross-border state aid)
  • The highest rank for sovereigns is the AA- to AAA category
  • The risk weight for exposure banks domiciled in these credit-worthy sovereigns is 20%
  • The credit quality scale for these exposures is the same as for corporates

So in other words, if a bank has a choice between lending to a non-financial company or another bank, the risk weighting will generally favour the bank loan, because then they can use the sovereign’s creditworthiness rather than that of the actual borrowing entity. Am I the only person in the world who thinks this is nuts?

It was a mildly positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 7bp, FixedResets up 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. Volatility was minimal. There were a few pockets of volume … but basically? Yech.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0797 % 2,319.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0797 % 3,469.4
Floater 3.14 % 3.19 % 65,443 19.23 3 0.0797 % 2,504.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.35 % 34,764 0.86 5 0.0307 % 2,535.3
SplitShare 5.46 % 5.03 % 65,187 4.62 3 0.1196 % 2,773.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0307 % 2,318.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 4.08 % 102,430 1.13 28 0.0708 % 2,273.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.99 % 97,301 15.46 3 0.1259 % 2,512.4
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.01 % 176,015 4.11 71 0.0607 % 2,423.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.38 % 134,994 1.32 46 0.0366 % 2,354.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.57
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 200,450 National crossed six blocks: 75,000 shares, 35,000 shares, 40,000 shares, 20,000 and two of 10,000 each, all at 26.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 160,983 Desjardins crossed 160,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-12
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : -1.75 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 145,231 National crossed blocks of 13,100 shares, 61,800 shares, 42,000 and 21,300, all at 24.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 137,526 Desjardins crossed 108,200 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 52,729 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.94
Bid-YTW : -2.39 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 39,392 Scotia crossed 14,800 and 16,700, both at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.73 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1618

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : -30.44 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.83 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1803

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.83
Bid-YTW : 1.10 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.28 – 26.64
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2778

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.28
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.65 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1720

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 25.74 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-12
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.74
Bid-YTW : -5.09 %

TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.70 – 26.89
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1222

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 0.02 %

Miscellaneous News

DBRS Changes SplitShare Rating Methodology

DBRS has announced that it:

has today published updated versions of two Canadian structured finance methodologies:

— Stability Ratings for Canadian Structured Income Funds
— Rating Canadian Split Share Companies and Trusts

Neither of the methodology updates resulted in any meaningful changes and as such, neither publication has resulted in any rating changes or rating actions.

The new methodology institutes a formal procedure for Reviews:

Rating actions taken on the preferred shares of an issuer are based on the following guidelines:

  • • If the downside protection available falls outside the expected range by a signifi cant amount for two consecutive months, the preferred shares may be placed Under Review with Negative Implications to indicate the high likelihood of an impending downgrade.
  • • After a rating has been placed Under Review with Negative Implications, it maintains its status until one of the following scenarios occurs:
    • – If the downside protection fell outside expected levels for two consecutive months subsequent to the rating being placed Under Review with Negative Implications, then the preferred shares will likely be downgraded. The revised rating level will depend on the path of downside protection levels during the Under Review period, as well as on other factors such as changes in the dividend coverage available and the credit quality of the portfolio.
    • – If the downside protection levels are consistent with the then-current rating for two consecutive months subsequent to being placed Under Review with Negative Implications (likely due to an increase in downside protection), the Under Review status will likely be removed with a confi rmation of the rating.
  • • If the downside protection indicates that an upgrade is warranted for four consecutive months, then the
    transaction will likely be upgraded. The revised rating level will depend on the path of downside protection levels during the previous four months, as well as other factors such as changes in the dividend coverage available and the credit quality of the portfolio.

They’re still using VaR based on one-day drops:

Volatility Rating

  • • DBRS analyzes the historical volatility and performance of the portfolio’s underlying securities to estimate the likelihood of large declines in downside protection.
  • • Historical performance data for a defi ned period is used (normally ten years).
  • • Daily returns are annualized; only negative returns count as potential defaults.
  • • A probability of default is calculated that will yield a one year VaR at the appropriate dollar-loss amount equating to the downside protection available.
  • • The probability of default is linked to a long-term rating by using the one-year default rates from the DBRS corporate cumulative default probability table.
  • • The long-term rating is converted to a preferred share rating using a notching assumption that the preferred shares of a company should be rated two notches below the company’s issuer rating.

A Diversification adjustment has been formalized:

  • • Portfolios with greater diversifi cation will generally exhibit less volatility and a lower probability of a large decline over time.
  • • As the diversifi cation of a portfolio by industry and by number of securities decreases, the diversification factor applied will increase.
  • • See the Downside Protection Adjustments for Portfolio Diversification table in this methodology, which shows the adjustment factor for varying levels of diversification.

The Cash Grind is treated as an adjustment:

  • • Higher capital share distributions increase the grind on the net asset value (NAV), which results in the portfolio requiring to earn a certain percentage return from capital appreciation (the percentage grind) to cover the amount that portfolio expenses and distributions exceed dividend income.
  • • The percentage grind will have less of a negative effect if there is an asset coverage test preventing capital share distributions once the NAV drops below a certain value.
    • – A higher NAV cut-off value will provide greater protection to the preferred shares.
  • • A longer transaction term increases the cumulative effect of any
    grind on the portfolio.

  • • The methodology shows the impact of capital share distributions on the maximum preferred share rating.
    • – More aggressive distribution policies and asset coverage tests will result in notching below the maximum preferred share rating (see the Impact of Capital Share Distributions on Initial Ratings table in this methodology).

They had this to say about option writing strategies:

DBRS views the strategy of writing covered calls as an additional element of risk for preferred shareholders because of the potential to give up unrealized capital gains that would increase the downside protection available to cover future portfolio losses. Furthermore, an option-writing strategy relies on the ability of the investment manager. The investment manager has a large amount of discretion to implement its desired strategy, and the resulting trading activity is not monitored as easily as the performance of a static portfolio. Relying partially on the ability of the investment manager rather than the strength of a split share structure is a negative rating factor.

PrefLetter

August PrefLetter Released!

The August, 2012, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The August edition includes an appendix describing the horrors that await a taxable investor seeking to invest in bonds in the current high-coupon, low-yield environment.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the August, 2012, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the September, 2012, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close September 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on September 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

PrefLetter

August PrefLetter Now In Preparation!

The markets have closed and the August edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The August edition will contain an appendix discussing the effect of the current high-coupon, low-yield environment on taxable fixed income investors.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The August issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the August issue.

Market Action

August 10, 2012

No great joy in the Canadian jobs number:

Canadian job creation hit a stumbling block in July after two months of modest gains and following an impressive number of new jobs added earlier in the year.

A hefty 51,600 part-time positions were eliminated over the month, with women over 55 feeling the brunt of the job losses, according to Statistics Canada data released Friday. Employment for all other age groups remained roughly the same as the month before, and full-time employment increased by 21,300 jobs in July, compared with 29,300 new full-time jobs in June.

Some are calling for rate cuts; others aren’t:

“All things considered,” David Madani of Capital Economics told clients in a note, “this jobs report provides further support to our long-held view that the Bank of Canada may eventually be forced to cut interest rates.”

Mr. Madani’s analysis assumes policy makers will focus on the headline number, which suggests that Canada’s economy has slid into a soft patch, as job creation was paltry in May and June. The unemployment rate rose to 7.3 per cent in July from 7.2 per cent the previous. Canada now has lost an average of about 5,000 jobs over the past three months.

Policy makers keep an eye on changes in the average hourly wage rate of permanent employees to gauge whether inflation pressure is building. That number jumped 3.9 per cent in July from a year ago, to $24.49, the fastest since April, 2009.

Bigger wages will support consumer demand. But all things equal, any increase in purchases will put upward pressure on prices. “This…could be a source of concerns for the Bank of Canada if it proves persistent,” Nomura’s Charles St-Arnaud, a former Bank of Canada economist, said in his analysis of Friday’s jobs report.

It was a mildly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 4bp, FixedResets off 1bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 6bp. Volatility was negligible. Volume was DEAD. You hear me? DEAD! I’ve seen more life in a regulator’s office!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2198 % 2,317.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2198 % 3,466.6
Floater 3.14 % 3.18 % 66,397 19.24 3 0.2198 % 2,502.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.33 % 32,184 0.86 5 -0.1225 % 2,534.6
SplitShare 5.46 % 5.04 % 64,412 4.63 3 0.0665 % 2,769.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1225 % 2,317.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 4.08 % 103,196 1.14 28 -0.0410 % 2,271.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.98 % 98,835 15.43 3 -0.2512 % 2,509.3
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.09 % 177,033 3.98 71 -0.0114 % 2,422.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 2.93 % 135,656 1.18 46 -0.0578 % 2,353.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.12
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 55,350 Scotia sold 20,000 to anonymous at 25.27.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 42,200 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 40,240 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 30,173 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 14,175 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 12,900 Desjardins bought 11,100 from National at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
There were 1 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.29 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2369

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.29
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.72 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.7600
Average : 0.6394

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-09
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 1.32 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.57 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.4254

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.41 – 26.67
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1833

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %

MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.59 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1368

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 50.93 – 51.19
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1884

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 50.93
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

Issue Comments

TA.PR.H Closes at Discount on Sub-Par Volume

Transalta Corporation has announced:

it has completed its public offering of 9,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series E (the “Series E Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per Series E Share.

The offering, previously announced on August 2, 2012, resulted in gross proceeds to TransAlta of $225 million. The net proceeds of the offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, for other general corporate purposes, and to reduce short term indebtedness of the Corporation and its affiliates.

The Series E Shares were offered to the Canadian public through a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank by way of a prospectus supplement that was filed with securities regulatory authorities in Canada under TransAlta’s short form base shelf prospectus dated November 15, 2011.

Holders of Series E Shares are entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 5.00% annually for the initial period ending September 30, 2017. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.65%. Holders of Series E Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series F (the “Series F Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2017 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of Series F Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.65%. The Series E Shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol TA.PR.H.

They announced on August 3:

that further to its bought deal financing (the “Offering”) announced on August 2, 2012, the syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank have exercised the underwriters’ option (the “Option”) granted to them. Pursuant to the exercise of the Option, TransAlta Corporation will issue an additional 3,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series E (the “Series E Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $75 million, bringing the aggregate gross proceeds of the Offering to $225 million.

TA.PR.H is a FixedReset, 5.00%+365, announced August 2. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

TA was recently downgraded to P-3 by S&P and placed on Review-Developing by DBRS.

TA.PR.H traded 236,734 shares today in a range of 24.70-85 before closing at 24.70-73, 3×16. Vital statistics are:

TA.PR.H FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
Market Action

August 9, 2012

Nothing happened today.

It was a positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 2bp, FixedResets gaining 7bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 11bp. Volatility was almost non-existant. Volume was very low.

PerpetualDiscounts (all three of them!) now yield 4.96%, equivalent to 6.45% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.35%, so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 210bp, a decent-enough narrowing from the 220bp reported August 1.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1601 % 2,312.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1601 % 3,459.0
Floater 3.15 % 3.19 % 67,437 19.24 3 0.1601 % 2,496.7
OpRet 4.76 % 2.32 % 32,094 0.87 5 -0.0459 % 2,537.7
SplitShare 5.47 % 5.04 % 67,014 4.63 3 0.1731 % 2,767.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0459 % 2,320.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.99 % 104,880 1.14 28 0.0230 % 2,272.5
Perpetual-Discount 4.97 % 4.96 % 97,949 15.50 3 0.2518 % 2,515.6
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.09 % 177,576 3.78 71 0.0734 % 2,422.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.18 % 136,455 0.78 46 0.1124 % 2,354.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 82,125 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 26.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.56
Bid-YTW : 2.61 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 73,035 Scotia bought 25,000 from CIBC at 25.80; Desjardins bought 18,500 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-09
Maturity Price : 23.55
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 69,101 RBC crossed 49,900 at 25.57.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 52,210 RBC crossed 48,500 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.45 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 31,417 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 25.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 23,041 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.75 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.5071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-08
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -0.27 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.54 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3108

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.23 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2675

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : -4.30 %

RY.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.22 – 26.53
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2137

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.50 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2190

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.73 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2904

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %

Issue Comments

DBRS Sounds a Warning – But No Formal Change – on CPX.PR.A

DBRS has announced that it:

has today published an updated report on Capital Power Corporation (CPC or the Company). The Company’s Preferred Shares rating is based on the credit quality of its subsidiary, Capital Power L.P. (CPLP; rated BBB by DBRS). The one-notch differential in the ratings of CPC and CPLP reflects structural subordination at CPC, which is largely dependent on its own resources and dividends from CPLP. Dividends from CPLP could be curtailed if the viability of CPLP needs to be safeguarded.

DBRS is increasingly concerned about the continued challenging merchant power market environment that could materially add to the Company’s existing challenges in the medium term. In addition, the Sundance Unit 1 and 2 restarts, which are expected in late 2013, could place more pressure on the merchant power market environment in Alberta. The continued downward pressure on natural gas prices, which make natural gas combined-cycle plants more cost effective in terms of both capital and fuel costs, are expected to pressure CPLP’s merchant power earnings.

CPC has no debt issued at the parent level and is not expected to issue any debt in the foreseeable future. The Company has $122 million of preferred shares outstanding as of June 30, 2012. Preferred shares, as a percentage of common equity, are within the 20% threshold (defined as the percentage of preferred shares outstanding divided by total equity, excluding preferreds). For the six months ended June 30, 2012, CPC distributed $3 million to its preferred shareholders and $37 million to its common shareholders ($6 million and $51 million to preferred and common shareholders, respectively for fiscal 2011).

DBRS confirmed CPX.PR.A at Pfd-3(low) on July 24.

CPX.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.A To Reset To 3.45%

BCE Inc. has announced:

BCE Inc. will, on September 1, 2012, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AA outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on August 22, 2012, BCE Inc. determines that at least 2.5 million Series AA Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of September 1, 2012, the Series AA Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 3.45%.

BCE.PR.A is interconvertible with BCE.PR.B on September 1, and notice of conversion is required to be with BCE by August 22, 2012. Note that brokerages and other custodians will have deadlines slightly in advance of this – so if contemplating conversion, find out your deadline immediately! The Notice of Conversion was discussed on PrefBlog.

I recommend that holders of BCE.PR.A convert to BCE.PR.B. The total dividends paid over the next five years will greater for the latter issue if the average prime rate exceeds 3.45% (provided that this issue continues to pay 100% of prime, which it will do unless the current price of $21 increases to over $25). This condition will be met if prime increases steadily to 4% at the end of five years. This is a reasonably good bet, even with the Fed announcing continued financial repression through the end of 2014. Additionally, I judge the chance of an overshoot of this figure to be much greater than the chance of an extreme undershoot; in other words, I judge the chances of average prime being 5% to be much greater than the chance of average prime being 2%.