November 24, 2011

November 24th, 2011

Today’s cheerful credit news is about Japan:

Standard & Poor’s said Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s administration hasn’t made progress in tackling the public debt burden, an indication it may be preparing to lower the nation’s sovereign grade.

“Japan’s finances are getting worse and worse every day, every second,” Takahira Ogawa, director of sovereign ratings at S&P in Singapore, said in an interview. Asked if that means he’s closer to cutting Japan, he said it “may be right in saying that we’re closer to a downgrade. But the deterioration has been gradual so far, and it’s not like we’re going to move today.”

Meanwhile, in Europe:

Stocks fell, Italian bonds declined and the cost of insuring European government debt against default rose to a record after German Chancellor Angela Merkel ruled out joint euro-area borrowing.

The yield on Italy’s 10-year bond climbed 14 basis points to 7.11 percent, while similar-maturity French debt yields rose three basis points to 3.72 percent.

Portugal’s bonds fell, with 10-year note yields climbing 90 basis points to 12.21 percent after Fitch Ratings cut the nation’s credit grade one step to BB+, the highest junk status.

Germany’s 10-year bond yield rose as much as 12 basis points to 2.26 percent before trading five basis points higher at 2.20 percent. Two-year note yields increased three basis points to 0.47 percent.

The Royal Canadian Mint’s gold receipt IPO appears to be going very well:

The Royal Canadian Mint raised C$600 million ($573 million) in an initial public offering of securities tied to its gold reserves, more than double its IPO target, according to two people familiar with the sale.

The mint initially sought to raise C$250 million from selling units in Canadian or U.S. dollars at C$20 or $19.29 each, the Ottawa-based firm said. Strong demand from institutional and individual investors drove up the size of the sale, said the people, who declined to be named because terms aren’t public.

Each exchange-traded receipt represents ownership in physical gold bullion held in custody of the Royal Canadian Mint. Proceeds from the sale will be used to buy gold, and the buyers of the receipts will own the metal rather than a stake in the mint, according to an Oct. 28 statement.

Huxley said “History is bunk.” Moody’s says Hungary is junk:

Hungary lost its investment-grade rating at Moody’s Investors Service after 15 years as the Cabinet seeks International Monetary Fund help to boost confidence in the European Union’s most-indebted eastern member.

The foreign- and local-currency bond ratings were cut one step to Ba1, the highest junk-level score, from Baa3, the company said today in a statement. Moody’s, which awarded Hungary its investment grade in 1996, assigned a negative outlook. The country is rated the lowest investment grade at Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings.

The government has scrapped two debt sales and reduced the size of another eight auctions in the last three months as the euro region’s debt crisis deepened. Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Cabinet on Nov. 17 asked for IMF “insurance” that doesn’t entail a loan and doesn’t impose conditions.

It was a rough day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 24bp, FixedResets down 13bp and DeemedRetractibles off 8bp. Not much volatility. Volume was very light – not unexpectedly, what with the US turkeys.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0964 % 2,131.1
FixedFloater 4.80 % 4.51 % 28,451 17.25 1 2.3785 % 3,211.9
Floater 3.38 % 3.41 % 66,017 18.68 2 -0.0964 % 2,301.0
OpRet 4.97 % 1.66 % 51,439 1.47 7 -0.0275 % 2,475.8
SplitShare 5.81 % 6.58 % 59,294 5.16 3 -0.2115 % 2,525.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0275 % 2,263.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.59 % 2.84 % 102,058 0.43 13 -0.1562 % 2,149.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.32 % 5.19 % 101,069 14.68 17 -0.2366 % 2,291.7
FixedReset 5.10 % 3.04 % 218,480 2.48 64 -0.1273 % 2,343.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.39 % 202,643 3.86 46 -0.0777 % 2,216.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 23.85
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 24.53
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 91,050 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 66,200 TD crossed 46,400 at 23.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 51,600 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 46,681 TD crossed 34,100 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 45,402 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 24.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 36,021 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.06 – 27.50
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2850

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.01 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-24
Maturity Price : 23.85
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.10 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3992

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

CIU.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 27.09 – 27.55
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3620

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.65 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2610

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.76 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2513

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %

BoE 2011Q3 Quarterly Bulletin

November 24th, 2011

The Bank of England has released its 2011Q3 Quarterly Bulletin with the following research articles:

  • The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact
  • Bank resolution and safeguarding the creditors left behind
  • Developments in the global securities lending market
  • Measuring financial sector output and its contribution to UK GDP
  • The Money Market Liaison Group Sterling Money Market Survey
  • Summaries of recent Bank of England working papers
    • An estimated DSGE model of energy, costs and inflation in the United Kingdom
    • The impact of permanent energy price shocks on the UK economy
    • Evolving UK and US macroeconomic dynamics through the lens of a model of deterministic structural change
    • Preferred-habitat investors and the US term structure of real rates

I was very interested in the second article, as it contains a defense of Special Resolution Regimes relative to bankruptcy; the politicians favouring of the former at the expense of the latter is a particular hobby horse of mine:

Commencement of insolvency leads to a freeze in the bank’s ability to make payments, which effectively results in the end of its business.(2) The sudden severing of these interconnections between a bank and the rest of the financial system and wider economy can have highly undesirable systemic effects. Individuals and small companies are entitled to compensation by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) for the first £85,000 of their deposits. But even a relatively short delay in the time needed by the FSCS to process and pay many deposit insurance claims can lead to hardship for households and businesses left temporarily without access to their savings. Disruption of this kind can undermine depositor confidence, potentially triggering contagion to other banks and endangering financial stability.

This fear on the behalf of depositors is a red herring. The authors would have us believe that delays by the deposit insurance corporation are inevitable, while delays by Special Resolution bureaucrats are non-existent.

The legal power to transfer some or all of the business of a failed bank to another company lies at the core of the United Kingdom’s SRR and of most other bank resolution regimes around the world.[Footnote]

Footnote reads: The transfer powers are called ‘stabilisation powers’ in the United Kingdom’s SRR and a ‘purchase (of assets) and an assumption (of liabilities)’ in the United States. The United States has had a bank resolution authority since 1933 and Canada since 1967. Transfer powers have also existed in Italy for some time and have been recently adopted in Germany.

I see no reason why these transfer powers can’t be incorporated into the regular bankruptcy process as a special case for defined institutions. Given bankruptcy, the regulator steps in as receiver and splits the bank with the objective of making the “Good Bank” as small as possible consistent with the purpose of maintaining financial stability. The “Bad Bank” holds all the common shares of the Good Bank and may sell them at leisure, although it may wish to do so on the weekend. I don’t see that this is different in practice from the aims of special resolution, or inconsistent with existing bankruptcy law. All that’s needed is an adjustment to bankruptcy law allowing this to happen when (i) the failed company is a bank and (ii) the receiver is the regulator.

Creditors, such as bondholders or other wholesale funders, that the resolution authority may have decided to leave behind in the residual bank do not enjoy these benefits [of being creditors of a solvent firm]. They must claim instead for repayment of their debts in the bank’s insolvency. But as is shown in the box on page 217, a decision to split the balance sheet in a way that fully protects depositors and certain other creditors could, on the face of it, put those creditors left behind in a potentially worse position than had the transfer powers never been used and the bank had been left to go through normal insolvency.

One reason for this lies in the fact that, under UK insolvency law, depositors in the United Kingdom rank equally — or ‘pari passu’ — with other ordinary senior creditors and therefore should share any losses equally between them.[Footnote]

Footnote reads: This contrasts with some other jurisdictions, most notably the United States, where depositors rank ahead of the other creditors (so-called ‘depositor preference’).

Seems to me that if the problem is the seniority of depositors, this is most easily addressed through legislation changing the seniority of depositors. You don’t need a Special Resolution Regime to do that. Another means of achieving the same end is for the deposit insurer to put up all the funds required to cover to the insured depositors and give the insurer and the uninsured depositors a senior claim in the Bad Bank.

The authors conclude, in part:

Bank special resolution regimes are designed to address systemic risks caused by bank failure while freeing the public authorities from the dilemma of having to use public funds to bail out all of a bank’s creditors. By doing so, they offer benefits to a financial system not only at the point of use but more generally through their effect on the behaviour of banks and their creditors.

There’s nothing here that can’t be addressed by small adjustments to existing bankruptcy law. However, the most objectionable part of the article is contained in the box which describes their plans for adusting the resolution regime:

Augment the existing SRR by developing ways to restructure a firm’s balance sheet without splitting it into separate parts. There is currently much discussion around the possible use of a ‘bail-in’ tool to write down or convert into equity some classes of unsecured debt of a firm in resolution. This would enable the resolution authority to allow losses to fall on some creditors by reducing the value of their claims on the firm without having to deal with the operational and legal consequences of transferring some of the business to a purchaser. The practical benefits of such an approach may be significant articularly when dealing with large and complex banks with huge numbers of counterparties and contracts governed by different laws.

This business of giving the resolution authority the ability to change the seniority of claims in an insolvency by fiat, instead of in accord with existing bankruptcy law, is what really sticks in my craw. Discretionary “bail-in” provisions at the whim of the regulator are an affront to the rule of law.

The other article I found of interest was “Developments in the global securities lending market”, but this was a review of the topic and how it is changing, with little that was particularly new or controversial.

Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality

November 24th, 2011

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Anna Pomeranets and Daniel G. Weaver titled Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality:

We examine nine changes in the New York State Security Transaction Taxes (STT) between 1932 and 1981. We find that imposing or increasing an STT results in wider bid ask spreads, lower volume, and increased price impact of trades. In contrast to theories of STT imposition as a means to reduce volatility, we find no consistent relationship between the level of an STT and volatility. We examine the propensity of traders to switch trading locations to avoid the tax and find no consistent evidence that they will change locations. We do find evidence to suggest that taxes imposed on the par value of stock will result in corporations managing the par value in the direction of minimizing the impact of the tax on investors.

Section II of the report, “Regulatory History”, give a highly entertaining account of the history of STT with the New York state government attempting to collect as much revenue as it could, with the affected companies, investors and competitors attempting to minimize the figure. A lot of time, and highly skilled time at that, must have been burned up in these games – which is the most insidious effect of a targetted tax.

Similar fun and games have been observed elsewhere, particularly with respect to preferred shares, as discussed on the blog in the post Par Value.

The literature review in section III traces the debate from the beginning:

The earliest proponents of STTs, Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978), argue that an STT will improve market quality. In particular, Keynes contends that chasing short-term returns, while potentially profitable to specific individuals, is a zero-sum game in terms of economic welfare. Since one investor’s gain is another’s loss and trading utilizes resources, the value-added through trading is negative. As a result, imposing an STT may increase welfare by reducing wasted resources. Second, since trading is speculative by nature, it potentially contributes to financial instability when trades are driven by short-term capital gains and not fundamental information. Keynes argues that an STT will curtail short-term speculation, and thereby reduce wasted resources, market volatility and asset mispricing. Consistent with Keynes, Tobin (1978) proposes a tax on foreign exchange transactions that would make short term currency trading unprofitable. He suggests that a transaction tax would “throw some sand in the wheels of speculation.”

I have a bit of a problem with this. In the first place, speculators help long term investors by providing liquidity when they wish to buy and sell; in the second place, market prices are a very important signal to issuers, who can choose to start new companies or issue additional stock in accordance with the prices. A dramatic (if rather unfortunate) example of this was the Tech Boom of the late 1990’s, in which all kinds of companies were able to get financing thanks to the influence of speculators on the price of Internet stocks. All good things can be taken too far!

After examining the data, the authors conclude (in part):

Our findings largely come down on the side of opponents of the tax who suggest that an STT will harm market quality. Since spreads have been shown to be directly related to a firm’s cost of capital, imposing an STT may hinder economic growth by reducing the present value of projected profits.

November 23, 2011

November 24th, 2011

Remember Iceland? The first domino? It’s through the worst of it, according to S&P:

Iceland had its credit rating outlook revised to stable from negative by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, which cited economic growth in the country after two years of “severe contraction.”

“Significant headway has been made in restructuring the private-sector balance sheet and we expect the process to be mostly completed by mid-2012,” S&P said. The BBB-/A-3 sovereign ratings were affirmed.

But other dominoes are toppling:

Germany failed to get bids for 35 percent of the 10-year bonds offered for sale today, propelling borrowing costs in Europe higher and the euro lower on concern the region’s debt crisis is driving away investors.

The yield on Germany’s 2.25 percent securities maturing in September 2021 climbed 15 basis points to 2.06 percent at 4:46 p.m. London time.

Belgian 10-year yields surged 41 basis points to 5.48 percent, after reaching 5.53 percent, the highest since November 2000. French 10-year bond yields climbed 16 basis points to 3.69 percent. The yield on Greek two-year notes jumped to more than 120 percent for the first time, before slipping back to 116.59 percent.

Total bids at the auction of securities due in January 2022 amounted to 3.889 billion euros, out of a maximum target for the sale of 6 billion euros, according to Bundesbank data.

Six of the last eight bond sales by Germany have been “technically uncovered,” with fewer bids than the maximum amount on offer, Norbert Aul, a rates strategist at RBC Capital Markets in London, said in an e-mailed note.

Under the German auction system, the central bank retains securities at sales for the secondary market. In today’s offering, the debt agency allotted 3.644 billion euros of the securities, leaving the Bundesbank to retain 2.356 billion euros, or 39 percent of the supply. That’s the highest proportion of unsold debt at a 10-year sale since 1995, according to Bloomberg data. The securities were sold at an average yield of 1.98 percent. In the secondary market, the rate rose to 2.13 percent.

DBRS confirmed Westcoast at Pfd-2(low):

DBRS has today confirmed the Unsecured Debentures, First Preferred Shares and Commercial Paper ratings of Westcoast Energy Inc. (Westcoast or the Company) at A (low), Pfd-2 (low) and R-1 (low), respectively, all with Stable trends.

On a consolidated basis (excluding the intercompany transaction), the Company’s external debt-to-capital ratio (52% at September 30, 2011; 54% at year-end 2008) and cash flow-to-external debt (19% for both the 12 months ending September 30, 2011, and in 2008) were relatively unchanged, while external fixed charges coverage (2.8 times, up from 2.5 times) improved marginally, partly due to contributions from expansions placed in service as noted above.

On a non-consolidated basis, Westcoast’s direct ownership of BCPFS fully supports its ability to meet its direct debt obligations. Its credit metrics are enhanced by cash dividends from several sources, the largest of which is Union Gas, which generate approximately 50% of the Company’s non-consolidated cash flow. Excluding the intercompany transaction, Westcoast’s non-consolidated external debt-to-capital ratio increased to 36% in 2010 from 32% in 2008, while cash flow-to-external debt (25%, up from 16%) and external fixed charges coverage (3.2 times, up from 2.2 times) improved significantly, mainly as a result of contributions from expansions noted above.

TMX DataLinx has collywobbles yet again, so this report is being prepared with Yahoo! data.

It was a rough day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 9bp, FixedResets off 12bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 14bp. All five entries in the Performance Highlights table were losers. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.15% (this figure is somewhat distorted by the fact that five of the seventeen issues are actually at a premium now and another two are bang-on par; the index is only rebalanced monthly), equivalent to 6.70% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates are now at about 4.75%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 195bp, tightening a bit (perhaps spuriously) from the 205bp reported November 16.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4795 % 2,133.1
FixedFloater 4.91 % 4.65 % 29,609 17.08 1 0.2592 % 3,137.2
Floater 3.37 % 3.39 % 155,972 18.71 2 -0.4795 % 2,303.2
OpRet 4.97 % 2.45 % 52,068 1.48 7 0.0220 % 2,476.5
SplitShare 5.80 % 6.42 % 57,570 5.17 3 0.0988 % 2,530.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0220 % 2,264.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.58 % 0.85 % 103,037 0.13 13 -0.2247 % 2,153.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.31 % 5.15 % 100,427 14.78 17 -0.0917 % 2,297.2
FixedReset 5.10 % 2.97 % 222,055 2.48 64 -0.1184 % 2,346.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.44 % 201,901 3.86 46 -0.1418 % 2,218.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.30
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 1,353,175 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 117,120 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.94; Scotia crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 101,400 RBC crossed 100,000 at 26.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 59,560 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 42,067 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 41,588 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.00 – 26.44
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2887

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 19.34 – 20.12
Spot Rate : 0.7800
Average : 0.6480

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.34
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.35 – 24.84
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3595

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.20 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.30 – 52.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2185

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.30
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.65 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2609

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 24.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

ENB.PR.D Reaches Premium on Huge Volume

November 24th, 2011

Enbridge Inc. has announced:

it has closed its previously announced public offering of cumulative redeemable preferred shares, Series D (the “Series D Preferred Shares”) by a syndicate of underwriters co-led by TD Securities Inc, RBC Capital Markets and Scotia Capital Inc. Enbridge issued 18 million Series D Preferred Shares for gross proceeds of $450 million. The Series D Preferred Shares will begin trading on the TSX today under the symbol ENB.PR.D. The proceeds will be used for capital expenditures, to repay indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes.

ENB.PR.D is a FixedReset, 4.00%+237, announced November 14. The issue traded 1,353,175 shares today in a range of 25.05-20 before closing at 25.10-13, 12×5.

For those interested in market trivia, this is the 88th highest daily share volume in the HIMIPref™ database of 632,706 entries.

ENB.PR.D will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset index. Vital statistics are:

ENB.PR.D FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-23
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %

November 22, 2011

November 22nd, 2011

The SEC’s campaign to create a society of paid informers is proving remarkably successful:

Bounty-hunting corporate tipsters are filing reports of potential wrongdoing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at a rate of about seven per day, according to the first progress report from the agency’s new whistle-blower program.

The public snapshot released last week counted 334 tips in the first 50 days after the program — revamped under the Dodd- Frank Act — became fully operational on Aug. 12.

The program gives whistle-blowers a share of proceeds if their tips lead to more than $1 million in penalties. So far, the top three categories of tips are those alleging market manipulation, problems with public disclosure or fraud in offerings.

I hope they’re managing it all right. I’m sure there’s still lots of ex-officers around from the East German STASI – perhaps they can be recruited as case managers.

The Fed’s stress test is … stressful:

The Federal Reserve told the 31 largest U.S. banks to test their loan portfolios and trading books against a deep recession and a European market shock to ensure they have enough capital to withstand losses.

The most severe test scenarios outlined by the Fed today include an unemployment rate of as much as 13 percent, an 8 percent drop in gross domestic product and a 21 percent plunge in home prices.

The Fed will also publish the results of the tests for the 19 largest bank holding companies. Six institutions with large trading operations will have to estimate potential losses from a hypothetical “global market shock,” the Fed said. That shock will be based on market price movements seen during the second half of 2008, it said, and include a scenario involving “sharp market price movements in European sovereign and financial sectors.”

The Fed said it would publish the results of the market shock scenario of the six institutions: Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Company.

The Fed said it would approve dividend increases and other capital distributions “only for companies whose capital plans are approved by supervisors and are able to demonstrate sufficient financial strength to operate as successful financial intermediaries under stressed macroeconomic and financial market scenarios.”

It was a mild day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 2bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 4bp. The Performance Highlights table was very short, with only three entries. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.9032 % 2,143.4
FixedFloater 4.92 % 4.66 % 29,980 17.07 1 0.2078 % 3,129.1
Floater 3.36 % 3.37 % 155,697 18.76 2 0.9032 % 2,314.3
OpRet 4.97 % 2.74 % 51,772 1.48 7 0.0330 % 2,475.9
SplitShare 5.81 % 6.47 % 58,198 5.17 3 -0.0141 % 2,528.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0330 % 2,264.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.57 % -0.80 % 101,968 0.12 13 0.1110 % 2,158.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.30 % 5.18 % 101,128 14.76 17 0.0169 % 2,299.3
FixedReset 5.10 % 2.87 % 224,828 2.48 63 0.0218 % 2,349.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.40 % 204,779 3.87 46 0.0401 % 2,221.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-22
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : -0.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 114,737 Anonymous crossed 21,400 at 25.15. Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 109,491 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 25.20; Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 103,025 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 93,549 Nesbitt sold 31,000 to anonymous at 27.41, then crossed 60,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.34
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 73,950 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 69,202 Desjardins bought 15,300 from Nesbitt at 25.32, then crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 23.40
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3012

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.20 – 23.59
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2929

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.45 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3037

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.60 – 24.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2164

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 19.29 – 19.85
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.5033

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-22
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.29
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 23.00 – 23.25
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1952

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %

New Issue: TA FixedReset 4.60%+310

November 22nd, 2011

TransAlta Corporation has announced:

that it has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotia Capital Inc. for distribution to the public 8,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series C (the “Series C Shares”). The Series C Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series C Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $200 million. Holders of the Series C Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.60% annually for the initial period ending June 30, 2017. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.10%.

Holders of Series C Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series D (the “Series D Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on June 30, 2017 and on June 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series D Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.10%.

TransAlta Corporation has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series C Shares at the same offering price. The Series C Shares will be offered by way of prospectus supplement under the short form base shelf prospectus of TransAlta Corporation dated November 15, 2011. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

The net proceeds of the Offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, for other general corporate purposes and to reduce short term indebtedness of the Corporation and its affiliates. The offering is expected to close on or about November 30, 2011.

They announced shortly afterwards that they:

increased its previously announced bought deal financing to $275 million. TransAlta Corporation has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotia Capital Inc. for distribution to the public 11,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series C (the “Series C Shares”). The Series C Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series C Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $275 million.

Update 2011-11-24: Rated Pfd-3 by DBRS

November 21, 2011

November 22nd, 2011

More evidence that the EU should be insisting on a Greek referendum, not forbidding one:

The world’s leading financiers are betting they can prevent bankruptcy in Greece with a bailout deal that will force strict austerity on its citizens, but that plan does not account for stubborn people like Olga Katimertzis.

The 58-year-old has served as a deputy mayor in the Athens suburb of Nea Ionia for more than three decades, and she embodies the way this country has started to fight itself. Wearing an old leather jacket in her chilly office, and chain-smoking cigarettes, she proudly describes how her municipality is offering free legal advice to anybody who refuses to pay new taxes imposed by the central government. Her offices are even organizing human barricades to prevent the electrical utility from disconnecting people who fall behind on their bills.

The MF Global receivership is heating up a little:

MF Global Inc.’s shortfall in U.S. segregated customer accounts may exceed $1.2 billion, more than double what was previously expected, said the trustee overseeing a liquidation of the failed brokerage run by former New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine.

That would mean customer accounts are missing about 22 percent of their total of $5.4 billion. A shortfall of 11 percent had been previously estimated by a person with knowledge of probes into the firm’s collapse. James Giddens, the trustee, said today that forensic accountants and investigators are working “around the clock,” and the estimate may change.

The CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission are also investigating cash movements at the firm before the bankruptcy filing. Regulators haven’t located the money.

The estimated amount of the shortfall has fluctuated. Examiners from CME Group Inc., the world’s largest futures exchange, found unexplained wire transfers at MF Global Inc. and a $900 million shortfall in client funds during the weekend the failing broker was talking with possible buyers, a person briefed on the matter said.

I’m still having a hard time taking this seriously. The first thing a liquidator does after being appointed by regulators is vilify ex-management – this not only makes him a hero when he announces he’s got all the money, but keeps him on good terms with the regulator who appointed him, so he’ll be in line for the next appointment as well. I note that the phrases “unexplained wire transfers” and “$900 million shortfall” are indeed in the same sentence in the quoted report, but are not directly connected. Ah, well, we will see!

The US is still not serious about deficit reduction:

A special debt-reduction committee in the U.S. Congress failed to reach agreement, extending partisan gridlock into the 2012 election year and setting the stage for $1.2 trillion in automatic spending cuts.

President Barack Obama blamed Republicans, saying in remarks at the White House they “refused to listen to the voices of reason and compromise.” The president said he would veto any move to avoid the automatic spending cuts that are supposed to start in 2013 as a result of panel’s failure.

Committee co-chairmen Representative Jeb Hensarling of Texas, a Republican, and Senator Patty Murray of Washington, a Democrat, said in an e-mailed statement that “after months of hard work and intense deliberations, we have come to the conclusion today that it will not be possible to make any bipartisan agreement available to the public before the committee’s deadline.”

As we’ve seen in Europe (and as we saw in Canada in 1994) nobody takes deficit reduction seriously until the market starts giving them major problems.

The Star had a good article on milkfare on Sunday, with a link to a restaurant industry website advocating reform, which contained a further link to a Facebook page advocating reform. The comments on the page are dominated by milkfare recipients and their fellow travellers – which only makes sense, considering that the benefits to the few are charged to the many – but I’m engaged in an interesting debate on one of the posts, anyway. Eventually, I hope, all participants on that thread will agree to the rough equation:

Canadian Milk Price = Free Market Price + Cost of Quota + Unearned Rents

… which, since they will insist that Unearned Rents = 0, will resolve to

Canadian Milk Price = Free Market Price + Cost of Quota

at which point maybe we can start getting somewhere. Milkfare was an appalling policy blunder which has only gotten worse since inception: it’s time for the politicians to ‘fess up to the fact that it ain’t working and move to a free market with compensation to farmers for loss of quota value.

Spread the word! What is really needed is a non-partisan campaign during the next election, urging all voters to ask the candidates what they will do to end milkfare. If Ontario gets eightteen more urban seats in the coming redistribution, that can only help the effort!

Wow, man … Cooler-ado is a happenin’ place, you know?:

There are currently 16 states that allow some form of legalized medical marijuana, Bloomberg Businessweek reports in its Nov. 21 edition. Only Colorado allows marijuana businesses to operate as such. It’s the first, and for the moment, only, for-profit marijuana marketplace in the U.S.

Predictably, Colorado is in the midst of a marijuana boom. From 2000, when Colorado voters legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes with Amendment 20, to 2008, Colorado issued roughly 2,000 medical marijuana cards to patients living in the state. By 2011 that number had jumped to over 127,000 paying customers, according to the Colorado Medical Marijuana Registry, and at least 25,000 more have applications pending.

Assiduous Reader BG sends me an interesting article titled Will WiFi Kill Us All, which discusses the long-term health risks associated with heavy exposure to cell ‘phones and WiFi electromagnetic radiation. I don’t buy it myself – I think the author has just experienced a placebo effect – but who knows? Something is behind the explosion in autism, peanut allergies, senile dementia (which may just be because we’re living longer, I don’t know) and alien abductions, but we don’t know what. I subscribe to the “soup theory” myself – simply that we now live in an environment where there’s lots of interesting chemicals and influences which have never existed before. A one-in-a-million chance is pretty minor, but if you take a million of ’em, you’re likely to get burnt.

DBRS confirmed TDS.PR.C at Pfd-2(low).

Today’s report is being made with Yahoo! prices because TMX DataLinx has colly-wobbles again.

It was a down day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 1bp, FixedResets off 9bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 12bp. All entries on the Performance Highlights table were losers. Volume was light.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3215 % 2,124.2
FixedFloater 4.94 % 4.67 % 29,925 17.05 1 -2.5316 % 3,122.6
Floater 3.39 % 3.41 % 155,025 18.69 2 -0.3215 % 2,293.6
OpRet 4.97 % 3.54 % 51,412 1.48 7 -0.5801 % 2,475.1
SplitShare 5.80 % 6.42 % 57,363 5.17 3 -0.3376 % 2,528.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5801 % 2,263.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.57 % 0.45 % 101,347 0.13 13 -0.0854 % 2,155.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.30 % 5.30 % 102,115 14.76 17 -0.0072 % 2,298.9
FixedReset 5.10 % 2.96 % 225,125 2.48 63 -0.0929 % 2,349.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.37 % 207,206 3.87 46 -0.1230 % 2,220.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-21
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-21
Maturity Price : 24.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-11-21
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 46,926 Nesbitt crossed 43,000 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 39,650 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 35,875 RBC crossed 23,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.24
Bid-YTW : 2.59 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 35,609 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.79; TD crossed 10,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.74
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 32,561 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 29,275 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 27.49.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.22 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.3988

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 23.90 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.2913

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.70 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3124

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.64 – 53.28
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.4776

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.64
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.86 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.3857

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

BAM.PR.I OpRet Quote: 25.27 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3392

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %

New Issue: BAF FixedReset 4.55%+309

November 21st, 2011

Bell Aliant has announced:

that its subsidiary Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. (the “Company”) will be issuing 4,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series C (the “Series C Preferred Shares”), at a price of $25.00 per Series C Preferred Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million on a bought-deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets, Scotia Capital and BMO Capital Markets.

The underwriters have been granted an over-allotment option to purchase an additional 600,000 Series C Preferred Shares at the offering price. Should the over-allotment option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the Series C Preferred Share offering will be $115 million.

The Series C Preferred Shares will pay cumulative dividends of $1.1375 per share per annum, yielding 4.55 per cent, payable quarterly if, as and when declared by the Company’s board of directors (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on March 31, 2012), for the initial five-year period ending March 31, 2017. The dividend rate will be reset on March 31, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.09 per cent. The Series C Preferred Shares will be redeemable by the issuer on or after March 31, 2017, in accordance with their terms.

Holders of the Series C Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series D, (the “Series D Preferred Shares”) subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2017 and on March 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series D Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.09 per cent, if, as and when declared by the Company’s board of directors.

The Series C Preferred Shares will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces and territories of Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus to be filed with Canadian securities regulatory authorities in all Canadian provinces and territories. The offering is scheduled to close on or about December 7, 2011, subject to certain conditions, including obtaining all necessary regulatory approvals.

The net proceeds of this offering will be used to make a lump-sum voluntary contribution to certain of Bell Aliant’s pension plans and for general corporate purposes.

The ‘use of funds ‘ is fascinating, especially since their 11Q3 press release notes that they made a $200-million contribution in 11Q1. The 11Q3 report notes:

Net benefit plans cost included in operating costs (pension expense) in 2011 will be $60–$65 million based on a discount rate of 5.3 per cent and a long-term rate of return on plan assets of 6.1 per cent, up from a comparable 2010 IFRS-based pension expense of $53 million;

The Statement of Comprehensive Income includes $150.2-million “Actuarial losses on defined benefit pension (DB) and other post-employment benefits (OPEB) plans”; the year-to-date figure is $176.4-million. Note 5 of the 11Q3 report is kind of horrific …they have a “Net benefit obligation as at September 30, 2011” of a little over $1-billion. Maybe we’ll see some more preferred share issues from these guys!

The issue is rated Pfd-3(high) by DBRS.

YLO 11Q3 Conference Call Transcript

November 19th, 2011

For those interested, I commissioned a transcript of the YLO 11Q3 conference call. Hymas Investment Management makes no representation or warranties regarding the accuracy or completeness of this transcript – use it at your own risk.

The company has made the call available only as a webcast. The Thomson-Reuters transcript is selling for $54 at time of writing – it was offered earlier for $106.

YLO has four preferred share issues trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange: YLO.PR.A & YLO.PR.B (OperatingRetractible) and YLO.PR.C & YLO.PR.C (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™, all are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns. The first three issues listed were removed from the TXPR index in October. DBRS downgraded all the issues by four notches in September.