Capital Surcharges for Globally Important Investment Banks

June 27th, 2011

The Bank for International Settlements has announced:

the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), agreed on a consultative document setting out measures for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). These measures include the methodology for assessing systemic importance, the additional required capital and the arrangements by which they will be phased in. These measures will strengthen the resilience of G-SIBs and create strong incentives for them to reduce their systemic importance over time.

The GHOS is submitting this consultative document to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is coordinating the overall set of measures to reduce the moral hazard posed by global systemically important financial institutions. This package of measures will be issued for consultation around the end of July 2011.

The assessment methodology for G-SIBs is based on an indicator-based approach and comprises five broad categories: size, interconnectedness, lack of substitutability, global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and complexity.

The additional loss absorbency requirements are to be met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5%, depending on a bank’s systemic importance. To provide a disincentive for banks facing the highest charge to increase materially their global systemic importance in the future, an additional 1% surcharge would be applied in such circumstances.

The higher loss absorbency requirements will be introduced in parallel with the Basel III capital conservation and countercyclical buffers, ie between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019.

The GHOS and BCBS will continue to review contingent capital, and support the use of contingent capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the global minimum, as high-trigger contingent capital could help absorb losses on a going concern basis.

I have mixed views on this. I reported last August that the push towards surcharges was gaining ground and have been advocating surcharges based on size since (at least!) March 2009.

However, I am unfavourably disposed towards the narrow focus of the plan, which affects only “global systemically important banks” as defined by the regulators and then uses an as-yet untested formula “based on an indicator-based approach and comprises five broad categories: size, interconnectedness, lack of substitutability, global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and complexity” to assess the surcharge imposed. There’s a lot of room for error there, and a lot of room for lobbying. There’s also a lot of cliff effect: what will be the effect on the markets when a bank’s G-SIB status is changed? What if it changes during the height of a crisis? What if a well capitalized medium sized bank is interested in purchasing a failing medium sized bank during a crisis? We saw that during the crisis, a lot of the American banks bulked up – will they be willing to bid next time? And finally, of course, the subjective nature of the G-SIB status determination opens up the door for a lot of lobbying and corruption.

I would be much happier with a system that was formula-based and applied to all banks on a progressive basis.

I was very pleased to see that the committees “support the use of contingent capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the global minimum, as high-trigger contingent capital could help absorb losses on a going concern basis”. The critical part of that phrase is high-trigger contingent capital, which is really one in the eye for those morons at OSFI, who have decided that the lowest possible trigger is the best. However, the “low-trigger” policy was enacted during the reign of the Assistant Croupier; now that he has departed for a greener pastures with a company he used to regulate (see June 14), the new incumbent may have different ideas.

HIMIPref™ Yield Calculation Change

June 26th, 2011

In the comments to the June 22 report, Assiduous Reader drap1 asked:

Hi…quick question about last prefletter. I’ve seen this other times, but here is a clear example:

With respect to TRP.PR.B and TRP.PR.C, TRP.PR.C has a higher dividend, higher reset price and higher market price (both are above $25); however, your model evaluates TRP.PR.C to perpetuity, but TRP.PR.B, to its reset date. What am I missing? Why doesn’t TRP.PR.C get evaluated to its reset date?

TRP.PR.C does resets a year later which could create a small difference depending on the yld curve, but I don’t think that’s the answer.

Good question! For a quick answer, here are the summaries of the two optionCalculationLists on the pseudoPortfolioReportBox:

Report Box
Instrument•:•TRP.PR.B (Security A51015)
PseudoPortfolioElement: Pricing Modification – Base Option ID: Undefined
Reporting: YTM (Port Method) at Bid
*****
Evaluated at bid price : 25.4000
Call 2015-07-30 YTM: 3.51 % [Restricted: 3.51 %] (Prob: 45.09 %)
Call 2020-07-30 YTM: 3.46 % [Restricted: 3.46 %] (Prob: 0.30 %)
Limit Maturity 2041-06-10 YTM: 3.47 % [Restricted: 3.47 %] (Prob: 54.61 %)
YTM (Port Method) : 3.4865 %

and

Report Box
Instrument•:•TRP.PR.C (Security A51016)
PseudoPortfolioElement: Pricing Modification – Base Option ID: Undefined
Reporting: YTM (Port Method) at Bid
*****
Evaluated at bid price : 25.9000
Call 2016-02-29 YTM: 3.65 % [Restricted: 3.65 %] (Prob: 52.02 %)
Limit Maturity 2041-06-10 YTM: 3.56 % [Restricted: 3.56 %] (Prob: 47.98 %)
YTM (Port Method) : 3.6095 %

So part of the problem is a stenographical error: I should have specified that the call on TRP.PR.B was calculated to the second reset date but, frankly, missed that when transcribing the table.

However, the interesting question is the appearance of second reset date in the TRP.PR.B table but not in the TRP.PR.C table, particularly given that the probability of exercise of this option is less than half a percent.

Possible options are added to the calculation list only if the probability of exercise, when initially calculated, is greater than the value OPTION_EXERCISE_CALCULATION_INCREMENT_PROBABILITY, which is currently set to 5%. However, subsequent normalizations did not enforce this constraint.

Additionally, as can be seen from the cashFlowDiscountingAnalysisBox, the cash flows to 2020 for TRP.PR.B extend one month further than the actual call date, as has been previously discussed on PrefBlog in the post What is the Yield of RY.PR.Y? due to the influence of the maturityNoticePeriod.

“Cliff Effects” are a bugaboo in all analysis and have been blamed, at least in part, for the Panic of 2007 (since a credit rating downgrade raised the capital requirements for all regulated holders, who therefore all had a strong prediliction to sell at the same time). By its nature, YTW is subject to cliff effects, at least insofar as it comes to reporting the duration of the YTW scenario (the amount of change in duration for relatively small changes in price is measured by the attribute pseudoConvexityWorst).

Two changes in programming have been made that should make the calculations at least little easier to explain, although cliff effects will still be present:
i) The constraint OPTION_EXERCISE_CALCULATION_INCREMENT_PROBABILITY is enforced during the normalization of option exercise probabilities
ii) maturityNoticePeriod is only accounted for when the exercise date is less than MATURITY_NOTICE_PERIOD days from the calculation date.

I have been toying with the second idea for quite some time and the change will save me a lot of explanations regarding yield calculation. I’ve resisted the idea because (a) as far as I can tell, it won’t make much difference and (b) a complex analytical programme is a chaotic system, meaning that small changes to some parts can cause huge differences in output under certain conditions. But now seems as good a time as any to proceed.

The effect of these changes on the YTW calculation is displayed in the following reports:

WFS.PR.A Term Extension Approved

June 24th, 2011

This is late, but Mulvihill Capital Management has announced:

that holders of Class A Shares and holders of Preferred Shares of the Fund have approved a proposal to extend the term of the Fund for seven years beyond its scheduled termination date of June 30, 2011, and for automatic successive seven-year terms after June 30, 2018.

As a result, holders of Class A Shares will benefit from ongoing leveraged exposure to a high-quality portfolio consisting principally of common equity securities selected from the ten largest (by market capitalization) financial services companies in each of Canada, the United States and the rest of the world. Holders of Preferred Shares will continue to benefit from fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash dividends in the amount of $0.13125 per Preferred Share representing a yield of 5.25% per annum on the original issue price of $10.00 per Preferred Share and an attractive seven-year term.

As part of the extension of the term of the Fund, the Fund will also make other changes, including: (i) provide a special redemption right to enable holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares to retract their shares on June 30, 2011 on the same terms that would have applied had the Fund redeemed all Class A Shares and Preferred Shares in accordance with the existing terms of such shares; (ii) change the monthly retraction prices for the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares such that monthly retraction prices are calculated by reference to market price in addition to net asset value and to change the notice period and payment period for the exercise of such rights and the payment of the retraction amount relating thereto; and (iii) consolidate the Class A Shares or redeem the Preferred Shares on a pro rata basis, as the case may be, in order to maintain the same number of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares outstanding.

Shareholders who exercise the special redemption right will receive the amount which they would have received had the June 30, 2011 termination date not been extended. Payments for shares tendered pursuant to the Special Retraction Right will be made no later than 10 business days after June 30, 2011, provided that such shares have been surrendered for redemption on or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on June 17, 2011. The retraction price per Class A Share to be received by a holder of Class A Shares under the Special Retraction Right will be equal to the greater of (a) the NAV per Unit on the Special Retraction Date minus $10.00 and (b) nil. The retraction price per Preferred Share to be received by a holder of Preferred Shares under the Special Retraction Right will be equal to the lesser of: (a) $10.00; and (b) the NAV of the Fund divided by the number of Preferred Shares outstanding on the Special Retraction Date. Any declared and unpaid distributions payable on or before the Special Retraction Date in respect of Class A Shares or Preferred Shares tendered for retraction on the Special Retraction Date will also be paid on the retraction payment date.

This follows publication of the notice of meeting and information circular

The proposal to extend term was discussed on PrefBlog. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

June 24, 2011

June 24th, 2011

The Europeans are tying themselves in knots while hairsplitting over Greece:

European Union leaders pledged to stabilize the euro-area economy, vowing to stave off a Greek default as long as Prime Minister George Papandreou pushes through a package of budget cuts next week.

Leaders of Europe’s six AAA rated countries have said the key ingredient of a second package must be a pledge by banks, insurance companies and asset managers to maintain their holdings of Greek bonds.

An EU statement spoke of the need for “informal and voluntary rollovers of existing Greek debt at maturity,” avoiding a coercive exchange that would lead credit-rating companies to declare Greece in default.

To make the rollover voluntary, talks with Greek bondholders must be held on a country-by-country basis, not organized from Brussels, an EU official told reporters yesterday. The EU wants national central banks and finance ministries to speak to financial institutions in their countries, the official said.

“We don’t see any way that investors are going to come out being paid on time and in full,” said Sean Egan, president of Egan-Jones Ratings Co. in Haverford, Pennsylvania.

Voluntarily agree to an exchange or there will be a coercive exchange! It would be laughable if it wasn’t so disgusting. Moral suasion from the central banks and finance ministries, eh? I bet that helps a lot when you call your bond guy looking for a bid; I bet that’s a really thin market.

Surprise! The banks don’t like being the voluntary piggy-banks of the state:

German Finance Ministry officials rebuffed a bid by bondholders for a state guarantee of new Greek securities as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government jostled with creditors over their share of a second rescue for Greece.

German banks and insurers including Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) and Allianz SE (ALV) signaled a willingness to roll over maturing Greek debt if governments offer incentives such as guarantees, said five people with knowledge of the talks. The Finance Ministry sees guarantees as a non-starter because they would undermine the aim of relieving the burden on taxpayers, a government official said.

There are mutterings about another domino:

Russia may face a debt crisis similar to the one gripping Greece by 2030 unless the government reduces spending, said Sergei Ulatov, the resident World Bank economist in Moscow.

“By 2030 the debt level would be unsustainable like in Greece” if nothing changes, Ulatov said in an interview during the Russia and CIS Capital Markets Forum organized by Euromoney in London today. “Right now, we are mostly helped by oil prices and not by a very prudent macroeconomic policy.”

But the first domino’s quite enough:

With default looking ever more likely, the great fear is that a major Greek credit event could imperil some large European banks, given the substantial cross-border sovereign debt held in the eurozone’s biggest economies.

“If there were a failure to resolve that situation it would pose threats to the European financial system, the global financial system, and to European political unity I would conjecture as well,” Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke said Wednesday, underlining the exposure of European money market funds to Greek debt.

I suspect that the Europeans will treat their zombie banks the same way they treated their zombie countries: not by ignoring the problem, but by changing the rules so that there is no problem.

Speaking of dominos and zombie banks…:

Italian banks slumped in Milan trading amid concern the European debt crisis may spread just as lenders face scrutiny from regulators over capital levels.

UniCredit SpA (UCG), Italy’s biggest bank, and Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (ISP), the second-largest, led lenders lower, tumbling as much as 8.9 percent and 7.2 percent respectively. Both stocks were briefly suspended after breaching limits on intraday swings. Italian 10-year bonds fell, increasing the additional yield investors demand to hold the securities instead of benchmark German bunds to the most since the euro was introduced in 1999.

Moody’s Investors Service said yesterday it may downgrade 13 Italian banks because they are vulnerable to a cut in the government’s credit rating. The firm had said last week it may cut the sovereign rating because the turmoil in Europe could drive the country’s borrowing costs higher.

Nobody is yet seriously worried about US Treasuries:

Two-year yields slipped one basis point to 0.33 percent today compared with a low of 0.31 percent in November. Ten-year yields lost 4 basis points to 2.87 percent today, the lowest since November.

Asssiduous Reader GL brought to my attention a speech by Mike Lazaridis titled The Killam Annual Lecture 2010:

I just want to ask people in the audience to answer a question for me. What would you say is your most prized possession? Have you ever thought about this? [someone in the audience yells out Blackberry] Yes, the Blackberry definitely could be up on that list but I would put something even higher . . . your education! How many people in this room could honestly say that if they thought about it their most prized possession would be their education?

On a slightly more paranoid note, I’ve always liked the point that an education is the one thing that “they” can never take away from you.

ISS backed the TMX-LSE deal:

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) instead threw its support behind TMX Group Inc. (X-T45.16-0.14-0.31%)’s proposed merger with London Stock Exchange Group Plc. The recommendation is important because ISS recommendations influence the votes of a number of institutional investors – though on it own, it will not likely be enough to tilt to balance in the LSE’s favour.

But much of the cash to finance the Maple offer would be borrowed, using TMX’s balance sheet, a fact that both ISS and Glass Lewis, a smaller advisory firm, identified as a drawback. The two also found common ground on the risks that Maple’s proposal would not get past the Competition Bureau. Because ISS believes the barriers to getting this approval are higher than those that TSX-LSE must cross, it suggests shareholders support the LSE deal because it is a “bird in hand.”

In any other country, of course, a proposal to merge the #1 exchange with the #2 wouldn’t even get the time of day at the Competition Bureau – particularly given that places #3 through #37 are not awarded due to the small size of the also-rans. But this is Canada; bureaucrats and politicians have to think about where their next job’s going to come from, so it just means ‘higher barriers’.

However, the ISS endorsement is, I believe, more important that the Globe story makes out: there will be a lot of firms, particularly those with index funds, who will be very heavily influenced by these third party recommendations.

How much did Paulson lose on Sino-Forest? It depends on how you count:

Paulson & Co. held 31 million shares of Sino-Forest in May, or 12.5 percent of outstanding stock, the firm said in a letter to clients. It had sold the entire stake as of June 17. The net realized loss on the investment since Paulson started buying Sino-Forest in 2007 was C$106 million, according to the letter.

Sino-Forest’s shares have dropped 82 percent since June 2, when Carson Block’s Muddy Waters LLC said the company overstated its timber holdings. Sino-Forest has denied the allegations. Paulson’s fund had C$562 million in mark-to-market losses since Dec. 31 on the investment, the firm said in the letter.

It must be fun doing business in Illinois:

In Illinois, you’re never too big or too small to get stiffed by the state, which is $4 billion behind in its bills.

While states periodically fall behind in paying Medicaid providers or, in the case of California, rely on bank loans and IOUs, the Illinois backlog has been growing for three years. It’s forcing some vendors to fire workers, cut services and, if they can, obtain loans and lines of credit to keep their businesses going while the state takes months to pay.

“These are small businesses owed $1,100 to $1,500 and waiting six to nine months to get paid,” said Duane Marsh, executive director of the Illinois Funeral Directors Association. “It isn’t chump change.”

Delayed payments are also affecting hospitals, universities and public-school districts.

S&P has put Gaz Metro on watch-negative:

  • •Quebec energy company Gaz Metro Inc. (GMI) has announced an offer to acquire Central Vermont Public Service Corp. (CVPS) for nearly US$500 million.
  • •As a result, Standard & Poor’s is placing its ratings on GMI and subsidiary Gaz Metro L.P., including its ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit and ‘A’ secured debt ratings, on CreditWatch with negative implications.
  • •GMI’s offer includes the assumption of US$230 million of CVPS’s debt.•We plan to resolve the CreditWatch in a timely manner after further assessment of this deal and discussions with the company.

What happened to Yellow this week?

YLO Issues, 2011-6-24
Ticker Quote
6/17
Quote
6/24
Bid YTW
6/24
YTW
Scenario
6/24
Performance
6/17 – 6/24
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 23.46-59 23.03-20 9.96% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
-1.83%
YLO.PR.B 15.70-75 15.60-00

14.70% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
-0.64%
YLO.PR.C 14.80-90 16.05-27 10.06% Limit Maturity +8.45%
YLO.PR.D 15.01-26 16.42-60 10.05% Limit Maturity +9.39%

It was a relatively quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 10bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was anemic.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2105 % 2,470.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2105 % 3,715.0
Floater 2.45 % 2.22 % 42,189 21.73 4 0.2105 % 2,667.1
OpRet 4.87 % 3.17 % 62,945 0.91 9 -0.0086 % 2,437.9
SplitShare 5.25 % -0.28 % 59,446 0.47 6 -0.0003 % 2,505.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0086 % 2,229.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.68 % 5.16 % 143,101 1.38 12 0.0121 % 2,075.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.55 % 123,586 14.60 18 0.0117 % 2,179.1
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.39 % 206,050 2.79 57 0.0151 % 2,307.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.08 % 4.92 % 283,037 8.15 47 -0.0955 % 2,151.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 319,454 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-24
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 0.81 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 121,194 RBC crossed 50,100 at 24.50; Nesbitt crossed blocks of 35,000 and 14,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 56,364 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.41
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 53,302 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.40; RBC did the same.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.38
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 34,419 RBC bought 13,100 from CIBC at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 33,502 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.66
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.50 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3325

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %

CM.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 27.09 – 27.49
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2789

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

CM.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.97 – 25.30
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2116

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 50.52 – 50.90
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2719

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-04
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 50.52
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.63 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2681

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.36 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2085

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %

BoE Financial Stability Report, June 2011

June 24th, 2011

The Bank of England has released its Financial Stability Report, June 2011.

Unfortunately, the Bank has taken action to ensure that the information published in this report does not fall into the wrong hands. The PDF document is secured (at the 128 bit level, no less!) in a manner which prohibits copying of extracts. Hah! That will teach Al Qaeda to quote from the Bank of England Financial Stability Report!

My attention was immediately caught by the fact that BIS concerns regarding synthetic ETFs have been given a prominent place in the threat list. Box 1 (on pages 16-17 of the PDF) points out that:

Because the collateral does not need to match the assets of the index being tracked, the bank might have incentives to use the synthetic ETF structure as a source of collateralised borrowing to fund illiquid portfolios

I’m not going to report on this any more because, quite frankly, I’m too pissed off at the moronic at worst and picayune at best restrictions on fair use imposed by the Bank’s encryption of the document. But read it; the research is quite good, which is presumably why it is being kept secret.

Update: Chart 1.4 has an interesting reference to Panigirtzoglou, N and Scammell, R (2002) ‘Analysts’ earnings forecasts and equity valuations’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Spring, pages 59-66

June 23, 2011

June 23rd, 2011

Moody’s will be making adjustments to some debt ratings:

A landmark Ontario court ruling bolstering the rights of pension plan members in bankruptcy cases could have an impact on credit ratings for companies with underfunded pension plans, according to a new report by debt rating agency Moody’s Investors Services Inc.

Moody’s said a review of 84 Canadian industrial companies it rates found two companies — Air Canada (AC.B-T2.250.073.21%) and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. — whose debt might be vulnerable to downgrade if the Ontario court decision is upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. The report said the impact would likely be limited and would affect ratings of specific debt instruments rather than a company’s overall credit rating.

“The ruling does not change how we measure debt and other liabilities, but it does change the priority of claim and the relative ranking of liabilities, which is relevant when assessing individual debt-instrument ratings,” said Bill Wolfe, Moody’s vice-president and senior credit officer.

“On this basis, we expect that only instrument-level ratings will be affected by the ruling.”

Moody’s said it will not change any ratings until there is a decision from the Supreme Court and it is clear there is a final ruling in the case.

Presumably it is Loss Given Default that will be affected more than Probability of Default. The effect of the ruling appears to be similar to the intent of Bill C-501.

Allied Irish has defaulted in the view of DBRS:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) today has downgraded the ratings of certain subordinated debt issued by Allied Irish Banks p.l.c. (AIB or the Group) to “D” from “C”. Today’s downgrade follows the execution of the Group’s note purchase offer.

Almost all of these instruments have been extinguished. The default status for the purchased and now-extinguished notes reflect DBRS’s view that bondholders were offered limited options, which is considered a default under DBRS policy, as discussed in DBRS’s press release dated 19 May 2011.

For AIB’s GBP 500 million Dated Subordinated Debt due 2025 and its EUR 500 million Dated Subordinated Debt due 2017, which are still outstanding due to the lack of consent for a clean up call, DBRS has downgraded their ratings to ‘D’. The downgrade reflects DBRS’s expectations that the interest payments of these outstanding subordinated instruments will be halted on the next payment date, as allowed by the Irish High Court. Further, the downgrade considers the extension of the final maturity dates, which are now extended to 2035. Given that bondholders are unlikely to receive interest as agreed upon and that the expected maturity has been extended, DBRS views these actions as disadvantageous to bondholders, which is considered a default under DBRS policy.

However, the rating of AIB’s GBP 368.253 million Dated Subordinated Debt due 2019, which is still outstanding, is unchanged at ‘C’, Under Review with Negative Implications. This rating considers that these notes have not yet been amended by AIB pursuant to the Subordinated Liabilities Order from the Irish High Court as a challenge in respect to these notes is ongoing before this Court.

S&P put Encana on Outlook-Negative:

  • •On June 21, 2011, Encana Corp. announced that it had ended its C$5.4 billion Cutbank Ridge joint venture negotiations with PetroChina International Investment Co.
  • •As a result, Standard & Poor’s is revising its outlook on Encana to negative from stable, and affirming its ‘BBB+’ long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on the company.
  • •We are also lowering our Canada scale commercial paper rating on Encana to ‘A-2’ from ‘A-1(Low)’.
  • •The negative outlook reflects our view that Encana’s adjusted debt to EBITDAX will remain above 2x through 2012, given weak natural gas prices and the company’s high capital expenditure plans, which we expect to outspend operating cash flow generated.

It was a mixed down day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 15bp, FixedResets of 11bp and DeemedRetractibles up 1bp. Volatility was muted; volume was quite good. Scotia had a good day..

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0234 % 2,464.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0234 % 3,707.2
Floater 2.46 % 2.22 % 39,133 21.73 4 -0.0234 % 2,661.5
OpRet 4.87 % 3.02 % 65,082 0.91 9 0.1933 % 2,438.1
SplitShare 5.25 % -0.28 % 61,806 0.47 6 0.0190 % 2,505.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1933 % 2,229.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 5.24 % 145,064 1.36 12 -0.0674 % 2,074.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.48 % 5.54 % 121,904 14.55 18 -0.1499 % 2,178.8
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.37 % 209,058 2.79 57 -0.1067 % 2,307.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.90 % 286,044 8.16 47 0.0095 % 2,153.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 189,106 Scotia crossed blocks of 102,400 and 55,200 at 22.35; then another 20,000 at 22.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 83,247 Scotia crossed blocks of 33,000 and 42,000, both at 23.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 78,213 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.11
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 49,779 RBC crossed blocks of 19,500 and 11,000, both at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 47,225 TD crossed 26,100 at 25.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 43,568 TD crossed 22,900 at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.28 – 21.85
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3178

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-23
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.28
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.57 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2234

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.12 – 21.46
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2209

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-23
Maturity Price : 21.12
Evaluated at bid price : 21.12
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %

NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.40 – 26.75
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2389

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.83 – 24.17
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2416

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.04 – 26.35
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2177

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %

CF.PR.A Settles Firm on Reasonable Volume

June 23rd, 2011

Canaccord Financial Inc has announced:

the completion of its previously announced offering of 4,000,000 Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series A ( the “Series A Preferred Shares”) at a purchase price of $25.00 per Series A Preferred Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million. The Series A Preferred Shares are expected to commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on June 23, 2011 under the trading symbol “CF.PR.A”.

The offering was underwritten on a bought deal basis by a syndicate of underwriters co-led by CIBC World Markets Inc. and Canaccord Genuity Corp. that included BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Raymond James Ltd., Wellington West Capital Markets Inc., Cormark Securities Inc., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Haywood Securities Inc., Mackie Research Capital Corporation and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

Canaccord has granted the underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable, in whole or in part, for a period of 30 days following today’s closing, to purchase up to an additional 600,000 Series A Preferred Shares which, if exercised in full, would increase the gross proceeds of the offering to $115 million.

Canaccord intends to use the net proceeds from the offering for general corporate purposes and may use all or a portion of such net proceeds with a view to growing or expanding its businesses.

CF.PR.A is a 5.50%+321 FixedReset announced June 6. CF.PR.A traded 187,001 shares today in a range of 24.75-98 before closing at 24.88-90, 2×12.

Vital statistics are:

CF.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %

CF.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2011-7-7:Greenshoe exercised:

Canaccord Financial Inc. (“Canaccord”, TSX: CF, AIM: CF.) announced today that it has closed the over-allotment option granted to the underwriters in connection with Canaccord’s bought deal public offering of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”), which closed on June 23, 2011. As a result of the exercise of the over-allotment option, Canaccord sold an additional 540,000 Series A Preferred Shares at a purchase price of $25.00 per Series A Preferred Share for additional gross proceeds of $13,500,000. In total, Canaccord has issued 4,540,000 Series A Preferred Shares for aggregate gross proceeds of $113,500,000. The Series A Preferred Shares trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “CF.PR.A”.

Canaccord intends to use the net proceeds from the offering for general corporate purposes and may use all or a portion of such net proceeds with a view to growing or expanding its businesses.

It will be most interesting to see how they choose between growing or expanding their business!

US Covered Bond Legislation Passes Another Milestone

June 23rd, 2011

The House Financial Services Committee has approved draft Covered Bond legislation:

The committee voted 44-7 today to approve the bill, which would provide a regulatory framework for covered bonds by giving the Treasury Department oversight of the market and creating a separate resolution process in order to bolster investor interest.

“The FDIC’s concerns, I believe, continue to be legitimate,” said Representative Barney Frank, the senior Democrat on the committee, who unsuccessfully offered two amendments drafted with the agency to change the measure. “The FDIC believes, I think correctly, there will be problems in some of these cases and the FDIC will not be fully protected.”

In an effort to alleviate some of the agency’s concerns, Representative Carolyn Maloney, a New York Democrat, offered a successful amendment that extended to one year, from 180 days, the amount of time the FDIC would have in event of a bank failure to hold the exclusive right to transfer the covered pool to another eligible issuer.

The panel also agreed, by voice vote, to a requirement that the Treasury write rules to cap the maximum amount outstanding, as a percentage of total assets, that any one issuer can hold.

Andrew Gray, the FDIC’s spokesman, said in an e-mailed statement that the bill would subsidize covered bond investors with the deposit insurance fund and “will add to the funding advantage” of large banks.

The FDIC’s Deputy Chairman, Michael H. Krimminger, testified in September 2010 regarding FDIC concerns regarding super-priority:

Unfortunately, H.R. 5823 would restrict the FDIC’s current receivership authorities used to maximize the value of the failed bank’s covered bonds. The bill leaves the FDIC with only two options: continue to perform until the covered bond program is transferred to another institution within a certain timeframe; or hand over the collateral to a separate trustee for the covered bond estate, in return for a residual certificate of questionable value. The FDIC would not have the authority – which it can use for any other asset class – to repudiate covered bonds, pay repudiation damages and take control of the collateral. This restriction would impair the FDIC’s ability to accomplish the “least costly” resolution and could increase losses to the DIF by providing covered bond investors with a super-priority that exceeds that provided to other secured creditors. These increased losses to the DIF would be borne by all of the more than 8,000 FDIC-insured institutions, whether or not they issued covered bonds.

Limiting the time in which the FDIC could market a covered bond program to other banks will constrain the FDIC’s ability to achieve maximum value for a program through such a transfer. Similarly, preventing the FDIC from using its normal repudiation power will prevent the FDIC from recapturing the over-collateralization in the covered bond program. The ‘residual certificate’ proposed in H.R. 5823 is likely to be virtually valueless. More importantly, the legislation would provide the investors with control over the collateral until the term of the program ends, even though the FDIC (and any party obligated on a secured debt) normally has the ability to recover over-collateralization by paying the amount of the claims and recovering the collateral free of all liens. Providing the FDIC a residual certificate instead of the ability to liquidate the collateral itself would reduce the value to the receivership estate and would not result in the least costly resolution.

So long as investors are paid the full principal amount of the covered bonds and interest to the date of payment, there is no policy reason to protect investment returns of covered bond investors through an indirect subsidy from the DIF

The FDIC issued a Covered Bond Policy Statement in 2008.

There is an excellent discussion of the legislation available by Barton Winokur, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dechert LLP, and is based on a Dechert publication by Patrick D. Dolan, Robert H. Ledig, Gordon L. Miller and Kira N. Brereton, titled Reform for the Covered Bond Industry on the Horizon.

US Covered Bond legislation was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it passed the Capital Markets Subcommittee. Consultations in Canada are taking place behind closed doors, as is only right and decent.

Update, 2011-6-24: I note from Chart 3.15 of the BoE June 2011 Financial Stability Report that covered bonds comprise 5% of 2011-13 maturities, but 16% of planned 2011-13 issuance in the UK.

June 22, 2011

June 23rd, 2011

Jim Kelsoe, proud portfolio manager of the worst bond fund in the history of the universe (so far), was last mentioned on PrefBlog on April 7, 2010. Now he’s been barred from the industry:

According to the SEC’s order, through his actions Kelsoe fraudulently prevented a reduction in the NAVs of the funds that should otherwise have occurred as a result of the deterioration in the subprime securities market in 2007. His misconduct occurred in the context of a nearly complete failure by Morgan Keegan to employ the fair valuation policies and procedures adopted by the funds’ boards of directors to fair value the funds’ portfolio securities.

Under the settlement, Morgan Keegan is required to pay $25 million in disgorgement and interest and a $75 million penalty to the SEC to be placed into a Fair Fund for the benefit of investors harmed by the violations. Morgan Keegan will pay $100 million into a state fund that also will be distributed to investors. The firms are additionally required to abstain from involvement in valuing fair valued securities on behalf of investment companies for three years. Kelsoe agreed to pay $500,000 in penalties and be barred from the securities industry by the SEC, and Weller agreed to pay a penalty of $50,000.

The Fed is going to maintain an easy monetary policy:

To promote the ongoing economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent. The Committee continues to anticipate that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period. The Committee will complete its purchases of $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of this month and will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.

The TMX-LSE deal has been sweetened:

A week before the London Stock Exchange and TMX Group Inc. ask shareholders to bless their planned marriage, the pair sweetened the pot Wednesday with a $4 per share special dividend for TMX shareholders.

London exchange shareholders will also receive a special dividend of 84.1 pence per ordinary share, payable on closing.

In the face of a rival hostile bid from Maple Group, a consortium of Canadian financial firms, the exchange partners said they also intend to increase the regular post-merger dividend “to be consistent with the [higher] current regular dividend of TMX Group.”

Here’s an interesting legal point – I know that some will misconstrue my interest and I’ll get into all kinds of trouble about this, but what the hell – regarding Galliano’s anti-semitic rant:

Under sentencing rules for hate speech, Galliano faces a maximum 22,500-euro ($32,500) fine and six months in prison if found guilty. His lawyer, Aurelien Hamelle, has said similar cases “most often” result in fines rather than jail time.

Geraldine Bloch, who filed a complaint over the February incident, testified that Jewish “was one of the terms said the most” in Galliano’s slurs against her. “I don’t know if he was drunk. He was a bit bizarre. He sweated a lot.”

Galliano’s addictions can’t excuse his statements, Eric Zerbib, a lawyer for LICRA, an international organization opposed to racism and anti-Semitism, said before today’s testimony.

It doesn’t explain and it doesn’t excuse anything,” said Zerbib. “In vino, veritas. In wine, the truth. Wine has a liberating effect which allows one to know an individual’s real personality, and given that the deeds were repeated several times, thus we know John Galliano’s personality.”

OK, so I don’t know the law here, but it’s rather an interesting point: Will Galliano be in trouble for having a shitty personality (which is exposed by drunkenness, yay! Or he may simply have reached in to the bag of tricks for the most offensive things he could think of.) or for expressing his personality (in which case drunkenness may be considered a mitigating factor)?

It was a good day on the Canadian preferred share market with PerpetualDiscounts up 15bp, FixedResets winning 11bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 13bp. Volatility was up a bit. Volume was very good.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.53%, equivalent to 7.19% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 5.25% (!) so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 195bp, a significant widening from the 185bp reported on June 15 as yields have gone in opposite directions.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1634 % 2,465.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1634 % 3,708.1
Floater 2.46 % 2.22 % 38,190 21.74 4 -0.1634 % 2,662.1
OpRet 4.88 % 3.22 % 65,062 0.91 9 -0.2057 % 2,433.4
SplitShare 5.25 % -0.48 % 62,674 0.48 6 0.0833 % 2,505.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2057 % 2,225.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 5.20 % 143,364 1.37 12 0.0016 % 2,076.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.53 % 121,211 14.58 18 0.1455 % 2,182.1
FixedReset 5.16 % 3.34 % 209,697 2.79 57 0.1148 % 2,310.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.08 % 4.89 % 287,247 8.18 47 0.1299 % 2,153.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-22
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 134,455 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
NEW.PR.C SplitShare 106,500 Nesbitt sold two blocks of 10,000 each to TD at 14.20, and six blocks of 10,000 each to anonymous, all at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-26
Maturity Price : 13.70
Evaluated at bid price : 14.14
Bid-YTW : -26.56 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 68,825 Desjardins bought two blocks of 10,000 each from anonymous, both at 24.77.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 60,305 TD crossed 25,000 at 24.54.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 52,534 Desjardins crossed 41,200 at 24.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 50,892 RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 and 20,000, both at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.91 – 26.33
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2624

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3058

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 23.51 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3592

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.33 – 26.68
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2307

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.35 – 25.66
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2277

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.33 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1882

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %

New Issue: IFC FixedReset 4.20%+172

June 22nd, 2011

Intact Financial Corporation has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement to issue and sell 9,000,000 Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Shares Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”), at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Preferred Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $225 million on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc. IFC has granted the underwriters the option to purchase up to an additional 1,000,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares, at a price of $25.00, at any point prior to 30 days following closing of the offering.

IFC intends to use the net proceeds of the offering, together with borrowings under acquisition credit facilities previously arranged by IFC, the proceeds of a previously announced subscription receipt offering and a portion of IFC’s existing cash resources, to fund the purchase price for its previously announced acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of AXA Canada (the “Acquisition”). The closing of the Acquisition is expected to occur in the fall of 2011 subject to receipt of required competition and insurance regulatory approvals and the satisfaction of certain closing conditions. The offering is not conditional upon closing of the Acquisition; if the Acquisition is not completed, the net proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes.

The holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Intact, on a quarterly basis (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on September 30, 2011), for the initial fixed rate period ending on December 31, 2017, based on an annual rate of 4.20%. The dividend rate will be reset on December 31, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.72%.

Holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their Series 1 Preferred Shares into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Shares Series 2 (the “Series 2 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on December 31, 2017 and on December 31 every five years thereafter. The holders of Series 2 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Intact, at a rate equal to the 90-day Canadian Treasury Bill rate plus 1.72%.

DBRS Limited has assigned a provisional rating of Pfd-2 (low) for the Series 1 Preferred Shares.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces and territories of Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus to be filed with the Canadian securities regulatory authorities. The offering is scheduled to close on or about July 12, 2011.

Nice to see another insurance holding company on the board!

Update: DBRS assigns provisional Pfd-2(low) rating.

It is interesting to note the initial fixed dividend period of 6.5 years; this does not appear to be a mechanism to lower the Issue Reset Spread so much (since GOC 5-Years are at 2.10%, while sevens are at 2.18%) as it is to lock in the 4.2% for as long as possible.