NA Announces Results of Extended Issuer Bid

April 27th, 2011

National Bank has announced:

the expiry of the Bank’s offers to purchase (the “Offers”) all of the issued and outstanding Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares Series 21 (the “Preferred Shares Series 21”), all of the issued and outstanding Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares Series 24 (the “Preferred Shares Series 24”), and all of the issued and outstanding Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares Series 26 (the “Preferred Shares Series 26”, and together with the Preferred Shares Series 21 and the Preferred Shares Series 24, the “Preferred Shares”).

The Bank announced that all of the Preferred Shares validly deposited under the Offers and not withdrawn as of April 26, 2011 have been taken up and accepted for payment by the Bank. As a result, the Bank has taken up a total of 4,639,139 Preferred Shares Series 21, 4,374,120 Preferred Shares Series 24 and 4,075,165 Preferred Shares Series 26 under the Offers for an aggregate consideration of $361,208,775.14.

The Preferred Shares taken up under the Offers represent approximately (i) 57.63% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 21, (ii) 64.33% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 24, and (iii) 70.26% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 26.

The extension of the offer was reported on PrefBlog on April 12.

Series 21 is NA.PR.N; series 24 is NA.PR.O; and series 26 is NA.PR.P.

April 26, 2011

April 27th, 2011

The market is anticipating European sovereign default:

Yields on government securities from Greece, Ireland and Portugal reached records amid speculation the heavily indebted nations won’t be able to avoid restructuring.

Ireland’s two-year yield reached a euro-era record 12.08 percent after the European Union said the nation’s debt burden surged the most in the currency area last year. Greek two-year yields have climbed almost 870 basis points this month, reaching 24.45 percent today as investors priced in losses, or so-called haircuts, they may incur in the event of a restructuring.

Portugal’s two-year note yields touched a euro-era record of 11.74 percent, up from 8.78 percent at the end of last month. The 10-year yield reached a record 9.61 percent today, compared with 8.41 percent on March 31.

Greece’s deficit was bigger than expected:

Greece’s chances of avoiding a debt-crunching exercise faded to almost nothing with the revelation that its budget deficit is going in the wrong direction in spite of robust efforts to reduce government spending.

The country’s budget deficit in 2010 was 10.5 per cent of gross domestic product, Eurostat, the European Union’s statistics agency, reported on Tuesday. The figure was considerably bigger than Greek government’s own deficit target of 9.4 per cent and the European Commission’s estimate of 9.6 per cent.

DBRS confirmed BAM, but was careful to include some warnings:

Overall, DBRS still remains concerned with Brookfield’s aggressive expansion program and the possible impact it may have on its overall risk profile. Brookfield’s investments normally include real, low risk assets that generate steady cash flow. If there was a shift towards more speculative investments intended for shorter hold periods, the ratings could come under pressure. DBRS notes that the financial packaging of Brookfield’s investments within its portfolio can be complex. The transparency for this and intercompany transactions can be a challenge at times.

DBRS notes that while Brookfield’s corporate liquidity and cash flow has been reasonable, it is not sufficient to be a primary funding source for large new investments. In fact, the current size of corporate debt and preferred shares is approaching the limits for the current rating category. Thus far, concerns that sizable transactions could negatively affect the Company’s credit ratings have been mitigated with the used of co-investor capital and non-recourse debt. Even so, DBRS notes that the non-recourse debt at the operating levels is significant and that it has first claim on the related cash flows. It also presents some group refinancing risk.

Japan has joined S&P’s list of sovereigns with a negative outlook.

Apparently Obesity is expected to surpass smoking as the leading cause of preventable morbidity and mortality. I can’t wait for the time when the do-gooders have had their way with this one! Outside every office tower and public place will be a long line of fatties scarfing down their french fries and pizza!

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 2bp, FixedResets losing 11bp and DeemedRetractibles up 5bp. Not much volatility. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0832 % 2,416.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0832 % 3,633.8
Floater 2.49 % 2.26 % 35,244 21.63 4 0.0832 % 2,608.8
OpRet 4.92 % 3.24 % 57,112 2.05 8 0.0048 % 2,411.4
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.29 % 84,359 0.63 6 0.0866 % 2,496.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0048 % 2,205.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.70 % 116,474 6.12 8 -0.0348 % 2,049.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.56 % 133,237 14.39 16 -0.0173 % 2,121.0
FixedReset 5.18 % 3.51 % 204,830 2.91 57 -0.1110 % 2,290.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.28 % 5.22 % 295,180 8.11 53 0.0529 % 2,075.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.38
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 281,290 Desjardins crossed 128,700 at 23.38, then another 130,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.41
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
CM.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 86,330 National Bank crossed 11,700 at 25.20; RBC crossed two blocks of 25,000 each and TD crossed 20,000, all at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 85,250 RBC crossed 10,000 at 27.65; then another 75,000 at 27.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.66
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 57,605 RBC crossed 49,200 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.49
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 34,202 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-26
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 33,004 TD crossed 20,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.65 – 26.34
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4409

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.52 – 22.96
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3443

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.16 – 21.43
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1859

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.16
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %

CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.16 – 25.34
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1123

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-26
Maturity Price : 24.92
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %

TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.65 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1400

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.28 – 25.54
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.2009

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %

WFS.PR.A Annual Report 2010

April 26th, 2011

World Financial Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to December 31, 2010.

WFS / WFS.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Whole Unit -7.70% -10.89% -6.53%
WFS -49.49% -42.44% -29.39%
WFS.PR.A +5.35% +5.35% +5.35%
MSCI World/Finance Index -0.23% -13.51% -8.75%

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.51% of the whole unit value, excluding one time initial offering expenses.

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield; unfortunately the number of units changesd, which makes it more approximate. The Total Assets of the fund at year end was $76.6-million, compared to $107.3-million a year prior, so call it an average of $92.0-million. Total Preferred Share Distribution in 2010 was $3.888-million, at $0.525/share implies an average of 7.41-million units, at an average NAV of ((11.57 + 13.11) / 2 = 12.34, so call it $91.4-million. Close enough! Call the Average Net Assets $92-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Investment income (sum of interest, dividends and withholding taxes) of $1.964-million received divided by average net assets of $92-million is 2.13%.

Income Coverage: Net investment income of $1.964-million less expenses before issuance fees of $1.743-million is $0.221-million, to cover preferred dividends of 3.888-million is just under 6%.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when a term extension proposal was announced.

WFS.PR.A: Term Extension Proposed

April 26th, 2011

Well, this wasn’t particularly hard to see coming, after the company’s warrant issue expired less than six months before dissolution! Mulvihill’s World Financial Split Corp. has announced:

its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to extend the term of the Fund for an additional seven years. The final redemption date for the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares of the Fund is currently June 30, 2011 and the Fund proposes to implement a reorganization (“Reorganization”) that will allow shareholders to retain their investment in the Fund until at least June 30, 2018.

In connection with the Reorganization, holders of Class A Shares will continue to benefit from the potential for leveraged capital appreciation in a high quality portfolio consisting principally of copmmon shares of the ten largest financial services companies in each of Canada, the United States of America and the rest of the world. If the Reorganization is approved and implemented, holders of Preferred Shares will continue to enjoy preferential quarterly cash dividends in the amount of $0.13125 per Preferred Share representing a yield of 5.25% per annum on the original issue price of $10.00 per Preferred Share.

As part of the Reorganization, the Fund is also proposing other changes including changing the monthly retraction prices for the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares so that they are calculated by reference to market price in addition to NAV and changing the dates by which notice of monthly retractions needs to be provided and by which the retraction amount will be paid. The Fund will also allow for the calculation of a diluted NAV in the event the Fund should ever issue warrants or rights to acquire additional Class A Shares or Preferred Shares.

Mulvihill Capital Management Inc. the manager of the Fund (the “Manager”), believes the global financial services sector is poised for strong returns over the next several years after experiencing one of the worst financial crises in history over the 2007 – 2009 time period. Subsequently, regulatory oversight and capital requirements increased in order to reduce the risk of another crisis from happening. Despite a decline in 2010 due to the concerns regarding European Sovereign defaults, many of the companies within the Fund’s portfolio universe are well capitalized and are expected to return capital to shareholders in the form of increased dividends and share repurchases which the Manager believes should benefit share prices. The Manager also believes that the Reorganization will allow the Fund to increase in value as the global economy recovers and financial services companies around the world grow stronger.

If the Reorganization is approved and implemented, shareholders will be given a special retraction right to retract their Class A Shares or Preferred Shares at NAV on June 30, 2011 on the same terms had the final redemption date of the Fund not been extended. The redemption date of the shares will automatically be extended for successive seven-year terms after June 30, 2018 and shareholders will be able to retract their Class A Shares or Preferred Shares at NAV prior to any such extension.

A special meeting of holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares has been called and will be held on May 31, 2011 to consider and vote upon the proposal. Further details of the proposal will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares in connection with the special meeting. The Reorganization is also subject to all required regulatory approvals.

The warrants’ exercise price was $11.43 and the Whole Unit NAV is now about $11.47, so those who exercised their warrants have, basically, earned the coupon. The company raised $12.8-million on warrant exercise, implying that take-up was about 15%.

WFS.PR.A no longer has a credit rating, since DBRS withdrew the Pfd-4(low) rating last November at the request of the company.

I applaud Mulvihill for their conduct in making a special retraction right part of the reorganization package. Such a feature cost them considerable AUM when it became exercisable with the PIC / PIC.PR.A term extension. Granting of such a right should be automatic; but for as long as there are sponsors in the market with less sterling ethical standards, such as Manulife Asset Management (as shown in the ASC.PR.A term extension proposal) and such people remaining in the business as Paul Lorentz, Sheila Hart, Jennifer Mercanti and Warren Law (the directors of ASC, who approved the terms of the proposal and recommended that preferred shareholders vote in favour), I will give credit where credit is due.

The company’s prospectus specifies a NAV test for capital unit distributions:

No distributions will be paid on the Class A Shares if (i) the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares are in arrears; or (ii) after the payment of the distribution by the Company, the NAV per Unit would be less than $15.00. In addition, the Company will not pay special distributions, meaning distributions in excess of the targeted 8% distributions, on the Class A Shares if after payment of the distribution the NAV per Unit would be less than $23.50 unless the Company would need to make such distributions so as to fully recover refundable taxes.

Despite these good things I am recommending a No vote on the term extension. With an Asset Coverage ratio of only 1.1+:1, the credit quality of the preferreds is simply insufficient to accept a term extension.

If the reorganization is approved anyway, I recommend exercising the special retraction right, while cognizant of the fact that, as in the case of the PIC.PR.A term extension, it is entirely possible that there might be sufficient preferred shares retracted that, on consolidation of the capital units, credit quality is restored to more acceptable levels. We can’t count on that, though!

It is my hope that, through voting No, preferred shareholders will get some kind of sweetener in a revised proposal. Most obvious, and perhaps least likely (and perhaps, given the extraordinarly low level of income coverage at present values, least desirable), is an increase in coupon. However, if a revised reorganization proposal provided, for example, for the forced redemption of a large number of preferred shares and the subsequent consolidation of the corresponding capital units with the combined effect of restoring Asset Coverage to more traditional levels, I would be very happy to recommend a favourable vote.

James Hymas Opines on RRBs

April 26th, 2011

John Heinzl has an article in the Globe & Mail of 2011-4-27 titled The case for, and against, real return bonds in which I am quoted:

James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management, said the low yields on RRBs suggest that some investors are worried about hyper-inflation. They would rather accept a tiny real yield than suffer a loss in purchasing power if inflation really heats up.

But he’s no fan of RRBs, either, partly because they’re less liquid than regular bonds but mainly because “they’re trying to do too many things at once. They’re trying to give you a fixed income and inflation protection, but they don’t perform either function particularly well.”

If investors want inflation protection, fixed-income portfolios are the wrong place to achieve it, he said. They should instead look to other asset classes, such as resource stocks, to counter the impact of inflation on their bonds, he said.

April 25, 2011

April 25th, 2011

Nothing happened today.

It was an uneventful day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 4bp, FixedResets off 4bp and DeemedRetractibles up 3bp. There wasn’t a single entry for the Performance Highlights table; volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,414.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 3,630.8
Floater 2.50 % 2.26 % 35,626 21.63 4 0.0000 % 2,606.6
OpRet 4.92 % 3.26 % 59,484 2.06 8 -0.0289 % 2,411.3
SplitShare 5.20 % -0.83 % 87,837 0.63 6 -0.1354 % 2,494.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0289 % 2,204.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 5.70 % 117,605 6.12 8 0.0348 % 2,050.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.57 % 134,153 14.38 16 0.0360 % 2,121.4
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.51 % 204,044 2.91 57 -0.0392 % 2,292.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.29 % 5.25 % 298,021 8.12 53 0.0276 % 2,074.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 99,684 TD crossed 90,000 at 27.49.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 86,938 TD crossed 76,000 at 20.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 75,595 Nesbitt crossed 70,000 at 22.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 66,709 RBC crossed 23,700 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-25
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 56,325 Nesbitt crossed 43,000 at 24.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 51,320 RBC crossed 50,000 at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-25
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.50 – 26.85
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2289

Offer expires tomorrow.

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.01 – 25.64
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.5119

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.38 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.4938

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.38
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.12 – 27.50
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2671

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.12
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

NA.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.10 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2450

Offer expires tomorrow.

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.33 – 24.63
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1994

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-25
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.33
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %

RF.PR.A Special Meeting Adjourned

April 25th, 2011

C.A. Bancorp Canadian Realty Finance Corporation has announced:

that the Corporation’s special meeting of Class A and Series 1 Preferred Shareholders (the “CRFC Shareholders”) to be held today (the “Special Meeting”) to consider the previously announced Proposed Transaction has been adjourned until May 5, 2011.

An insufficient number of holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares was present in person or represented by proxy to constitute a quorum for the conduct of business at the Special Meeting. The adjourned Special Meeting will be held on May 5, 2011 at 4:00 p.m. EST at the Corporation’s offices at 401 Bay Street, Suite 1600, Toronto, Ontario. Proxies for the adjourned Special Meeting must be received no later than May 3, 2011 at 4:00 p.m. EST.

CRFC Shareholders are encouraged to read the Information Circular for the Special Meeting, which contains detailed information about the Proposed Transaction, and to vote their shares. A copy of the Information Circular is available under the corporate profile of CRFC on the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) at www.sedar.com and on CRFC’s website at www.cabancorp.com.

CRFC Shareholders who have questions about the information contained in the Information Circular or the Proposed Transaction or who require assistance in completing the applicable form of proxy, are encouraged to contact Kingsdale Shareholder Services Inc. by telephone at 1-866-581-1513 toll free in North America or 416-867-2272 outside of North America or by email at contactus@kingsdaleshareholder.com.

Director Resignation

The Corporation also announced today that Robert Wolf has tendered his resignation as a director of the Corporation. The Board will consider the need for a replacement director if the Proposed Transaction described in the Information Circular does not proceed. In the meantime, the remaining two directors will continue to carry out the duties of the Board. The Board is currently comprised of John Driscoll (Chair) and Paul Haggis.

The information circular is available on-line and was discussed in the post RF.PR.A: Shareholders to Vote on Manager Change.

In that post I pointed out that the proposed new manager is a hedge fund specialist with no publicly published track record and concluded:

Well, I just plain don’t like this issue and recommend that preferred shareholders vote against the plan. A change in recommendation will be dependent upon:

  • The company should obtain a credit rating for the preferreds
  • The company should present a credible plan for funding the redemption of the preferreds (e.g., a credit line with a major bank).
  • The NAV test should be more stringent.

I see no reason to change the recommendation as yet. Vote No!

Research: The Annuity Decision

April 25th, 2011

Annuities are very popular for retirees – and, indeed, were until recently compulsory when an insolvent pension plan was being wound down – but are largely misunderstood. I examined some of their investment characteristics in my recent article “The Annuity Decision”, published in the March/April, 2011, edition of Canadian Moneysaver.

Look for the research link!

Update, 2011-6-15: Regretably, the link to the publicly available annuity rate information given in the article is no longer operational.

Update, 2011-9-27: Canadian annuity rate data, collected by CANNEX, is now being published by the Globe & Mail.

BCE.PR.G / BCE.PR.H Conversion Results Announced

April 25th, 2011

BCE Inc. has announced:

that 370,067 of its 10,051,751 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AG (series AG preferred shares) have been tendered for conversion on May 1, 2011, on a one-for-one basis, into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AH (series AH preferred shares). In addition, 1,159,372 of its 3,948,249 series AH preferred shares have been tendered for conversion on May 1, 2011, on a one-for-one basis, into series AG preferred shares. Consequently, on May 1, 2011, BCE will have 10,841,056 series AG preferred shares and 3,158,944 series AH preferred shares issued and outstanding. The series AG preferred shares and the series AH preferred shares will continue to be listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols BCE.PR.G and BCE.PR.H, respectively.

The series AG preferred shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on May 1, 2011, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE, a fixed cash dividend based on an annual fixed dividend rate of 4.50%.

The series AH preferred shares will continue to pay a monthly floating adjustable cash dividend for the five-year period beginning on May 1, 2011, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE. The monthly floating adjustable dividend for any particular month will continue to be calculated based on the prime rate for such month and using the Designated Percentage for such month representing the sum of an adjustment factor (based on the market price of the series AH preferred shares in the preceding month) and the Designated Percentage for the preceding month.

The conversion notice was reported on March 29; the dividend reset on BCE.PR.G was also reported.

Both issues are tracked by HIMIPref™; both are relegated to the Scraps index based on credit concerns.

CSA/IIROC: Your Order is State Property

April 23rd, 2011

This commentary is terribly late, but better late than never! I’ve had the links in my “Draft Posts” pile for a long time, but am only now getting around to posting the stuff.

The Canadian Securities Administrators (which is the securities commissions) and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada have released POSITION PAPER 23-405 DARK LIQUIDITY IN THE CANADIAN MARKET, which provides an update to 23-308 and 23-404, which have been discussed on PrefBlog. The comment letters have been published.

One conclusion is:

In our view:

  • An exemption to the pre-trade transparency requirements should only be available when an order meets or exceeds a minimum size (in the Position Paper, we will refer to this as the “minimum size exemption” or “minimum size threshold”). This minimum size threshold for posting passive Dark Orders would apply to all marketplaces (whether transparent or a Dark Pool) regardless of the method of trade matching (including continuous auction, call or negotiation systems), and for all orders whether client, non-client or principal.

They further explain:

Rule 6.3 of UMIR (the Order Exposure Rule) states that “A participant shall immediately enter on a marketplace that displays orders … a client order to purchase or sell 50 standard trading units or less of a security ….”. Aside from the specific exemptions under the Order Exposure Rule, it is currently required that client orders with a quantity equal to or less than 50 standard trading units will be directed to a transparent marketplace in order to be displayed. The Order Exposure Rule encourages transparency and supports the price discovery process, while still providing an opportunity for dealers to minimize large, passive order information leakage. Price discovery is enhanced by requiring smaller passive orders to be posted in a visible marketplace and rewarding those orders with increased execution opportunities. Additionally, IIROC has provided guidance in Market Integrity Notice 2007-019 with respect to the entry of client orders on non-transparent markets or facilities

So in other words, if you want to keep your order for 4900 shares dark – you can’t. It’s illegal. The powers that be have determined that your order is required as a critical part of the price discovery process. Those prefs you want to sell are quoted at 20.50-00, and you’d like to place an offer at 20.90, keeping it dark so the penny algos won’t move to 20.89? Tough luck, sucker. You are required to tip your hand to your broker, the exchange and the world.

The regulators don’t have a clue about the real world, though:

the Order Exposure Rule which requires that participants immediately enter on a marketplace that displays orders, all client orders for 50 standard trading units or less, subject to a number of exceptions. This is a benefit gained by passive, displayed orders in a transparent order book, in that active orders not meeting the size conditions of the rule are obligated to be routed to a transparent market, thus increasing the chances of execution for the displayed order.

If this was really beneficial to retail they wouldn’t need to make it mandatory. It is plainly apparent that not a single writer of this report has ever attempted to execute a trade in an illiquid market. They state that their motivation is:

The posting of limit orders in a visible book is important to maintain the quality of price discovery. To achieve this, limit orders should ideally be directed to, and displayed in visible marketplaces in order to facilitate the price discovery process.

In other words, the purpose of limit orders is not to save some money. The purpose of limit orders is to “facilitate the price discovery process.”. At least, according to the regulators.

It is in the discussion of the rule that the regulatory contempt for retail shines through:

allow larger orders to be executed with decreased market impact costs. However, as the “market impact cost” rationale described above may be less relevant to small Dark Orders, a possible rationale for allowing smaller orders to be posted as Dark Orders and be exempted from pre-trade transparency requirements is that they offer price improvement over the NBBO. While small orders may provide some price improvement when posted as a Dark Order, the limited quantity diminishes the value of price improvement to all market participants when compared to the value, or net benefit, of having larger Dark Orders offering the same price improvement, as well as providing much greater amounts of liquidity to the market as a whole. Currently in Canada, there are Dark Pools or Dark Order types that offer as little as 10% price improvement over the NBBO. In the situation where the NBBO spread for a particular security is very small (for example, one penny), we question whether the price improvement provided by small non-transparent orders is sufficiently meaningful for contra-side participants.

So if you feel that 10% price improvement (which, I take it, is 10% of the quoted spread, not the quoted price) is a worthwhile thing to have in your pocket – tough! Your orders are not for your benefit, they are for the benefit of other marketplace participants.

This is made explicit in the official staff view:

It is our view that the potential negative impact on price discovery of a greater number of small orders being entered without pretrade transparency and the potential drain on visible liquidity outweighs the benefits of the possible price improvement that they may offer. While post-trade information contributes to the price discovery mechanism, pre-trade transparency is an important element. The risk of a significant erosion of the quality of that mechanism exists if a substantial number of small orders are posted in the dark. As regulators, part of our mandate is to foster fair and efficient capital markets. The requirements to post small orders to a visible market and facilitating price discovery are key components of fair and efficient capital markets.

Consequently, we are of the view that an exemption from the pre-trade transparency requirements should only be available for orders meeting the minimum size threshold.

The staff, by the way, are not people with any knowledge of, or interest in, the capital markets and have no idea of what is meant by the phrase “fair and efficient capital markets.” They’re 25-year old B-School grads and 30-year-old lawyers with majors in boxtickingology.

They asked for responses on or before January 10, 2011.

One response which attracted some press attention was a tearful wail from David Panko of TD Securities, who is distraught that he cannot compete unless he has privileged access to the markets:

In addition, the existence of rebates encourages sophisticated high frequency traders to “stack the quote” by bidding and offering in large size. While this is certainly a benefit for small investors with orders that can be filled “on the quote”, it also disincents traders from placing natural bids and offers in the market, as these new bids and offers would be behind a large volume of HFT orders In turn, this leads to a greater proportion of client orders filled actively by crossing the bid-ask spread. The result is a combination of worse average fill prices for the end clients (through more frequent crossing of the bid-ask spread) and much higher marketplace fees for the broker (through a higher active/passive ratio)

Mr. Panko either does not know, or does not care, about the distinction between “informed” and “uninformed” traders.

These are the two types of traders who execute actively. Basically, so the theory goes, there is a “market price” for a security, which is the mid-point of the bid-offer spread. Call that “P” and the spread “S”. There is also a “Value Price” for the issue, P’, which is the Platonic Ideal price in a perfectly efficient world in which all private information has been put to work. It is assumed that over the long run P = P’, but these can vary over the short-run.

An uninformed trader will execute his active order and, on average, lose 0.5*S on each of his trades. If, however, an informed trader oberves that P’ > P + 0.5*S … back up the truck! He’ll execute all kind of active orders, happily paying the spread in exchange for getting his buys filled at a price that may be significantly less than P’.

So while one can certainly say that end-clients, as a group, are getting worse average fill prices, it is trivial to demonstrate that informed traders are getting better average fill prices and uninformed traders are getting worse ones. Informed traders will receive market rewards that reflect the accuracy of their estimates of P’.

To which I say – “Wonderful”. If there is anybody out there who truly wants to encourage price discovery as a valuable social good, they will do everything they can to reward informed traders and punish the uninformed. If we’re lucky, the uninformed ones will go bankrupt, go on welfare and die – that would be good.

Sufficient bankruptcy of the uninformed will, eventually, lead to a higher proportion of informed traders in the market, greater losses by HFT, therefore somewhat wider spreads, therefore more incentive to place “natural” bids and offers in the marketplace and give Mr. Panko something to talk about with his clients. It’s called competition.

So, with the shift to HFT stacking the quote, informed traders are winners – since they can execute at better prices. Uninformed active traders are also winners – since their market orders are executed at better prices. The only losers are the uninformed “market-maker” traders – those who, when attempting to buy a stock, consider it to be the height of genius to place a bid inside the quote rather than lifting the offer. These guys are now having their lunch eaten by people who can do it better. Boo-hoo-hoo. It’s called competition.

Mr. Panko also squares his rot for a good boo-hoo-hoo about how unfair it is for brokers to pay so much money for execution of active orders. Well, Mr. Panko of TD Securities, today is your lucky day because after a lifetime of research into market microstructure I think I’ve hit on a solution for you, which I will provide to TD Securites free, gratis and for nothing: if it costs more, charge more. A crazy idea, I know, but it just might work! Why should an off-quote limit order attract the same commission as a market order?

It’s a shame I’ve been so critical of Mr. Panko’s commentary, because his discussion was quite interesting, with more supporting numbers than is usual with self-serving sell-side lobbying letters in Canada, although the numbers themselves did not get much support. Unfortunately, the decision to “strongly recommend” the complete elimination of liquidity rebates is not particularly well supported by his discussion and argumentation: perhaps TD Securities wrote the recommendations in the executive suite, then assigned him the task of writing the rest of the letter.