July Edition of PrefLetter Released!

July 12th, 2010

** See Update Below for Delivery Problems **

The July, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The July edition contains an appendix discussing the potential for calls in the PerpetualDiscount sector and the evidence (or lack thereof!) that the market is accounting for this potential.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 13 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 16.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Update, 2010-7-12: I regret to advise that there were delivery problems with the July issue – the file was somehow corrupted at some point during the delivery process. If you are unable to open your issue, please either contact me or use the subscriber download feature and it will be replaced.

July Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

July 10th, 2010

The markets have closed and the July edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The July edition will contain an appendix discussing the potential for calls in the PerpetualDiscount sector and the evidence (or lack thereof!) that the market is accounting for this potential.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The July issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the July issue.

TXPR Rebalancing: July 2010

July 10th, 2010

Standard & Poor’s has announced a massive revision to the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, reflecting their new methodology:

These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 19, 2010

TXPR Revision 2010/7
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BMO.PR.N FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.O FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.T FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.X FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low)  
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low)  
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  
BPO.PR.L Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
BPO.PR.N Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
BRF.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.K FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.L FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.M FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
EMA.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
FFH.PR.E Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(low)  
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
AER.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.M FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.D OpRet Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.L FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.N FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.Y FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.F FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.S FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.A FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.I FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.K FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  

TXPR Revision 2010/7
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BAM.PR.J OpRet Pfd-2(low) &nsbp;
CCS.PR.D Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
CZP.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
DC.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3  
DW.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3
FTS.PR.E Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
FTS.PR.G Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high)  
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-2(high)  

The net effect of these changes (counting solely by issue count, not by the undisclosed index weight; and counting HIMIPref™ "Scraps" issues according to their bracketted ‘would be’ subindex) are:

TXPR
Net Changes by Issue
July 2010
Category Adds Deletions Net
Class
FixedReset      
OpRet      
PerpDis      
PerpPrem      
Credit
Pfd-1(low)      
Pfd-2(high)      
Pfd-2      
Pfd-2(low)      
Pfd-3(high)      
Pfd-3      
Pfd-3(low)      

I regret that I do not have time at the moment to fill in all of the empty boxes or to make any comments – but I will!

Well – maybe a quick comment … looks like credit quality will improve significantly … but it depends on the weighting factors they use.

TXPR: S&P Announces Major Methodological Change

July 10th, 2010

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

the following modifications to the methodology of the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, which will become effective after the close of trading on Friday, July 16, 2010, with the second semi-annual review of the index in 2010:

  • There will be no limit to the number of preferred share issues from any given issuer. Previously, the number of issues per issuer was limited to a maximum of three.
  • There will be a maximum relative weight of 10% set per issuer. All eligible lines for an issuer will be included in the index and capped on a pro-rata basis to a maximum of 10% of the total index market capitalization.
  • Preferred shares that have a mandatory conversion or a scheduled maturity or redemption within 12 months of the review period will not be added to the index. Existing index constituents which have a redemption or conversion will be removed on the redemption or conversion date.
  • A buffer rule for existing index constituents will be applied for the dollar value traded liquidity requirement. Existing constituents must have a minimum average dollar value traded in the 3 months prior to the review date of C$100,000.
  • The liquidity requirement to get included in the index will increase from C$100,000 to C$200,000.
  • Effective January 2011 the rebalance scheduled will change from semi-annually to quarterly. Rebalancing will occur after the close on the third Friday of January, April, July and October.

In order to lessen the impact of these changes, the new methodology will be phased in beginning with the July 2010 rebalance. The index will rebalance 25% each month from July to October, effective after the close on the third Friday, where S&P will apply a weight factor to each issue in order to gradually bring each in to the index.

It will take me a little time to digest the effect of all these changes. Clearly, they are attempting to make life easier for CPD so that mechanical application of trading rules to a change in relatively small issue doesn’t burn them as badly as POW.PR.C, inter alia, burned them last time.

I find the liquidity requirement to be fascinating. Assiduous Readers will remember that HIMIPref™ has a relatively complex methodology for determining averageTradingValue. This is because preferred share volumes are lumpy: a few block trades can distort a simple mean average considerably. We may well see some issues added that don’t really meet a sensible trading criteria.

July 9, 2010

July 10th, 2010

Naturally, the poster child for the financial crisis is the American homeowner, flim-flammed into buying a house and now being foreclosed. But see Subprime mortgages: Myths and reality for one take on this … and now it’s hitting the papers:

Whether it is their residence, a second home or a house bought as an investment, the rich have stopped paying the mortgage at a rate that greatly exceeds the rest of the population.

More than one in seven homeowners with loans in excess of a million dollars are seriously delinquent, according to data compiled for The New York Times by the real estate analytics firm CoreLogic.

By contrast, homeowners with less lavish housing are much more likely to keep writing checks to their lender. About one in 12 mortgages below the million-dollar mark is delinquent.

Though it is hard to prove, the CoreLogic data suggest that many of the well-to-do are purposely dumping their financially draining properties, just as they would any sour investment.

One of the big problems with the US system is that, typically, mortgages are extended without recourse. Instead of layering on extra rules, as I reported Fannie Mae did on June 23, simply charge a premium for non-recourse mortgages. Piece of cake, and one big source of problems eliminated.

Low volume today, but prices did OK, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp and FixedResets up 5bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.80 % 2.88 % 24,323 20.33 1 1.2048 % 2,073.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.1009 % 3,133.7
Floater 2.30 % 1.97 % 45,062 22.47 4 1.1009 % 2,233.5
OpRet 4.88 % 2.20 % 81,841 0.08 11 -0.0035 % 2,341.6
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.23 % 85,027 3.44 2 0.6606 % 2,185.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0035 % 2,141.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.62 % 116,382 1.84 4 0.0000 % 1,919.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.95 % 179,872 13.99 73 0.0674 % 1,827.5
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.72 % 313,229 3.49 47 0.0478 % 2,204.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 8.00 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 15.36
Evaluated at bid price : 15.36
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 15.41
Evaluated at bid price : 15.41
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 87,094 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 74,488 Nesbitt crossed 65,100 at 18.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 18.45
Evaluated at bid price : 18.45
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 68,400 Nesbitt crossed 21,300 at 25.21 and bought 11,800 from TD at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 54,118 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 51,325 National crossed 45,000 at 24.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 24.32
Evaluated at bid price : 24.54
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 46,316 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SBC.PR.A: Warrants for Capital Unitholders

July 9th, 2010

Brompton Split Banc Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final prospectus for an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder of record on July 19, 2010 will receive one half of one warrant for each Class A share held.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price. The subscription price is $20.58, which is the sum of:
a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus; and
b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering.

Warrants may be exercised on or before October 22, 2010, the expiry date. The Company has applied to list the warrants (under the ticker symbol SBC.WT) and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof, on the TSX. Warrants will be distributed to client accounts on a best-efforts basis after the July 19, 2010 record date.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. It is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares, and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

The intention to undertake this warrant offering was discussed in the post SBC.PR.A to Get Bigger. SBC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

LBS.PR.A: Warrants for Capital Unitholders

July 9th, 2010

Life & Banc Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final prospectus for an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder of record on July 19, 2010 will receive one half of one warrant for each Class A share held.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price. The subscription price is $17.66, which is the sum of:
a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus; and
b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering.

Warrants may be exercised on or before August 23, 2010, the expiry date. The Company has applied to list the warrants (under the ticker symbol LBS.WT) and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof, on the TSX. Warrants will be distributed to client accounts on a best-efforts basis after the July 19, 2010 record date.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. It is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares, and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

The intention to issue warrants was discussed in the post LBS.PR.A to Get Bigger. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2010-12-16: In their 2010 Semiannual report, Brompton discloses:

Unitholders received warrants on the basis of one-half of one warrant for each Class A share held on July 19, 2010. A whole warrant entitled the holder to subscribe for one unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share) of the Fund at a subscription price of $17.66. Warrants not exercised prior to August 23, 2010 were void and of no value. Upon the exercise of a warrant, the Fund paid a fee equal to $0.27 per warrant to the dealer whose client exercised the warrant.

… which is nice to know, but some disclosure of the success of the offering would have been appreciated. However, that report indicates there were 10,059,675 units outstanding as of 2010-6-30, and there are 10,307,447 (according to the Toronto Stock Exchange), so they were able to sell about 250,000 units.

IMF Releases GFSR Update

July 9th, 2010

The International Monetary Fund has released an update to the Global Financial Stability Report:

Despite generally improved economic conditions and a long period of healing after the failure of Lehman Brothers, progress toward global financial stability has recently experienced a setback. Sovereign risks in parts of the euro area have materialized and spread to the financial sector there, threatening to spill over to other regions and re-establish an adverse feedback loop with the economy. Further decisive follow-up is needed to the significant national and supranational policy responses that have been taken in order to strengthen confidence in the financial system and ensure continuation of the economic recovery.

Banks are also confronted by significant funding pressures coming from maturing bonds. As was emphasized in the April 2010 GFSR, banks face a wall of maturities in the next few years, especially in the euro area, and the recent turbulence has at least temporarily dampened the primary market for financial institutions’ bond issuance

Regulatory reform efforts aimed at making the global financial system safer need to continue in an expeditious fashion. The basics of such reforms—to the quality and quantity of capital and more liquidity—need to be finalized and an appropriate timetable for implementation established. The current level of uncertainty surrounding the final set of reforms is making it difficult for banks to take business decisions about various activities and constraining their willingness to lend. Greater clarity on the details and timing of intended regulatory reforms is thus required. Moreover, the implementation schedule will need to take into account the current health of the financial institutions and the status of the economic recovery to support trend growth and enhance stability. A crucial complement to regulatory reform is strong supervision. This applies in the steady state, but even more so during the transition period when there may be variances in the implementation of the new rules between jurisdictions. Adherence to strong supervisory principles can help contain the risk of regulatory arbitrage.

Presumably, the regulators will require extra staff, and hence extra managers. Fortunately, the IMF has some very well trained and competent staff who are willing to discuss the potential for new jobs!

July 8, 2010

July 8th, 2010

There’s some criticism of the European stress tests:

Regulators have told lenders the tests may assume a loss of about 17 percent on Greek government debt, 3 percent on Spanish bonds and none on German debt, said two people briefed on the talks who declined to be identified because the details are private.

“This isn’t a stress test,” said Jaap Meijer, a London- based analyst at Evolution Securities Ltd. It’s “merely the current valuation of government bonds.”

Credit markets are pricing in losses of about 60 percent on Greek bonds should the government default, more than three times the level said to be assumed by CEBS. Derivatives known as recovery swaps are trading at rates that imply investors would get back about 40 percent in a Greek default or restructuring.

“I wonder how much these stress tests are reverse- engineered to inspire confidence in the market” and banks, said Bruce Packard, an analyst at Seymour Pierce Ltd. in London.

Reverse engineering? Surely not! That’s done by evil bonus-seeking bankers underwriting sub-prime, not by Holy Regulators!

American banks are hoping to generate investor opposition to fair value accounting:

The American Bankers Association opposes the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s plan to apply fair-value rules to all financial instruments, including loans, rather than just to securities. The group says the rule could make strong banks appear undercapitalized.

The association’s website, noting that FASB’s stated mission is to serve investors, provides a sample letter for people writing to the board and suggests they focus on why the proposal isn’t “useful for investors.”

The ABA has devoted a whole page to the campaign.

State Street reached for yield – and suffered:

State Street Corp., the third-largest U.S. custody bank, reported second-quarter earnings that missed analysts’ estimates because of a $251 million after-tax charge related to its securities lending business.

State Street recorded the charge, which reduced earnings by 50 cents a share, to replenish funds that managed money on behalf of securities lenders. The funds invest cash deposited as collateral by securities borrowers. The injection allows State Street to lift redemption restrictions placed on clients in the fall of 2008 after the funds suffered losses.

Pensions & Investments has some interesting background:

It could be argued that the U.S. pension fund sector had historically engaged proportionately more in leveraged finance — by lending securities to raise cash collateral that can be reinvested for returns — than securities lending over recent years and that pension funds only very recently adopted a profile more in line with the U.S. mutual fund sector. That profile has maturity and liquidity more in line with the underlying loan transaction, that is, short term.

The mean return of the total return to lendable securities in a portfolio generated by the U.S. pension fund sector is almost double than that of the U.S. mutual fund sector over the three-year period under consideration. What should really worry the pension fund sector now is that the difference is at its historic low. The pension fund sector has reined in reinvestment guidelines and reduced its return expectations to reduce risk.

AIG writ small!

It was a good day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 16bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp. Volume was moderate.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.83 % 2.94 % 23,320 20.28 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1860 % 3,099.6
Floater 2.32 % 1.98 % 45,470 22.44 4 0.1860 % 2,209.2
OpRet 4.88 % 1.08 % 80,223 0.08 11 0.0849 % 2,341.7
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.32 % 87,945 3.45 2 0.0882 % 2,171.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0849 % 2,141.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.61 % 117,537 1.85 4 0.0497 % 1,919.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 180,568 13.97 73 0.1553 % 1,826.3
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.74 % 317,257 3.49 47 0.0271 % 2,203.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.18
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 106,516 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 106,016 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.80; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 87,830 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 75,950 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 1.08 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 64,593 RBC crossed 55,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 58,000 Nesbitt crossed 44,200 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 25.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

July 7, 2010

July 7th, 2010

There’s some doubt about the EU stress tests:

Investors say they don’t know if some banks are hiding bad loans, whether they have enough capital to withstand a debt default by a European state and whether governments can afford to rescue them. The European Union still hasn’t disclosed the tests’ criteria, including if they contain a sovereign default.

Protecting the senior bonds of 11 U.S. banks from default using credit default swaps costs an average of about 144 basis points, according to data compiled by CMA DataVision. In Europe, the average cost has climbed to about 224 basis points this year, the data show.

Europe’s largest banks are trading at a discount to their book value while their U.S. counterparts trade at a premium. Europe’s 20 largest lenders are trading at about 10 percent less than the net value of their assets. The 20 biggest U.S. banks trade at a 10 percent premium, Bloomberg data show.

Some European lenders used accounting-rule changes made in October 2008, about a month after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s collapse, to allow them to avoid writedowns on assets based on plunging market values, unless a default was deemed likely. Under pressure from EU leaders, the International Accounting Standards Board approved changes letting financial institutions in more than 100 countries that use International Financial Reporting Standards to reclassify some investments so they no longer had to book paper gains and losses as credit markets fluctuated.

Deutsche Bank, for example, used the change to shift about 38 billion euros of assets, including commercial real estate and leveraged finance, into its loan book from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, saving it a net 3.2 billion euros in markdowns based on valuation gains and losses through the first quarter of 2010. ING Groep NV, the biggest Dutch financial-services company, reclassified 24.4 billion euros and Societe Generale SA shifted 25.3 billion euros in assets, escaping about 2.8 billion euros in losses.

Perhaps in response (yes, OSFI, sometimes regulators respond to investor outcry! How ’bout dat?), C-EBS has released some details:

The macro-economic scenarios include a set of key macro-economic variables (e.g. the evolution of GDP, of unemployment and of the consumer price index), differentiated for EU Member States, the rest of the EEA countries and the US. The exercise also envisages adverse conditions in financial markets and a shock on interest rates to capture an increase in risk premia linked to a deterioration in the EU government bond markets.

On aggregate, the adverse scenario assumes a 3 percentage point deviation of GDP for the EU compared to the European Commission’s forecasts over the two-year time horizon. The sovereign risk shock in the EU represents a deterioration of market conditions as compared to the situation observed in early May 2010.

Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, spoke at the Westchester County Bankers Association, Tarrytown, New York, 25 June 2010, drawing parallels between the Credit Crunch and the Panic of 1907.

There’s an interesting trend in bond underwriting:

Borrowers are obtaining credit from banks competing for a pool of bond deals that dropped to $1.18 trillion in the first half from $1.92 trillion a year earlier as Europe’s sovereign debt crisis pared sales, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The number of banks on each high-yield deal has almost tripled since 2000, cutting fees by an average of 57 percent per firm.

“We’ve been very clear with our banking business partners that we’ll take care of those who are good to us,” said Martin of London-based Virgin, which enlisted a record 14 banks to sell debt in January. “If you want to be in the bond, we need you to give us your balance sheet as well.”

Martin included Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Barclays Capital and HSBC Holdings Plc in Virgin Media’s bond offering, along with 10 other managers, after they agreed to join a 1.925 billion-pound ($2.9 billion) credit facility. The four banks, whose spokesmen declined to comment, ultimately weren’t needed on the loan.

There’s a big TIPS sale tomorrow and speculation there will be a big concession:

Barclays Plc’s Michael Pond, the top-rated analyst of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, said the U.S. may struggle to sell a record-tying $12 billon of the securities tomorrow with the government likely to bolster the size of future auctions and inflation expectations low.

“We are concerned that the market will have difficulty absorbing this much supply given other headwinds and believe a significant concession is needed for the auction to go well,” Pond said in a note to clients dated July 2. “The level of real yields combined with the size presents a high hurdle for a good auction.”

The $12 billion of 10-year TIPS will match the record amount sold in January 2004. The U.S. will sell $30 billion of the security during the second half of 2010, based on the size of tomorrow’s auction and the Treasury’s plans to reopen the issue twice, Pond wrote. That amount is up from $15 billion worth of sales during the second half of last year and the historical high of $21 billion during the first half of 2004, he wrote.

Real yields, which take into account inflation or deflation, have fallen to 1.218 percent on 10-year Treasuries, from 1.685 percent April 2, according to Bloomberg Data. Current real yield levels, only 30 basis points away from the 91 basis point yield experienced in March of 2008 during the deflation scare, leaves the security with “limited upside,” Pond wrote. “At current levels, this would be the lowest yield at a 10-year TIPS auction.

I was briefly quoted in the Globe, deprecating GICs:

So why would anyone choose a government bond?

“The main thing is liquidity,” says James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management in Toronto.

With most GICs (cashable GICs being the major exception), you agree to lock in your money for a certain period. In exchange, you earn a higher return. Bonds can be sold at any time, but you earn a lower return.

“I don’t really recommend GICs at the best of times because of the liquidity issue,” he says.

The semi-annual TXPR index rebalancing should be announced soon – last year’s announcement was on Friday, July 10.

PerpetualDiscounts were flat on the day, while FixedResets rose by 15bp on average volume.

PerpetualDiscounts now show a median-weighted-average yield of 5.99%, equivalent to 8.39% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield about 5.50%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 290bp, unchanged from June 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.83 % 2.93 % 24,289 20.29 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1592 % 3,093.8
Floater 2.33 % 1.97 % 45,911 22.46 4 -0.1592 % 2,205.1
OpRet 4.88 % 2.37 % 81,254 0.08 11 -0.0428 % 2,339.7
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.22 % 88,649 3.45 2 -1.0037 % 2,169.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0428 % 2,139.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.80 % 118,453 1.85 4 0.1437 % 1,918.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 5.99 % 181,718 13.94 73 -0.0048 % 1,823.5
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.71 % 320,116 3.49 47 0.1463 % 2,202.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.27
Bid-YTW : 8.25 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.73
Evaluated at bid price : 18.73
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.84
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 106,615 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 55,375 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 51,954 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 45,870 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 19.87
Evaluated at bid price : 19.87
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 34,840 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 33,400 RBC bought 10,000 from anonymous at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.